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■Just as the revolution of 1*48 vas preceded by a 
•campaign of banquets',so a hundred years later,the 
European revolution vas announced by a 1 campaign of 
congresses' spread over the years 1947-1949. These 
congresses expressed the state of mind and stimulated 
the «ajar trends of a heterogenous and »airy sided move­
ment - a xrrcnemt curiously inefficient in its tactics, 
and in its direct strategy,but to which the Council of 
Europe o*es its existence,and because of vhich the 
Community of the Six has been able to take shape and 
vin the acceptance of public opinions"
These opening vords to the article 'The campaign of the
European congresses',vritten by Denis de Eougemont in 1967*.
provided the original impulse to this present dissertation.
For,as de Kou0emont has *o aptly reminded us,the history of
the European Community does not start in Hay 1990,but daring
the crucial transitional years just after the Second World War,
2
vhich itself g*ve the impetus to the post-var ' European Idea'.
Zt Is foe this reason that the story of the ’ campaign of the 
European congresses' during the late 1940's is both interesting 
and instructive. It is also relevant to the present-day debate 
over Europe. Indeed,at a time vhen ve are re-assessing aore and 
■ore the socio-economic,and above all,the political dimensions 
of the European Comaranity,it is surely of value,and perhaps 
elightenlng, to look back to vhat de Kougenont has described as 
the "certain creative freshness inspiring the vfaole undertaking* - 
these thirty years ago. In doing so,ve can discover and reflect 
upon the important corresponding debates,arguments and dilenas 
vhich ere beginning to appear in the ne* directly elected Bare» 
pean Parliament. Moreover, had it not been for the hard prepara­
tory vork and essential psychological progress achieved during 
these transitional years after the var, underpinned by Western 
Biropen vital economic recovery,the idea of a Biropean Parlia-
m « t  might not have materialised in the practical,If still 
stunted foi»,*hleh we are nov starting to witness.
1. D SilflS DE KOUGBIONT, '  The campaign of the European congresses', 
Government and Opposition .vol.2 ,No.3 ,April-July 1967,
pp.129-334.
2* fen i^s<*erat:^ oaspli>He der Widerstandsbevegun-
Bner£Lng out of a cold *tr  context and in sequence with 
one, the corn« stone and main reference point of this immediate
post-war Baropean campaign was the "historic",though sadly for­
gotten, 'Congress of Barope',held at The Hague In Hay 1948,and 
around which the major part of this study Is centred. The Hague 
Congress,within a space of only three days,indeed,not only cap­
tured the fiery Baropean mood of the p«rlod In question,it also 
condensed,rationalised,synthesised and transformed the 1940's 
debate about transition within a Baropean framework Into an 
active end practical campaign for real change. It was,in the 
words of Carol Webb,"a startling occasion,bringing together many 
Baropean political leaders and parties,but somehow going beyond 
this X» Indicate the emergence of a new political current. It 
was certainly the peak of the Baropean Movements' attempt to 
capture widespread public Interest in the European Idea.1,1 The 
Hague Congress,in short,was the most grandiose,the most emotio­
nally charged,and the most convincing mass demonstration in the 
post-war era of Borope's will and determination to unite.
The "strange driving passion",which,de Kougemont informs us, 
"inspired the militants of Baropeanism" these thirty years ago, 
failed nevertheless to actually unite Bar ope in real and i i ediat» 
terms. The Hague Congress,and the subsequent campaign of the 
Baropean Movement,it Is true,led directly to the creation of the 
Council of Bnropc In May X949,including an official and repre­
sentative European Assvkblyt but the latter body was dewoid ef 
real political teeth,lacking In sustained Impact,and unaKle in 
the final erent to muster any real influence or popular support. 
Prom an iimedlate and specific point of view,there was no real 
Baropean "revolution* - there vas no effective transfer of 
national political sovereignty to a supra-national Baropean 
Political Authority.
So what went wrong? Vas it a lack of pragmatism or realism?
Jean Monn>et,far his part,seemed to think so,and characterised
the Hague Congress,the birth of the European Movement,and the./*
1, Carol Webb,'Baropeanism and the Baropean Movements', in 
Social and Political Movements in Western Bar ope ,p.3X6.
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./.political campaign which it sponsored as "voluntaristic",
"confused",and "dreamy"• 1 This dismissal of a political appreodi, 
of a political lead and appeal to catch the entkusl&sn of 
peoples,parliaments and g or «minants alike for the European 
Idea,led la tara to a technocratic,"functional* approach, 
designed by Monnet,and with the aie of filling the supra-natio­
nal gap in Europe by a series of "backdoor* manoeovres which 
would transfer limited national powers in specific economic 
areas to an «-political and mainly bureaucratic High European 
Authority. As Kobert Schuman bluntly explained in his famous 
press declaration of May 9,1950:
"Europe will not be made all at once,or according to a 
single general plan. It will be built through concrete 
achieveneats which first create a de facto solidarity." *
Concrete achievoaents - there hare been many: the "spill 
w r "  effects and "feedback" aspirations of Hoonet's functional 
approach have indeed resulted in a certain "ascpansiww logic" 
of "sector integration*, and by side-stepping the questions of 
"high politics” ,have also «tabled a limited transfer of powv 
from the nation-state apparatus to a High European Authority - 
be this the European Comission or the Council of Ministers.
Yet,because the former authority is a bureaucracy and has, 
therefore,no legitimate popular-politico! base; and because 
the latter is still,more than ever,essentially intergovernmental, 
in which national interests are the most vented and best pro­
tected, the real Influence of such High European Authorities is 
clearly liai ted, and in the final event,unable to sidestep 
probIans arising from national politics. In short,the so-called 
"functional" integration of Europe has much to its credit,but 
its continual evasion of the central dilama in European . / .
1. JEAH MONK HT. Mémoires .(Librairie Arthftne Pavard. 1976^.p.323.
2. SCHUMAH DECLARATION,9 .5 .5 0 .,plus Plan,see leesings Con— - 
porarv Archlves.vol.7.I9*&-50.P.I0701.
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./.union - that of political sovereignty - has resulted in a 
bureaucratic alienation in the integrating machinery,and a 
separation between the proposers of coordinated actions and 
the legitimate holders of political power. In the words of 
Valter Scheel:
■Borope has grown beyond the blind belief that political 
unity would automatically and inevitably follow communal 
institutions in the economic field. This conception has 
shown itself to be false. The impulses which will bring 
Borope together,in the economic field too, mast come fron 
politics.*1
The wheel has therefore turned foil circle. Indeed,the 
gradual attention and importance no* being attached to the future 
role and purpose of the directly elected Baropean Parliament is 
indicative that •  political stimulant,along with greater demo­
cratic control of Europe's institutions,is seen again as the 
■ore acceptable strategy for a workable and legitimate European 
union,as opposed to the increasing "spill around" tendencies of 
functionalism. That is why,to repeat the point aade earlier,the 
deliberations at the Hague Congress of Hay 1946,and the politi­
cal campaign for a Baropean Assembly which they spurned,are
relevant aad worth studying.
Zt must be stressed,of course,that the Baropean campaign
launched at The Hague was not of a purely political nature
alone. la fact,the Baropean MfiT— wit was also extremely tctiv*
in ecoraeic,social,and cultural spheres. It is not within the
scope of this study,however,to go into the details of these
cooplex and varying activities,since this would take another
three volumes to describe! The following work will instead
concentrate on the political campaign of the Baropean Movement,
which,after all,was the central pillar and primary activity of
the campaign as a whole. In analysing chiefly these political
aspects,it must,on the other hand,also be emphasised that the
text makes no pretence at giving a qualified account of the
views and policies pertaining to the gnmrnments and p arl iaa acts
I . WAATKE SCKES., opening address to the Free Democratic Party 
Congress , it. 11.73. itran ^ .1  Humi«, '<* Q^tfcW* (Alia «Uwt»
—  W*w>
Involved or the Intergovernmental Biropean Institutions«about 
which much has already b e «  written. The main thesse of this 
book is rather to describe the important and fascinating poli­
tical straggle pursued by the European Movement behind the 
official scenes,which subsequently overflowed into the realm 
of official decision-making during the period in question. After 
a brief survey of the formd. post-var setting,ve must.therrfbr*
return our attention to the emergence of individual pro— Bare— 
peaa groupe during 1fa* v i r , and in turn,look at the basic ideas 
and purposes of the European pressure groups which sprang up 
after the war,and their decision,in the s n e  of 1947,to foam 
a liaison committee and sponsor a mass 'Congress of Europe'.
The decisive preparatory stages to,and the actual launching of, 
the Hague Congress itself,in May 1948,can then be described in 
full context. - This much will comprise the first part of the 
study. In turn,the second part of the book will go on to des­
cribe the official launching of the European Movement,In Octo­
ber 1948,and the political campaign pursued for the creation 
of a Baropean Assembly,leading directly to the setting up of
the Council of Borope is Nay 1949* Finally,the conclusion
«<n triefiy examine -Che initial political vork and lost oppor­
tunities of the Council of Europe,in conjunction with the 
Strong,but then declining campaign conducted behind the scenes 
at Strasbourg by the European Movement. The text will 
finish at the point of the federalist-functionalist split in 
the torment,in 1950,and the eclipse of the overt political 
initiative with the launching of the Sc buman Plan.
The break up of the European Movement in 1950 indeed 
marked the rapid decline of the political campaign for a supra­
national Burope which had emerged so strongly in the late 
1940's. In the end,there were no "miracles” ,and a crucial and 
opportune tine for "making Europe* faded away in the bureau­
cratic h u e  of functionalism. But the passing of time can never 
fully destroy the appeal and significance of views and ideas./.
- V i  -
./.which have been so forcefully and passionately expressed. - In 
the light perhaps of the r*-e»ergence of a Europe« political 
initiative,it will be left to the reader to decide whether these 
views of the recent past have real meaning for today.
- Tli -
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1CHAPTER I  THE POST-WAR SETTXWG
I) * Shattered Peace'
■The four-century-old state systen that »as centered in 
Europe,and which had been weakened in the First World War, 
collapsed in the course of the Second. A new systoi would 
have to emerge. There was auch uncertainty about the shape 
it would take,and about the two countries that were sure to 
dominate i t . " 1
The aeeting of Kussian and American troops on the Elbe in the 
late acrming of 25 April 1945 epitomised both The mergence, 
out of the wreckage of the Second World War,of the two new world 
' superpowers ' , and the eclipse of the old Europe and the inter­
national systen it hitherto represented. The aoaentous war-time 
rise of the Soviet Onion and America,together with the destruction 
of Germany,the crippling of France and her neighbours,and the 
iaporerishaent of Oreat Britain,resulted in a new bi-polar balance 
of power between the two eaergent giants,both of whoa before the 
war had been politically detached Pro« the prevailing international 
order - the Onited States due to strong isolationist currents at 
hoae, the 8oviet Union due to the isolation to which she had been 
subjected abroad,as illustrated at Versailles and later at Munich. 
Row,it was up to these two great powers,thrown to the Internationa, 
fare,to shape the post-war world and the destiny of Europe.
The far-reaching ratifications of the new international 
order in eatixryo would Impose crucial conditions and limitations 
upon the European integration process and European unity campaign 
w4ich c u e  into being*and which in part it fostered. The central 
international development by which co-existence between the 0 .5 . 
and the O .S .S .X . gave way to a global antagonim on a bloc basis 
was especially significant,since it not only provided a new inpulse 
and a new sense of urgency to the European Idea,but also a . / .
X. Daniel Yergin.Shattered Peace:The Origins of the Cold war 
aid the national Security statetPeliCan I9»o ) .p .9 .
/.new geo-political definition to the whole undertaking. In the 
words of Walter Laqueur:
"The cold war created a far greater degree of European 
unity than had been thought possible,and it also brought^ 
about lasting American involvement in European affairs."
As 'Western Omari became the official order of the day, so too 
did the European Onion campaign tailor its aims to meet the 
needs of the moment and the official opening provided. When the 
process unfolded,hovever,differences in nuance and of objectives 
became more pronounced,not only among the various unofficial 
pressure groups which comprised the European Movement - the 
subject of this study,but also among the main governments concerned. 
The central pivotal role of Britain,seeking primarily an Atlantic 
alliance and only a co-operative Europe,clashed in the final 
event with the supra-national European initiative sought by 
Prance. For each,it was chiefly a question of security - the 
former having to readjust to her reduced power capability,the 
latter to the reality of a renascent industrial Germany. What 
set in motion the initial complementary unity process,nonethe­
less, was the overall perceived threat posed by Soviet imperialism 
and impending western European economic collapse. This was also 
what chiefly motivated U .S. intervention,subsequently giving 
form to the post-war international order which ensured the 
splitting of Europe into two differently united halves. The 
next few pages will atteapt,briefly,to describe this crucial 
development. •
Although the European unity movement emerged essentially 
out of the traumas and idealism sporned by the Second World War? 
proposals for European regional action had played little part 
in official war-time planning for the new order,while at the ./.
1. Walter Laqueur,Europe Since Hitler, (weidenf»id »
1970),p .89.
2. CP. pp. 38-43.
/.same ti»e perceptions of the immediate post-wax iicesndonal situation
did not necessarily iaply any rigid bl-polar dirision of world
responsibility between the U .S. and U .S .S .R . Indeed,to all
appearances.Great Britain,backed by an Bwpire and Commonwealth
of son* three-quarters of a billion persons,also emerged fro* the
war as one of the »ajar triumphant powers,and had throughout the
conflict been one of the 'Big Three* responsible for drawing up
the new European aap at the Tehran,Yalta and Potsdan Suamits.
Prance too had aanaged to retain 'big power' status,joining the
other 'Three' in the post-war Council of Foreign Ministers and
in the occupying German Control Comission, as well as in the
permanent security Council of the newly-founded United Nations
Organisation. Together,Britain and France had initially given
soae impetus to the European unity idea,recorded in Churchill's
dramatic offer of 15 June 1940 to establish an Anglo-French Union?
and in Churchill's sponsorship in 1943 of the 'Council of Europe'
2
idea also supported by de Gaulle» In turn,however,this sort of 
heady European enthusiasa gave way to a reassertion of a acre 
national 'realpolitik' view, a s  Churchill so brutally informed 
de Gaulle in January 1944,"..each  tl>e we arnst choose between 
Europe and the open sea,we shall always choose the open sea. Bach 
tiae I m st choose between you and Roosevelt,! shall always choose 
Roosevelt."^ Proa this position,stenaed Churchill's "three circlas* 
concept of Britain's post-war world role,whereby unity with the 
tapir e and Coaaonwealth c m *  first »followed by unity across the 
Atlantic and finally with Europe.4
The Roosevelt Administration,on the other hand,strongly 
influenced by the 'Wilsonian' liberal view of foreign a f fa ir s ,./ .
1. For the'inside' story,see Jean Honnet Heaoirs.op.cit..pp.I37-14l.
2. Cf.pp. 52.
3. uuoted in D .P. Calleo.Europe's Future:The Brand Alternatives 
(Hew York,I965)p.124.
4 . See R .J. tieber,British Politics and European Unity:Parties. 
Elites and Pressure Qrouos(Un.of California,1970)pp.17-16.
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./.had  a more 'global* perspective of the post-war order,sunned up 
in the term ' Grand Design'.denoting an international approach 
which would not strive to install simply another 'balance of 
power* or new pditicd. 'sphswe of influence'tilt attempt instead to 
remove conflict,anarchy and erode 'power politics' from inter­
national relations altogether.1 Having deliberated and in turn 
rejected the idea of future European unity,on the grounds that 
it would Jeopardise the new global strategy envisaged as well as 
threaten American trade,the U.S. policy makers looked instead 
to the setting up of the United Nations Organisation in the 
political field,and the Bretton Hoods reconstruction,development 
and monetary agencies in the economic field. Coupled with this 
was the public pressure in America towards the end of the war 
to withdraw from Burope after the conflict. The net result was 
that the U .S. Administration was neither favourable towards 
European unity nor willing to become permanently entangled in 
European affairs,let alone prepared to assume any post-war 'camp1 
responsibility. Through exit most of the war,in fact,Roosevelt had 
regarded his role mare as that of a "mediator between Russian
3
Communism and Churchilli am imperialism” . Nov,towards the end 
of the war,he in turn promised Stalin at Yalta that there would 
be no more U .S. troops stationed in Europe within two years of
4
Hitler's pending defeat.
The Soviet Onion,however.having borne the brunt of the 
fight against Hitler,and having lost twelve million of her 
population and one-third of her economic resources in the procos 
of doing so,did not share America's abstract view of international 
relations nor America's eagerness to pull out of Europe at the./.
1. See D. Yergin,op.cit.,pp.8-9.
2. See the interesting account of the OS State Dept. Sub­
committee on European Organisation(I943-4)in Hans A. Schaitt, 
The Path to European OniontThe Marshall Plan to the Coraon 
Market (Louisiana State Universltv.I962).Do.H-Ts.
3* ^chard Mayne.The Recovery of Europe:Prom Devastation to Onitv
(weidenfeld k Hicoison,l!J70) ........  1J
4 . Roger Morgan.Western European Politics since I945:the shaping 
of the &a-opean'i m m i m  ^ ------
./ .f ir s t  opportunity,though this was certainly not due to any support 
for European union. Soviet designs - like those of Prance after 
the rirst World War1- were essentially about status,security and 
reparations. The peace settlement which emerged from the Yalta and 
Potsdam agreements in 1945 seemed to provide this. In exchange 
for giving credibility to Roosevelt's idealistic United Nations 
project and for contributing to the final war effort in the Par 
Bast against Japan,as well as having earlier agreed not to inter­
fere in sensitive Mediterranean areas such as Greece,Turkey and
2
Italy , Stalin secured a vast extension of the USSR's frontiers 
westwards from the Baltic to the Black Sea(especially in Poland), 
plus a free hand in a range of buffer-states comprising not only 
ex-Nazi allies such as Hungary,Bulgaria and Romania but also 
Poland,Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia. (While having reluctantly 
ceded to these Soviet security demands in Eastern Burope,Roosevelt 
and Churchill managed to extract at Yalta,nonetheless,a Soviet 
guarantee to uphold democracy and political freedom in the region). 
In addition,although Germany vas to be divided into four occupatim 
zones,the USSR would be able to extract reparations by removals of 
capital equipment not only from her own zone,but also 10% of that 
deemed 'unnecessary for the German peace economy* from the other 
zones.
The immediate post-war settlement was in turn defended as an 
extension of Roosevelt's 'Grand Design'«based upon a Tealistic' 
policy of co-operation and co-security along with confidence in 
the exemplary potential of the United Nations. Despite his sus­
picions of Soviet policy,plus some added tension at the Potsdam 
conference itself.President Truman pursued the liberal 'Yalta 
axiom' of co-existence bequeathed by his predecessor. Moreover, 
having to bow to public pressure in America for withdrawal from 
Europe,he also swiftly demobilised the huge U.S. armed forces ,./. 
l.See S . Morgan,op.cat.,pp.10-14.
2 .See,for example,winstoo Churchill's account in The second World' 
war(Cassell)Vol.XI, pp. 187-«,200,203.
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./.though this did not stem the growing U.S. isolationist tide which 
_ as in 1918 - returned a ««publican majority in the Congressional 
Elections of November 1946 committed to domestic budgetary priori­
ties and to a vast reduction in foreign aid and Military expenditure 
abroad. American reluctance to be drawn into Europe as a count«r- 
veight to the Soviet presence in turn led to the develop*eat of a 
dangerous pover vacuum in western Europe,accompanied by a fear of 
exposure and insecurity. This fear was exacerbated by the prospect 
of economic collapse and by Moscow's blatant disregard for the 
international tenets implicit in the Yalta understanding,and was 
finally brought to a head by the mounting urgency of the unresolved 
German problem and by Britain's imminent failure to exercise world 
power responsibility. It vas in response to this fast deteriatlng 
situation that an eventual reassessment of U.S. policy took place, 
leading to intervention in Europe and thereby calling into question 
the tenuous '(¡rand Design* axiom left over fiom the war.
- The post-war European economic crisis,which vas to provide the
tangible motivation for Amcs-ica's ultimate intervention.arose mainly
from the fact that the war,in simple terms,had "cost more than the
combined total of all European wars since the Middle Ages.*1 The
apparent return to political normality throughout most of Western
Europe could not really conceal that total war had left in its wake
2
almost total ruin and chaos. Of the four main Western European 
nations,moreover,Britain had nov acquired a staggering external 
debt of€3,000» .while France,Italy and Germany had suffered drastic 
reductions in resources and nov had to face impossible expendi­
ture levels simply to keep alive. Initially relief .rehabilitation 
and reconstruction were generated by short-term American loans3and 
by lima ted UKX.AA aid. within a year of the end of the war there was 
even some mis-placed optimism as to the rapidity of Europe’ s . / .
I . kichard Mayne,op.cit.,p.32.
Por a vivid description of the post—war European "waste land*
see Richard Mayne,ibid.,pp.26-37.
3. Ib id .,p .72.
4. 'United Nations Belief aid .Rehabilitation Administration'
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./.apparent recovery.* Ho»ever, behind the Immediate paupery and visible
destruction which was first tackled lay the invisible sub-structural
devastation brought on by the war. Capital equipment was obsolete
and warn out. The work force had been brutally uprooted and was now
exhausted,undernourished and disorganised. Technical skills had been
lost. Essential foreign markets had either disappeared or had been
taken over. Food and fuel production now dropped to dangerous levels.
In short,by the Autumn of 1946,the "hidden damages" of the var began
to emerge vith a vengeance. "Europe stopped,caught her breath,and
2
suddenly collapsed from delayed shock." To this vas added the 
"dollar gap",resulting from the massive U.S. export surplus to 
Europe in the face of the latter*s fast disappearing foreign assets 
and dwindling credits. By the Spring of I 947,not only had Western 
Europe manifestly failed to recover as hoped,but vas confronted by 
perilous shortages,exhaustion and inflation at home,and by the 
prospect of no longer being able to buy from abroad. A crisis of 
unforeseen magnitude loomed ahead,while in America,vhere industrial 
production as well as gold reserves had more than doubled during 
the var,the public had only just opted for further isolationism.This 
prompted the British Chancellor,Hugh Dalton,to complain that,"the 
Americans have half of the total income of the world,but von* t 
either spend it in buying other people's goods or lending it or 
giving it away on a sufficient scale."3
To this post-war European economic crisis vas added a nev 
ideological tvist,provoked by aggressive Soviet political speeches 
and by unco^romising use of the right of veto by USSR delegates 
to the U.K. security Council, and above all by Soviet action la 
Eastern Europe. Indeed,the sheer speed,ruthlessness and thoroughness 
vith which this region fell into the absolute political grip of 
Soviet Communism not only broke the Yalta guarantee,it also called 
into question the viiole 'Yalta axiom' about co-operation and . / .
1. See Elchard Hayne,op.cit., pp.83-*.plus the section on Will Clay­
ton ( US Under Secretary of State)by Hans A. Schmitt,op.cit.,p. 17.
2. Hans A. Schmitt,ibid.,pp.I7-It.
3. Quoted by Daniel Yergin,op.eit.,pp.306-7.
. / .  co-existence, and revived the fear of antagonistic ideological
bloc confrontation. By the Sumner of 1947,Bulgaria,Rumania,Hungary, 
and Poland,as well as the Russian-occupied zone of Eastern Germany 
tad all become absorbed by intimidation and brute force into 
Soviet puppet dictatorships. Czechoslovakia was next on the list . 
Vhat guarantee vas there nov of Western Europe in its isolation 
and economic chaos not going the same way,especially in view of 
the Communist armed struggle In Greece,Soviet territorial demands 
on Turkey,and the strengthened position of Connunist Parties in 
both France and Italy where they commanded a quarter of the 
popular vote? Any such take-over perhaps had not been Stalin's 
immediate post war Intention,but as Attlee,the British Premier, 
put it , "to leave nothingness might tempt the Soviet Union to 
strike out for domination over the whole of Europe."1
The most sensitive power vacuum of all,in  this sense,remained 
Germany.whose destiny would also determine that of Europe as a 
whole,and whose unsettled status after the war made her the test 
case for the new international order to be forged. In the final
event,as Roger Morgan has argued, the"problem of Germany" would
2
be the "supreme cause of East West friction." Tet,throughout the 
firet year of peace,it was not the USSR but France which was 
regarded by US officials as the major obstacle to a permanent 
settlement of the German question.^ Under Dc Gaulle and in turn 
Bidault.it was the French Government which initially led the 
opposition to German political or economic unification,and which 
stressed Just as ouch as the USSB the importance of reparations 
and security against the threat of renewed German aggression.
By the Summer of 1946,however,a new perspective emerged. The . / .
1 . g«» K. Barker.B-rif In in .  I>ivlde<i SurOPt 1^4$ - 1970, 
(Weidenfeld & N icolson ,1 9 71 ),p . 54.
2. E. Korgan,op. c it .,p .1 7 .
3. J .L . Gaddis,Th* United States aad the Origins of the Cold 
•Jar 1941-1947. ( Col .  University Press, 1 972) ,pp026-7.
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•/.Western authorities now became increasingly avare of the general 
economic "impasse" resulting from a strict application of the 
measures formerly agreed in the wake of the celebrated Morgoathax 
Flan to place severe limits on the level of German industrial 
output.1 The British in particular resented having to pay some 
£80m in order merely to keep Germany at subsistence level,while 
the Russians not only refused to co-operate in this,but also 
continued to pillage at vili in their own closed-in zone,while 
still demanding reparations subsidised by the Western zones.
In reaction the British Foreign Secretary,Ernest Bevin.was 
finally provoked to complain that the USSfi was "determined to 
loot Germany at our expense."^ The Soviet Onion meanwhile also 
refused to allow Germany to erport in order to pay for mach- 
needed food imports*despite the fact that Germany had previously 
played a central role in European trade.(Before the war,in fact, 
the three Western zones alone had been the source of one-fifth 
of all industrial production In Europe,whereas in the immediate 
post-war era production there reached barely a third of this 
pre-war le v e l^  At the same time,moreover,Molotov decided to 
push Soviet demands for a centralised government in Germany.
In view of the rigid on'e-party state system already enforced in 
the Soviet son* by April 1946(and which the USSR had in turn 
attempted to foist upon the free Western sones of 3erlin),plus 
the vindictive and highly disruptive effect of Soviet "looting", 
this initiative appeared near to a take-over bid. In short,by 
the Autumn of 194è,Germany was fast developing into a major
source of mutual distrust,dispute,over—reaction and conflict.
1. Jacoues Frevond . Western Burope Smcc the War; A short 
Political History. (Praecer.1964J, pp•3>-2.
2. See C.K. Woodhouae.British Foreign Policy Since the Second 
World War. (Hutchinson,1961J ,p p .17-18.
3. See £. Barker,op. c l t . ,pp .57-6.
D. Tergln.op. c it .,p .3 06 .
. / .  Tlie impending crisis over Germany, together with the 
threatened collapse of the Western European economy and the 
political submission of Eastern Europe to absolute Soviet pover 
and ideology,all profoundly disturbed the political and civil 
order of Western Burope,severely shaking its confidence in its 
capacity to survive. In the initial absence of an American lead, 
it fell upon Britain to voice ~an opinion on this deteriatlng 
situation. Indeed,in his first major epeech as Foreign Secretary, 
Bevin declared in the House of Commons that in Eastern Burope 
one kind of totalitarianism vas being replaced by another.^
The 'ailent transfer of power* and the real if masked decline
2
of Britain as a 'Great Power' after the war »however,placed 
considerable limits an her ability to respond adequately to the 
precarious European coneition.
Over one-quarter of the nation's wealth had,in fact,been 
expended on the war effort,while overseas investments had been 
liquidated and one-quarter of merchant shipping lost. Burdened 
with a massive national debt,and unable to pay out <tf current 
earnings for more than one-third of imports of food and raw 
materials(run&lng at some £ 2 ,OOOK a yearithe post-war British 
Government was soon "deeply conscious of the debilitating effect**
1 this would have upon foreign policy.^ To this was added an 
expensive list of strategic responsibilities and overseas burdens, 
at a time *f  Bipire discontent and transition,and of violent 
nationalist or communist inspired stirrings. The brute reality 
of the situation was that Bitttadc*s resources were simply over­
s t r e t c h e d ,  while ber economic potential did not match the world 
leadership role which she was meant to exercise on a par with
the US and OSSfi. Bevin.a life-long practitioner of power-./.
1. Speech oi 2 0 .6 .4 5 .,quoied by E. Barker,op .cit.,p .4^.
2. See G. Llchthelm.The lie* Surope:Todav and Tomorrow.(Praeger, 
1963),PP .12-16.
3 .  J  Frankel,British F o r e i g n  policy 1 9 4 5 - 1 § 7 i . ( O u ? . 1 9 7 S ) . p p .
1 •
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. / . politice,quietly concluded that Britain could not stand up to 
Soviet power ia Europe without the United States.1
This reassessment of British power capability and of US 
responsibility^to be analysed in more detail later)was not 
immediately appreciated by American policy-makers. Influenced by 
isolationist pressures, they In fact weakened British resources 
further by impulsively cutting off lend Lease aid in August 
1945»only to replace it later by a loan stipulating sterling 
convertibility with the dollar,which in turn resulted in a 
flight of capital from London,a rapid exhaustion of the loan 
and,by the Sammer of 1947,a drain on British reserves to the 
tune of $237b  a week.^ The general impact of the 40£ increase 
in the US wholesale price index In the second half of 1946, 
moreover,accompanied by the grossly distorted trading effects 
of the dollar gap and US exports, in turn hampered the expansion 
of multilateral trade and production,and slowed down to an 
alaraing degree the course of poet-war European recovery.^
The final blow came when Burope's crucial fuel shortage was 
aggravated,particularly In Britain,by the disastrous Vinter 
of 1946-7,encapsulating the mood and fear of vulnerability and 
insecurity which events since the war had nurtured.
Time was clearly running out. The holding operation which 
Bevin and Attlee had striven to maintain at the international 
level,In  anticipation of the US eventually being brought In as 
a counter-weight to Soviet power In Europe,began seriously toH- 
t«-. As the US Under-Secretary for Bconomic Affairs,WE. Clayton,
came to acknowledge,'The reins of world leadership are f a s t . / .
1. B. Barker,op .cit., pp .54-5.
2. fi. Kayne .op .c it .,p .87 .
3. See Inverchapel Kemorandum to US State Dept., 1 t .6 .4 7 .,  
summarising Britain and Burope's post-war economic crisis, 
Forelra Relations of the United States. 1947,V o l.Ill ,
•The British Commonwealth & Europe’ , pp .17-23.
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./.slipping  iron Britain's competent but now very weak hands.
These reins will be picked up either by the United States or 
Russia." But America could not assume this leadership "unless 
the people of the United States are shocked into doing s o ." '
The crucial event which was used by Bevin to administer 
this "shock" took place in February 1947 when,in the wake of 
the winter fuel crisis which had forced half of British lndugtc 
to come to a halt? the Foreign Office abruptly informed the 
State Department that Britain had to withdraw from protecting 
Greece and Turkey,and that the United States "would have to 
undertake the task" of defending the Eastern hediterranean frcn 
the apparent Soviet threat.^ At the same time,Attlee Informed 
the House of Comoons that Britain would pbjrtly be pulling out 
of India. This was done by the middle of August 1947. In the 
wjrds of Richard Hayne:
"..w ithin  the span of a few months and by a few crucial 
decisions,the British Government tacitly acknowledged the 
closing of an epoch. Fax Brltannlca was coming to an end. 
Harried by economic necessity,Britain was embarking on a 
long,painful and halting process of readjustment: very 
gradually,she was becoming one European country among 
many, each no longer Btrong enough to play a decisive 
world role by herself."*
Bevin's timely appeal for US intervention did not go 
unheeded. Truman and the State Department were eager to seise 
the opportunity,regain the political initiative vis-a-vis 
the new, isolationist Republican-dominated Congress,and 
assert America's newly realised world role. On Karch 12 ,the 
' Tranan Doctrine' was announced,in which the US President not
only asked for funds,but promised that his commitment t o ./ .
1. Quoted by D. Yergin,op.cit.,p .306,(karch 1947>.
2. See louls J . Halle.The Cold War aa ¡lla frr . (London, 1967). 
p . 113-
3. See FKJS. 1947.V o l .V ..p p . 35-37.
4. R. M&yne.op. c lt .,p .8 6 .
./.protect Greece and Turkey was part of a broader commitment to 
■support free peoples of the world" ae&inst the threat of totall-
tarlanlsn! As Louis J . Halle has explained:
"The consequences of Mr. Truman's Message of March 12 did 
not stop with aid to Greece and Turkey. They continued with 
the Suropean Recovery Programme and the policy of actively 
containing the Russian empire from Elbe to Korea. They 
continued with the measures of opposition to further Russian 
expansion which finally inaugurated the Cold War. All this 
vas implicit in the President's Message of March.12,which 
thereby represents a turning point in history."
The official US abandonment of isolationism and of the 
'Talta axiom' in favour of a tougher 'Riga' conception of D8 - ...
Soviet r el atia® m m  ft fundamental development of crucial signifi­
cance to Western Burope and the unity process which It helped 
establish, ior the policy switch essentially aclmowl edged not 
only Britain 's decline but also Western Burope's Inability to 
fend off the perceived Soviet threat without US aid organised 
at a multilateral level.^ Despite the dramatic circumstances 
which finally propelled the President to make his pronouncement. 
It vas no rushed decision. The first major step towards this policy 
re-evaluation had been set in motion one year previously when,on 
22 February 1946.the US Ambassador in Moscow,George Kennan,ssnt 
his celebrated "long telegram* on Soviet affairs to President
Truman,In which a strictly Ideological and world-revolutionary
4
picture was pressnted of Soviet intentions. Commenting,a few days 
later,on the worsening German problem,Kerman stressed that the 
centralised German agencies favoured by Moscow could fall under 
Russian control and thereby ensure Soviet domination of all of 
Germany. In these circumstances,he bluntly stated that there were 
only two courses of actio*: . / .
1. See J . 7reymond,op. c i t . ,p .j 9 .  — ———— —
2. Louis J . Halle,op. c i t . ,p .123.
3. See,for example,the note exchanged between the US State and 
War Departments,5 .3 .4 7 . ,on this subject, fRUS 1947,V o l .I I I . 
op. c it . p p .197-9.,plus background to Marshall Plan ,pp .197- 
249.
4. See J .L . Gaddis ,op .cit., pp. 3l6.31S-322.327.
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• / .  * ( l )  to leave the remainder of Germany nominally united tout
extensively vulnerable to Soviet political penetration and 
influence or (2) to carry to its logical conclusion the process 
of partition which vag begun in the east and to endeavour to 
rescue the western zones of Germany by walling them off 
against eastern penetration and integrating them into the 
international pattern of western Europe rather than into a 
united Germany." 1
That Kannan's "get tough" policy,with its crucial implications 
for Germany and European integration,seems to have struck a chord 
can be judged by the fact that he was very soon appointed as the 
director of the Policy Planning Staff at the US State Department. 
In the meantime,moreover,Truman put up a strong fight at an lnt**>
2
national level to remove Soviet troops still occupying Iran ,
while a more specific reorientation of policy was affirmed when
the US Secretary of State,lames Byrnes,announced at Stuttgart on
6 September 1946 America's intention to promote,if necessary,Vest
German unification,as well as safeguard Western Europe as a whole
from soviet Influence» This was followed a few weeks later by the
announcement of an Anglo-American economic bl-sone in Germany
coming into operation from January 1, 1947, viewed by the Soviet
Union as the start of the Cold Var.^ American public opinion
took more time ta accept this policy Change towards containment
and Involvement. Churchill's famous 'Iron Curtain' speech at
Fulton,Missouri in March 1946,for example,received a mainly
4
hostile response,while in November of the same year,it needs to 
be remembered,a Republican majority was elected to Congress on 
an isolationist ticket. Fortunately for Truman»however,while the 
Republican isolationists led by fiobert A. Taft concentrated on 
domestic-budgetary affairs,their main foreign policy spokesmen,
namely John Foster Dulles and the influential chairman of th e ./.
1. Quoted by J .L . Gaddis,op. cit.,p.l528.
2. Ib id ,p .316; Dean Acheson.Present at the Creatlon;Ky TearB 
in the State Department.(Hew York,1970J, p p .196-8.
3. C.k. Vooanouse,op.cit.,p.18.; Gaddis ,op .clt.,p .331.
4. See V. Knapp,Unity and Kationaligm in Europe Since 1945. 
(Perganon press,1969),pp. 1 0-1 ? ;W .Laqueur,op.cit., pp.90-91.
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./.Senate Foreign Relations Committee,Arthur Vandenberg,caae to 
appreciate the administration1s perception of the international 
situation. Italics,in fact,clearly stated in January 1947,in a 
major speech approved by Vandenberg,that Germany should be united 
within the framework of a federated Europe,while on March 22 
resolutions introduced to Congress favouring a "United States of 
Europe" were well supported.1 The influential publicist.Valter 
Lipmann,in turn argued the case for US aid in order to promote 
Bi rope an economic union.^ - The appointment in January of the 
same year of General Herahall as the new US Secretary of State 
helped to set the seal for such an initiative and together with 
his Under-Secretary,Dean Acheeon,and President Truman the declaim 
to "scare the pants off Congress" by portraying the Greek and 
Turkish troubles as part of a global Soviet revolutionary policy, 
to be resisted especially in Europe,was put into operation.^
Thus,the announcement of the 'Truman Doctrine’ in Inarch
1947,while certainly an historic turning point no doubt jolted 
by the stunning British strategic disclosures sent off by Bevin, 
was nonetheless part of a policy response set in motion some time 
earlier to the overall crisis in Western Europe,highlightened by 
Soviet moves in the East,Britain' s demise,and Germany's crucial 
but uncertain pivotal role in the new post-war order. Implicit 
in the launching of the 'Doctrine' «however,was an exaggeration 
of the specific point at issue. The domino theory of Soviet 
penetration and the threatened collapse of Western Europe ,which 
so gripped official policy perceptions on both sides of the 
Atlantic,overlooked the case that Soviet demands on Turkey were 
not followed up by action.while Stalin actually ordered the . / .
1 . See has Beloff.The United States and the Unity Oi.airOBfl, 
(Faber A Faber,1 9 6 } ) ,p .14.
2. Ibid.
3. See R. Morgan,op.cit.,p .20; d . Acheson,op.cit.,p .219.
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./.Greek Communists ’ uprising to be wound up,despite Yugoslav protests! 
The vulnerability of Western Europe,and Germany especially,to 
Soviet Communism vas,on the other hand,very real,as became 
tacitly clear at the unsuccessful Four 2over Conference held in 
hoscov between fcarch 10 and April 24 ,in the immediate wake of 
Truman's declaration. Indeed,upon his return,harshall stated In 
a radio address to the American people that Russia appeared 
determined to obstruct or delay the settlement of matters 
essential to the recovery of Europe. He then concluded:
"The recovery of Europe has been far slower than had been
expected. D i s i n t e g r a t i n g  forces are becoming evident. The 
patient is sinking while the doctors deliberate. I believe 
t h a t  action cannot await compromise through exhaustion... _ 
Whatever action is possible.. .must be taken w i t h o u t  delay.”
The full significance of the Truman Doctrine,as a pledge by the
US not to allow Western Europe to become a depressed erea at
the mercy of Communist advance^,whether Intended or not,now
took tangible form.
On Kay 8 ,Under Secretary of State,.Jean Acheaon.delivered 
what was In effect a prologue to the harshall Flan«calling for 
world political and economic stability and freedom,and declarteg 
that a "coordinated Suropean economy” remained the "fundamental 
objective" of US foreign policy.4 The Policy Planning Staff 
under Xennan in turn drew up two important and detailed reports 
in favour of a U8-sponsored programme of economic aid for 
Europe.5 With the Initial aim of "halting the econoale disin­
tegration of Western Europe" and of "restoring hope and con­
fidence" to the area,the long-term objective envisaged was
above all political,namely "to encourage and contribute t o ./ .
1. s-e y. im la s . Conversations wl.i.y
2. FBUS 1947,V o l .Ill ,o p .c it .p .219; I
3. «lean Konnet,op.cit.,p .265.
4. FRUS 1947,V o l .Ill , o p .c it ., p .219; K. Beloff, o p .c it .p p .18-19.
5. FRUS ib id .,p p .220-230.,Kemo. 1 6 .5 .4 7 .,KecommendatIon 23.5.47.
Stal in (I and on 1 £fc2jpp 1b4-5. 
TT^all e , op .c i t . ,p .1 27.
./.Bone form of regional political association of western Suropean 
states." Implicit in this proposed political strategy was the 
de facto recognition of Europe being divided between East and West, 
and the urgent need for the Western son eg of Germany to "make the 
maximium contribution to economic restoration in western Europe in 
general." America's interests in the entreprise were presented as 
follows:
"The Planning Staff recognises that the comnuniste are 
exploiting the European crisis and that further communist 
successes would create serious danger to American security.
It considers,however,that American effort in aid to Europe 
should be directed not to the combatting of communism as such 
but to the restoration of the economic health and vigor of 
Biropean society. It should aim,in other words,to combat not 
communism,but the economic maladjustment which makes Suropean 
society vulnerable to exploitation by any and all totalitarian 
movements and which Russian communism is now exploiting ."^
In short,the ambitious US programme of economic assistance to Eurcpe
now under serious consideration,though no doubt motivated by "a
genuine souse of community with the peoples of Europe"2 and perhaps
also by American economic interests and outlets relying to a certain
extent upon European recovery,was nonetheless ersentially a matter
of US political and strategic security against potential Russian
conuainist advance. It was a continuation of the Truman Doctrine,
¿tripped of any naked negative anti-communism,but conceived all-
the-same within the foreign policy framework of 'containment'.
Events now moved quickly. Cb May 2 2 ,both Parties in Congress 
authorised aid for Greece and Turkey,and thereafter pursued a bi­
partisan foreign policy upholding the basic tenets implicit in the 
Truman Doctrine. At the same time,in anticipation of America's 
major entry into European affairs,the French and Italian Premiers 
abruptly expelled Communists from government. On Kay 29*the US 
and British authorities set up an Economic Council in their bi- 
sone»with German m em bership .(Eventually,the French sone, too»co­
operated }.- It was in this setting that on June 5 ,at Harvard./.
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1. FRU5.o p .c i t ..p .225.
2. V. K n a p p .o p .c it .,p .20 .
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. / .  University,Karshall sketched the picture of European collapse; 
called for a OS-sponsored programme of European reconstruction, 
not "piecemeal" relief;and issued an open invitation asking the 
European nations themselves to take the initiative in drawing up 
such a recovery programme! It was an historic opening is post-war 
US foreign relations, inaugurating America's active assumption of 
world leadership and European commitment.without,nonetheless, 
thereby appearing to force the "American way" on Europe.2 The 
'open' invitation,implying that Russia and the Eastern European 
states cculd participate,was la this sense a skilful diplomatic 
ploy? It was safe to assume,Kennan had argued,that the Soviet 
Union would refuse to collaborate In what was meant to be,as 
Marshall himself stipulated,"a joint programme,to be agreed by 
a number,If not all,European nations'' at an independent trans­
national level. It was best,therefore,to "play It straight" and 
force the Soviet Union to come clean in assuming responsibility 
for the division of Burope.* This point was subtly Implied by 
Marshall when he declared: '
"Our policy is directed not against any country or doctrine 
but against hunger,poverty,desperation and chaos. Its purpose 
should be the revival of a working economy in the world so as
to permit the emergence of political a n d  social conditions Is
which free Institutions can exist...Any government which is 
willing to assist In the task of recovery will find full co­
operation, .on the part of the Unites States.Government. Any 
government which maneuvres to block the recovery of other 
countries cannot expect help from us. Furthermore,government* 
political parties or groups which seek to perpetuate human 
misery in order to profit therefrom politically or otoerwlse 
will encounter the opposition of the United States."
Marshall's bluff worked. For,the implicit i f  not explicit 
condition of Eastern European participation was the renunciation
by Moscow of the absolute tutelage which it had Imposed In that
area since the war,plus,in effect,the tacit acceptance of . / .
1. For harshall Flan text.see FHUS.o p .c it ..p p .237-9.
2. Clayton had stressed the Importance of this tactic.FRUS.P .235
'}. See D. Tergin,op. c i t . , pp .314-5.
4. See Hans A. Schmitt, o p .c it .,pp .20-1.
5. FitUS.op.cit. .pp.2jb-9.
. / .German economic revival as part of an integrated European recovery. 
Thus,while Britain and aleo France eagerly accepted the continental, 
basis of Marshall's offer and swiftly organised a preparatory 
meeting with the USSE to discuss the natter,the Soviet authorities 
insisted that the Marshall Flan,as It stood,was an American take­
over bid in Europe and an infringement upon national sovereignty, 
and that each participating country should,instead,separately 
administer the available funds. In turn,therefore,the USSR 
refused to participate in the full-scale follow up planning 
conference arranged In Paris,ensuring that all the Soviet satd2ite 
states,despite Poland and Chechoslovakia's initial interest in 
the Plan,had to follow suit. By mid-July,the 'Paris Treaty', 
setting up the Committee for Buropeas ¿eonomic Co-operation,was 
signed by the 16 Western Suropean nations outside of the Soviet 
orbit,with the task of drawing up a comprehensive and supposedly 
trans-national four-year 'Buropean Recovery Plan’ . On April 16,
1948,two weeks after Congress had provided an initial $5 billion 
appropriation(out of a total S17 billion),the Western Buropean 
recipients signed the Convention for Buropean Economic Co-opera­
tion and set up the correoponding administrative organisation, 
'0£SC '. The first official step towards Western Buropean economic 
consolidation and unity had been tak«n. "The Karshall Plan thus 
became a Western Buropean plan,and the Communists were out­
manoeuvred, appearing to be ranged on the side of ' hunger,poverly, 
desperation and c h a o s ' . A t  the same time,the tighter Soviet 
measures enforced in the Eastern half of Europe,together with 
the setting up of the counter-unity C0K1KFORM, in Septo&sr 1947,c«be 
up of Eastern Buropean Communist Parties plus those of France 
and Italy,cemented the division -f Europe into two,and confirmed 
Russia's intentions to violently resist ERP,as witnessed b y ./ .
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./ .t h e  Communist-led s trikes is France and Italy Is Bov«?mber and 
December of the same year. In turn,the effects of these strikes 
In stiffening the resolve of the new French Premier»Robert 
Schuman,together with the failure of the Four Power London 
Conference of Hovember 1947 In resolving the German question, 
persuaded the French authorities finally to endorse the A&glo- 
Amerloan case for reriving Western Germany within the developing 
OEBC framework. On March 7 ,1946 ,the British,French,American and 
Benelux nations Issued a communique favouring the establishment 
of a Federal Government for Western Germany,(France being further 
assured by the formal agreement authorising her economic absorb- 
tion of the Saar). Hence,the division of Birope and the division 
of Germany into two separate halves now becane an established 
fact, against a background of fierce ideological bloc confronta­
tion and mounting political tension. The seeds of Western Suro­
pean unity had been sown,but so too would they reap the Berlin 
blockade crisis of June 1948 and the crystallisation of the 
•Cold W a r '.1
The international framework of Western Europe's development 
in the early post-war years was thus set by a confrontation 
between the two super powers.^ The momentous issues at stake 
arising from the 'shattered peace’ »together with the strategic 
and political Implications of this development,were of crucial 
importance in determining the new face of Europe and of the post 
war Suropean unity campaign. Indeed,the Impact of the new batace 
of power not only helped consolidate Western Burope,but also 
brought to a head the fundamental conceptual differences concer­
ning the pace and ultimate character of the unity project.
1. Cf. pp. 2b&-i,
2. R. M orgaa,op.cit.,pp.20-1.
2) Western or European Union?
Although Marshall Aid w&s granted on the understanding that the 
recipient nations would attempt to formulate a joint economic 
plan of action,America'e chief strategical concern was Western 
Surope's political stability and unity in response to perceived 
comaunlst advance. The immediate need to tackle the region's 
economic vulnerability by supplying DS funds in order to boost 
greater trans-national trade and t o  cushion closer-monetary co­
operation was essentially meant,as the influential DS Congressmen 
Kersteo and Pollbright put it ,"to  encourage the political unifi­
cation of Burop«.*1 The implications of t h l B  policy,while indeed 
offering hope to those wbo envisaged an eventual full-scale US- 
Western European partnership,also allowed for the pre-emptive 
option of America being able to secure Western Europe's contteued 
political and economic allegiance without being liable for any 
organic entanglement In the area. - The US,In other words,could 
quite simply protect Its essential strategic and market Interests 
without being drawn into more burdensome structural links and 
responsibilities across the Atlantic. It is worth noting In this 
context that the US Foreign Assistance B U I  debate on Marshall 
Aid,emphasising the need to fortify the political and economic 
stability of Western Surope,also articulated the view held in some 
quarters that aid should be conditional on the recipient countries 
forming a defensive alliance among themselves,while the final 
Act Itself assured America's direct interests by insisting that 
the funds be the subject of bilateral agreements.
The role of Germany in all this was of crucial significance, 
insomuch that Western European economic recovery as well as £aSt- 
West strategic considerations In America relied heavily upon./.
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1. See h. Belo ff,o p .clt .,p .27 .
2. Ib id .,p p .25-28.
./.West Germany’s reconstruction and alignment in the US-0EEC ca*p. 
Implicit in the Marshall Flan,therefore,was an unconcealed US 
political attempt to force the pace towards a rehabilitation of 
Vest Germany within a uniting Europe. As S. Ter gin has argued >
"It reduced the tension over German recovery by placing 
that nation at the centre of a Continent-wide effort.Without 
Germany,it was argued,Europe could never recover,and the 
Americans made it clear to.jittery Europeans that success 
in the Marshall Plan depended upon an economically vital 
Germany. Aid from the United States would compensate the 
Western Europeans for the reparations they would not be 
getting from Germany. Meanwhile.economic recovery would 
keep most of Germany looking to the Vest,and so integrated 
into a Western system. Here,then,were the central and 
douhle aims of the Marshall Plan - economic recovery and 
economic containment. Here,also,was a solution to the 
German Question.* 1
Moreover,the very fact that only a part of Germany (admitedly
the major part),just aB only part of Europe,could effectively
operate within the Plan was itself a key element in enabling
the US-sponsored unity process in Vestern Europe to take off.
In the words of David P. Calleot
"Unification was made easier,not only by the division of 
Europe as a whole,but in particular by ti.e division of 
Germany. It can be argued that almost all the postwar 
progress towards unity has depended on Germany's partition, 
for it is hardly conceivable that the Western communities 
could ever have achieved such a degree of integration if 
Germany had been at her full size. Germany united is too 
large,too populous,and too powerful to be fitted peacefully 
* within the European framework." 2
The Marshall Plan,in this connection,remained in consider— 
»hie part a double-edged US policy commitment, expressly identi­
fying one the one hand Vest Germany as a central and Integral 
stimulating force for Vestern Suropean recovery as a whole,while 
failing on the other hand to clarify the extent to which America 
herself was prepared to become intrinsically linked to the Suro­
pean unity Initiative.' The mixed stringency and ambiguity e f . / .
1. i). Yergin.op.cit. ,p .J 26.




•/.th e  scheme in this ultimate sense propelled Trance to consider,prt- 
-■arllj.the ’European' way of containing (West) Germany,whereas in Britain 
it stiffened Bevin'e resolve to secure his main objective to see, 
in the words of Max Beloff,"that the United States maintained its 
footing in Europe."1 Consequently,in spite of the initial con sen- 
Aial basis and historic momentum provided by the Marshall Plan in 
favour of some sort of urgent Western Europe an consolidation,the 
longterm political implications and linkage 'variables for the unity 
process arising from the scheme hightened what eventually proved 
to be divergent political-strategic planning priorities in France 
and Britain with regard to Suropean union.
On the one aide,France,reluctantly accepting the case for 
West Germany's economic revival within the Karshall Aid framework 
(funds being distributed through OEEC from mid-1948 onwards) and 
conceding in turn Vest Germany's political rehabilitation with the 
formation of the Bonn Government in September 1949» came round to 
the view that renascent German might would best be harnessed wlthfei 
a supra-national and inter-dependent West Suropean structure. 
Initial Freneh fears about Germany's revival,leading to what became 
perhaps an over-dependence on British collaboration and good-will 
and to an increasingly precarious insistence by France cm*dntaiatog 
some control of the industrial Ruhr area through the International 
Ruhr Authority created in April 1949, thus gradually gave way to 
the more visionary 3chuman Plan of Hay 1950 (secretly prepared by 
Jean Nonnet)proposing the pooling both of French and German coal 
and steel production (along with that of othar interested Axropean 
states) under a Common Suropean Authority,as a ‘ first step" in 
the federation of Western Europe.2 This sectoral or 'neo-fmetiajal' 
supra-national project lauached by the French Government in 1950» 
and which subsequently gave birth to the Biropean Coal and Steal/»
I . M. Beloff,o p .c it ., p .26.
*• ^ f . pp. 4H —V-
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./.Community - the 'Europe of the Six' - was itself»moreover,pre­
ceded by a more overtly political Buropean campaign,described In 
later chapters,which,though no doubt provoked la large part by 
concern over Vest Germany's poet-war role,was also part of~a 
broader emotional .response to the war-time experience which had 
Instilled In some political quarters both In France and In other 
areas of occupied Europe a new supra-national conceptual break­
through regarding Baropean reconstruction after the war.1 Indeed, 
it was no coincidence that the postwar constitutions of both 
France and Italy,for example,envisaged the limitation of national 
sovereignty within a broad,peace-keeping new order. In the same 
context,It Is worth observing that notably in Prarce but also In 
Italy,Belgium and Holland a poll conducted In 1946 by Count 
Coudenhove-Kalergi and his associates revealed that over half of 
all HP's were favourable to the idea of Buropean Federation.-5
In Britain,however,a rather different view prevailed. In the 
Initial post-war phase this could be explained by the fact that 
the country had appeared to emerge,along with America and Russia, 
as one of the three major victorious powers,having,In striking 
contrast to the Continental states,neither suffered a complete 
débàcle nor occupation. Despite some fraying at the ends,her 
political and economic structures seemed largely Intact,while 
the country’ s social cohesion never seemed stronger. Indeed, 
under Churchill’ s patriotic leadership,British society had 
mobilised to the hilt,and In turn,at the end of the war there 
resulted a deep re-newed national awareness K Ì  a popular 
determination to turn military victory into a new civic mobili­
sation for a vast national programme of social and economic./.
1. Cf. pp. 4J-4.
2. Preamble and Article 11 respectively of the French and ItaUm 
post-war constitutions. The Vest German federal constitution 
of 1949 also made the same explicit sovereign provision.
See R. Mayne,op.cit. ,p.l 65; R. r.organ.op.cit. ,p. 5.
•/.reform . The landslide labour victory of 1945 subsequently mandated 
the post-war Attlee administration to carry out such a programme, 
in which socialist measures in the national context were given top 
priority. The sum significance of the situation was explained by 
the leading federalist,Altiero Spinelli,as follows:
*111 this meant..a strengthening of nationalism - British 
nationalism to be sure,better mannered than that of other 
countries,alien to exaggeration,but nationalist: nonetheless, 
strengthening the persuasion that outside of national unity, 
there is nothing that has the right to interfere with i t . "
In short,contrary to the continental experience,the model and 
appeal of the nation-state,as an instrument of protection and 
reform,was now even more valid in Britain than before the war. 
Added to this was the political,economic and emotional link with 
the B&plre and Commonwealth whicb had rallied to the flag In Brltcfcto 
"darkest hour",while proverbial British aloofness fro» the Xuropesi 
continent in times of peace,together with the ruling labour Par1y% 
reluctance to abandon any part of its newly won governm«ntal 
authority to suspicious 'Conservative' elements in Europe,plus 
the discouraging prospect offered by the continent's prostrate 
economic condition and Bhakey political roots,all presented a 
rather negative list of reasons,as Attlee later put lt,*not to 
enter Into engagements to the full extent possible to the Contin­
ental Powers.*2 la turn,the raplA realisation by the Attlee 
administration of Britain's own precarious oondition and effective 
war-time eclipse by the two new world super-powers,described in 
an earlier section, 1*4 wt to m  integnsliet hut to a strictly practical, 
'step by s te p ' »intergovernmental approach to the fundamental 
trans—national questions and principles arising out of the off IcM
European unity programme. Above all else ,it led to a rea lis t ic ./.
1. A. Splnelli,"The growth of the European Movement since World
War I I " . Buropean Integration.ed. C .6 . Haines,(John Hopkins, 
1957),p .42. , .
2. C.R. Attlee.As it happened.(tf. Heinemannt1954),p .173.
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./.assessment by Bevin and his Foreign Office advisers in favour of 
securing an American commitment for the defence of Britain and 
her neighbours as a top foreign policy priority. As Wilfred Knapp 
has argued:
"Em est Bevin was well aware that western Europe could not 
be defended against the Soviet Union without the support of 
United States . In his mind,therefore,the essential requirement 
was to keep a bridgehead for the United States in Europe 
rather than to unify Europe in such a way that the United 
States micht be tempted to leave Europe to look after 
itse lf ."  '
Post-war British foreign p o l ic y .accordingly,became 'Atlantic' 
rather than ' Europe' oriented.'Western Union’ rather than European 
Federation became the order of the day. Though to a very large 
degree both concepts were complementary,in the final evmt Bevin 
gave priority to the former. Bis strategy,in this sense,was not 
so much geared against closer European unity as conscious of the 
rlBk of becoming prematurely over-committed to the European main­
land at the price,perhaps,of strengthening the US isolationist 
lobby. Despite his former espousal of the European Union idea as 
well as hlB rousing lead in activating European support for the 
Marshall Aid initiative,his grasp of world power politics led him 
to reject both a Euro-centric or 'third force' policy option.^
In this respect,therefore,he could not pursue a dynamic policy 
of 'European leadership' on an organic plane. Nor,on the other 
hand,could he attempt to seek an effective American commitment In 
the absence of some sort of British-sponsored effort in the Euro­
pean arena. He thus embarked upon a central tut limited policy of 
'co-operation* with Britain's European neighbours,stimulating thatr 
hopes for European Union but falling well short of the supra­
national commitment of which they began to conceive. To a,perhaps,
exaggerated extent he never lost sight of his cherished Us . / .
1. W. Knapp,op.cit., p .32.
2. As early as 1927,at the TOC,Bevin had advocated a trans-nationri. 
European 'econonic entitity '. See F. yilliams.Ernest Bevin. 
BflrtrO^ of » great Bn,-^iBittftn, (Hutchinson, 1 952) , pp. 1 4^-1 k1
3. See ib id .,p p .262-3.
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./.partnership objective. The result was a startling s’.iccess In
bridging the Atlantic gap,but a lost opportunity In Europe Itself.
- As Roy Jenkins later commented: "He played weak cards with great 
force.. (but)he began the mishandling of our relations with Europe. 
..H is  rolea in the creation of NATO and In the spuming of the 
Schaman Plan were symbolic." 1
The final parting of ways between Britain and France over 
European union(though France too remained a loyal adherent of the 
wider ‘Western Onion’ )was an historic but far from clear cut pro­
cess. Indeed,between 1947 and 1950 much of the initial progress 
towards consolidation and unity was based around an Anglo-French 
entente»inaugurated by the bl—lateral mutual assistance treaty 
signed at Dunkirk In March 1947. This itself brought about the 
multi-lateral Brussels Treaty defence pact,while 02SC and,later,the 
Council at Birape were 4Lso spearheaded, by the entente. It was not a 
balanced partnership,however,Insomuch that up until the Sebuman 
Plan break-out Prance depended on British participation within the 
Airopean unity project in order to cancel out Germany's ultimate 
admission. For a full three years,in fact,the French Government 
avoided stepping over the parapet in its dealings with Britain 
over Europe. The British Government was clearly aware of this 
tactical advantage and exploited It by Insisting each time on a 
■step-by-step" Intergovernmental European policy in line with Its 
strategic and world Interests. Attlee,himself»recorded in this 
respect:
"Germany is potentially a great Power,but France is  unlikely^ 
ever to occupy again the position she once held. A realisation 
of this has created a demand for some form of federation,but 
there Is a general recognition that without 3ritain such a 
grouping would not be strong enough to hold its own. On the X 
other hand,Britain has never regarded itself as Just a . / .
1. Soy Jenkins .^Ernest Bevin".Hlne Ken of PowerCHanish Hamilton, 
1974),p .80.
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. / .  Buropean power. Her interests are world-wide." 1
In consequence,for three years Britain managed to thwart all 
attempts supported by France at creating a more organic fora of 
European union. The issue arose in acute i o n  over the proposal to 
create the Council of Europe as a move towards federation. The 
arguments and vheeler-dealing which took place regarding this 
proposition,In which the campalga of the Suropean Movement was of 
crucial significance,are- a oantral theme In the chapters which 
follow. Suffice at this stage to outline the differences of r i w  
which already surfaced in the ismediate wake of the Marshall Plan 
concerning the first two official Western European initiatives, 
namely the Brussels Pact and OBSC.
While the latter organisation, directly associated to Marshall
Aid,was still in embryo, the rapid deteriatlon in Bast-West rcOattms
which accompanied the preparatory arrangements leading to the OEEC
Treaty of April 1948 prompted more urgent action in the Western
Europe defence sphere,resulting in the Five-Power Brussels Pact
2
signed by Britain,France and Benelux on 17 Karch 1948. Officially 
described as a 'Treaty of Economic, social and Cultural Collabora­
tion and Collective Self- defencethe Pact,so far as Britain was 
concerned,essentially centred on the latter aspect. It was in fact, 
to quote Richard Kayne,"the first post-^ar Treaty to recognise the 
potential danger from Soviet military p o w e r . C o n c e i v e d  by Bevin, 
and proposed jointly by the British and French Governments,the 
Pact clearly appeared ae an extension of the mutaal defence agree­
ment signed earlier at Dunkirk,placed now,however,within a cold 
war setting. Profoundly disturbed by the perceived Soviet menace, 
and finally provoked by the break down of the Four Power London 
Conference in Hovemfcer 1947, Bevin,indeed,clearly indicated the . / .
1. Attlee,op .ait., p .172. 2. Cf. pp.
3. fi. Karoe.The Coarmnity of Baropa.(Gollancstl?62),p .72 .
./.eBeential military nature of the pact he had in mind in a secret 
memorandum which he despatched to the US Secretary of State at 
the beginning of the new year. Despite token support for "some 
fora of union in Western Europe",the British Poreicn Secretary 
tacitly emphasised the more immediate need for a mobilisation of 
Western Burope defence,with the backing of America and the Domi­
nions, in order to halt the Rnssian threat. 1 Using Western Burope 
as a springboard,what Berin was suggesting,in the words of the 
US Under Secretary of state,"would in fact mean consideration 
of a military alliance between the United States and Great 
Britain . " 2 The concept of a wider'Atlantic Alliance'was certainly 
not opposed by Berin's colleagues in Europe. Bidault.for example, 
was "more than willing" to enter into a "concrete" Western 
alliance with America^, while the Belgian Premier,Paul-Henri 
Spaak also stressed early in the preparatory stcges leading to 
the Brussels Pact that any defence arrangements which did not 
include the US were "without practical value*.* However,where 
France and Belgium differed with Britain was that in Burope 
itself they wanted to go beyond a Western Union defence arrange­
ment , envisaging the proposed Five Power Treaty as a tight basisK/ 
for pursuing a deeper regional organisation of Western Burope 
with a full economic and cuetuas union as the goal. 5 In Washing 
ton an even more forthright position was adopted»Kennan stressing, 
as Policy Planning Director,the primary need for a "real federal 
(Stropean)authority" rather than "Just another fraaeworic of 
military alliances."® Bevin,in turn,tried to broaden his appeal 
in this respect,calling for a more sweeping "consolidation of 
Western Burope" in his historic speech to the House of Connons
<n
on 22 January 1948. Shortly afterwards,the following m essage ./ . V
1. yjftjs 1 9 46 . V o l .Iil .*w rstem  Europe".P P .4-6 .
2. I M S .  p .13. 3. Ibid. ,p .29. 4 . I b i d . ,p .6.
5- Ib id .,p p .26-30. 6. Ib id .,p p .7-8. 7 . Cf.pp.'fb"*-
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./ .w a 0 sent to the US State Department concerning American hesitation 
over Bevin's 'Western Union' policy»
■Mr. Bevin quite understands the preoccupations of the 
United States Government. At the sane time he Is conscious 
of a risk of getting Into a vicious circle. Without assurance 
of security which can only be given with some degree of 
American participation,the British Government are unlikely .
to be successful in making the Western Union a going concern."
The Soviet-organised coup in Prague,in February 1946,forced the pace
of events,leading to the signing of the Brussels Treaty one month
later and to an official "fix* commitment" by the US of alllt&ry
9
support. By June,is response to the West German currency reform
crisis and the Berlin blockade,this US commitment was given a
a decisive boost In the form of the Senate-backed Tandenberg
Hesolution heralding a full-scale American defence association
with Western Europe. Ten months later  the scheme was complete,
and on 4 April 1949 Bevin vent to Washington to sign the Horth
Atlantic Treaty which united for defence purposes the US and
Canada with the Brussels Treaty Powers plus,by this tine,Iceland,
r
Italy,Norway,Portugal,Greece and Turkey. ’Western Union* had 
been achieved, Bevin1b impact in all this having been Immense.
Integration in the Suropean sphere itself»meanwhile,had 
been held In check. As a Chatham House Study Group later pointed 
out in this connection:
"From the beginaln£ British foreign policy aimed at the 
inclusion of the United States and Canada in a European 
security system. This concept permeated British official 
thinking throughout the whole period ...Its  corollary was 
that British Continental commitments should move pari pagan 
with Aaerican ones and on no account in advance ox them." 4
The Brussels Treaty remained essentially a military one. The
provisions on "economic,social and cultural collaboration”
6
were vague,and progress on these matters "notably slow", in
keeping with Article 7 of the Treaty.lt is true that an inter-
1. Ffebs.op .cit . .p . 1 9. ' J j ^ i j o l l c y  ¡¡’ianning Report,2 3 .3 .4 8 .,
3 • Cf. pp.
4. 3«« R .Ball.11*TO and the Suropean union aoveasr*» (London, 1 959),
5. Hans A. Schmitt,op .c l t . , p .35. P*
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/ •  governmental Consultative Council of foreign Ministers w a s  set 
up,along with a secretariat and a number of committees1,but this 
still fell short of the type of institutional arrangement en­
visaged by Bldault and Spaak,who in turn tried to persuade the 
Council to support the European Movement’ s proposition for a 
more sweeping supra-national European Assembly's described in 
later chapters. Economic questions,in the meantime«together with'“ 
continental efforts to set up a customs union,quickly disappeared 
fron the Brussels Treaty agenda«being consigned,more qgroprfe&ely,
to the OEEC.
The immediate raison d ’ etre of the 05SC,however,as a joint 
co-operative effort by the 16 Western European nations , plus 
the allied-controlled sonss of Vest Germtny, to close the dollar 
gap and “restore a strong and prosperous European economy"through 
"effective use of American aid" and a certain liberalisation of 
European trade,was a fairly consensual t»t limited basis for 
an official European unity initiative at an operative trans­
national level. immediate,practical tasks at hand were too 
pressing to permit any rash or radical institutional development. 
In Its Initial scope,nonetheless,the results achieved by OEBC 
weie startling by anyone's standards. Indeed,within a remarkably 
short period the OEEC countries managed,through the cushioning 
effects of 0S funds,to restore production to near pre-war levels. 
Total output of goods and services between 1947 and 1950 rose by 
25>,and in certain key industries the advance was even rore 
striking: steal production increased by 70,-,cement by 80£, 
vehicules by 150% and refined oil products by 200?->.^  At the
same time,quantitative trade restrictions were dismantled a n d ,./ .
1 . Por 'fflimul« Treaty Twit.see R. Vaurhn.ioat-Vftr Integration 
in Europe(E.Arnold 1974)pp .24-30; A.¿F. Boyd.oestera Pnion.
(Hutchinson,1948},appendix B.
2. 0E3C Convention, 1 6 .4 .4 8 . ,signatories:Austria,Belgium,Denmark, v 
Tranee, Greece, Ireland, Ic eland, Italy, Luxembourg,Norway, Nether­
lands, iortugal.UX,Sweden,Switecrland and Turkey.For text,see
it .Vaughn, op. c i t . , pp. >0-35.
3. ¡See " •  Laaqueur.op.cit. ,p1 36.
./ .b y  1950,a multilateral clearing system for monetary transféré 
was created through the European Payments Union. The en** result 
was a doubling of intra-European trade within six years and a 
general increase in exporte of 915" within half that time.' "By 
the end of the four years (1946-52) which the Marshall Plan had 
originally been designed to cover,Buropean recovery had been 
achieved and the OEBC had played a notable part in that recovery?2
There can be so doubt that OSBC was a tremendous success, 
without which Buropean unification plans would have remained a 
pipe—dream. At the sane tine,nonetheless,OEBC was severely limited 
both in scope and in actual structure,and was Incapable in itself 
of providing the necessary momentum for a deeper fora of union.
The restrictions in scope derived essentially from Britain’ s 
reluctance to give up the right of Independent action on trading 
matters,explained initially by the fact that only 25£ of UE 
trade was with Burope whereas some 50£ was with the Commonwealth 
nations,backed up by preferential tariff agreements.** french 
efforts at freeing not only trade quotas tut also key sectorial 
tariffs ,in  turn proposed at a more detailed level by the Dutch 
Foreign Minister Stikker,tfcus received short shrift from the 
British,fearful of mounting pressures for an eventual Buropean 
Customs Union,while conscious of their dependence on the revival 
of world trade in general. Similarly,with post-war Stirling being 
grossly overvalued,Britain held out as long as possible for bi­
lateral monetary clearing arrangements,Attlee' b Labour admini­
stration tending to regrxd f is c d  autonomy and an unimpaired 
Sterling area as essential to its national economic planning 
measures.* Ia the final event,despite the developing Benelux./ .
1. W. Laqueur,op .cit.,136-9. ^
2. K. Camps.Britain and the European Comnunlty 1953-1.2.63. (Oxford 
University Press,1964)»p.6.
3. See "Les Anglais en _'r.ce de l ’Union européenne" . itevue de 
l ’ Action Populaire J.arch 1 949, pp. 2 0 0 -1 .
4. On British reluctance,see K.Camps,op.cit., pp.7-9» >i. Beloff, 
o p .c it ., pp .25-26.
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. / .  tariff union initiative*,OEBC*e economic programme shelved the 
idea of a fall European Cuetome Onion,insisted upon national 
economic planning rights(albeit within a co-operative programme)« 
and»lastly,distributed US funds to each member state seperately. 
Economic co-operation,not economic unification remained the order 
of the day.^
These limits in the scope of OEBC vere also reflected is its 
fomal structure. During the preparatory period leading to the 
signing of the Convention in April 1946,the French had,in fact, /  
tried to introduce a supra-national element to the organisation 
by proposing the setting up of a strong executive board working 
full time,voting by majority, backed up by an adequate internatiaad. 
secreteriat.and led by a Secretary General vith power to take 
important initiatives. The British once again,however,refused to 
go along vith this bold political step,and insisted on a council 
of ministers operating by unanimity vith most of the work being 
done by different committees of government appointed experts,as 
stipulated in the final OZSC text.-5 - In the words of the leading 
British federalist of the tlme,R.V.(r. Mackay:
" ..t h is  organisation vat a co-operative one; all decisions 
were to be made by governments; and any resolutions of the 
executive committee had to be unanimous. The most,in effect, 
that OEBC could do was to make recommendations which the 
individual governments carried out; there was no transfer 
of sovereignty,or integration in any sense ...It  was,in short, 
a purely intergovernmental organisation." *
A more balanced critique of OESC vas later offered by Jean Konnet
who,also discounting the overt political campaign led by the
European Movement,succinctly commented:
•Iior would the pragmatic methods of OEBC bring unity,because 
there it  vas laid dovn that aayone oould be exempted from 
decisions vhich he found d iffic u lt . It vas the opposite of 
the Community sp ir it . Still»provided that the lim its of co­
operation were recognised for what they vere,03EC c o u ld ./.
1. First conceive:- in 1^43, and initiated fey the Cur ton's Convention 
of 1944, the full Benelux union was put into official effect in 
January 1948. A similar,though abortive attempt wae made by
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. / .  certainly help the .European economy »which in the past had been 
too compartmentalised.. .It  would be a mistake to ask more than 
that of a system which entailed no delegation of sovereignty.
V ery so on, 0 EEC had become simply technical machinery...1  
realised that neither this organisation.. . ,nor the pariibubentary 
meetings in Strasbourg that resulted from the Hague Congress, 
would ever give concrete expression to European unity." 1
3) The European Caapaiai
The setting up of OEEC together -with the launching of Western
Union on the basis of the Brussels Pact and later through NATO,
though no doubt essential steps in achieving Western European
stability and security,nonetheless failed to satisfy accompanying
demands for a more organic fora of European integration. Such
demands were at first difficult to quantify,since indeed official
European action in the wake of the Marshall Plan momentarily
boosted hopes and aroused enthusiasm among most(though not all)
pro-European groups who only later,in view of the still orthodox
framework of Western Europe's co-operative institution»,argued
that the measures taken scarcely seemed proportionate to the "new
start* envisaged. Veteran European federalist,Altiero Spinelli,
for example,later claimed in this respect that the harshall Plan
had not been maximallaed,primarily due to the continent's failure
to stand up to Britain. Ee went on to argue:
"If  the American government had seen through the false 
European spirit of the Brltish,and had granted the aids 
contingent on the creation of political federal Institutions 
on the continent,we would now have European union, since no 
serious opposition could have been given by the forces 
favouring maintenance of sovereignty except,of course,
Great Britain ." *
It was a tempting but,at thiB stage,shallow analysis of the
situation. The first effective Impetus to Uestera European unity
had been taken up and translated into "practical politics" by
Britain's foreign secretary, Brnest Bevin. Without his "shock"./.
1. Jean >,£>nnet,op.cit. ,p .273.
2. Altiero spinelli,quoted by Hans A. Sclnnitt.op.clt.,p.24.
•/•tactics sad determination to secure America's commitment in Vest 
airope's survival the Marshall Plan as well as the 'Atlantic 
Alliance' Bight not have Materialised at a ll. Vithout the economic 
recovery and military security which derived from this official 
initiative,Western Burope would not have been in the position to 
pursue further integration measures. At the same time,moreover, 
Trance and the Buropean continent in general could by no means 
afford or dssire to ditch Britain in the way Spinelli suggested. 
For,in the immediate Marshall Plan era,looming economic collapse'1 
and vulnerability to soviet Comnunisa was the main concern in 
Burope*' capitals, not Buropean "constitution mongerlng" with all 
the pit-falls Bevin rightly feared in this context. The long-term 
implications arising out of the Marshall Plan,however,particularly 
the role of Vest Germany and the need to sustain Joint economic 
recovery and expansion once US funds were curtailed,did indeed 
demand a more lasting institutional ediface and political under­
standing. The growing ooncero, in this connection,that the British 
Government seemed to regard Buropean regional action ac a tempo­
rary expedient destined to take second place to national economic 
planning powers and to a broader 'Atlantic' unity concept opened 
a policy rift which,in time,the Buropean political campaign both 
tried to bridge and exploit. Put a-uother way,Buropean regional 
action dealing with immediate reconstruction problems and cold 
war security needs did not hold out the gerv of further integral 
development. 01BC,notably,"got things dons* and perhaps helped 
to pave the way towards the Buropean 'Cotanon Market' initiative 
in the decade that followed; but the decisive trans-national gap 
which prevented a direct passage from Buropean intergovernmental 
co-operation to supra-national union remained to be filled.
It  will be argued in the course of t M s  book that the 
political campaign of the Buropean Movement le a d in g  to the • / •
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. / .creation of the Council of Europe nnd the European Consultative 
Assemhly played a crucial part in filling  this supra-national gap. 
even i f ,in  the final event the campaign faltered and vas eclipsed 
» by Monnet's more judicious neo-functionalist approach. In compari­
son to Bevia's step-by-step policy based upon a cautious though 
sharp analysis of urgent requirements and actual conditions,the 
idealistic tone adopted by the Buropean Movement may seen naive.
It no doubt vas; and the eventual demise of the campaign In the 
wake of the technocratic-orlented Schuman Plan may be cited as 
proof of this. nonetheless,except if one takes an entrenched 
deterministic view of hi story, naivety and Idealism can at -Une s be a 
potent force. A rich assortment of political leaders were attract«! 
to the European Movement campaign,ranging fron Paul-Henrl Spaak 
to Konrad Adenauer , from André Philip to 0go La Kalfa ,froa 
François Mitterrand to Michel Debré.etc. Were they all naive? 
Perhaps so,but they should not be dismissed out of hand. Some 
vers in government,more were not; but their campaign,spearheaded 
by a determined executive team led by IXincan Sandyc,Joseph Retin- 
ger and Henry Brugmans(among others)dld,for a short period of 
time at least,have an impact. In Prance,Bidault and Schuman took 
a special Interest in promoting the Movement's proposals. The 
International press and parliamentary groups(both barometers of 
public opinion}also shoved a positive disposition towards the 
Movement as it gathered pace. More of this later, aiffice for 
the sionent to stress that the political campaign of the European 
Movement,veil ahead of the relatively Immobile official co-opera­
tive institutions,helped boost and keep the supra-national Euro­
pean Idea alive,creating the popular-political climate vithout 
vhich the Buropean Community might not have come to birth. - As 
Paul-Henri Spaak declared in this respecti
"..w hilst recognising the primary responsibility for the 
creation of a United Europe rests with the Government*./.
, / .  themselves,we should remember that without our Kovement they
can achieve nothing. Behind then,and indeed ahead of them, y  
there must be a surge of public opinion,and it is we in the 
Suropean Movement, who f o n  the core of that opinion." 1
-Set against a sombre,bi-polar,cold var background and an 
official unity policy generated by the exigencies arising out of 
Europe's exhausted economic condition and precarious political- 
strategical situation, the birth and idealistic-political campaign 
of the Suropean Kovement during the vital formstlve years which 
spread from the Marshall to the.SOfcuaan Plan can now be examined 
more fully.
1. Paul-.Menrl Snaak.foreword to the European Movement and tTie 
Council of Europe(Hutchinson 1949J.P.13*
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A B W  START?
1 ) jRropean idealism and the Second World War
Although it was the cold war and the Implications arising out of it 
which gave practical effect to the process of Western Buropean con­
solidation, the vital impetus to the post-war Buropean unity ideal 
stoaned directly fro» the traumatic experiences of the Second WozSdWar. 
The ' European Idea' ae such,of course,already had a long catalogue 
of conceptual precedents stretching from the era of Charlemagne,and 
later the Crusades and the poet-medieval plans for Buropean pacifi­
cation presented by Henry de Havarre and the Duke de Sully,to the 
rational arguments of Rousseau.fcontesquiea and Saint Simon,and is 
torn to the romantic urginge of Tic tar Rig) B id  ttte cosmopolitan plsns of 
hasrlnl,and so on. But, in order to get to grips with the essential 
underlying hope and conviction which transformed the previously 
detached diplomatic or theoretical efforts for Buropean unity into 
a passionate movement for effective change,it is to the Second World 
War - ae an extension of the first World War - which we must look 
for a tangible contextual reference point. In particular,we must 
try to understand the vital psychological breakthrough in Buropean 
idealism and supra-national thought wrought by the re—newed lead-np 
to war in 1939*by the voluntarlstlc supra-national comnitment that 
waB born in reaction to fascism,and by the «notional **i^tiae pro­
cess which led to what became known ae the 'Buropean Resistance'.
In this connection,it needs to be recalled that the First 
World War had been fought in the name of 'national salf-detezninstimf. 
The League of nations set up in 1920 in order,theoretically,to up­
hold the peace was consequently fashioned os a very loose inter­
state basis which,in the final analysis,was incapable of exercising 
any real international authority over its members. When war broke 
out again in 1939 the League had long passed into the periphery./.
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. / .o f  political endeavour. T^e evident failings and incapacity of the 
league, how ever, had given spark to other initiatives aimed at putting 
an end to the "International anarchy" of the "balcanised" Ba.ropean 
States’ system,the most famous of which was the Briand Plan of 
1929,sponsored by the Pan-Suropa movement under Count Coudenhove- 
Kalergi. The P lan ', proposing a fora of European Confederation, 
received support from diplomatic, and political circles,but could 
not sten the growing nationalist-dictatorial tide which swept much
of Europe. la the discouraging years of the 1930's,the 'Personalisf
2
movenent in Prance also fought in vain ag&lnst new mass totali­
tarianism and the slide back into total war. Finally,in Britain, 
in the wake of the Munich Crisis of 1938,a restricted but influen­
tial body of opinion known as 'Federal Union' came up with a set 
of proposals profoundly more supra-national than contemplated 
hitherto. Arguing that the failure of the League of Nations,the 
nurturing of aggressive nationalist dictatorships and the re-newed 
danger of a European "civil war" had been caused by the lack of a 
real and democratic international authority endowed with sovereign 
powers over and above those of the nation-states,they proposed the 
urgent creation of a free Buropean Federation,with British partici­
pation,as a bulwark against further nasi aggrandisement. With the 
final outbreak of war,followed by the so-called 'Phoney War' in 
Western Europe,'Federal Union' reached the senith of its activities 
and attracted a rich ffilwctag to the cause »including Lord Beveridge, 
Barbara Wooton,Lionel Robbins,Kingsley Martin,Harold Wilson,Prof. 
Haysk,R.W.G. Mackay and Hiss F .L . Josephy. The movement's influence 
in Britain rapidly dwindled,however,after the French and Dutch 
débàcle of 1940 and in the subsequent re-birth of British national 
pride and sense of puz?ose in the lone fight against nazi tyranny 
which followed. Nevertheless,the idea that a new type of SiropeanV. 
£or Br^ng  Kworandum text,see R. Vaughn.op.cit.,pp.11-12.
3* op"^Federal U nio n ', see A >  ^ y d .o p .c i t . ,p i u s  a documentary 
chapter compiled by John Pinder to be published in a SuT series.
./.order  needed to be established after the war had at least been 
launched. By now,however,the real theatre of thought In favour of 
some sort of supra-national commitment had passed to the anti­
fascist and resistance groups in occupied Europe.
It is indeed an important point that the Suropean idea,in its 
full supra-national form,was inspired to a very great extent as an 
idealistic rallying call in opposition to nazi-fasclst oppression. 
It was,In fact,no mere coincidence that the first organised anti­
fascist mo vemmt, founded in Italy as early as 1923 under the 
radical-socialist leadership of Gaetano Salvemini,Carlo Rosselll 
and Ernesto Rossi,and known as 'lion hollare '( ' Don't Yield),developed 
into perhaps the most vocal and active pro-European antl-nptionallgt 
group of the pre-war and war-time period,giving birth to the 'JUstioe 
and Liberty' movement under Rosselll,and later to the resistance 
'Action Party' and European Federalist Kovesent in Italy. The vital 
and original conceptional breakthrough in European thought to which 
these anti-fascist leaders became committed was the idea of supra­
national government as a principle in Itself. In other words,as 
a reaction to the pernicious and violent tenets of fascism,and in 
opposition to fascism's blatant mass manipulation of national- 
patriotic feeling and to its blinded rejection of moral-democratic 
norms,they developed a credo in which a tolerant supra-national 
outlook and corresponding political organisation would be the 
central pillars of a democratic,free-thinking and freedom-loving 
Buropean society of the future. This is why the antl-fasciot resis­
tance pact of 1930 was committed to a "new hunanity" in a "free" 
and ^ust" "United States of Burope"Jand why Carlo Rooselll,before 
being murdered by the fascist militia,went on to call for a "Young 
Europe" movement and for a "Buropean Party". It is also why Ernesto 
Rossi,along with militant anti-fasciste Altiero Spinelli and . / .
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. Bigenio Colorai, jointly declared in a clandestine nanlfesto issued 
in 1941 from the penal island of Ventotene that an end had to be 
■ade to the "reactionary..selfish..militaristic-imperialistic" 
grip of nationalisa in Europe and that after the war a new "human* 
and progressive European fédération was imperative. The text 
farther stressed!
"The problem which must be solved in the first place,and 
without which there will be no real progress,is the definitive 
abolition of the division of Europe into national sovereign 
states.. .
The Binds of the people are already much better disposed than 
in the past towards a federal reorganisation of Europe. All 
responsible men mUBt now recognise that It is impossible to 
maintain a balance between indépendant European states... 
the main aim{is)the creation of a solid international state. 
This is a time for a new task and it is also the time for , 
the new mm of the KOVBKBJT FOR A TREE AI.'D UNITED EUROfB. " 1
The 'Ventotene Hanifesto’ was subsequently circulated in 
clandestine circles,strongly influencing the Action Party p r o g w  
of 1943 which called for a post-war European federation with 
executive,legislative and Judiciary organs?and,in turn,providing 
the basis of the ’Movlmento federalists Europeo* launched in the 
same year.^ At a wider level,the KfE and Ventotene proposals, 
according to Dutch resistance leader Henry Brugmans,represented 
the most ■reflective" end "concrete* programme of action to aneræ 
from the European-minded resistance groups,the"clarity"and "rigour* 
of which was borne out in the final joint programme of these 
groups. That such a like-minded European resistence network came 
into being was a consequence of the trans-national solidarity 
which nasi-fasclst occupation provoked. The supra-national view 
*
which emerged was further aided by the complete collapse of the 
existing pre-war nation-state orders throughout the European con­
tinent and by what Steven Bawes as described as the "existential
freedom" to opt forradlcally new allegiances in choosing t o ./ .
1« Ventotene hanifesto. full text in PlOcola antolO.ftia federalists
. ____!Stt •
Kay 1S43; see also A .S p in a lli.l ’ Eurona ncn cade dal cielo.
(kulino 1960) ,p p .17-22.
angnn,op.cit., 
I. ,KFE TURIN
. / .resist the new prevailing national order! In Bhort,the individual 
decision to resist the effective national authority - be this 
the long-established fascist order in the cases of Italy and 
Geisnany.or an apparently "legal" puppet regime as in the case of 
Vichy prance - led many partisans,hounded as "traitors",to conceive 
of a higher morality than that of pure national-patriotism. The 
psychological anguish and mental breakthrough in making such a 
decision has been summarised by Spinelli as follows:
"The rejection of the principle ’my countiy right or wrong’ , 
the decision to support what was ’ right’ even againrt one’s 
own country,amounted to defeatisa,when co-.fined to words,but 
became high treason if  transacted into deeds. Some of the 
enemies of tyranny more deeply imbued with national traditions 
suffered soul-searching agonies before taking this stand.
Others of a more radical temperament broke the taboo of 
national loyalty to their own state without difficulty and 
vithout remorse." 2
The result was that a variety of resistance personalities
neither fully enamoured with alternative nationalist-oriented or 
conumnist-controlled^power groups,became actively involved in the 
struggle for a supra-national post-war European federal order. 
Important political prisoners,such as L£on EQ.ua,avowedly espoused 
the cause. Leading resistance fighters throughout Europe began to 
formulate federation plans and proposals? Is December 1943,Henry 
Prenay, commander of the faaous ’Combat’ resistance network,in turn 
made a dramatic appeal for a trans-nationel ’Biropean Resistance’ 
union. Pour decisive meetings were subsequently organised in 
Geneva between representatives of various resistance movements 
from Denmark,France, Italy,Uetherlands,J'-orway,Poland,Czechoslovak*, 
Yueoslevia and Germany. There resulted,in July 1944,the Joint
formulation of the 'European Resistence hanifeBto'.signed b y ./.
1. See S. Hawes' chapter "The individual and the :esistance 
community in Prance".assistance in Europe 1939-1£4 5 . ed. Hawes 
and White,(Pelican 197 6}.
2. A.Spinelli,Buropean Union in the Resistance",£2V£QaSLi_ea4 
Opposition.v o l .2 .Ho .3 .Anrll-Julr 1967,p p .321-^29.
3. The Comraunist international resistance cannot be fully compared 
insomuch as its basic allegiance remained Koscow-oriented.
4. See W.Lipgens.airopa-Poderatlonsplaoe der ./iderstandsbewungea
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. / .a l l ,t h e  principal part of vhich stated the urgent post-war need 
to set up a supra-natlosal European Government responsible direeOy 
to the people rather than to national administrations,along with 
a European Federal Constitution and a Supreme European Court.
- The full anti-fascist and war-time evolution of the supra­
national European idea had found its international spokesmen.' 
Limited in number and overall influence,they had nonetheless 
given expression to the federal and democratic Biropean ideal 
with a vigour and emotion unknown before , and which would in turn 
fire the immediate post-war Bu rope an campaign. For,as Spinelli 
has so aptly m in d e d  us:
"Vhsn we recall today the emergence of thie(Baropean}federal 
idea during the war,not as a distant ideal,but as the comer- 
stone of the sew democratic post-war world,we may fail to do 
Justice to the originality and vigour of t h i B  vision,if we 
do not also remember that those who dreamed of it were exiles 
on penal islands,or In concentration camps or nembers of the 
Resistance.* 3
2) The Growth of Biropens Movements after the War
The ’ Buropean Resistance’ call for a new federal order,R. Vaughn 
has argued,“was not Just the dream of a few wise men; it probably 
represented the aspirations of many."* It has already been pointed 
out In this respect that a majority of parliamentarians In France, 
Italy,Belgium and Holland after the war were favourable to the 
idea,as was further expressed in concrete form in the post-war 
constitutions of the former two countries? Is addition,a public
opislos poll held is France in the immediate aftermath of th e ./.
1. For * aore detailed description of this development leading 
to the 'European Resistance Manifesto' ,see Lipgens,op .cit.; 
opening chapters by A. Chi ti-Batclli in Storla del Fédéralisme 
Europeo(E .R .I . .Turin .19 73 ) : Henry Bruwaans/I  ' Idée Européenne
1Q20-197 0 (College d ' Europe,Brufge,Tempel,1 9 7 0 ) ,pp .8l- 104;
A. Spinelli,"European Union in the Resistance",o p .c it . ; Jean- 
Fier re QouzT.Les Pionniers de 1 ' Europe Con^«utfcirj(Siropean 
Research Centre7lausanner'9oF77ppri9-24$J7Freymonapp.ci'tpp.9-11.
2. See R.White,o p .c it .,p22.
3. A. Spinelli,op.cit.
4. R. Vaughn,o p .c it .,p .1 1.
5. C f.p .24.
./ .w a r  in Europe,in July 1945,recorded that 75jfc»of those questioned 
were in favour of the recreation of Europe as a federation of states 
with "all matters of common interest under the control of a demo­
cratically elected federal government."1 The situation after the 
var,nonetheleB8,wa8 such that European plana and projects were 
pushed mainly into the background. The vigorous lead taken by the 
'European Resistance' was quickly eclipsed by the return to power 
of traditional political parties whose policies,though not neces­
sarily unfavourable to the European federal idea,were conditioned 
by the practical exigencies and immediate needs of the nation,and 
smothered in t u n  by tie eciue of the slide of 'blg-power' diplomacy 
into cold war. The Marshall Aid initiative,it is true,finally gave 
new life  to the pojt-war European campaign,but it war also part of 
a bi-polar development which had fundamentally shattered the con­
ceptual framework envisaged by the 'European Resistance'. Looking 
back on the failure of the hopes of Ventotene and Geneva,Spinelli 
corun entedi
"In the first elaboration of a plan of action,there was the 
belief. . .that Europe would continue to be the centre,and an 
an autonomous centre,of the political life  of the world.
America would return across the ocean.. . , Russia behind its 
borders.. .The reality of 1945 and of the following years wa* 
instead completely different. Europe became merely a passive 
object of American pove- and.Russian power that had divided 
it and were occupying i t . "  2
The 'European Revolution* which leading resistance groups had
envisaged simply failed to occur,and the influence of these groups
rapidly declined.
initial efforts in keeping the movement and its aims alive, 
nevertheless,were made. Indeed,immediately after the liberation of 
France,the left-wing resistance group 'Franc-Tireur' constituted 
the 'French Comcittee for European Federation1 in which Albert 
Canus and Robert Verdler played a leading role. Together with the
gpinelll MFB group,they organised tie first airopean Federalist./.
1. R. Vaughn,opTcit.,pn.
2. A. Spinelli, quoted F.Ji. Willis I taly yhooscs J-U-oseCOUFJ «¡71 )p .6 .
3. See Gouzy,op»cit.,p.25»
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. / . Conference, held at Paris in f.&rch 1 945»repeating the supra-nptional 
Bi rope an message of July 1944.' New federalist organisations emerged; 
and more meetings with such groupb were subsequently held: first 
at Geneva(May 1945)»then at Hertenstein(August 1946) , and finally 
at Luzembourg(October 1946),where the »nropean Onion of Pederallsts 
was officially constituted. There followed important meetings at 
BaleOtovember 1946),at Paris (Dee ember 1946),rjad evratual.iy at Amster­
dam (April 1947)»where it was decided to organise a major internatio­
nal HTP-sponsored congress at Kontreux for the sunner.^
mid-1947 the EOT claimed a mombership of over 150,000 in 
Prance,Italy,Holland and Belgium,with new recruits from the rest 
of Europe too. Arnold J . Zurcher enthusiastically declared later tlst 
"this group approached the dimensions of a mass organisation with 
truly multinational support."^ Be this as it may,the movement 
remained of only marginal interest to the real political establish­
ment in Europe,having no solid base in the traditional party struc­
tures and governmental elites where decision-making counted. Kore- 
over,right from the start,it was plagued by labyrinth divisions over 
theory and policy. This had much to do with the rise of the "new" 
current of thought which,by 1947,dominated the EOF,under the title 
"integral federalism",denoting a corporatist and internal-oriented 
brand of fe d e r a l !»  as opposed to a "fusionlst" approach extending 
political sovereignty on an international scale. Drawn in part from 
the libertarian-Proudhonian ranks of the pre-war 'personallst' 
school and war-time resistance circles jointly «related  with Denis de 
Rougaaent,Alexandre Karc,Harcel-Claude Hytte and Henry Bru@nans,wlio 
rejected essentially the monolithic aspects of the "Jacobin” state,* 
the integral federalist current became increasingly absorbed by the
=m ore reactionary leading movement "La F6d<ration",which had i t s . / .
V. See A. Spineili,"Baropean Union in the Resistance",op.cii.
2. For a detailed study of this process,see W. Lipgens Hie Afange
WBr SUmftlBfhgB (Klctt,Stuttgart 1977).
3. A .J . zurcher,op .cit.,p .22 .
** F* V * * *  ^ ¿ r a l is m e  **
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/.roots,not in the Resistance,but is the pre-war anti-parliamentary 
leagues and in the corporatist networks of Vichy France. Promoters 
of this latter group were,above all,followers of the Kaurrasaien 
tradition. Indeed,André Voisin,as General Secretary of "La Féderatkn*, 
together with Max Richard,as chief editor of publications,and Louie 
Salleron,as the main "cultural* spokeanan,had all been Involved with 
Action Fyancaiae before the war,vhereaB Bertrand de Jouvenel,a foun­
der leader,had openly espoused fascism as one of Doriot's staunchest 
supportera in the 'Parti Populaire Français'.1 ¿heir policies could 
not have contrasted more with the political, juridical and constitu­
tional vievs of the former supra-national resistance current led by 
Spinelli and the KFI. For,indeed,they essentially rejected the 
liberal and modern parliamentary tradition;thei rejected political 
and constitutional models of representative organisation;they in 
fact rejected the whole concept of "political" sovereignty and 
therefore the notion of a popular and collective supra-national 
European sovereignty expressed through representative "political" 
institutions. The long-fought for principle of equal political 
rights and of accountable access to political power,best summed up 
in the term "one man one vote",vas meaningless to them. Instead, 
they wanted to distribute powers along corporate lines to what was 
called the "living forces" - a vague term meaning extra-parliamentary 
working groups of patronat,trade unionists,technicians,vocational 
associations,local and ethnic groupings,youth and church organisa­
tions, etc. How the proportional role and strength of these separate 
interest groups vas to be equitably calculated,and who, furthermore, 
vas to take responsibility for thls,vae a fundamental democratic 
problem evaded by the meaningless term "proportional to their social
role". In conclusion,unlike the Spinelli-KFE rump in the EUF,they./.
1. See A. Grellsanmer.Lea Mouvements FédérrJLlstgp .en K w r.Af ,1 Sjl à 1 974(Presaesd ' 1°,cl JT -11 ”  i n  ;K-¿«h»*-ictjon g r w Æ
(Stock,-! 962), pp. 326, 380,447,466, 555n, 558, 562-3, 559; D.Dioudonnat, Je suis Partout 1930-1944;lee maurragaiena devant la tentation
./.identified  the European unity campaign not as a political lieal in 
order to extend the parliamentaxr-otate model to a supra-national 
constitutional bane,but rather as a functionel-orlented process 
by which a "revolutionary" European Estates General of tàe extra­
parliamentary "living forces" would emerge and soaehow force the 
hand of the political establishment to cede powers to corporate 
and regional groups.
At the Hontreux Congress,held on 27-31 August 1947,these 
fundamental differences of view emerged more clearly. Indeed,as 
Spinelli recorded,the Congress was split into two main factions, 
upholding "diverse conceptions" about the federal idea,the stronger 
group gravitating around the French "Fédération" circle,the weaker 
group around the Italian HFe I lately weakened by internal disputes 
and by the temporary departure of Spinelli who,as General Secretary 
of the Action ?orty, had tried to keep the federation issue alive 
in the Italian constitutional battlcfthe K?E,with Spinelli once 
more at the helm,fought hard at Kontreux for the restitution of 
the main points In the original resistance programme,stressing the 
need to constitute a "European Government" and a "European Parlia­
ment* with supra-national sovereign powers,along with a "European 
Court" for the protection of individual rights. On the other side, 
the French Integral federalists criticised the KFE's preoccupation 
soley with "constitutional" and "institutional" changes purely at 
the European level and In the political sphere. As Spinelli went 
on to record:
■The Italian(federalist)movement was anti-ideological,the 
French one was profoundly ideological. The Italian movement 
was fixed upon the crcation of European institutions with 
the view to developing a new European political framework 
which would profoundly revolutionise the whole of national 
and political l ife . The French moveaent regarded European 
institutions at being a simple element of coordination, 
incapable in itself of providing change,and for this reason 
supported a multifonn programme of action whir^ concerned 
all the parts of existing socie ty ." 3
* ~ r u 1*“ 1" ° «1 floaflP»
(KFE publicatio n ,19 53 ;,P P .156-160.
2. See Chiti-Batalli,op.clt. ,p p .196-7. 3- Spinelli,op.cit.
./.Henry Brugmans gave a siailar version of the Kontreux debate:
"In fact,one one aide,the Italians of the HOTimento Federalista 
Europeo', Altiero Spinelli,Ernesto Rose ! and their friends, 
insisted exclusively on the necessity of a European POLITICAL 
union. And for such a union to be viable,It needed a supra­
national power,which,in t u » , could only be defined through a 
federal constitution. This being the case,the movement,in 
their opinion,needed to apply itself to one objective only: 
the convocation of a European Constituent Assembly...
On the other side,the French movement 'La Fédération’ , 
animated by the tireless André Voisin,defended very different 
portions.. .No doubt,European vnion was indispensable,but its 
institutions,instead of slavishly copying national parliamen- 
tarianism,should reflect pre-existing social realities:political 
federalist needed to correspond rather to a European society 
made up of autonomous groups and unions."
These fundamental differences which,Brugmans explain •dt’bonti- 
mially divided" the J5TF between the hard-core exponents of integral 
federalista and the so—called "maximalists" in the KFE seriously 
hampered the image and inner cohesion of the movement. Indeed,in 
reference to the former predominant grouping,the influential Euro­
pean campaigner Rané Court in complained that "the society of which 
the federalists dream is unpleasantly cI obc to the French ancien 
regime and to the Portugal of Salasar."2 Spinelli*s "maximalist" 
views,on the other hand,appeared impractical. The KPE,Brugmans 
argued,"wants to prematurely force the hand of history",adding,
"and gives too much emphasis to the centralising character of Euro­
pean federal authorities...The fear of a Europea; ' super-State1, 
which is so familiar to French,Swiss and Benelux circles, rarely 
appears in I t a l y .M o n t r e u x  did not settle this argument;it in 
fact exacerbated it . In contrast to Ernesto R*e.sl's earlier 
call for a "true supra-national State with its own sovereignty and 
a.central government directly responsible to and elected by the 
cltisens’ fthe General Pqllcy Resolution approved by the Congress 
advocated instead an "organic solidarity" accompanied by "functloni 
decentralisation and self Government. " It is true that a "federal,/.
1. Brugmans,op.cii.,pp.123-4. See also Uouzy,op .c it . ,p .11.
2. René Courtin, "French views on European union"»article in 
International Affaire.Vol. XXV;Ho.1 . Jan .1949.p. 17.
3. Brugmans,''Positions fédéralistes européennes " . La Fédération .July
1 i4ü, CEC <jgi.JiVA. :La Pe.isée Politlaxie du yédéralismefejjaag 1969)p2^
* • - ;i r i t
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./.authority“ at a European level was also proposed, tut it was meant 
to include a "government* fashioned according to the corporate 
group# of the "living forces". Moreover,despite the efforts of 
the Spin ell1-Bo bsi wing,there was not one phrase in the Hontreux 
Resolutions referring to a projected European Assembly»Parliament 
or Federal Constitution. The integral federalist side,in short, 
carriei the Congress,aided by eloquent interventions by Denis de 
Rougement and Brugmans. Ket one phrase explaining the KFE position 
was printed in the Official Report of the Congress. The sole dis­
senting voice recorded was that of British L'ederal Union veteran 
Kiss F .l .  Josephy,who declarod that she was "lost in the subtleties 
of integral fe d e r a l !« . Similarly,the composition of the SU?
Central Committee,decided at the Congress,was,in brugmans' view, 
"provisionally" dominated by the integral federalists^,despite the 
inclusion of Sossi,though not Spinelli. The three senior positions 
In the Executive Bureau - President,Institutional Director and 
Secretary General - were assigned respectively to Integral federatttB 
Brugmans,Marc and Raymond Silva, in the meantlme.Karcel Hytte had 
been put in charge of the political debate at the Congress,while 
André Voisin,as General Secretary of the 'French Coordination 
Committee of Federalist Movements' and as a leading Central Commit­
tee member,remained in a strong strategical position. The sum 
significance of the situation,despite the subsequent moderate and 
bridge-building efforts of Brugmans and Silva,was described by 
Spinelli as follows}
■The Integral federalist wing gained a complete victory at 
the Kontreux Congress...The BÈTF thus became a centre for 
attracting movemnts who wented an integral transformation 
of the vbole of society in the federalist sense. Ths Italians 
remained practically isolated in an attitude of opposition, 
deprived of almost any effective Influence upon the new inter­
national organisation and its policy...The negative results 
of th>.;> situation were not long in being fe lt ...t h e  French 
federalist movement..proved incapable of formulating e "le a r ./ .
. / .  European federalist policy and remained identified essentially 
with their programme of internal federalism ■ 1
As the first major European pressure group to emerge after the
war«the BCJP's preoccupation by the summer of 1947 with internal
federalist theories was indeed remarkably out of step with the deafly
Berious patten  of international events and bi-polar power pressures
which had by now given rise to the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall
Plan. Other Buropean movements which meanwhile had been formed,to be
described shortly,appeared much more linked to cold war developmoits.
The impact of the Marshall Plan upon Buropean unity politics,none-
thelesBiW as certain ly  appreciated by Bxu&sans who was never fully
converted to hard-line integral federalist do^na and who,as BUP
Executive Chairman,strove to present on behalf of the movement a
■third force* Biropean policy,accepting Marshall Aid but "refusing*
somewhat hopefully bloc confrontation and Europe1b forced division
into Bast and Vest Ideological spheres. Burope,he naintained,should
f>
neither be capitalist nor communist,but "social". This "third ibrce" 
concept was echoed in centre-left french political circles and even 
more so among a key section of the British Labour le ft .^  At a dis­
tinct trans-national level it *a* also the central motivating theme 
which gave Impulse to a new libertarian-socialist Buropean grouping.
-Launched just a few weeks prior to the announcement of the Tru­
man Doctrine at an international confcrence held in London on 22-23 
February 1947 under the auspices of the nilitant though miniscule 
'Independent Labour Party»,the Movenent for a United Socialist 3tgtgi 
of Europe indeed 1 ed the "third force ■ Held in elate frig ttat atSy m iidqaMlart 
socialist Burope would prevent inter-bloc warfare. Electing Karce« 
Pivert(leading SPIO militant)and Bob Biwards(ILP Chrirman and GenoA 
Secretejy of the Chemical Workers Union Respectively as Chairman aid 
Vice-Chairman,plus the exiled Spanish Socialist leader Birlques
Gironella as head of the Executive Bureau,the MJSSE wait on to . / .
1. S jin e ili .o p .c it .,p p .156-9.
2. See, .for example.Bruaaana.Vinct tn« d 'Europe 1 946-1966. (College




./.pronounce at the larger follow-up conference at kontrou.3 e-Paris on 
21-22 June,held In the immediate wake of the ¿»arshall Aid speech, that 
a regenerated Europe could "only be conceived and realised by the 
Biropeans thetteselve8",and that one of the "essential" steps in this 
was the "transfer of national sovereignties to a federal o r g a n ic ."  
The far-left character of the movement and the rich revolutionary 
flavour of its first meetings,however,plus its apparently dogmatic 
stand i n . favour of only a socialist united Europe and its sponsorship 
by the outcast IX?,all initially restricted the KUSSE's appeal,desplte 
attempts to enlist rank and file  socialist support. Left-wing federa­
lists , such as Brugmans,Hare,Henry Frenay and later Spinelli and 
Ignacio Silone,nonetheless did become involved,as did eventually 
senior »«nbers from especially the French and Dutch Socialist Parties, 
considerably increasing its international standing,though changing 11b 
orientation towards a more pluralistic conception of &iropean unity!
By contrast, the Britlnh United Birope Movement, founded prtnrtnwDy 
by Winston Churchill and his son-in-law Duncan Sandye in May 1947, 
and fired hy the former's historic "Burope Arise" speech at Zurich 
in Septenber 1946 and by the soviet threat to Western Europe1b 
security,had no time for "third force" solutions or for federalist 
bravado. Firmly committed to the idea of a Western Alliance and 
linked closely to establishment circles, it had practically no dealings 
with the HUSSE and only a tenuous rapport with the EUF. Under 3 an dye' 
lead,the Oil* concentrated Instead on practical action for European 
unity within closely-knit influential circles,with the view to es­
tablishing an Anglo-French spearhead movement. Certainly in its Wttal 
stages,however,the movement was seen as a Churchill propoenda vehifnl*.
-When Ctarchill declared at Zurich his prestigious support for
2
the creation of "a kind of United States of Birope",he had,as Paul- 
Henri spaak put it,"caused a considerable gtir"^and "galvanlred all 
Ibose who believed in the need for a new E u r o p e " , thereby becoming./.
. see »nvd.op.elt.pp.81-2;USSB.IL i pamphlet,Feb.1947,CA&l BBPQGE 
. For full Zurich speech text; see ?°yd,2 p' ci tL 'ApPSn?i?c^?Q£<:i
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. “one of the leading pioneers of European unity.*'Be this as It nay- 
even federalist leaders Brugo ans and Spinelli were enthused by 
Churchill' b European lead- hie Zurich speech nevertheless con­
tained, as Spaak als* stated,"an ambiguity which no one noticed at 
the time* tut which would "become the root cause of a grave mis— 
understandin g .*' This concerned the precise geographical vision 
which Churchill had of a united Europe,and whether he seriously 
contemplated Britain as being a part of the scheme or not. ChurchSL, 
as mentioned in an earlier section,had in fact a long-standing 
record In favour of European union,but had never been too d e a r  or 
consistent about Britain's position in this respect. I *  1929,he 
had supported the Brland Plan,tat had also Indicated that It was 
suitable only for continental Europe and not for Britain,whose 
role was at the centre of the Bnplre and Commonwealth. This message 
was repeated In 1930,when he confided:
"But we have our dreams and our own task. We are linked but 
not comprised. Ve are with Europe,but not of It . Ve are 
Interested and associated,but not absorbed.* «
During the war,on the other hand,Churchill publicly espoused the 
idea of a future 'Council of Europe' In which Britain would. It 
seemed, take the lead .^  Bnt he subsequently dropped the idea ix. Aw our 
of a "three circles* concept uniting Britain primarily with the 
mplre and Commonwealth,and with America,and only then with Europe? 
Finally,at the end of the war,he developed a model of a future 
"world order* based upon separate co-operative regional pillars 
such as America,Asia,Europe and,in tun ,Britain  again with the 
Baplre and Commonwealth. The Zurich speech,In essence,was a quali­
fied extension of the latter two models,stressing the over-all 
peace—keeping framework of the Omited Hâtions Organisation,while 
also stating that Britain should help foree a united Europe fcit
not be Included as a full member of this regional group. Indeed./.
1. Spaak.op.cit.,p .2Ó0. "
2. Churchill,article in the’ Saturday Evening Post' ,1 5 .2 .3 0 . ,  
quoted by Bru/anans.l 'Idée Européenne.op .cit.
3. See Boyd,o p .c it .,p .7 3 ;European Kovenent and the Council of
2 urope.op.clt..p- .■ A . & . p .3-
. / .b e  plainly emphasised!
•The first step Is the creation of the European family must 
be a partnership between France and Germany..The first step 
is to form a Council of Europe..In all this urgent wort,France 
and Germany must take the lead together. Great Britain,the 
British Commonwealth of Nations,mighty America,and I trust 
Soviet Russia..oust be the friends and sponsors of the new 
Europe and must champion its right to live and shine."
- I«  SPaak explained in th is  respect :
"The united Europe which Churchill advocated was a continental 
Europe,of which France and Germany were to be the joint leaders. 
..Churchill wanted Britain to promote the creation of a united 
Europe,but he did not want Britain to be a part of it . For a 
number of years after his Zurich speech nobody asked exactly 
what was on his mind when he made it . Feople were only too ¿Lad 
of his backing for a great cause. The ambivalence of hie speech 
suited everyone.. .However,he was perhaps wrong not to have clari­
fied his position when the time was right and to have allowed 
people to believe that there was a powerful movement in Britain 
ready to press for that country's integration within continental 
Europe. * 2
Ciairchlll,in all probability, had a split mind on the issue,at 
times being influenced by his pro-Biropean col leagues, notably Sandy» 
Harold MacKillan and perhaps fiobert Boothby,all who saw Britain's 
integral role within Europe as complimentary to her overseas links, 
while in later tines being pressed by High Tories such r.s L .S . ¿aery 
and Ant honey Eden,who continually stressed Britain's prior commit­
ment to the m pire  and Commonwealth, though approving of continental 
moves towards European unity. The Betting up,in January 1947»of the 
British 'United Europe Committee' under Churchill's chaii*anehip and 
with sandys as the main Secretary was in this sense a victory for 
the pro-European lobby,as was the first official policy statement 
declaring that despite Britain's "special obligations and spiritual
ties" with the Coaaonvealtfc Bhe was nevertheless * "P*rt of Europe 
■trut must be prepared to make her full contribution to European uaity?^ 
Thie gain was repeated when,at tiie official launching of the U W  at 
the Albert Hall in Kay 1947,the principal policy resolution recog­
nised that "Britain Bust play her full part" in the united Birope
campaign.* In turn,Sandys was able to give full vent to this view, / .
1. Churchill’ s Zurich speech,Boyd,op.cit.,appendix J.
2. Spaak,op.cit., pp .200-1•
j. See Joyd,op.clt.,pp.74-5. 4. Ibid.
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./.when,as the main UEK delegate to the UEF hontreux Congress,he de­
clared in a key speech,contrary to Churchill's ambivalent Zurich 
message,not only that the European unity project depended on a 
Franco-German partnership, hut also that
"France must be assured that there will be in the European 
Union another large power upon whose friendship and good faith 
she can implicitly rely. There is ,o f  course,only one such 
power,and that is Great Britain. Unless Britain cm  convince 
France that she means to play her part as a full and effective 
member of the European family,the whole project will come to 
nought.■
The "dilanma" of "divorcing the Commonwealth to many Burope",he 
optimistically concluded,would not arise In practice.1
While this point was subsequently borne out so far as the 
attitude of the Commonwealth nations themselves were concerned(as 
shall be seen in later chapters),a very major "dUeium" did even­
tually arise,howover,within the Conservative Party and in the U9i 
over this loyalty issue. Although Sr.ndys initially succeeded in 
persuading Churchill to support and in turn preside over the Hague 
Congress project,despite all the political pit-falls and federalist
connotations which were attached,and where Churchill,in fact,pub-
2
licly declared that Britain's place vas vithin a united Europe,
In the long-term,as Party pressures grew and the return of a Con­
servative administration drew nearer,Churchill sided with the more 
imperial-minded Amery and Eden lobby and most of the Party members 
who, as Spaak put it,"though ready to follow their leader..were 
not prepared to go beyond expressing a measure of sympathy for the 
idea of a united continent of Europe of which Great Britain would 
not be part,"^ likewise in the UEM,where Tory spokesmen such an 
Amery(a Vice Chairman) , Eden and Xealle Hore-Belisha carried con­
siderable political weight,difficulties and doubts regarding a 
real European cc mitment arose. The token presence of a few Labour 
and socialist members,such as Gordon Lang K .P . and Victor Gollancx,
plus representatives of the weaker Liberal Party including Lord ./. 
1* at hoatreuz Congress.Aug. 19*7.Official It eoort.o p .
2. Cf .pp!?Iisrb-'7. 3. Spaak,op.cit.,p201.
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./.Layton(treasurer),Lady Violet Bonham Carter and Lady Rhys-Willlams* 
as well as other leadlsg representatives of industrial.military, 
cultural and religious spheres.could not fundamentally challenge 
this Conservative political predominance over the movement. Moreover, 
among the ranks of the committed Europeans,ambitious politicians 
such as MacMillan certainly had problems In following their opinio» 
yet avoiding Party scorn and possible ridicule regarding any open 
plans of a federal nature. The result was the espousal of a con­
federal approach,which initially became labelled as "unionist" and 
eventually as "functionalist"? Boothby,though hardly ambitious by 
this stage,also fell into the same camp,since it appeared the only 
way of securing Britain's commitment both to Europe and her over­
seas territories. The position and strategy adopted by Sandye, 
however,was more acute and is of central Importance to this dis­
sertation.
Vhlle sharing the view advocated by MacKillan that Britain 
could,at the outset,be committed rithin Europe upon a mainly con­
federal basis,Sandys wanted to equip this initial structure with 
a potentially expansionaiy capacity, based not around a rigid but 
a flexible political framework,which would not require a severe 
jolt but would itself provide the motor for progress towards a 
deeper form of union. Indeed,one of the principal themes throughout 
the following chapters will be to show how Sandys,as effective 
leader of the Buropean campaign,was consistently and f im ly  in 
favour of Britain’ s commitment to a real united Burope with an 
eventual European Government and Parliament on a supra-national 
scale. He was not,on the other hand,a theoretical federalist,but 
was rather a sharp and committed realist,seeking practical methods 
and sensible formulae for achieving his goal. Above all»the crucial 
difference between Sandy■ and the more open supporters of Buropean
political federation was a question of method rather than o f . / .
1. Dj^ Council Llst.BAMnYg
2 * $ J 5i & 84f 1iil«ime8©ri?.e Pr «” Schuman Ila n  i»en se ,ie .in corporatin g  a
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. / . direction,though this method would,in the final event,determine a 
Blight difference in destination. For,on the one hand,the “maxi­
malists* were drawn essentially from a Juridical-constitutional 
tradition of change,vanting to translate common values and goals 
into precise institutional fona through direct Judicial-political 
methods. - European unification needed to be defined,from the 
start,in the specific sense of a projected European Federation,to 
be achieved by a straight-forward constitutional approach which 
would finally transfer,*at a stroke* precise sovereign powers to 
a Buropean political authority,forthwith to be constituted. Sana's, 
on the other hand,was more accustomed to British political practise 
whereby sovereign parliamentary powers and rights were not simply 
produced by specific constitutional acts,but evolved gradually in 
a less rigid framework of precedents anfl conventions,arrived at 
through experience,general consent end without the prohianatic 
need for a binding agreement signed at one moment in time. In this 
sense,he did not favour a "Federal Pact* approach, twt rather the 
gradual creation of a European authority through a drawn-out 
series of agreements and conventions,evolving almost "iaperceptlhly* 
into, an effective federal framework without having to secure a 
prior commitment to such a project from the national governments 
and parliaments involved. - This much he tried to explain at the 
Kontreui Congress,whan he said:
"Whether in the eoonomic or political sphere,complete unity 
will not In any case be achieved overnight. At first it may 
only be possible to adopt quite modest measures of co-operatliii 
among a restricted number of nations. But the important thing 
is to make a start. An attitude of co—opcratio.'.,once Initiated, 
becomes & habit,and the scope rapidly expands. A group of 
nations working In harmony with one another by their example 
attract others to them,and the area of confidence progressively 
widens." 1
It will be argued in the following chapters that,in the
context of the time,the strategy advocated by Saridys was the most
progressive and realistic mixture possible,In so much as that up
until Kay 1950 official circles on the Ba rope an contlnm t . / .
i. sanays speecn.O fn c ia i Report.op.cit.
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./.could not envisage Buropean union without Britain,and that Britain 
would certainly not Join any binding constitutional Buropean project 
as evoked by the "maximalist" federalists. On the other hand.it will 
also be argued that,in the final event,the views of the latter grouft 
to draw up a "pact* even without Britain if  necessary,were partially 
vindicated in view of the previously unforeseen rigidity of Britain* 
negative attitude towards Europe«*' \j»vow.
For the time-being,In any case,the combination of Churchill's 
apparent Buropean initiative,Soviet anjrandieement,the Marshall Flan 
and lingering wartime idealism for the supra-national pacification 
of Jferope together pro up ted the fnunrtttg of the trans-national European 
Parllammtnrv nniB^.nmi.r Coudenhove-Kalergi' s initiative, launched 
at an international conference held at Gstaad in September 1947,the 
KPU could only initially ouster 114 "active parliamentarians" to 
the cause,representing Austria, belgiun, Britain,Denmark, France, Greece,
' Italy, the Netherlands, Sweden and Switserland.1 The French and Italic 
delegations,moreover,comprised nearly three-quarters of the total 
p
attendance. Bevertheless,despite these representative shortcomings, 
the SPU.wlth Coudenhove at the head,regarded Itself as a "prellmlnaiy 
Buropean Parliament",whose role was to "help organise in every 
Parliament non-partisan groups favouring (European) federation", 
and to "call as soon as possible a CCNSTITÜBJT ASSEKBLT for Burope", 
to be elected either by national parliaments or directly by the 
people.^ A more specific set of proposals would be presented at 
the follow-up conference planned for 1948. Some important names 
were attached to this ambitious movement,including Paul Heynaud, 
Bdoucrd Bonnefous,François de Kenthon,Paul Pflimlin and André Noel, 
but the organising Council of 15 mmbers were mostly political
"unknowns",with the exception of Georges 3ohy(EPU chairman and . / .
1. aee Bnvd.op.cit..p.B4i llpgans.Uie Anfapgc Ce- airopalschân 
ltlnmin«politlk 1 945-1 947.OP.Clt. .pp. 554-561 ♦
2. Ibid . •
3. Ibid.
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./.leader  of the socialist Group in the Belgian Parliament)and René 
Coty(a future French President).The EFU's value,above a l l ,vas In 
the subsequent organisation of All-Party Groups throughout the 
Parliaments of Burope,notably in France,Italy and Britain. The 
latter Group,as ve shall see in following chapters,vould be of 
particular Interest,In view of the special importance attached to 
the British Governments European policy. Its founding chairman. 
Labour K .P . RVG Kackay,vould indeed be one of the aost sealous 
and ardently committed leaders of the European campai*«,and,despite 
his veak standing vithin his own Party's hierarchy,he vould occupy 
a vital pivotal position In his federalist critique of the Churdtfill- 
ÜBK "monopoly*.of the united Burope idea in Britain.1
Biropean pressure groups had also emerged in other spheres. 
Post-var Christian Democratic Parties on the Suropean continent, 
for example,combined In June 1947 under a loose umbrella organi­
sation known as 'Nouvelles Eaulpca In ternationalesunder the pro- 
federal leadership of HBP deputy Robert Bichet,and later attractlig 
Schuman,Bidault and Adenauer to the can»«,though its programme 
Initially regained rather vague.2 Of »or* immediate interest.perlap* 
vaE the Independent League for Economic Co-operatloB.founded in 
Brussels In Jnne 1946 under the distinguished chairmanship of the 
past and future Belgian Premier,P«ul Van Z*eland,and supported by 
leading political and economic personalities including Paul-Henri 
Spaak,Roger Mots,François Poncet,Michel Debré,Etienne Giscard 
d ' Bstaing,Pieiter £erstens,Bgo La Halfa,plus UEX men be re such 
as Kach^llan,Lord Layton,Peter Thorneycroft and Edvard Beddlngton- 
Beiirens. Perhaps the two most committed and interesting leaders 
of the movement,hovever,were Danniel serruye(former chairman of
the pre-war 'Union Economique Douanikre• )and the fascinating./.
1. Sec RWG Kack.a-T.Iou Can't Turn the Clock BtiCk(Loadon I946)pp.
266-7,plus his main work.jederal Burope.(London 1940).
2. For its more detailed proposals, see 1IEI Conference pamphlet
(1949 ),CASK BRUGGE.
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• / .  former aide to war-time Polish General Si-oraki and poet—war
•Bainence Srise’ of pro-European political clrcles,Joseph Retinger
- the initial orgaalsor of ILBC.1 The basic aim of the movement 
was,in the words of Retinger,"to revive the concept of unity of 
Birope by applying It first to the economic fieldr^ It* main pro­
posals,as outlined by Stmiys at the Montrcux Congress,included: 
the gradual establishment of a European customs union;a common 
production plan;coaplete free trade,to be achieved through progressive 
reduction of taiiflb;the convertibility of European currencies) 
and more Joint Ri rope an tt»-operation over th* regulation of agri­
cultural and energy problems.^ The USC,moreover,was one of the 
first groups iaaediately to seise upon the Marshall Aid announce— 
maat in June 1947,drafting straight away a set of concrete proposds 
for the British,French and US Governments,outlining how the aid 
could best be channelled along constructive l in e s .*
By aid-1947,a proliferation of European pressure groups had 
thus come into being - some, such as the UKF,MUSSB and In part the 
NBI,inspired Initially by post-war Idealism aud a mainly Euro­
centric federal vision not fully in keeping with the bi-polar 
international development which was now forcing the pace of official, 
decision aaking, others,notably the U9 1 ,IIEC and in part the EPU, 
taking cue from conditions and events leading to a •estern bloc 
consolidation«though the latter group had a distinct Biropean 
federal policy too,while ILEC was in many ways a forerunner to 
future Coraon Market European functionalism. To a large extant, 
howev«>Juet as official Buropean policy projects »ich as OESC 
hinged upon an Anglo-French axis« so too did the emerging airopean 
campaign need to consolidate its activities In these two countries.
-Despite the existence of various populist though m a in ly ./.
2« Ibid* fQ
3. Serruys speech at Koctreux , see official Repprt»op.cit.pp5B- 9.
4. Retinger Meaolrg.op.clt.,pp.212- 3.
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. / .fringe federalist mo vein en te in France, there was no umbrella organi­
sation comprising a more balanced and influential grouping of Euro­
pean activists. Tills lack of organisation vas of considerable con­
cern to Duncan sandys who,despite the political Imbalance in his 
own movement on account of Labour's hostility to Chnrchill1, none­
theless regarded the US! as a future launching pad for coordinated 
action with France especially and with similar movements on the 
European continent as a whole. Indeed,already in December 1946, 
he confid.ed to Coudenhovet"It is difficult to make any progress at 
the moment in France,the reason being French fear of a revived 
Gennany."* Efforts were nevertheless initiated mainly through the 
former resistanoe leader and actual co-director of 'Le Konde'.Recé 
Courtin,who looked to a united Europe as an Independent "third 
force" analogous to the Socialist-KHP-Radical alliance in France 
while offering at the same time an international solution to the 
"German problem".** Thcugh initially greeted by doubts and hesitation 
among French Socialists,who were sympathetic to Courtln's unity 
project tut deterred by its links with Churchillf the scale of 
international events and Western European momentum helped out. By 
10 July ,1947,Courtin was able to send Sandye an impressive list  of 
26 leading political and cultural figures,Including Socialists,who 
were willing to form a French Committee.® On 16 July,the Committee 
was officially inaugurated with the veteran Radical leader,Edouard 
Herriot,as its Honorary President. The other main members included: 
Paul Bastid(Radical),Paul Reynand(Independent)i?ierre-Henri Teltgaa 
(KRP)and subsequently Paul Ramadier(Socialist)as vice-presidents» 
plus René Kayer(Radical);Paul Coste-Floret,François de l.enthon, 
Sdmond Michel et(MRP);Robert Lacoste,françols Leenhardt,André l e » /»
1» Cf. pp.eo-1. " ” 7 “
2. See Lipgens ,op .cit .,pp .570-2
3. See Courtin article in International À *fairs .o p .cit ., p p .10-11.
4 .  L i p g e n s , o p . c i t .
5. Courtin,letter to Sandy», 10 .7 .47 . ,CAB‘. BRU3GB.
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.Troquer and >1. hon.1o*(SFIO)and the Benior academic André Siegfried. 
Courtin,for hie part,acted as General Secretary of the Committee, 
formally called*!« Conseil Français pour 1 'Europe U n ie '.soon to be 
aided by A&dré Ho el (MRP ) and by the fo n e r  Fr ench kinister, Raoul 
Lautry(Independent)who became Chairman. - a b  Sandye remarked,with 
obvious satisfaction,the French Committee was "influential and 
highly representative."^ The Committee,however,was rather more pro- 
federal than perhaps anticipated,Courtin clearly setting down their 
objective as a "European Federation".2 Ramadier,Dautry and Noel,on 
the other hand,proved to be a little  more cautious In this respect, 
and in practice,moreover,Courtin himself was forced to modify his 
position due to pressure from his British Bffi colleagues. This 
British pressure became only too evident as the campaign to co­
ordinate activities started to gather pace.
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3) lugiiuung« of Coordination
Sy mid-1947 it had in fact become clear that the multiplicity of 
European pressure groups which had emerged since the war and in res­
ponse to developments leading to the cold war ran the risk of causing 
confusion and potential discouragonent both among public opinion and 
within the groups concerned. Though in some cases duplication of 
membership occurred,the need for closer overell liaison w b b  impera­
tive. Coudenhove-Kalergi.in this connection,initially saw it as h ie^  
task to lead an umbrella movement for European unity and,already in 
November 1946,had proposed a merger betveen the projected IJffi and a 
revived version of his Pan-ftiropa under the title 'United Europe’ , V 
of which he would be Secretary General «Churchill ( Honorary )?resld«t 
and Sandya Assistant Secretary General.^Neither Sandye nor Churchill ^
seeoed to have shown any marked enthusiaffa for the project,though./.
1. Se* ¿ ip g an s .o p .c it .,p .¿11. —
2. C?W  'Provisional Manifesto.2A. 1 .4 7 . .CAff BHUGGS.
3. Coudenhove-Kalergi.'United 3nrppe:m«noranrtua on the planned 
merger of the British Com~iit\.ee for a United Sates of Sirope 
and the Fan Huron«»a Union.fl«t«*d.i. 1 1  4 6 ..CA&i BHUGGE.
./ .t h is  did not dissuade Coudenhove from greeting the formation of the 
United 3urope Committee',in January 1947,as a "new sister organiaatta" 
to his dissipated Fan European Union1,nor from proposing the idea of 
inviting Churchill to be Honorary President of the projected EFU.^ 
Churchill's failure to show up at the EFU-Ostaad inaugural congress, 
in turn,wag hardly an auspicious starting point for Sandys in his 
own attanpt to lead an. umbrella, grouping with EFU support. - As 
Retlnger acidly commented concerning Coudenbove's co-operation along 
such lines:
"He had every right to be considered as a pioneer of European 
Unity,and not withstanding other circumstances he wanted to be 
treated as such." 5
Co-operation between the UEM and RTF,though rather difficult 
at first,resulted in a more substantial alliance. The initiative in 
talcing up contact seeas actually to have come from the federalists' 
side whentin February 1947, Bmgmang,Merc and K.R. Nord wait to 
L0ndon on behalf of the HJF in order to start discussions with the 
newly formed United Burope Committee and to outline their own "ob­
jectives and working methods." Stressing the international compos!tin 
of the 37?,as opposed to the national character of the apparently 
junior UEC,and pronouncing the conviction that a United Burope 
needed to be based upon the surrender of certain elements of na’CUnd. 
sovereignty together with the need for economic planning and inner 
federalist and ti»e rejection of a purely "Western bloc" policy 
aimed against Russia,they subsequently sought the UBC position, 
concluding rather naively:
" I f  the United Europe Committee could share our views..It  
would seem that nothing would stand in the way of the UEC 
adhering to the &tF,on the same conditions and with the 
same rights and duties as the other federalist movements." 4
The point which the BUT delegation failed to grasp,however,was that
the UBC,despite the inclusion among its ranks of some Federal Uniu/. 
~  See Coudenhove telegram to Churchill, 1 6 .1 .4 7 .,  CAJ& BHUGGE
2. letter to Sandys,17 .6 .4 7 . ,  Ca EK BHU03E. 3. Retinger op.cltp.214 
. Hote to UEC members signed by Brugmans.l.arc and Nord, and sent 
to Sandys from London on 3 .2 .4 7 . ,CAB; BRUGGE.
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/.members»1 had not been founded In order to become affiliated to any 
European federalist organisation,but rather to give an Anglo-French 
lead to the developing European movement aea whole. Sandys»nonethe-
1 ess,answered the HJF questionnaire with considerable tact,stressing;
■It is clear that no United Birope could be created unless 
the nember states were to agree in some measure to surrender 
elements of their sovereignty."
He in turn explained,however,that any such partial relinquishment
of sovereignty could only develop'out of a broader gradual campaign:
have not attempted at this stage to iefine what these 
elements should be or to define the precise constitutional 
solution which will commend itself to the nations of Europe.
We are confining ourselves to the limited aim of obtaining 
sufficient support for the general conception of European 
unity to enable a representative conference of leading 
Europeans to be convened. It would be for Buch a conference, ,  
after full discussion,to consider the next steps to be taken.*
Sandy s ' compact reply, el eo assuring the BUT that the UBC/UEK 
recognised the need both for common political and economic action 
in Europe plus the ultimate need to "unite all the peoples of BuropdJ 
hopefully with the "co-operation of Bussla",actually summed up the 
strategy which he adopted up to the convening of the Hague Congress 
over one year later.- The European sovereignty issue,though by no 
means rejected,was not to be allowed to stand in the wry of prior 
practical progress of the European campaign in its initial take-off 
stage. K>r was the campaign to be overtly aimed at uniting the Vestem 
half of Europe alone,though this was the initial Implicit aesumptfcn. 
Above all,the Idee of launching a "representative conference of 
leading Europeans" had been aired. -It soon proved to be the central 
uniting thene in the joint campaign which followed, though at the 
cost of considerable federalist disoord and misunderstanding.
The federalists’ position in relation to the new British move­
ment wae indeed essentially one of bluff and naivety. The need for 
serious British support and involvement in the European campaign was
evident to all but the most adventurous of "maximalistes" in th e ./.
1. ie . Oorion Lang h.JF., p .l . Josephy ,l.0rd Beveridge,etc.
2. See,for example, Sandy a letter to Coudenhove, 4 .1 2 .4 6 ., CABK BHUGliS.
3. Sandys. ’answer to questions'.attached to ¿Ui' iiote.on.clt.
./.context of the tine. Spurned by Labour1 and unable to muster much
Impact now through '? ederal Union',the ECJF leadership had to face the 
fact that the emerging Churchill group,despite its ambiguity,would 
have an international standing which would overshadow the relatively 
unknown, though numerically superior, theori stg in their own trans­
national movement. Sandys*nonethel ess,valued the international links 
of the ST?,while at the erne time he hastened the formal launching 
of the Anglo-French United Barope groups. Both aspects combined when, 
after having been officially represented at the U9! Inauguration at 
the Albert Hall In May 1947,the leading 3D? spokesman in Trance,André 
Voisin,issued an invitation through Qordon Lang requesting a Joint 
meeting In  Pails between British and Prench delegates of the Europe* 
unity and federalists movements. On July 17ionly one day after the 
Conseil Prançals was officially set up »Sandys arrived in Paris as 
part of what was supposed to be a mixed team of leading British UB( 
and federalist personalities,including Gordon Lang,Robert Boothby, 
L .S . Amery,Leslie Hore-Bellsha,Lerd Beverid3e,KlsE Josephy and led,
p
In theory,by tT£H treasurer Lord Layton. At the various meetings held 
throughout the course of the visit it soon transpired that it was 
more than a purely Anglo-Trench affair and that Sandys was taking the 
lead in order to force the pace towards a more ambitious coordination 
project. Having secured major status through the UEK and CTEB beinc 
identified as "sister movements",on July 20 he chaired a crucial 
exploratory meeting attended not only by Lang,Courtin and Noel 
representing the "United Burope Movement and associated movements" 
together with fixugaans,><arc and Silva for the BUT,but joined also by 
Joseph Retlnger and Daniel Serruys representing the ILEC,plue Léon 
Kaccas &s a vice-president of the EFU. Opening the proceedings,San^s 
case quickly to the point - in view of the "large measure of common
agreement" existing between the movements,he vas proposing the . / .
1 . Information given to the writer by Henrv '-irugmans.
2. See BW  Lettre Circulaire. No. 1 •*. 2 2 .7 .4 7 . ,CBc G Eli EVA; Federal
.1 4 9 .August 1947,article "Diversity L Unity", RETIHGEK 
Lipgem s,op.cit.,pp.61 2-4.
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./.formation of a European Llaiftpn ^ommittce. in which each participating 
movement would retain its independence while accepting that the new 
movement as a whole would have to draw up some "broad division of 
responsibilities* and allocate to each organisation some "more or less 
defined sphere of activity." There resulted the following agreement! 
The participating movements to the new Comr.ittee would seek "as far 
as possible" to adopt a "common line of action" and to "endeavour in 
all important matters to act in consultation and agreement with each- 
other", though retaining their ultimate "freedom of action." It was 
also agreed that tha IIBC would concentrate on the economic aspects of 
the campaign, and the XPU on gaining parliamentary support for the Su ro­
pe an cause,while the SU? would act as a trans-national masB propaganda 
movaoent,leaving the DBI/C?EtJ to concentrate on gaining the support of 
"prominent public figures" with the view to organising "large public 
meetings of an international character." 1
The draft agreement to set up the 1 Biropean Liaison Committee* 
was speedily approved by the UEK,the IISC and by the C?BtJ, fears in 
the latter group concerning British Conservative caution over the 
supra-national sovereignty issue being overridden by the realisation 
tLat the European unity campaign "depended" on an Anglo-French agree- 
aact.^ Probiens soon arose,however,both with the EOF and BPU. In the 
first case,the SJ? Montrsux Congress In August t947 marked a notable 
difference of view between the EU? theologians and the invited U9C 
delegation,leading to a public clash on radio over ths "revolutionary" 
federalist views of da Bougaaont and the "realistic" unionist tactics 
defended by S » d y s .3 At the subsequent EOT Central Committee meeting 
on August 3 1 ,both Hytte and Marc also complained about the dangers of 
being associated too such with "parliamentarians",who threatened to 
submerge the federalist movement in an apparent attempt to regain the
influence which they had lost. It was only with considerable attaaftty,,/.
~  * European Liaison Comnittee* meeting, 20 .7 .47 .
RBTINOEB PAPERS.
2* leB réunions fédéralistes franco-anglaises'»
3. De Bougea oat, article in Government & Opposition.op. c i t .. pp.~s .
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. / . therefore,that Bitiffnans managed to extract a formal ratification of 
the liaison pact,1 notifying Sandye of the fact on September 2. The 
EPU ratification,on the other hand,failed to materialise. There can 
be little  doubt that Coudenhove was to blame. Having been snubbed 
by Churchill and Sandys in his own liaison attempts,and publicly 
embarrassed by Brugmane' outspoken ’ third force" statements.the 
final straw was ClurchiH *s disinterest in and Sandys1 downgrading 
of the projected EPU-Gstaad conference. In the final event,despite 
having tentatively agreed to the July liaison pact»Coudonhove 
persuaded a meeting of the provisional EPU Council,held only one 
day before the Qataad conference in September,to withdraw froa 
membership of the European liaison Committee. The conference was 
not even informed of this decision and in consequence did not dis­
cuss it . Moreover,the decision to leave the Comsittee was communi­
cated some two weeks after the Gstaad conference without any re­
ference to the newly elected Council. The fundamental problem was 
that Coudenhove expected a privileged share out of liaison responsi­
bilities for himself and hie movement. Sandys,already making his 
weight felt,together with Retinger held that such special treatnect 
was untenable. The longterm result,as Retinger put it,was that 
Coudenhove "accepted several times to participate in the Co-ordinating 
Committee,but each time after a few weeks or even a few days,he 
j
retracted."
Initial coordination had at least been achieved between the
four remaining movements,while some interest was also expressed with
regard to the developing Catholic-HEI initiative,though on the
condition that European unity did not become soley a "Party issue"?
In the eeae context,Sandys waned his French committee colleagues that» 
in any talks with the tJSSE»they should argue that insistence o n ./.
1. Sli'F fcc meeting.Kontreux.3 1 .6 .4 7 ..o fficial minutra.CBC GS?eVa .
2. See Retinger,op.cit.,p .214; Coudennove-Sandys correspondence 
21 .6 .4 7 . A 25 8 .4 7 .»letter from Sandys to Koel 6 .6 .4 7 .»Kemo on 
relations with EFU.CAai BHDGGE; plus lip gens ,op .c it .,pp .617-8.
3. Sandys letter to Noel 6 .8 .4 7 . ,op.cit.
. / . a  purely 'socialist* Europe “would bring us nearer to real unity in 
Europe"»adding "the aim should be unite all Europeans,aii parties 
and all n a t io n a l i t ie s .T h e  stress which SandyB placed on avoiding 
party divisions over Europe was Intrinsically linked to hie strategy 
of convening an international assembly of "prominent public figures" 
who would publicly acclaim the cause of European unity and in turn 
propel the campaign into the realas of governmental attention. The 
July liaison pact had in effect assured Sandys of responsibility for 
such a campaign. The idea took root more firmly when at Hontrail 
both he and Retlnger discuesed the project at considerable length, 
and found ,as Retlnger recorded, "from the outset we were in complete
9
agreement."*  The federalists for their part,however»launched at 
Kontreaz the idea of an alternative corporatist-oriented Base inter­
national congress on the lines of an "Estates General of Europe", 
composed of delegates from the so-call ed liv in g  forces"»*® would 
prer.ent their "eahiers de revendlcations" to vast deliberative 
assenblies and permanent committees which would somehov persuade 
national authorities to relinquish powers to a nt?w European authority 
which,In tun,would have fixed responsibilities to coordinate and 
give full expression to the various autonomous institutions and 
groupings initially called into action.*^ such a programme was 
presented by Bjugmans at the subsequent European liaison Committee 
meeting held at Paris,in Sandys' absence,on October 1 5 .*  The very 
evident doctrinal void which separated the EUT "militants" froa the 
Sandys-Retlnger axis both as regards the nature of power and the 
purpose of politics was now also threatening to disrupt their 
initial plans and objectives for the European campaign.
hatters moved towards a partial conc?usion at the next meeting 
of the Buropean Liaison Committee,held in Paris on Itwanber 10-11,where 
Sandys,as a priority,tightened his tactical grip and numerical./.
1. Letter by TB Ear tin on behalf of Sandys to ¡,.]}ebr^,l7.9.A7.
2. Retlnger,op.cit., p .215. 3. See de Rpugc>ont,op.ci» . ,p .336«
4. Buropean Liaison Committee meeting,Earls,1 1 0 .4 7 . .official
minutes ,CA.»i BRUGES.
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./.advantage In terns of organisation,securing the meeting's agreement 
to increase representation in a new Co-ordination Committee to a 
maximum of four delegates for each member movement,while at the sane 
time set up an Executive Comalttee including a Chairman and General 
Secretary appointed on a yearly basis and backed up by a secretariat 
based in Paris and London, in annexed Protocol to the provisional 
aereement(moreover,also defined the UIM and CFBJ as two distinct 
member groups both entitled to their full quota of votes. The net 
result of this agreement was that the Sandys-Betinger axis was assured 
a permanent majority in the new Coordination aad Executive Comnittees 
insomuch that the separately recognised CFBQ under Courtin would not 
challenge their British co-founders in the USK,while the ILEC was 
both sympathetic to Sandye' realistic approach and,in any cace,cos- 
prised many US ' members. In addition,the three-to-one monopoly in 
Sandys’ favour was extended even more in the projected Executive 
Comnittee where Sandys and Hetinger were guaranteed the two additional 
places of Chairman and Secretary. Not surprisingly, therefore,was the 
ultimate decision concerning the scale and character of the planned 
"European Conference” postponed until the next meeting of the re­
stive ted Comnittee,though already Sandys defended nis own invitation 
policy restricting the Congress to about 300 important personalitieB, 
as opposed to the federalists' view of a mass gathering of at least 
1000 popular representatives. Already at this stage,in fact,,the 
ascendency of the Sandys-Retinger axis with regard to the planning 
of the immediate campaign was quite evident,the location of the 
"Conference* being decided,on Sandys' initiative,ae The Hague and 
the date being provisionally fixed for Kay 19*6. This choice of 
venue arose from the fact that Sandys,relying on his friend Prince 
Bernard of the Netherlands,could secure substantial financial backing 
for the proposed Hague project from the Dutcb-baBed Philips Group, 
and had already arranged for the leading Dutch political supporter of 
European union,Senator Ker8tenstto coordinate this fund raising ./.
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/.ta s k . This illustrative point,that the financing of the project was 
already under way,jaade it clear to the hard-presred federalist rep­
resentatives is the Committee that the campaign policy would ulti­
mately be decided by those who held the purse ctrlnga. The BUT,in 
this respect vas not a well financed organisation,whereas the U S ,  
assisted by ICI Chairman Lord HcGowan,succeded in raising generous 
funds from the leaders of British industry. For all its naive enthu­
siasm in favour of a pseudo-revolutionary campai^i of the "living 
forces",the ECTP was simply unable to finance by itself any project 
for a mass "Bstates General". As an organisation it  could not match 
the crucial financial pull of its counter-parts in the Liaison 
Committee. These hard economic facte,together with Sandys' impressive 
organisational flair and the political reality that a European movent 
ostensibly backed by Clurchill would outshine an organisation of 
mainly unknown federalist theorists at an international level,would 
indeed weigh heavily in the EPF's official decision whether or not 
to accept the provisional agreement of November 11. 1
Presenting his report to the BUT Central Committee on Hovenber IS 
Brugmane had little  hope to offer. The SUP was confronted by a "drffetjc 
situation".having to take "great risks" whatever it decided to do. 
"Alone against three" in the Liaison Committee,the EUF’ s idea of 
"summoning Burope" in a vast popular campaicn of the "living forces*^ 
leading to a mass "Estates General" had been superceded in the 
Committee by 3andys’ idea of a conference of outstanding European 
personalities,which would in turn provide the basis for a more pro­
tracted political campaign. Moreover, Biugm-'ns warned .despite Labour's 
official opposition to the "Churchill movement" and the USSE's de- 
tachment from the coordinated campaign,the Hague Conference project
stood a good chance of succeeding as a politically representative./.
T. Bu.ro tie an Llalaon Comi.ittee neetinr.Par-ia.10-11 . I I . A7. . official 
minutes.CAB! BH0BGB. On UEK finances see E. Beddington-Behrens, 
look Back - Look Forward (Kacillllan. l?63),ch .13 , "ihe 3urot>ean
p e rS S ^XCSc T E O T i . 3 see ograIett-er «PP*»*« of
. / .t f f a i r .  The federalists,he went on to argue,siiould have no Uluelons 
as to the influence they would have at such a congress:
mJe have at once sensed the danger for us in this spectacular 
gathering;it could crusi* us.or at the very least,create confusion 
in the public at large .. However,if we refuse,what will happen?
It seems difficult to call the Estates General against the 
congress of The Hague. The others will have ample cover on the 
left ..and  we shall soon have to face serious financial diffi­
culties. Very probably this would soon paralyse our action in 
the immediate future,and it is the imnediate future which counts. 
..Our own movements will disintigrate if  we do not give them a 
clear goal. We would run the risk of becoming a sect. And in the 
meantime the others would act. The right is enjoying an unexpected 
revival,the comnunists have deliberately isolated themselves and 
the 'third force* will either withdraw to its tent or join the 
'great names' of a ‘united Europe' . . . J e  could, doubtless, to a 
certain extent prevent the others from winning a complete 
victory at The Hague, but we could not succeed either, anc we 
should have paralysed eachother mutually."
It  was evident in his presentation that Brugmans had undergone
a strong dose of realism through his brief association with the more
politically experienced members of the liaison Comnittee. -'lis fears
of the StJ? becoming an isolated "sect" had also been given a severe
jolt when,in attempting to reduce the anti-federalist majority In
the Committee by appealing for Trench socialist support and USSB
involvement, the SPIO leader Léon El un mockingly tu n e d  him down,
2
accusing the federalists of being a "bag of crabs". Brugmans,as a 
result started to have serious misgivings about the over doctrinaire 
aspects of hard-line integral federal ism,and thereafter attempted to. 
steer the BUF along a more moderate and adaptable "poasiblliste" 
approach in the European unity campaign. He ardently proposed,there­
fore, that the November 11 agreement be ratified by the BUT,but on 
the condition that three provisos be respected:(1 )that Eastern Euro­
pean countries be invited to the conijresa; (2)that "permanent organs’ 
be set up at The Hague;(3)and that delegates to the congress be chos« 
by national comr.ittees without the Joint Corjnlttec Slaving the right 
of veto. In this way,he hoped to retain some "third force" aspect to
the affair,secure sone loose sort of "Estatee General" apparatus . / .
1. 3UF CC meeting, 1 5.11. 47. »quoted by de itouGac:ont,oj:.cit.p7j37ï
2. See Lipgens,op .clt.,pp .62ê-7.
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.and,at the crucial initial stage,reduce Sandys’ monopoly of authority 
wielded at a singular committee level by charging a broader alter­
native organisation with responsibility for the Hague Congress 
invitation policy. Not everyone at the SJ? Central Committee meeting 
was convinced by hie arguments or by his compromise approach. - as 
de Rougemont inform a ua:
"In the discussion which followed,one could feel that each of 
the 16 members of the Central Conr.ittee who spoke (out of the 20 
present)had the same fears end contradictory desires,however 
unequally divided: breaking with the party of leading personalities 
which held the purse strings and the press,meant,on the one hand, 
to run the risk of courting destruction or of becoming a sect,as 
Brugmans said..and,on the other hand,to condemn the Hague to be 
slaply a trompe 1 'oeil congress,without any European future.
But to ¡o to The Hague under the auspices of a union vaguely 
outlined b;* Churchill instead of calling the Estates General - 
did this not involve running the risk of losing not only the 
benefit of numbers..but also the creative and revolutionary 
dynamis» which the federalist doctrine brought with it?
Should we survive end risk losing the very reason for our 
existence?..Or should we run the risk of isolation and dis­
location and thus Jeapardise the only chance perhaps for our 
federalist revolution to succeed?" ‘
In the final event,the more realistic views of Brugmans prevailed
and the November 11 agreement was ratified. It was a difficult and
important decision both for the BC7F and for the future campaign,
frought with risks and the seeds of ¿rowing internal dissension.
As de Hougenont again put it :
"The BUT chose that day to take the risk of collaborating. It 
did d o  seemingly without enthus!a s s ,  even with a certain pessimiaa 
anong many,as if the decision implied more than a concession."
There was now one month left between this crucial ® r  decision 
and the next meeting of the Liaison Committee.during which the HJF 
made one more rftort Id enlist the support and involvement of the USSE 
and EPTT in order to reduce,indeed overture,the anti-federalist 
majority with regard to the Hague preparations. On December 10,i'.arc 
;„ade an impassioned appeal to the USSB Chairnan,i.arceau Pivert,in 
which he insisted:
"A very im ortant g^m® will be played at the ¡¡ague .-«union, 
a reunion which we are firmly intent upon transforming into 
an Bctatea General of Burope/ Sut,in fact,this game will n o t ./.
1. de Hougenont,op.cit.,pp.337-C. 2. Ib id ,p .¿ y  ,
. / .  only be played at '¿'he Hague,it is olrep.dy now being played,and 
the result of the battle will depend to ■ lar^e extent on the 
preparations in hand.* 1
The appeal waB made in vain: The French USSE leaders,especially
Henry Frenay,tried tut failed,to persuade their British colleagues
- John HacNair,Fenner Broc’ri.'ay,Walter Padley.etc. - to noderate
their stand and participate in the Hacue preparations. As Frenay
confided to Marc,"one has Just to mention the naie Churchill and
it 1 b like waiving a red flag in front of a bull."^  In the final
event,the USSE Executive Committee narrowly rejected a motion to
participate in the joint Hague campaign,though Frenay»Pivert and
later Bob Edwards indicated their personal sympathy for the project
and the possibility of participating in an unofficial individual
capacity.^ The BFU,likewise,decided to "maintr.ln its independence*
in order to concentrate its campai^ at the”purely parliamentary
level.
Meanwhile,In anticipation of the compromises which would have 
to be made in the joint campaign, Brugmans and Silva attenpted to 
move the EUF towards a more practical "nossibiliste* centre-ground 
policy position. Key support for this strategy was given by leading 
Dutch Central Committee member H .R. Nord who,in early December, 
presented Buigmans with a compromise federalist plan which struck 
a balance between the corporatist extremes of the lntegral-federAK 
Fédération tendency on the one side,and the strict constitutional 
approach of the Spinell1-Bo cel maximaliste MFE alliance on the 
other side. The plan,somewhat ambiguously called "Thoughts about 
a Bi rope an Constitution*, basically proposed that,instead ofjwrsulng 
an unrealistic "Estates General* approach or an Impractical 
■^Juridical? approach,the SÜF ought instead to adopt a pragmatic 
•factual approach* in the European unity campaign,concentrating
on attainable European Institutions and -..•orking on from there. . / .
1» Karc.letter to K&vcesu Pivert,10.i2.47.,BHUGKANS PATERS
2. Frenay letter to Marc, 12 .12 .47 . UEF PARIS.
I :  Î i j s s s s p î c ï î r ip l r î l s ^ î 0 bh/gi.a^ papers
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./.The  initial goal,he weat on to aigcest,siiouli'! be a "Buropean political 
council (a kind of ’Politburo' ) , containing influential politicians and 
capable of exercising considerable authority." In turn,a "draft text" 
outlining proposals for a "Buropean Bill of Rights" and the setting 
up of "regional sub-federations" and autonomous "Buropean functional 
agencies" could be presented to this suthorlty as the most suitahle 
official agency at the Buropean level! Uord,in short,was proposing 
that the Hague Congress should attempt to s'tlmulate the official 
setting up of a Council of Europe,rather than actually regard Itself 
as a representative transitional Buropean instrument of change. This 
coincided with Brugmans’ own developing thoughts on the issue and the 
need to campaign for an Intergovernmental pact setting up a Buropean 
authority of some sort,the sectoral, functional and integrating 
mechanlsns of which would develop and coordinate a web of multiple 
and regional autonomous groupings. Nord'B plan,in fact,would be 
reflected in large part later In the ECTF’s official draft resoltlons 
for the Hague Congress.2 In the meantime,it provided a stimulating 
reference point for Brufaans as he entered into the crucial liaison 
Coamittee dlscusions of December 13«
It was,In fact,at this meeting,held in Paris and spread over 
two days,that the Committee assumed the new official title of the 
"Joint International Committee of the Movements for Biropean Unity". 
Attended at various stages by R. Dautry.P. Baetid,R. Court in, E. Vermeil, 
and a . Hoel (CFBJ) ;Paul van Zeeland,P.Kerstena, D. Serruys, Beddington- 
Behrens and J.Dalattre(IlEC); BiMgmans, Silva and Volsin(HJF) sand by 
Lord Layton and Sandys(USK),the meeting speedily elected Sandys and 
Retlnger as Chairman and General Secretary respectively of the new 
Executive Committee,joined for the moment by Brugmans,Serruys and 
Deutry. The main business of the meeting - the preliminary orcanisatioc
of the Hague Congress - was lers straight forward. Having already./.
1. H.R. aiord.Thour.iitB a W t  a &»ropeaa Constitution.e. 1 2.47^
PAPERS.
2. Cf.pp. 1*6-11»,
S' CA^'affiaSI“ “ 11011*1 ConB!ittee 1 >  U .  1 2« 4 7 . .o fi'icJLal mtortee.
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./.examined Brugaans' three conditions for continued involvment in the
project - that Eastern European countries be invited,that*peraaneat
organs"be set up at the Congress and that the delegates be selected
by national committees - Sandys had confidently replied as "PrOTlsiinal
1
Executive Chairmen" in a circular Issued two days before the meeting 
that the "Immediate purposes* of the Congress were to "demonstrate 
in striking fashion* existing support for the E-iropean idea and to 
forthwith launch a strong campaign In all countries. Stressing,as 
he had on previous occasions,that the aim of the caapaipn was to 
bring about the "effective unification of all Europe" and that "care 
should be taken to avoid giving the impression that the aim of the 
Conference was the creation of a Western hloc",he nonetheless went 
on to argue that,in view of the "ideological opposition* of Rissia 
and her satellite states to the European idea and the restrictions 
which would prevent a free selection of delegates from such countries 
a an all number of "observers" should instead be selected by the Jo*it 
Committee for representative purposes. The formula,he emphasised, 
would apply both to Eastern Europe and to Spain. It was hardly a 
policy which corresponded to Bmpnans' lingerin ' "third iorce" 
aspirations,nor did Sandys1 vague references to a post-Hacue camfBi^n 
fully satisfy his more specific structural denrixds. Even so,despite 
the distinct hardening of attitude with regard to Soriet intentions, 
no doubt boosted by the collapse of Four Power London talks in 
Uovember,^ Sandys had gone some way towards aocoraaodating Brugmans 
on the "Western bloc" issue,(though Bevin,it is true, had as yet 
to pronounce in full his Western consolidation policies).^With 
regard to the essential invitation policy, jowever,Sandys left little 
room for compromise. His argument,of vital importance for under­
standing the preparator7 stages to the Jlaflue C o n g r e s s ,a s  AiDwst./.
1 . SandVB. ‘Organisational Arranremeatg for the ton; er.eng.g' .note,
1 1 .12 .47 ., REilWiEB PAPEKS.




. "The question ae to whether or not the Conference is ,in  fact, 
fully representative of Europe,will be decided by the innresrion 
fonaed by the press,and,through then,the general public of the 
world. That imp res r-ion will depend entirely upon the actual 
conpoeition of the assembly,and not u^on the nethods adopted 
to issue the invitations.
If the composition of the delegations is inadequately balanced 
or inferior in personal standing,the press reaction will 
certainly be unfavourable,and the fact that we might be able 
to say that delegations had been selected by impeccable 
constituted committees in each country will not make the 
ali^atest difference.
numerous consultations w ill,o f course,have to ta!:c i>lace and 
advice will have to be sought from the individuals,organisations 
and groups in the various countries. IF , MOtf EVER, THE EUROPEAN 
COORBIIUTIUG COH. IT TEE IS TO BE PJ5SP0RSI3L5 FCR THE SUCCESS OR 
FAILURE 0? THE CONFERENCE,IT MUST ITS5LF .12TAIK FULL CONTROL 
OF THE SELECTION OF DELEGATES, AND CANNOT AFFORD TO DELEGATE 
THIS VITAL FUNCTION TO ANY OUTSIDE BODIES." 1
Sandy8 was clearly determined not to allow the federalists to 
reverse their minority status in the Joint Committee by transferring 
the invitation decision-making to a loose international network 
spread out beyond the immediate grip of the "unionists” and opm to 
mass federalist agitation. Above all,he  was adamant upon preventing 
the Congress itself from beins attended by delegates of "inferior 
personal standing",meaning unknown federalist enthusiasts lacking 
in impact and ill-equipped to carry out a practical programme of 
action. Already in a strong strategical position,he managed to persuade 
Siugmans to accept a joint "conpromise" set of proposals,in due 
course approved by the Committee meeting on Decenber 14. It was 
agreed, therefore, that the Hague Conference was to be entitled 
"Congress of Europe", the purpose of which was«
■1. to demonstrate in striking fashion the powerful and wide­
spread gupport which already exists for the Hiropean idea;
2. to produce material for discussion,propaganda and technical 
studies;
3. to provide a strong new impetus to the campaign in all 
countries."
With regard to the Eastern European question,it was further stated:
"In cojntriiB from which it proves impossible to obtain repre­
sentation delegations should(with the exception of HuaeiaJbe 
represented by stiall numbers of observers chosen by the co­
ordinating Conn-lttee."
Finally,as to the actual responsibility for selecting delegates,«/»
i . Sandys,op.cit. (iu8 italics)
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./ .t h e  agreed text patently emphasised:
"European movements,where they existed,should be fully conoulted, 
but the final decision and. responsibility must rest with the 
International Comr.ittee."
In short,the International Comsittee continued to support,while
Brugmans also succumbed to,the arguments and stratepy put forward try
Sandys and Retinger in favour of holding a spectacular gathering,
limited in scope by the tight organisational control of the Committee,
nnd designed to win influential support for the general cause of
European unity. In the words of Walter Xipgens:
"These limited objectives,amounting essentially to a demonstratJcn 
for the purposes of influencing political parties,fell far short 
of the federalist idea of an assembly of ’living forces' demanding 
their rights from.the nation states a..I laying the foundations of 
a federal policy.
Brugmans,nonetheless,was satisfied that in actual circumstances he 
could do no better,and that at least the Hague project might indeed 
provide a "strong new impetus” to the future caapal&i. His conditions 
had not been met,but events were now moving too fast to permit him, 
recklessly*to pull out of the Joint project.
Yet there were further iw.miliations to ccue. llavine agreed the 
place and venue of the liague Congress,the Connittee,in fact,went on 
to decide that "Mr. Churchill would be the most fitting person to 
preside over the Conf erence",while a "group of prominent European 
patrons",including van l eel and. Slum, Count Sforza and l&igh Dalton of 
all people,should be approached by the Committee actually to deliver 
this and other important invitations.^ Furthermore,Sandys' determi­
nation to control the initial selection procedure vae aided when a 
draft guide which he had prepared for the British case,giving prime 
place to political and establishment circles,was approved by the 
Committee for general application,as was Sandys' proposed estimate 
that countries such as Britain should be represented by at le a s t ./.
1. Official r.inutea.QP.clt.
2. lipgens,op .cit .,p .636 .
3. Official minutea.QP.Cit.
. /.IOO  leading personalities out of a aov projected total of 750 for 
the whole Congress.1 Finally,in yet another rebuff to the BJF's 
official standing,the Joint Corsnittee,under Sandys' influence, 
allotted preparatory responsibilities for the three main committees 
which would constitute the Congress on the following basie:-(1 )the 
USv and the CPEC, only in "collaboration with Dr. Brugmane".would 
draft a report for the political conunitteejte) the ILBC alone would 
prepare a similar text for the economic and social committee;(3 )the 
General Secretary, Retlnger,would take responsibility for preparing 
a report for the cultural committee,again in collabor'tion with 
de Rougemont. It was clear that the EUF.as such,had a tough battle 
ahead in securing proper recognition of its contributions and aims.*
The first official meeting of the 'Joint International Committee 
of the Movements for European Unity' was subsequently drawn to a 
do se ,a fter  having initiated , as Sandys put it ,"an  effective 
instrument for Joint action" which would,he hoped, "strengthen our
p
appeal to the public and lend greater weight to our efforts." 
Whether the Committee would actually raanape to create an impression 
in the practical political spheres of official decision making 
depended to a major extent on how seriously the projected 'Congress* 
of Europe* would be viewed by the political and economic leaders of 
Western 9arope.towards whom Sandys and Retinger,above all,now had 
to direct their energy and persuasive sUills. The project at this 
stage was still froujht with risks and dileonas. This was especially 
the case with recard to the attitude of the British Labour Govern­
ment which,while having initiated the 0E3C process and in the months 
to follow would launch the 'Western Union* campaiGn,nonetheless 
ended up keeping the former movement in check and the latter policy 
on a decidedly Atlantic rather than European conceptual basis. More­
over,It renained openly hostile to the "Churchill-inspired" . / .
i . Annex to official minutes.o p . cit. - The final British number 
swelled to 152,out of a total 800 delegates.
2« Official niautes,op .cit.; Lipgen e ,o p .c it .,j>.¿¿t.
/.movement in Britain,and was hardly likely to be enthused about a 
'Congress of Europe' organised under Ciurchill's auspices. The Joint 
Committee hoped to surmount such hostility by attracting influential 
personalities to the cause representative of the whole democratic 
political spectxum. But the Committee itself did not yet constitute an 
effective united front as an international Bu rope a n  movonent, despite 
Sandys' optimism,insomuch as the EFU still retained a eulkingly 
hostile attitude towards it,while the USSE for the most part 
regarded the movenent as an instrument for only a 'capitalist' 
Europe. The If El had not yet fully emerged. Above all, however, the 
seriousness of the movement,and the realistic gradual approach to 
European unity which it stood for,could only be appreciated by the 
more cautious leaders of Europe's political and economic establish­
ment if the scope and character of the Hague project was of a 
similar serious grain. Any naive talk about a "revolutionary"
Estates General and the like could throw the whole project out of 
balance and out of the realm of serious politicrl consideration.
This was vhy Sandy« vented to retain a tight grip of the planning 
and preparatory stages to the Congresstand to keep the federalists 
as ouch out of the limelight as possible. Brufmans and the "possi- 
biliste" centre in the EU7 appear to have accepted the point,on 
the grounds that they otherwise risked becoming a "sect". There 
were others who did not. De Rougeraont,for example,coneluded:
"One can see here the difference in level betve«n the federalist 
ambitions and the unionist objectives. Can one say that the Joint 
Comrr.ittee vas nearer to the 'p o s s ib le t o  what political parties 
and their leaders vould allow? Titis would amount to the admission 
that the federalists had at the same time given up trying to 
C1-12ATE the possible,which le the essential act oi every revolutto, 
political or spiritual. 2 think rather that the EUF still hoped, 
to make the Hague Congress something more than a congress."
-The preparatory stages to the Hague Congresr would only partially 
vindicate de Rougemont's analysis.
1. De B0ugemont,op.cit.,p.33S.
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A. PREPARATORT STAGES
C fltfm  3 .  IPITIil PEEPARATIOKS: PBCgtBZR 1947-KAROH 1948 
1) The Invitation Policy
"The preparation of the Congress of Burope was very difficult, 
rfe wanted to have a monster internation.¡1 gathering independent 
of any government rnd of any political party,and to get the most 
European minded,the most famous and the most representative 
participants. But rivalries were hard to avoid and,moreover»it 
was nattirally difficult to gather seven hindred and fifty people
- the number we had in mind - wil.ling to spend a week of their 
tine on work which,although we thought it most important,did not 
is some cases seeir. so to them."
Thic brief survey by Retlnger1 of the si<?aificpnce, difficulties and 
issues at stake in the Hague Congress invitation policy neatly summed 
up the two central aspects Involved: how to attract the support of 
influential personalities,and bar to prevent in-fighting among the 
various groups sponsoring the Congress,particularly in view of the 
fact that some 3J7 members still regarded tiic Congress as yet another 
launch meeting of ‘living force" militants. An additional prohlos was 
that the movanant as yet had few national branches,while Sandys was 
intent on laying down a central guldline for the issue of invitations, 
as well as ensuring that the International Executive Committee which 
he dominated had ultimate responsibility for the final Invitation list. 
Addressing himself to these problems,Sandys had already argued,in the 
lead up to the Joidt meeting of December 13-14,that in order to be 
both representative and authoritative the Congress needed to be com­
posed of "heads or leading figures" from each major profession,organa- 
sation and political party,etc. As described earlier,the meeting in 
tain had initially decided to issue Invitations in each democratic 
Western European country through a well known "Comnlttee of Patrone", 
but at the subsequent Executive Committee meeting in Paris,held on 
January 30 ,the idea was dropped in view of the "political diffiailties*
this entailed. I n Its place there would be a l i s t  of prominent «/»
1. R etlnger ,o p .dt ., pp .21 5-6.
2. sandys'conference note,1 1 .1 2 .47. »op.cit.
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./.people who had accepted to attend the Congress." 1
Vhat this change In fact signified was that Sandys renalned 
unahle to secure a politically-balanced match of party leaders in 
Britain willing to act as Patrons. Retinger had tried but failed to 
convince his old colleague Righ Del ton to represent Labour,whereas 
hi a earlier success in gaining Sir Stafford Cripps’ support had also 
p
foundered. The reason was quite simple - Labour would not 'share a 
platform with C in rehill. There were no doubt some valid political 
reasons for this, insomuch that Churchill,as Honorary President of the 
Congress,would,along with the Conservative Party in general, derive 
rye satisfaction from leading from on high his Labour opponents in 
such a Biropean setting. Sandys' contention,on the other hand,that 
the whole point of the Hague Congress was that It vas above partisan 
domestic politics vas sincere and plsusible. Prom the very start of the 
invitation arranges sits he had striven to be politically objective, 
stressing that the national Parlisaentary list  be drawn up "in pro­
portion to party strength(and)to be nominated by the (newly constitu­
ted) All Party Parliamentary Group" for Europe.  ^ In contrast to all 
appearances,moreover,persuading Churchill to gpcDaor the Hague project 
in such a senior capacity,despite the possible risks and potential 
enban-assnents which all too easily might occur,was a coup in itself. 
Put another way,it was not only the Labour leaders who risked losing 
face by supporting the Congress; whereas the possibility of enhancing 
their own standing and talcing the wind out of Churchill's sr-ils also 
existed. This double-edged political dilanaa at the centre of the 
Hague Congress invitation policy,to which more attention will be 
given in later chapters,was well summed up by Harold KaOIillan - 
sufficient for aa initial understanding - in the fol’ ovlng vay:
"As regards our Parliamentary represertation..Churchill was in 
a somewhat delicate position. He enjoyed of course an unrivalled 
position as the war leader vho had helped to save Rirope. S it ./ .
1. .1 olnt Tnt»TTn»tion>1 Upm tive Coi.'.mittpe meeting. jQ. 1 . *6 . . o fficial
2. B i $ I ^ r ? o f . :c!???p?Sl8Uetter to Dalton, 22.1 2.47 . ,CA®; BHUGGB.
3. Sandys,op.cit.
. / .  he was also t party politician«an active and eonevhct truculent
leader of as opposition anxious to weaken and as soon as possible 
take the place of the existing Government. As a party leader he 
could not fail to recognise that a considerable portion of the 
Conservative Party were doubtful and even anxious about this 
new movement. They feared,and not unaturalDy,that in one way or 
another,both on the politicaland economic side,Britain' s position 
as head of the Empire and Commonwealth might be prejudiced.
These doubts were to remain,and it was not until many years 
later that they could be substantially renoved. The Liberal 
Party was m all,and on this matter united. Hit the weight that 
they could give either in Parliament or outside was limited.
The Labour Pc.rty,or at least its chiefs,was undoubtedly suspicion 
i f  not opposed to the whole a ffa ir . They were not unnaturally 
Jealous of Churchill ' b unique position,which they believed hia 
to be exploiting .■ '
Re-structuring their plans towards achieving a more attainable
representative list of prominent persons,if not actual party leader^
from political,professional and organisational circles.Sandys and
Retinger proceeded to operate maialy through their own personal 
2
contacts and through trusted colleagues in the Joint International 
Committee network itself. In Prance,Courtin was given responsibility 
to compile the invitation l is t ,"in  consultation with Voisin." The 
Hutch and Belgian menbers of the Comi.ittee were also £,iven the go- 
ahead to arrange their own draft lists , leading (though moderate) 
federalists were instead given charge of less important draft netioial 
lists ,Silva checking the Swiss situation(though Sandys also had pri­
vate talks with the Swiss Foreign hlnister),vhile Brugmane was asked 
to find out how far it w&c possible to obtain non-fascist elements 
.Trom Spain and Portugal. Sandys aleo despatched Dautry,ae a safe 
and moderate colleague,to go to Scandinavia,a region whose pragmatic 
approach to European unity would help in furnishing delegates 
favourable to a realistic approach at the the Haenie Congress? “  In 
addition to the sensitive situation in Britain,where Sandys relied 
to an increasing extent on the All-Party Parliamentary Group to 
nsure a representative political delegation, there regained the two
trouble spots of Germany and Italy. In both cases Sandys appears./.
Harold K tO iiilin .Tides of Fortune 1 945-1 r.55, U achUlan,London, 
l?69),p .159 .
2. See R e t in g e r ,o p .c l t . ,p p .21 5-6. .
3. Sandys,confidential report on invitation pi-ocees,IC£6jplus in-
foraation in lettersto iautry and Paris iureau ,21 .0.2 2 . 1 2 . 47 . ,
CA»i BdUGSS.
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. / .t o  have exercised personal control over the invitation process, 
operating through the British and American authorities in the two 
main Western sones of Germany - Konrad Adenauer,beginning to make 
hie weight felt in MSI circles,was one of the leading delegates to 
come forward on this basis1- while,with regard to Italy, Sandys decided 
to pass over the maximalists KFB and entered into direct talks with 
the Prime Minister, Alcide De Gasperi.aad the Foreign Minister,Count 
Sforea.as well as with the Pope. As a result of these latter con­
versations,it was decided to constitute what was described as a 
"representative Italian Committee" which would act with the blessing 
of the current political and catholic establishment.^ Though it is 
true that spinelli and Rossi above all showed little  sympathy for 
the "durehlll-inspired" Hague project in the first place,this rather 
hlunt dismissal which they received from Sandys,and later froo Ret3ogoa 
wcwld be a source of grave bitterness and discontent,even if in the 
final event the new Italian Committee had,in fact,to operate to a 
considerable extent through the well established KPS network.
The fundamental point at issue in this whole process was that 
Sandys sought the backing of influential personalities for the Hapue 
campaign,whereas the entrenched federalist side wanted the Congress 
to comprise soley "»ilitants" already fully converted to the Siropean 
cause,In the MFB case,or somehow representative of the "living forces" 
in the integral federalist case. According to Sandys’ strategy,the 
Congress,though hopefully representative in the general political 
sense,would be tilted towards moderate "unionist* methods of change 
rather then to pseudo-revolutionary formulae. The more radical 
federalists did not appreciate that such a moderate tendency would,in 
fact,be the Inevitable result of the Congress being broadly repre­
sentative. This was where the conflict oi strategy occurred in its 
simplest forms whereas the political oriented KPE maximallstes.aE./.
1« See M organ,op .cit..p .56: Adenauer r.eraolrs 1£45-Ig57. Oeldenfeld A 
If; col son, 1966) »PP*109-111,1 66.
2. Sandys,report on Rome trip. I CP 5. January 194b,CA3-. iHtJGGE.
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• / .v e il  ae the more doctrinaire integral federalists were impatient to 
provide a radical in pulse and lead,Sandys and Retingerf supported by 
the majority of the Joint Committee)wanted to have at least a margin 
of political consensus behind the movement before embarking on a 
more adventurous programme of change. The overall control which the 
latter two exercised is the choice of delegates was confirmed at the 
Joint Committee meeting of January 30 ,at which it was decided to set 
up a Selection sub-Committee,composed of Sandys. Dautry and Serruys, 
along with Voisin for the minority BUT,which would be responsible 
for scrutinising draft lists presented,whereas Retinger himself 
would be responsible for submitting invitation proposals in the 
case of countries where so reliahle organisation existed.1 - As 
Retinger later commented in this respect:
" ..s o  far as France Belgium and Holland were concerned,our 
friends in these countries were of the greatest help,but when 
it  case to other countries we gen rally had to use our own 
judgements and make arrangements ourselves. All this entailed 
sot only an extremely extensive correspondence.. but also 
personal visits by myself and Duncan Sandys to several iundred 
people. As time went by re found it more and more difficult to 
refuse invitations to persons whose names hrd been put forward 
but whom we did not consider suitable. After we had arrived at 
The iiapie it fell to me to refuse admittance to some would-be 
delegatee." 2
z) initial Organisation of the Political Bcp.ort
ihf main organisational framework for the Hague Congress,it will be 
recalled,was to be divided into three main working committees,deal tog 
with political is si es,economic and social problems,and cultural and 
moral questions. The draving up and selection of the reports,and in 
turn the draft resolutions,to be su tor it ted to these committees was, 
therefore,of crucial influence as repan't the choice of issues to 
be digcusred(or not discussed)at The ria.Tie,cn<1 would thus determine 
to a considerable extent the siiepe oik' r.rea of the final text to be
approved by the Congress. The importance of these draft texts w as./.
1. ¿rnclal minutes.op.cli. 1
2. Retlncar,op.clt.,pp.2l 5-6.
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./.c learly  appreciated by S--ndys. With hie past ministerial ej^srimce 
and acute political skill,he was well aware that a major intemational 
conference lasting for only a few days could be fixed in considerable 
part beforehand .providing the documentary preparation was suffici«rtOy 
clear in forts and suitably vague in contents so as to warrant general 
approval for plans which could be later defined in a nore intricate 
and perhaps sore compelling manner than initially indicated. In tuis 
sense,while content to leave the experts in the H 3C  to draft their 
own report and to allov de Rougenont and the acre radical federalist 
theorists to continue theorising (under Retinger's ultimate supervision) 
In the drafting of the cultural report, Sr.ndys,as described earlier, 
had made sure that responsibility for drawing up the essential poli­
tical report remained In the 'safe* hand of the Anglo-French United 
Rirope Movement, "in collaboration with Dr. Brugmans". Losing no time 
in formulating and circulating his own proposed scheme,which he coat 
to Dautry in the form of a memorandum on December 21 ,he again drew 
attention to Bagmans' seemingly individual junior role,stressing:
"I hope that this memo ran dun will provide a sufficient skeleton 
to enable the two Committees to start work without delay. I am 
at the same time asking Dr. Brugjnans to set out any proposals he 
nay wish to make for dlscuseion by our two Cormittees. I hope 
that by the middle of January your Comr.ittee and ours will have 
been able to produce the Tirst draft of the text of the political 
report. These documents coul<! then be exclmnged and after further 
consideration,we might,towards the end of January,have a Joi^it 
meeting between representatives of the French Committee,the 
British Committee and Dr. Brugmans." '
The draft memorandum itself2 strongly Indicated Sandys' pre­
occupation with the need not to harass the Ha^jie Congress delegates 
with unwieldy proposals for which it would be difficult to reach 
approval by consensus. The first section of the report,he. stressed, 
"should point to the ultimate goal of European unity,and should 
explain in extreraely general terms the various forms which tills unity
might take,and the political advantages which mipht be exyected t o . / .
71 Sandys, 1 etter to twutry, 21 .1 2 .4 7 . ,CA3i
2. Sand.Ts.l.amorandun br the Chairman of the SxaCfttiYe C9mnl.li.tg,ft 
(IC P 4 ) ,2 1 .1 2 .4 7 . .CASK 3RDGOB.
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./.flow  fran it ." It should end,he added,with a resolution "urging 
Governments to make a Joint declaration to the effect that they 
accept European unity as one of the vital airas of their national 
policy and., engage thanselves to take no action which might obstruct 
or render more difficult the eventual attainment of this objective." 
Though this strategy was later attacked by pro-federalist historians 
as being weak and dilatory, and virtually subservient to official 
British foreign policy in failing to "point the way ahead"lit must 
be understood that Sandy.s wanted to Indicate the "ultimate goal" 
without laying down any doctrinaire conditions as to the precise 
fora and Juridical requirements of the future union,which,at this 
stage,would be of tteoretlcal rather than of practical value to the as 
yet unofficial campai&i. The European movement had to prod,perhaps 
even goad,but not try to dictate to denocratically elected goverxnarta
- Hence also the need for some vague official recognition of the 
unity cgmpalffi. Hit as Sandys went on to specify later In the text 
with regard to current inter-governmental action leading to OESC,
"no far reaching measures of economic Integration are possible 
without some corresponding unification in the political and military 
spfcerea." This point was further developed in the second section of 
hie memorandum w h«,dealing  with "immediate steps" for which the 
movement should campaign, h* proposed the official setting up of a 
"Hiropean Council" based upon a regular system of lnter-ministerial 
conferences aiming to achieve a common European policy on current 
economic,political (defence and cultural pro hi m s , and backed up by a 
pernanant international secretariat. Again,though this indeed sounded 
all too similar to the actual debate taking pl?.ce recording Hie ecopeof 
the projected OEEC.as well as foreshadowing the Brusrels Pact initia­
tive, Sandys nonetheless couched his proposal in ter^s prescribing a 
more organic evolution, arguing in this resrect:
■»he goal of a United E u r o p e 'will,obviously,not be reached 
overnight. Barriers of suspicion must first be worn down an d ./.
See,for example,lipgens.rp.cit.
. / .  a common European outlook built up. Thlc vill be broucht about 
only by developing ar.ong the Oover-iment- of Europe the habit 
of regular consultation and Joint action upon matters of common 
concern.■
It was a thaae to which he would return,and about which he would be 
more explicit,during the course of the carapai{?i.
At this early stage, it is probable chc.t San dye did not have a 
clear picture himself of how the evolution irom an inter-govemmsatal 
to a »1 pre-national European structure would actually take place.
He was cl ear,however,in maintaining that a Gradualist strategy was 
called for i f  the Buropean movement was not to fall at the first 
lurdle. This did not mean,as Spinelll would later insinuate, that 
there was absolutely “no talk of federation,transfer of sovereignty, 
*ipra-national institutions,or. .of creating a real Buropean political 
framework. Indeed, Sandys did express his personal views on these 
important matters already at this date. Two days before the Joint 
Comnittee meeting of January JO,he in fact issued a press statement 
which threw considérable light on his draft outline of December 21. 
The text,giving a good Insight into the pragmatic strategy which he 
pursued during the Hague campaign and after,is quoted almost in full 
below:
" ..t h e  Biropean nations.. cannot be effectively or lastingly 
united without some pooling,to a greater or leeser degree,of 
their separate national sovereignties. My own view is that the 
more the rights of sovereignty can be merged and shared the 
greater will be the prospect of pe.-.ce and prosperity.
Bit at the s^me time,we must face the fact that the nations 
are not,and rightly,prepared straight away to entrust their 
safety and stability to new aad untried international insti­
tutions. The first pre-condition of any union of nations is 
mutual confidence and a comaon outlook. These cannot be created, 
they must grow. The first stage in this process is to foster 
the habit of regular consultation between Governments on inter- 
airopean and International problems. These Include trade, finance, 
defence,foreign affairs,culture and education. For this purpose, 
it  is  urgently necessary that formal lnter-governmmtal con­
sultative machinery should be set up. Out of this process of 
consultation there will emerge,I believe quite quickly,a sense 
of Buropean solidarity and comion purpose.
When a firm basis of confidence and Joint experience has 
be».n layed,it wculd be reasonable to ask the nations of Birope 
to abate at any rate sone part of their separate sovereigntiesr/•
J . Spinelll. -Why Europe*.Ullli:: . Buropean Interratlon, QP. civ. .PP5B-9.
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-/.Agreeing with pro-federal sympathies of "justifiable impatience", 
Sandy® vent on to argue:
". .However»to sitip the essential preparatory stapes would be to 
ignore the very real psychological and practical difficulties 
which exist,and would destroy all hope of bringing this great 
project to fruition. If,on the other hand,without immediately 
pressing for the irrevocable surrender of national rights,we 
first create an atmosphere of mutual trust and a realistaion 
by the European peoples of their common interests,! am convinced 
t-iat it will thereafter be possible to bring about some effective 
and far-reaching form of organic union. Koreover,lt may wall be 
that all this will be accomplished within a space of time which 
will surprise even the most optimistic supporters of the cause 
of a United Europe." >
Though Sandys did not go into such detail whan presenting his 
monorandua on the initial organisation of the political report for 
the Hague Congress,it*is likely that some of his more astute 
colleagues at the joint meeting of January 30 ,held in the immediate 
wake of Bevin's dramatic speech in favour of a Consolidation" of 
Western Europe,were confident that the Hague project entailed mo 
than a mere moral boost to the intergovernmental initiatives now in 
train. The Executive Oomaittee,ln fact,purposely added to the pre­
vious three objectives of the Hague Congress outlined in Decanber 
that it should also "help bring into being European organistions to 
further the wortc of unification ."2 Koreover,it was further agreed 
that the EC? as a whole,rather than just Brugnans in his individual 
capacity were to have a formal role and authority in the drafting 
and final consideration of the political report. Sich partial 
xeco&iltion of the federal case, how ever,vas not enough to hold off 
the mounting opposition to Sandys* leadership in more sensitive 
EtJP circles.
3) Tension among the Pederallsta
There can be little  doubt that the rather brusque vcy in which ^ 
Sandys initially set about orcaniBing the Con,Tress arrangements
created considerable teasion and anger within the HJF,whooe./.
>. Sandys.Streatham Hews.28.1 .48..S /JT  
Conservative candidate for 3 ;reath_ .
Sand.'s actually spoke in favour of an eventual European "Pede- » 
ra t io n ".? ersp actives PQijtlques de 1 941. copy,CAgi 3HUG3E- 
1. Mijuai»_niati£l # »* ••*■
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D7S F/jr:itS. (He was prospectlve 
ami. On French radio,26 .1 .48 ,
. / .  negotiating position and status vithin the Joint Committee had 
been rather drastically deflated since the heyday of the Montreux 
Congress. Doubts and aaticisms had of course been expressed prior 
to the official launching of the Comnittee on December 14. The 
tactical out-«anoeuvring of the EUF which followed,however,gave 
way to a storm of protest. Already,on December 31 ,the EUF Secretary, 
Raymond Silva.angrily complained to Retinger about the way that 
Sandys was going about reftscrbng to himself as the Chairman of the 
Joint Committee,when in fact he had only been designated the post 
of Chairman of the Executive Committee,the movement as a whole
heving “no formal Chairman"? This vas only the tip of the iceberg.
2
At the subsequent EUF Central Committee meeting of January 15-17, 
a whole deluge of critical charges was heaped against the "unionist" 
orientated Committee and the effective control Sandys exercised o m b t  
the preparations for the Hague Congress. - Attempting to pre-sapt 
any outright rebeH3cu,BrcLg»a*B was the first to declare openly that 
there was a "tactical" struggle going on in the Joint Comnittee and 
that his task was not made easier by other members who had "every 
difficulty in the world to play the game in a correct manner*. He 
therefore proposed that the EUF had two options: either to withdraw 
from the Committee,or to try ajfain to re-enforce the federalist 
representation within it . Ruling out the first option,on the ground 
that it would appear to the public sLafiy as a damaging "ouarrel 
between federalists",he suggested instead that the EUF should once 
more approach the more federal inclined EPU and USSE to join the 
Committee. Though most members regarded collaboration with fPD 
as being an eventual possibility,considerable doubte were still 
cast concerning the USSE,which would not support a Congress presided 
over by Churchill* Hytte was one of the most outspoken critics at 
this point,saying that the EOF should insist that the Congress be 
held under several presidencies. Brugmans' position differedr It 
was an"incontestable historic fact",he said,"that when one
1 . SILVA letter to Retinger ¿ X . 1 2 .4 7 ..RETIWGER PAPERS.
2. EUF Central Committee meeting 15-17.I . 4 8 . ,official minutes.
C K  6HMEVA.----
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• / •  evokes the idea of European unity,Churchill1s name comes to mind.*.' 
Marc in turn intervened to say that,in his opinion.the Hague 
Congress should be a "revolutionary act"»producing a "psycho­
logical shock" sufficient to initiate some transfer of authority 
to new organs born out of the Congress. He *therefore opposed the 
idea of having Churchill as the sole President at ihe Hague,varnhg 
that,if the EUF did not react. against this.it vould find itself 
trapped in a "psychological and institutional framework" in which 
it vould have no significant role. The strongest challenge to 
Brugmans• moderate approach in the Joint Committee as regards the 
Hague Congress came,hovever,from the minority Italian W E  ving in 
the EUF Central Committee. Aitiero Spinelli(acting in place of his 
colleague £ossi)led this opposition,declaring his objection both 
to the integral federalist notion of a European Congress of the 
"living forces".and to the possibiliste strategy of compromise 
vith the "unionist" camp. The EUF,he strongly argued,should lisist" 
vithin the Joint Committee that the Hague Congress be only a 
"federalist Congress"»otherwise he would vote against continuing 
collaboration. Miss Josephy.in reply,clearly stated that if the 
EUF did not participate at The Hague it vould not be "federalist 
at a ll". It vas preferable,she therefore suggested,to work vithin 
the Joint Committee vith the aim of gaining the maximum "federalist 
nuance" possible at the Congress. In this sense Brugmans had 
already outlined his plans to increase the federalist viewpoint 
in the Political Report,declaring the need for a preamble to the 
report which vould clearly indicate that the federalist goal vas 
not "utopian*. The French federalist,Francis G£rsrd,also lent 
hi» support on this point,and summed up the possibiliste position 
by vaming that the EUF should not forget that the Movement vhich 
they were attempting to create at The Hague would surpass the 
scope of the federalist movements.If the EUF stuck to an inf 1  »title 
federalist formula the Congress vould be solit vide open.If,on the 
other hand,room for agreement could be found vith those not yet 
of a federalist opinion,there vould still remain the possibility
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. / .  of convincing them at a later stage,whereas a split would simply 
cut short all rapport between the two camps.
The turtulent aeeting ended on thlg note,and in tu n  
the Joint Executive meeting of January JO went on to give the SJT 
greater official representation in the formulation of the Politfcfcl 
Report,as already noted,as well as deciding to appoint official 
Rapporteurs for each of the three Congress Committees, thus pla­
cating toaliariiad extant requests for a broader chairmanship of the 
Congress? In addition,the Executive Committee also decided ho 
try once more to enlarge the composition of the Joint Internatio­
nal Committee as a whole, Courtin,Voisin,Noel and Rebattet(French
Secretary) .undertaking to approach the USSt and the NEI,while
2
Retinger would again try his best vith the EPU. An effort was 
thus made to appease the federalist position. However,so far as 
the fundamental aspects of the Congress were concerned,the more 
doctrinaire posture of both the integral federalists and of the 
MFE maximalistes was effectively pushed aside.
This »a« particularly the caae for the lbi*er. Ind*ed,pi4jr Id -tt* 
meeting of January 30 ,Marc naively stirred up the integral fed­
eralists’ hopes by publicly stating that the Hague Congress would 
in fact prove to be a revolutionary"Estates General of Burope":
"No,not all is lost yet",he declared," . . Europe's voice 
will at last make itself heard.The representatives of all 
the living forces of our continent are going to be convoked 
at the Hague".
In swift reaction,the subaequent meeting of the Joist Executive 
Committee severely rebuked such wild and unauthorised public 
pronouncements,the minutes for the meeting of January 30 readings
"in order to avoid possible confusion.no oral or written 
statements regarding the Congress should be made by members 
of the Committee or the organisations they represent,vithout 
prior consultation with the General Secretariat..»• 4
The Executive,under Sandys continuing influence,further stipulAad: 
_________________ _
1. Minutes 3 0 .1 .4 6 .,op .cit. 2. Jbid• Retinger had in fact 
already contacted Bohy in this respect on 23 .12 .1?. ,Letter 
to Bohy,RETINGER PAPEXS. 3. MARC "Les Etats Gfcneraux de la 
Have", LA FB>ERAT10N,no 36,Jan.I9*8 4 . Minutes pp.cit.
• / •  "for the sake of clarity,in any references they might make 
to the Hague Congress in their publications,the organisations 
represented on the International Committee should adhere to 
the agreed title,namely j- Congress of Europe -and should employ 
no other designation*.
This clear indication of the strength of feeling vith vhich 
Sandys,Retinger and the majority of the organising committee ob­
jected to federalist slogan-nongerring with regard to the Hague 
Congress did not,however,reduce all hope vithin the possibilist 
SUF leadership that soae federalist progress could be salvaged
2
fro* the gathering,nov definitely scheduled to open on Friday Hay 7. 
The BUF General Secretary,Raymond Silva,even urged that the federa­
list movement should "re-double its efforts".and that the "federalist 
idea would be victorious at The Hague."3
The «axiaaliste leaders of the MFE rewained unconvinced on this 
point. Indeed,already in November 1947 Rossi privately confided to 
Spinelli that he vas very sceptical about holding a congress under 
Churchill’ s auspices. The idea of an "Estates General",moreover, 
appeared incomprehensible to him,as he scoffed at the naive dft*ts of 
Marc,Silva and others in the EUF who,he said,simply wanted to lay
4
their hands on the funds available through the Churchill group.
By the time tie Second National Congress of the MFE vas held at 
Milan,on February 15-17 1948,Rossi was even more adamant and out­
spoken in his opposition to the Hague Congress« Stressing the EUF’ s 
minority position in the organising Committee and Sandys' snubbing 
of the MFE in favour of high-ranking Italian personalities of 
"nationalist" and even former "fascist" background,he insisted that 
the Churchillian brand of Europeanism had nothing in common with ^  
that of the MFE. "Churchill",he stated,"has always been the symbol 
of ftiglish imperialism"?hi5 views about a united Europe did not./.
I .  O fficial minutes - 30.1 .48 . . o p . c it .  2 . Ibid .
3. EOF Lettre Cjrculaire no. XVII CEC GEHEVA
4. E. ROSSI,letter to Spinelli,9 .I I .4 7 .¿MFE TURIN
5. E. ROSSI,speech at I I o MFE National Congress,Milan,15-17.2.48., 
"On the participation of the Italian EUF delegation to the Hague"
MFE TURIN — - ------>
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» /• compare in depth and significance to the federation plana of the 
MFE. Rossi also varned,moreover,that Churchill's presidency of 
the Congress would prevent the involvement of prominent British 
and European Socialists,and would thus ensure that the publicity 
concerning the proj«ct would centre above all on Churchill himself. 
There was no use,he pleaded,to assume that,because the federalist 
case was"intellectually and morally" superior to that of Churchill, 
the press would give it suitable coverage. Brugmans’ stature,he 
continued to argue,was "tiny" compared to the*'world-wide” fame and 
importance of Britain's war-time leader* Churchill had only to 
pronounce one speech and it would be given full coverage by the 
world press. He therefore concluded that to participate in the 
Hague project at this moment in time would be a serious’ nistake", 
and that while there resained no ■guarantees" concerning the list 
of delegates to be invited,and while the federalists could not 
find political support from someone of Churchill's calibre,then 
the MFE should refuse to attend the Congress.*
Not everyone agreed with Rossi on this point. MFE delegate 
Palumbo,for example,argued that the federalists should not refute
2
"a priori" the possible openings which The Hague might constitute. 
Similarly the veteran Mino di Viilagratia thought that the federa­
list position should teocicwdat The Hague and that, even if BrugninS 
"historical stature" was smaller than that of Churchill,"his voice
3
would be heard the same". Spinelli,for his part,agreed fully with
Rossi's argument,but not with his conclusion. The EUF,he warned
his MFE colleagues,would in anycase be sending a small delegation
to The Hague,if only to oppose the unionist monopoly there. The
absence of Italian federalist delegates would be seen as a sign of
division. For the sake of "federalist solidarity" it was therefore





3. KINO DI VILLAGRAZIA,Speech,ibid.
4. SPINHLLI, speech,ibid.
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After considerable debate,Spinelli*s slightly more concilia­
tory formula »as accepted by both Rossi and di Vi:iagrazia,vho 
jointly presented a motion to the Congress declaring:
"in consideration that no representative of left-wing 
opinion will want to participate at the Hague Congress, 
and that it will be aChurchillian demonstration in favour 
of a western bloc,the MFE will delegate representatives 
only in thj form of observers to participate at the Hague 
Congress"
Following a passionate speech by Brugmans, however, who apoeaied for a
more "cooperative spirit" and for a "general international plan"
in favour of a united Europe,rather than a "cxystilisation" between
the unionist, and federalist forces,the MFE narrowly rejected Rossis
motion,in the hope that the British Labour Party would assume its
"responsibility" towards Europe and not dogmatically Drevent a
2
Socialist voice being heard at The Hague. At the same time, the 
KFB conference explicitly re-ai finned its support for the 
"fundamental principle" of creating a European "supra-national
Government directly and freely elected by each citisen of the
3
federated states , and directly responsible to them". To this 
the MFE added that they would "participate more actively in the 
EOF and in all initiatives of a fctaropean character,upon the condi­
tion, however,‘that these initiatsw  were “directed to promote the
idea of Buropean federation and not to mislead popular aspirations
4
behind false objectives".
Despite the fierce and outspokca lack of txust which the 
K 7I leaders felt towards Sandye and the "Churchill-dominated" 
Hagie project, the h o t  ament as e whole had decided not t o  bcpoctt
• the Oongreas,though the final KFE motion of February 17 stowed 
the risk and reluctance involved in this decision. BmgaaaB*torec»e* 
who had been severely harassed up until the meeting by h is ./.
1. Motion presented by Kossi.di Vinacrraeia,Monti -MFE Congress,ibid.
2. BRUGMANS, speech,pius cowpte rendu.ihid.
3. List of Resolutions adopted by 11° MFE Congress - Political 
lotion .printed in L'UNITA SUROPEA Feb. 1946, MFE TUHIN
4. Ibid.
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. / .  maxiraaliste critics,had scored what proved to be only a hollov 
personal victory against the Spinelli-Rossi wing. For a while.it 
is true,he could continue tmabat*d upon his possibiliste sta>ategy 
within the Joint International Committee,where his standing and 
prestige now increased to a considerable extent. His powers of
persuasion,however,had only bought time;they had not fundamentally
altered the growing scepticism which existed within the MFE ranks 
concerning collaboration vith the unionist camp,while among the 
more militant integral federalists there lay hidden a latent 
powder-keg of discontent over their cherished objective of a 
European Estates General. The latter group,in fact,would erupt 
at lie Hague,upon the discovery that it did not constitute anythiig 
quite SO "revolutionary* as they had hoped. In doing so,they split 
the federalist camp wide open and precipitated Brugmans into 
making a"disastrous" intervention during the long debate over the 
European Assembly. The Italian MFE delegates,for the most P«rt;
retained a low profile both prior to,and at the Hague Congress.
Rossi,for example did not even attend,while Spinelli(for once) 
made no intervention. After the rather abortive performance of 
the EUF at Ihe Hague,however,they vented their wrath with full 
vengeance and a clear conscience,leading to Spinelli's full take­
over of the MFE and radical alliance with Frenay in the EUF,*hich 
in turn culminated in dislodging Brugmans and his possibiliste 
colleagues from the central EOF reins of power. This much will 
be explained later ; suffice for the moment to pinpoint one of 
the main set-backs which Brugmans had hoped to avoid in his plan 
for a "general" international gathering at The Hague,and without 
which the Churchill-unionist position would not have been quite 
so dominant - the failure to persuade British Labour,and in turn 
the European Socialist Parties ,to officially support fend attend 
the Congress.
I . Brugmans' own personal description expressed to the writer 
concerning his intervention during this debate. Cf.pp.231-2.
4) Labour's H o e t U iq
..■the attitude of the British Labour Government to the Congress 
of Si rope.. created by far the big/rect political prohl m  its 
organisers had to face. VhUe the atiitoide of most Western 
Governments was sympathetic and at worse lukewarm,in Uritain 
it uas openly and actively hostile. This unfortunate decision 
vao to set the Labour Government on an anti-Europern course 
which it kept as long o.s it was In power. Britain lost the 
unique opportunity it had of assuninc the 1 ee.dcrchip of 
Birope to which victory in the War cave it the title and the 
means. "
Though the above statement by Retinger’ s M o crap her, John Pomianjis 
indirritably correct concerning the Kague Congress,the broader 
conclusions arrived at need considerable revision. To disriss the 
Labour Government's record as being "antl-Buropean" on r. count of its 
failure to support the Harae Congress and the canpaiiTi which folDcweel 
is indeed a blinkered under-estimation of Britain’ s official role ±i 
initiating OESC and the Bmssela Pact, both of vital practical sig­
nificance in the immediate context of that tine. To accuse the 
Labour administration of not as'tmting the "leadership of Europe" 
needs to be tempered by these factB. To claim,moreover,that the war 
had actually given Britain the "title" oxi'. “:neanB" to lead Europe 
should also be seen in the light that the lndisputed "title* had 
been achieved at the cost of subsequent economic and military 
exhaustion so far as the“i*eans" were concerned. The result was 
sumaed up by Christopher Kayhew who,as former Under Secretary of 
State under Bevin at the Foreign Office,clearly argued:
"In the early stage it was our economic weakness resulting 
jTrom the war, spilling over into the field of defence,which 
seemed a particularly impelling factor. The close association - 
with the Units! States was a p i e a s u r e ,t  also a necessity."
-The economic and strategic reasons which pushed the Labour
Government towards the espousal of a prim arily  "A t la n t ic "  rather
than 3iro-centric oriented forei(3i policy aiter the war have alr»n i
been outlined earlier.^ What needs stressing again at this p o in t ./.
1. S*t itetinger m «noira ,op .cit. ,p .2 l  "t. ~
2. C. kayhew,"British Foreign policy since 1945 ".International 
Affairs.vol. JCXVI.no.4 ,October 1950,p .477.
3. CF., ch. 1 .
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. / . i e  that Bevin's "Western Union" policy by no means cancelled out 
closer moves towards Burope&n unity,but on the oondition that this 
did not impair the overriding Atlantic commitment sought or weaken 
Britain's faltering international trading relations. As Kayheiw 
warned,"it was of the utmost importance not to act hastily." The 
attitude of the British Government had to be tempered "inevitably" 
by the "universality of Britain's. ties and comsitmente in the Wes­
tern world." No other countxy had "a foot in so many camps’ and was
ccnseqierrOy liable "to fall between so many stools." The simple option
of conc ait rating primarily on Biropean union, or adopting a European 
■third force" policy was,therefore,totally discounted:
"It  has,I think,always been recognised by the ’’ritish 
Government that such a con bination, even if  it could be 
brought about,which is very doubtful ,' ould not be strong 
enough,from either the economic or defence point of view, 
to be sure of deterring Soviet acgresrion.or of remaining 
neutral if  such aggression took place. It always seemed of
the utmost importance from many points of view that Europe
and the United States should go ahead together,and that no 
encouragement should be given to isolationist elements In 
the United States by any appearance of cold-shouldering from 
Europe. Then,as now,the planning of Europe's defence,trade 
and economic development,seemed to rake little sense without 
active United States participation." 1
The British Government's two-tier "Western Union* policy of 
actively forging greater Western .European coordination at a non- 
organic co-operative level,while pursuing at the same time the 
principal objective of an all-embracing Atlantic Alliance,reached 
its high point v h s .o n  January 22»1948,Bevin declared to a packed 
House of Conmons that the "free nations of Westera Surope must now 
draw closely together..! believe the time is ripe for the consoli­
dation of Western Europe."2 While going on to qualify the "union" 
he had in mind as a loose "spiritual" and ethical"understanding, 
based on a treaty but not a "rigid thesis" or "directive",and backed 
by the United States, 3rvin,nonethel ess,iiad spoken out,as Spaak put 
it , "as a great B:ropean" and had launched tiie "beginning of a new ./.
1. kayheV'Op.cit.,p.4t3-
2. Bevin,House of commons debate on forei'?i «ff»ir«.Hminurd. 
22.-23.1 • 4b.
./.Biroyean policy" as well as a "future Atlantic policy* .1 Though 
Spaak also described how,under the probable pressure of his iorei^i 
Office advisers,Bevia was "a little  overcome bj his own boldness" 
and beequently "tried to minimise th? significp.nce of his speech*, 
the initiative of January 22 led directly to the signing of the 
Bmssels Treaty Pact on K^rch J 7,1 546, between the British,French 
and Benelux GovercmentB. The military orientation and institutiona.1 
limits of the lntei>-governinental Consultative Council established 
under the -reaty,briefly described in an earlier section, 2 still 
constituted a form of European Council, even if it we.e neont to be a 
stepping stone towards the formation of an Atlantic Alliance systea. 
Bevin.in this respect,stole a lot of the thunder contained in the 
initial Hague Congress draft political reports proposing a "Council 
of Burope*.^ In ehort.he felt that the official steps he had already 
takan,highlighted further by the formal — iaururation of OEBC on 
April 1 6,guf-iciently justified both his 3uropean standing and the 
Lauour Oovemmoat's lack of interest towards the i'a^ue Congress, 
whica,after all,was a purely unofficial and as yet rather ambiguous 
affair. Thar* wac,however,another underlying reason for his negative 
attitude towards the project,co recalled in the following account 
by Retinger:
T r io r  to the Congress of Europe..! had a long talk with the 
Foreign Secretary,>:r. Ernest Bevin,whose tirignpolicy at that time 
still had Churchill's complete support. I tried to persuade 
him to induce the labour Party to give us their backing, but 
during the two hour conversation the only argument he put 
forward against joining the movement wac the fact that Clurchill 
was its official leader in Great Britain. ClurchUl was a 
political opponent,and the Labour Partj .ould not support its 
political opponent. Hr. Bevln said,amon£ other things,that 
naturally the personality of Winston would dominate the Hague-. 
Congress, and when I suggested that Sir Stafford Cripps was 
willing to take part(as he «as willing to do),in order to 
counteract Churchill1 b Influence, Bevin pooh-poohed the idea.
I tiien suggested that he himself shoulO go to The Hacue,./.
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1. Spaak,op.cit.,pp. 1 42-1 44.
2. Cf.pp. 30-31.
). Cf .pp.Hb-**»--
/ .  but he confessed frankly that he was not of sufficient stature 
in Europe to be a counter-balance to the im-’ense popularity of 
Winston Churchill." 1
Though it was perfectly understandable on Bevin's part not to 
want,In effect,to lend support to a political opponent,his apparent 
timid reluctance not to be shown up in public by Churchill was a 
political misjudgement, for,as Spaa* had indeed pointed out, Bevin's 
international prestige as a"great European" had,at this time,been 
well secured by his "historic" speech of January 22 together with 
the rapid establishment of the Brussels Pact plus OEEC. Sy seizing 
the initiative with such resolve and 1  eadership,Bevin had effectiv*ay 
pulled the European mat from under Clsirehlll's feet. His reputation 
and stature were not endangered by attending the Congress,at which 
he could have spoken as the leading government at at earn an In Europe, 
and as the architect of the Brussels Treaty.whereas Churchill's 
fame did not compensate the letter 's  actual removal from real 
political power. Nor was Benin's "Western Onion" strategy at risk, 
since his European standing could have been enhanced in Aoerica1s 
eyes without having to take any fins Euro-centric comr.ltment. By 
being absent at The Hague,however,which had by Kay 1948 progressed 
from being an unofficial to an influential public gathering of 
considerable interest,Bevin not only assured Churchill of the 
European gauntlet once more, but was also placed on a defensive 
position in order to piush his pro-Atlantic policy through. It is 
true that Churchill's presidency of the Congress posed a serious 
political pro hi an; but Bevin could have turned this against Chur­
chill and the Conservative Party by showing good-will and uncalled- 
for modesty in attending the conference.and thereby gaining a much 
more sympathetic hearing than Churchill whose presidency would have 
appeared vain and inconsiderate, indeed.had fevin agreed to go to 
The iiaoie.it was not he,but Chirchill,who,in the final analysis, 
would lave been placed in an embarrassing political position. The ./.
l . n«tinger,op .cit .,p .220.
./.latter  had,up until then,always shows a keen political cuteness not 
openly to usurp Bavin's official steading on the European issue,for 
a fear of the back-lash accusation of "sour crapes"; it is likely 
that he would hare been forced to do so apaln. Moreover, 3evin would 
have found hil self in good Socialist company at The Hague - the 
Belgian Premier,Paul-Henrl SpaaJc had already agreed to go,while the 
prestigious leader of the French Socialists,Lion Slum,had even indi­
cated that he would preside,if so requested at one of the Committees! 
It was a formidable team and,along with Bevin,would have out-matched 
anything C in re hill could muster. Bevia., furthexmore, could have followed 
HLurn's example and offered to preside over the deliberations of the 
political Committee,which would have been an ideal platfom for 
advancing the British Government's Juropean policy,and one which 
would have captured the attention both o. 'he  official observers and 
of the press much more than the eloquent expressions of intent put 
forward by Cmirchill. - To sum up,b& failing to attand the Ha cue 
Congress» Bevin lost a valuable opportunity to reap ths political 
benefits of the pragmatic European lead which he had already given, 
and which he could have used as a powerful and impressive counter­
force to Churchill's more vacuous rhetoric and fading past giory as 
Britain's rejected war-time leader. There were certainly political 
pro hi ens for Bevin to go to The Hacue. £u» these difficulties would 
have re-bounded and blown in the face of the Tory leeder had Bevin 
decided to use oil the trappings and influ¡nee of his office in 
order to assume the political leadership of ihe Congi'eas of airope, 
with vje support of Sneak, Hum, r.nd other leading Socialist statesmen 
from the Suropcan continent. 2y not coinp»he allowed Chu re hill to 
"steal the shoW,while his Buropean col-,ca;ue£ :or the nost part 
rulkefi on ¿¡ie pidt-lincs. 1“ rll tliir,3ie hac1 niEtafcenly r.rrsineri that 
*he Con^recs would pass by alnost unnoticed coi’wnred to the real 
rovenmentcl Initiatives ia Surope. Thic vrr to nisjufi-e the depth/.
• *AAXVuiC i
. / .o f  feeling on the European continent In favour of a speedier Euro­
pean unification process,which inevitably cpilJ ed over into the • 
emotional wave of the Hague Congress. Paul-Honri Spaak indeed judged 
the Congress to be an "historic landmark in the aunals of Europe."' 
Bevin,ln contrast,regarded the whole project a- having nuiseance 
value only. It proved to ter* such more than this.
The net result of all this was that the Labour Government
decided to ignore the whole Hague project,and concentrate on
"practical" initiatives of its own. In hie parliamentary address
of January 22 Bevin in fact tacitly declared:
"It  is  easy to draw up a blue-print for a united Western 
Europe and to construct neat-looking plans on paper. While
I do not wish to discourage the work done by voluntary poli­
tical organisations,I oust say it le a much slower,harder 
Job to carry out a practical programme which takes e«-
p<*V>n^tvhich face it . 1 an afraid it will have to be done 
a step at a time." 2
lik e w is e ,it t le e ,in  the same debate,completely washed his hands of
the whole question,stating:
"1 have already said that we velcome the fullest support for 
the United Europe idea. As regards any particular organisation, 
it  would not be right of the Government to pronounce a ruling 
on it,but we have always welcomed and supported it . This la a 
voluntary organisation for the propaganda of ideas." '
Pressed further by Cm re hill aB to the labour Government's attitude 
towards the All-Party Group for a united Europe,the British Premier 
conceded that the Government was not involved,though i f  was "free 
for anybody to Join the organisation."* Despite the official 
assistance gives to the project in other European countries^, the 
British Government this chose to m a i n  aloof, passing on responsi­
bility concerning the Hague Congress to the labour Party machine 
itself,and to the ideological hard-liners in the labour National
E-ecrutive Conrittee.who would have ta pronounce the final decision.
T. Spaa!k,op.clt. ,p.201 .
2. 3evln,Hansard. 22- 23.1 .48 ..op.cit.
3. Attlee,2 3 .1 .4 6 . ,ibid.
4. Ibid.
5. See KacKlllan .op .cit .,p .161.
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The Labour Party,as as organ!satIon,had,In actual fact,as yet to 
fall fully into line with the "Western Union" policy evoked by flevin 
and the labour administration. In the early post-war period there had 
been much hope among the party rank and file  that some sort of under­
standing might indeed be achieved with soviet Aisrla. Bvai by 
the Spring of 1^47,while accepting that Britain would have to rely 
on some sort of broad Atlantic arrangement and that initial limited 
co-operation in Western Burope was necessary, the party'e foreign 
policy statanent published by Transport House and entitled "Cards on 
the Tati e"1 , still looked to a "one world" post-war order, rej ecting 
at the Base time a "third force* Biropean formula on the grounds that 
it would provoke rather than prevent a permanent ■crystalieation" of
5
3irope into rigid bi-polar bloc spheres of influence.1. This was not 
the viw,however,of a key section of the Labour Left. Indeed,in Kay 
1 9 4 7 » & S  members of the so-called 'Keep Left' group,Richard Crossoan, 
Ian Klkardo and Michael Foot,together with other Labour IIP’ b Including 
K.V.G. Hackay and Leslie Hale,lucidly declared in opposition both to 
the party's reluctance to formulate new plans and to Bevin 's apparent 
subservience to American rather than European conceptual dictates that 
"Ve are Europeans now!" , adding:
"A Socialist Britain cannot prosper so long as Burope is divided. 
The gftal we should work for is a federation which bonds together 
the nations now under Eastern domination with the peoples of 
Western Burope." 3
3uscribing to the view that an independent and democratic socialist
airope would act as a .progressive force acainst Bast-West polorisaticn,
their aspirations rapidly dwindled in the wake of the Prague coup,
■the Beilin crisis and the formation of ITATO. *y Kay 1949,Kikardo was
fighting a lone baxtle in claiming that the "third force",as a
"peaceful solution of Birope's pro hi eras", still "made sense"*,and by ./. 
^  ibid” ° f 7thg Tnbla‘ ••^aa"1>ort House. 3Prinr 1 947.LABOUR PARTY ARC?OVRS
i-eop l-eft.paper published for the labour Pprty Conference,Kay 1947, 
LABJtIR PARTY ARCHIVES.
4. Ian Klkardo,"Why I Dlaa/tree".Tribune. 20. 5. 49.
./.ear ly  1950 he finally came round to the view that the "Buropean 
Revolution» vaild have to be limited initially to the creation of
’Keep Left ' group w«.» that ite leading personalities - especially 
Crossn&n and hackay - had acted as an important Labour vanguard in 
establishing,along with other Labour Left-wingers such as Barbara 
Castle and Christopher Shawcross.the Parlimentary Labour Party 
•Europe Group* and in tarn the 'ill  Party Group’ for a united 
Birope. In short,they had established a non-partisan rapport with 
those circles sponsoring the Hague Congress.
The party machine did not approve. This wrs particularly stressed 
by Hugh Dalton as head of the NBC International Committee,who,whlle 
having shown no effective synpathy for Keep Left,or for the USSE for 
that matter,was steadfastly opposed to any Si rope an unity campaign 
which was not strictly socialist In character. Eight froa the setting 
up of the TTHi under Churchill’ s presidency he had Indeed criticised 
participating Labaur menbera, such as Gordon Lang,as showing ■colla­
borationist tendencies*,while the NEC General Secretary,Korgan Philips, 
had advised maabers of the party to "withdraw* their support on the 
grounds that the future of Europe depended on "the success of the 
United nations and on the strengthening of frirtndly collaboration 
between ftissia,America and Britain ."* Sandya,In turn,had concluded 
that.at thi.s rather difficult Juncture in time,Labour had been 
caught off balance,but that Labour rank anJ file  support would soon 
follow.® Despite Retlnger's efforts,thir proved not to be the case. 
Thereafter,In fact,In the wake of the Marshall P}fin and In a final 
desperate attsapt to prevent a definite 2ast-West polarisation,the
Labour Party tried to revive the Second International, in tv.e v a in ./.
1. rg Papers campaign.
3 . ____________________  ___ ______  _,i.argate 26-30.5.47.,
Official nJoort.BTi. 106-107. LAH)UR I ARTY ARCHIVES.
4. Korean Philips,letter of 2 2 .1 .4 7 . ,quoted in full by Dalton,ibid.
5. Sandys,letter to Ooud3nhov«,25.1 . 4 7 . , CAS. BHJ.-.<E.
a "Western Riropean Federation". Meanwhile the importance of the
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./.bope of at least salvaging some East-Ueet Socialist dialogue in 
Europe. In tarn,at the 'International Socialist Conf,?rence' .held at 
Antwerp between N0v«sber 28 and December 1 ,1 947 ,and attended by dele­
gates of 18 Socialist Parties principally from Western and Eastern 
Birope,tbe Karshall Pjao was only given qualified support (le. that 
it should relain non-political ) ,whlle at the same time the Moscow 
Comlnfoi* was indirectly attacked!(The issue of a European "third 
force" was left aside). Ifcr the time the Committee of the Interoatiaji. 
Socialist Conference met on January 10 ,1946 ,however,the deadlock of 
the London talks with Russia weighed heavily In the decision of the 
British Labour Party and Prench Socialist Party to jointly sponsor 
a European Socialist Conference at London,in }'.arch,to which only the 
Ht-rshall Aid countries (including the Western zones of Germany ) would 
be invited to send delegations.^ In the wake of the Prague coup,in 
February,the Eastern Biropean Socialist Partlss had either been 
expelled or had withdrawn from the International Socialist Conféra» 
altogether.^ - It was at this very crisis wrought moment in time, 
with its ¿Lobal strategy of East-West détente eclipsed by events 
and its European-Socialist policy in tatters,that the Labeur Party 
machineiy was in turn tossed Into the political fray concerning the 
projected 'Congress of Europe',to be held under the auspices of the 
Opposition Tory leader. The response was fax from positive.
The attitude of the Party Executive to the Hague Congress was 
first discussed In detail at the HEC meeting of January 28,where, 
upon th* Advice of Morgan Philips,it was acreed that a public state­
ment on the Issue, so soon after Bevin's speech of January 22 ,vas 
"undesirable".* Instead,a "private comrunicatlon" was conv«yed to 
labour members who had already Indicated their support in order to „
discourage" that from participating in the proposed Congress,and./.
v. See Keealngs Contenoorary Archive*, V° 1 .7 , 1 94S-50,p.9n 2.
2. Ibid. 3. Ib ii .,p .§ S l  f.
4. EEC aeetlng.gB.1 . 4 8 . .official m inu t ea. Plu s accompanying aalfi on 
the Ha cue Congress by >*crgan philips, L ajûUB p a KTY ARCHIVs s .
./ .t o  emphasise the Letour Party’ s own initiative in sponsoring the
conference of Western European socialist Parties to he held in Karch. 
Word of the NEC decision subsequently circulated,and in tuni prompted 
CInrchill to write to Attlee on February 1 in order to state that a 
wide measure of political support for the Ha awe conference had alres$r 
bees obtained on the Continent,and that prominent Socialists in other 
countries had accepted invitations to attend. Attlee,in reply,again 
washed his hands of the affair,saying that it was not up to the 
Labour Government but to the NBC to decide upon official party 
policy towards the Congress. Churchill then wrote to Shinwell,who, 
as NEC Chairman, abruptly replied that the Executive had reaffirmed 
the decision to "discourage" Party menbers from taking part in the 
Congress,on the grounds that "the subject of European unity is much 
too important to be entrusted to unrepresentative interests . " 1 
Shinwell's specific objection concerning the "number of private 
individuals selected by unknown process (vho) rob the congress of 
any real representative character" was,however,based upon incorrect 
information supplied to hire by Morgan philips,giving little  emphasis 
to parliamentary delegations and too much to individual groups. 2 
This matter was subsequently cleared up by Retinger who,after a 
long discussion with Morgan Philips on Karch 2^,in turn stressed in 
writing that the composition of the British delegation had only been 
officially decided at a joint meeting held on February 24 between 
the U 9itFederal Union,the All Party Group,and the British sections 
of the IXEC and USSB.at which it was agreed that out of a British 
delegation of 100, 20 Lajour K P 's ,8  Trade Unionists,4 members of the 
Co-or-eratlve K0v e n «t  and 5 nenbers of the USSE woulf be invited to 
attend the Congress.* Koreover,in the final svent,tfcis nunber went
up to incluJe some 40 Latour H P 's ,27 Conccrvntivc H P 's ,5 Liberals,
~  Correspondence between Churchill,Attlee L S*vlnvell,Feb. 1946, 
Leeeln/rs Contep^or^rr Archives.op.clt. .p .S111; CAB. EWG'tB.
2. Hote to IT EC aeetinr.. 2t . 1. 4b. .o p .c lt .




./ .M 's ,a n d  4 Indepaidents out of e total delegation of 150. 1 Despite 
this clarification as to the balanced representative planning of ¿he 
Congress.plus a vain attempt by Retinger to invite the 'International 
Socialist Committee(ie. the organising cosnlttee of ..he Western Euro­
pean Socialist Conference in Karch)to become an "official sponsor" 
of the Hague Congress^with all the executive rights and political 
representation this entailed,the labour Executive refused to budge 
In its rigid opposition to the whole sche&e.
The repercussions were soon felt. - It has already been noted 
how labour's position bung over the KPS conference in February; so 
too aaong the British federalists was ther both anger and disappoint­
ment. Kiss Josephy indeed declared that "great harm" had been done 
by the labour Party announcement,which would "Inevitably have a highly 
prejudice effect upon the Continental Socialists who will find thaa- 
selves In an extremely difficult position." She in turn argued, 
rather simplistically,that labour had not appreciated the “true" BtTF 
origins of the Hague Congress in the welter of UIK publicity sur­
rounding the whole affair In Britain. "*e are convinced",she added, 
"that had the BTF's neat been published as one of the sponsors the 
reaction of the labour Party In th ib country would have been very 
different."^ Bxug»ans,haxd-pressed and bitter over labour's reaction, 
proffered a different argum ant In a 3JF policy document circulated 
towards the « d  of February. The B0T,he stated,had "feund much unde i— 
standing but little  organised support in British labour.” * Rather 
than blame Sandys and the UEK for the "Cmrchlll problem",he instead 
put the onus of responsibility upon the l a ’»u r  Party itself ,hla 
argument being stated In full belowt
1. "List of rT itlah delegates to the Conrreaa oi.SurPPg Hague"
2£. 4. 46 ., CAB! BHUGGE.
2. Retinger,letter to Philips,20 . 3 .4 6 . ,CAS-. BHUGjE.
3. Josephy,official 3JF Bxecutive document.Con^rese of Birtioe,5 .2 .4 8 .
UK? PJlSIS (Kiss Joaephy was chairman of federal Union J,
4. "So tt by Dr. Bruranana".February 1948, CA&1 B3J0GB.
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"The following ere the relevant fects regarding the Congress of
Europe at The Hague, organiaed by
-J  Tho Europoan Union of Federalists (grouping 40 movomonts) V  
Tho United Europe Movement
The Independent League for European Cooporatlon 
Le Comltd pour 1 'Europe Unie (2d. Harriot) »-
1. Tho Congress will be held, whatever Labour m:; decide to do.
^  2» The response will be considerable, since continental opinion
! is extremely favourable to European Unity.
2. Labour's abstention would not be understood on tho Contiuont, 
especially aftor Or. Bevin's spcech. It would not bo 
interpreted as a demonstration of stron^th, but cs a lock of 
sense of responsibility towsrds Europo. On the Continent it 
Would cortelnly strongthon Hr. Churchill's prostl^t, if not 
the case for European FoOorctiori.
4. Sony Labour people and Socialists *111 certainly participate, 
even if tho Labour J*crty coycotts the Cotnjr^ss; it will not 
bo strong enough to prevent a Churchilllan victory, but It 
will cover the orgenisers on their left flsnk.
5. Mr. Sandys has obtolnod serious support frost the Vctlctn.
As the future of the Continental doroocrocles depends largely 
on collaboration between Socialists end Christian Doraocrats,
It night be dangerous to boycott a cengross in shich H.H. the 
Pope is personally lntercstod.
6 . The European Union of Federalists (princlpclly coaposed of 
Socialists, Cothollcs and progresslvo Independents) has 
always tried to counter-balance Ur. Churchill's position as
o chenplon of European unity. In Its efforts It hes found 
much understanding but little orgonisod support in Sritiah 
Labour circles. On the Continent It has built up a strong 
populer ond progressive movement, especially in Holland,
Franco, Gorneny end Italy.
7. The Kuropoan Parliamentary Union (CheJrmam Goorges Aohy,
Belgian Socialist) and "United Socialist States of Surope" 
are ready to become co-organisers of the Congress in order to 
make it a really representative demonstration. All thoy are 
waiting for La a favourable LaDour doclsion.
Pobruary 1948.
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The final point made by Brugnans was well supported by the
recent developments in the two movements to which he referred. The
joint meeting of February 24 ,for exaTrple, at v*iich the composition
of the British delegation was agreed upon,had been attended by
British USSE delegates and by Mackay for the EPU. Moreover,as the
founding chairman of the USSE,Bob Edvards was pressing for the
full involvement of his movement in the Hague preparations. As
Sandys privately confided to Hack ay:-
"Our negotiations with the USSE were progressing well and 
they undoubtedly would have joined us but for the Labour 
Executive’ s decision(even so the proposal to join our Committee 
was only turned down by the USSE Executive by a majority of 
two)".
The EFU Council was also warming to the Hague Committee,while the 
British All-Party Parliamentary Group,under Mackay, had "asked" 
the EPU as a whole to be the "organisation responsible for issuing
3
(parliamentary)invitations to the Congress” . The All-Party Group
A
in the French Parliament was in turn contemplating a similar step. 
The stumbling block was again the hostility shown by Labour with 
regard to the Congress,which the sulking EPU Secretary General, 
Coudenhove-Kalergi.was only too glad to use as an ercuse not to 
collaborate. "It  is more important", he wrote to liackay in r e fe r « *  
to the Labour administration,"for us to collaborate closely vith 
the Government initiative for European Federation than to partici­
pate at the Hague Conference".^
Brugmans* main point in his ESJF Executive note had stressed, 
however,that it would be in Labour's own interests(as well as in 
the interests of a European Socialist strategy) to become fully 
involved in the Hague Congress. He repeated his argument in a 
strongly-worded letter printed in the Labour weekly "Tribune" on 
February 20;
X.Cf. p . i o j
2 .SAHDYS.letter to Mackay 9 .3 .4 8 . liACKAY PAPERS.
3. Recorded i» the Joint International Cownittee meeting,5 .3 .48. ,  
official Minutes(icA iM ) . CAEM BKUQGG.
4. Ibid.
5. C0UDENH0VE-1ALERGI,letter to Mackay 28 .2 .48 . ¡IACIAY PAPERS.
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"There is nothing to be said against party politics in 
this matter ( he remarked) But we, on the Continent,few 
that European Federation may be judged by the Labour Party 
as a point of purely internal policy,a ouestion of being 
more or less strongly against Hr Churchill.
I am very uruch surprised to see th*t in Gre^t Britain 
the Congress of Burope is regarded as the initiative of 
the United Burope Movement. On the Continent it is just 
the opposite. Ve have daily to make it clear that the 
Congress vill not be a purely federalist manifestation(ie.
.of the EUF)..
Emphasising the strong Socialist orientation of the EUF,Brugmans
continued to argue:
"There certainly are essential differences between our 
conceptions of European Federation and those of a reaction 
nary. But don’ t you think it would be politically rel«w*nt 
if  they could be openly confronted,especially since Mr Bevin's 
recent speech did not make it quite clear vhat was the specific 
Socialist point of view? What aurope and the world are vaiting 
for is neither negativism nor a Labour secession,but the 
clear-cut,progressive solution for problems which v i n  arise 
while Europe unites. The Hague would be an eyceilent platform 
for every partisan of European unity to make his own contri­
bution» Can responsible Socialists stay aloof when this 
discussion is taking place?
"The conference can be really representative,if Labour 
lifts the ban. Otherwise,a good occasion of com’non will 
and frank discussion will be missed".
In all this, Brugmans was extremely conscious of the latent
tension within his own movement over participation at The Hague,
and of the pledge which he had in effect given to the MFE that
Labour would in the final event assune its "responsibility" to
2
Europe by attending the Congress. This in turn accounted for his 
passionate aoncem about Labour’ s negative response and for his 
incessant appeals during this period tot?rds his Labour comrades. 
On the eve of the International Socialist Conference,in March,he 
made a final plea to Morgan Philips. Writing as £UF Executive 
Chairman and as "a member of the uutch Labour rarty for 2 1 years", 
he again stressed the mainly Socialist and radical composition of 
the BUF, adding in respect of the Congress itself:
I.BRUGi-ANS,letter in Tribune 20 .2 .46. 
2• Cf *p. .
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"The Congress at The Hague vill take piece ,-\nyvay and vill 
strike public opinion as people on the Continent are very 
keen on the idea of European unity. Some Socialists vill 
participate for certain and the texts of the proposed 
resolutions could be satisfactory and it vould then be 
impossible to maintain that this Conrrress vas reactionary.
It all depends on one problem,vill the Socialist and 
progressive forces at Die Hague be in the ©osition of free 
lances or official representatives.. .
If in Great Britain the. •Churchill problem* exists,it 
does exist on a much smaller scale on the Continent. On the 
other hand.ve are pretty sure to be able to obtain good 
representative delegations from practically all European j 
countries in the West if the Labour Party ban is lifted".
Similarly,Retinger had also made a direct appeal to Shinvell,
stating:
"A number of leading continental Socialists have already 
indicated their intention to attend the Conference. In the 
circumstances the decision to discouraoe members of the 
British Labour Party from participating vill not be understood 
in other European countries,especially after Mr Bevin's 
speech advocating Western Union" . 2
The appeals to Labour vere all "tade in vain and,as a result, 
the Continental Socialists vho had already agreed to attend the 
Congress vere indeed placed in an extremely difficult position. 
Foremost among these,of course,there figured both Paul-Henri Spaak 
and Léon Blum,vho,in making their tentative decision,had also taped
3
to receive Labour Party support. The Labour Party "discouragement" 
severely dashed their aspirations. The more pugnacious Spaak at 
first came out fighting,and informed Ketinger soon after the 
Labour decision that he vould strongly urge Blum and other Con­
t in u a l  Socialists to go together to The Hague "whatever the
4
attitude of the British Labour Party may be". He further added 
that,in his opinion,"no European Congress could be in any vay 
representative vithout the presence of Churchill, the chief artisan 
of Victory and recognised as such ty "*>st Continentals".^ Blum./.
1. BKUG.SA.HS,letter to H.^hilips 19 .3.48. BHUGMANS PAPERS
2. RETINGER,letter to Shinvell 12.2.48» CAEN BRUGGE
3. Information contained in the H.Philips tlEC note 2 6 .1 .4 8 .op cit
4. P-ecorded by Retinger in a letter to Sandys 1 .3 .46 ,after talks 
Vith Spaak on 14 .2 .48 . , CAEM BRUGGE
5. Ibid.
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./.a n d  the French Socialist Party Executive Committee,under the 
strong pro-Labour influence of its Director , Guy Mollet,vere 
less certain about causing a split among Socialist ranks. At a 
crucial meeting on February 19 they decided instead to attempt at 
persuading Labour to change its policy vith regard to the Congress, 
in order to ensure a "total and organised Socialist representation 
at The Hague. Guy Mollet vas in turn charged with carrying out 
negotiations on this point vith Labour representatives at the 
forthcoming International Socialist Conference. *s Marceau Pivert 
informed Marc, hovever, the SFI0 did not hold out much hope in this 
auest to influence Labour, the NEC decision to "discourage” parti­
cipation at The Hague having come as a "heavy blov" to the French 
Socialists. Nevertheless,the SFIO Executive Committee had not as 
yet ruled out their official support of the Congress»and,in addi­
tion to re-affirming their policy in favour of Suropean Federation, 
they vere still prepared to take part in the invitation policy.
In the meantime,the European activists vithin the Labour 
Party itself,led by Mackay and Leslie Hale(both members of "Keep 
Left").decided to resist the NBC decision to"discourage" Labour 
members from attending the Hague Congress. They indeed regarded 
the NEC policy as weaning "not encourage",vhich ir. no vay consti­
tuted an official ban upon Labour participation. The Labour Execu­
tive and Cabinet.plus the official vhip.all in fact played along
2
in the game,and were consulted at each stage of the preparations. 
Indeed Mackay grew so confident that no real obstacle vould be 
placed by the Labour Party machine upon participation at 3he Kacue, 
that he even catered, into a bet vith Sandys that at least 25
3
Labour M.P.s vould attend the Congress! By April,41 Labour MPs 
had actually accepted to go as a delegation,including leading./.
I . Information described at length in a letter from Pivert to Marq
19.2 .48. , BROGHANS fAPHRS
<£. Events clearly recorded by L. Hale in a letter to Meraan Philips
22.4.48. , ¡'lACKAY PAPERS
3* Mackay letter to sandys,X4.5 .4 8 ..records this interesting 
anecdote! MaCKaY PAPERS
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. / .  members of the "Keep Left" group such as Kichard Crossman,Mackay 
and Hale,along vith other prominent Buropeanists such as Gordon 
Lang,Christopher ¡»hawcross, Hugh Deiargy,J.B. Hynd and Ivor Thomas, 
(the latter two being former Ministers)? In the meantime,however, 
the International Socialist Conference,held privately at Selsdon, 
Surrey,on March 2 1-22 ,put a damper on much of the general Socialist 
enthusiasm for the Hague Congress.
Meeting under the hard-line chairmanship of Hugh Dalton,the 
conference in fact rejected French appeals to participate at The 
Hague,in a blunt decision stating that the Socialist Parties shoutâ 
"take no part" in the forthcoming Congress. The memorandum sub­
mitted by the British Labour delegation went still further,and 
declared vith regard to the Congress:
"the concept of European unity may be corrupted in the 
hands of reaction. Socialists everywhere must guard against 
the prostitution of this great constructive ideal into the 
vulgar instrument of anti-Soviet propaganda,by discredited 
politicians who hope to rebuild their shattered fortunes 
under the protection of its popular appeal." 2
¡¡oreover, despite the fact that the Labour delegation also defended 
itself by proposing that the Socialists themselves should take the 
"initiative in promoting the(European)ideal on the plain of con­
structive réalisa",when pressed specifically by the French to 
organise a major propaganda campaign and a conference of European 
Socialist Parties,trade unions and progressives before the Hague 
Congress,as veil as to set up a permanent organisation for the pro- 
■*tion of European unity,they objected and fell back to propose the 
convening of a more limited conference of Sociflist parties,in
3
order to discuss co-ordination methods. The preparatory conference 
in question vas in turn scheduled for April 25. - It would be the 
scene of a final French appeal to Labour with regard to partici­
pation at The Hague.
Ï. " List rf British Delegates.. " .o t * cit. Also see Guardian article 
’¿éïégaCês to conference on European Union', 1 7 .4 .48.
2 .  " European C0-0»erayi'™ rn rhm  thp FrnnraorV nf t h e  l'.t > rn v e r v  
Progranrae" - Lrbour rarty memorandum to Selsdon meeting, 
2I-Ü2 . 3 . 4 8 . LABOUT: rtlRTY AECH1VES 
t— sings Cont— pqrary Archie«».o p .c it .,p .9215.
CHAPTER ^  RE-APPRAISAL OF THE POLITICAL CAMPAIGN; I1ARCH 19-tfe
I) General Position: Joint Committee Meeting March 5
At the same time as the hard-line ideolouues in the Labour
Executive were busy undercutting international Socialist support
for the Hague Congress on the grounds of it being "reactionary" and
"uirrepresentative",the organising Committee it*elf had in fact
clearly demonstrated the falsity of this accusation by securing
in Britain the actice support and collaboration of the All-Party
Parliamentary Group for European Unity. It h.'.s already been noted
hov representatives of the latter group had participated in the
joint meeting of February 24 ,at which the method for selecting the
British delegation to the Hague was decided? Similarly,on Friday
March 5 ,at the first full Joint International Conrdttee meeting of
the new year,the a h -Party Group sent Mackay,Boothby,Sir Peter
i-.acDonsld and P.G. Roberts as "observers" to the re-union. The
member organisations in the Committee were represented by Layton,
Rhys Williams,Retinger and Deiattre(lLBC); Brurrmans,Josephy and Nord
(EUF);Vermeil,Courtin,Jacquet and Noel(CFEU) ;and finally Sandys,
2
Lang,Goilanes and Liridsay(UEM).
The meeting was mainly preoccupied vitfi the effects wfeicfa 
Labour’ s open hostility to the Hague Congress vould have upon the 
conposition and general appeal of the conference^ Indeed,as a 
further illustration of their efforts to be representative,both 
sections of the Anglo-French movement ensured the inclusion of 
Socialists in their Conaittee groups ,Lang and Gollancz for the UEll, 
and Jacquet(a member of the French Socialist Central Co!?snittee)for 
the CFEU. The initial part of the meeting,moreover,was dominated 
by Labour’s outspoken Buropean militant,KWG. Mackey,who,despite his 
"observer* status,gave a discourse on the political situation./.
1. Cf. p .10}. ”
2. Joint International Committee meeting 5 .3 .46 .. Official Minutes 
( IC/M/4). CAEM BRU0G8.
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in Britain arising from Labour's hostility to the Congress,and 
stressed that the Labour,Trade Unionist,and Co-operative members 
vho comprised the socialist part of the British delegation vould 
go to The Hague "even if the Labour Party did not reconsider its 
attitude". Brugmans,for his part.drev attention to Spaak's strong 
support on this matter,and suggested that the Belgian Socialist 
Premier should be proposed ajs Honorary President at The Hague, 
aiong-side Churchill. The meeting decided to "study" the idea, 
vhile,in the meantime,Jacguet was charged vith enlisting Paul 
Ramadier, the former French Socialist Premier, as Chairman of the 
Political Committee at The Hague.(Blum' s reluctance to break 
ranks vith Labour had evidently been appreciated). As regards the 
other tvo Committees,Paul Van 2eel?nd,as President of the ILEC 
and a former Belgian Christian-Democrat Premier, had already 
accepted to chair the Economic debate,this decision being con­
firmed by the meeting,vhereas nobodv had as yet been designated 
the chairmanship of the Cultural d e b a te . The main point to be 
stressed vas that a clear effort bad once mart- been made to 
ensure that the running of the conference vould not be monopo­
lised by any one political group, indeed,by deliberately choosing 
a distinguished Socialist as Chairman of the Political Committee,' 
vtiich vas regarded as the most prestigious and important focal 
point of the Congress,the Joint Executive Coonittee undermined 
Labour's argument that the conference vas controlled by the 
"hands of reaction".
The actu‘ 1 invitation lists for t»e Congress had,in the 
meantime, been completed is regrrds -Jrit'in, Frtmce,Belgium and 
the Netherlands,though it vas noted that the Labour Party policy 
might ultimately cause some alterations. The Committee 
also took note,vith considerable satisfaction,that the Dutch 
Labour Party had decided upon "an absolutely favourable attitude" 
tov?rds the Congress,vhile the USSE vas actively collaborating 
in the preparations.despite having rejected ony formal commitment 
to the oroject itself. The HEX,moreover,hsd rdded its supoort./.
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. / .  in favour of participation at The Hague,<mt! vould give a "formal" 
confirmation ot this agreement at its next Executive meeting,on 
March I I .  The EPU,for its part,still hud some "resi?rv?tions" about 
becoming involved,though the lend which the British and French 
An-Party Groups vere already giving in reiftion to the t>repara_ 
tory CDmraittee vas indicative that Qaripittwe vas losing ground in his 
personal opposition to the Sahdys-dominrted co-ordination movement- 
On tas jxto'V the meeting vas informed that Retinner had written to 
the EPU Chairman,Georges Bohy.and that "a result may be expected 
vithin a short time".
On a lighter note,the Cownittee also discussed the type of 
flag vhich could be used for the Congress and for the ensuing 
international campaign. Sandys proudly presented his ovn design, 
vhich vas basically a broady-qiread refi letter " E" (for Europe), dravn 
on the back of an envelope. The moetinrr in turn accented this 
great voxk of art as their official emblem,not realising that it 
vould later become the subject of an amusing,indeed ridiculous, 
nuarrel vith Coudenbove.
la addition to the outstanding problems still remaining 
vith regard to the as yet incomplete invitation lists for the 
Scandinavian and Mediterranean countries in oarticular,the status 
of the Eastern European delegations and of the UiA vas ai»o brought 
into question towards the end of the meeting. After thoughtful 
debate,it vas finally confined that both the Eastern European and 
Spanish delegations, instead of being selected on an "official" 
representative basis,vould be constituted under a limited "observer" 
static ard be Aram fro* among the most famous person?lities living in 
er.ile.such as Salvador de Madariaga(leader of the Liberal Interna- 
tional)for Spain,and Gregory Gaf enco(for~ier Socialist Rumanian 
Foreign Minister)for Eastern Eurone. Retinner vould be mainly 
responsible in this area. The invitation policy in respect of 
the USA vas described in the official minutes of the meeting 
as follows:
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"The advantages ■-'nd disadvantages regarding American 
representation were discussedrit ir. of the utmost im- 
pcrtance to convince the United States of the realism 
of the Congress;on the other hand,the presence of the 
US delegates,even as observers,might tend to lessen 
the political significance of the Congress unless other 
non-Buropean nations are given an e^ual reprerentation.
It is proposed to invite persons from the USA to attend 
the Congress as guests".
Despite the "guest" status vhich w?.s thus attributed to the USA,
it vas clear that the Congress organisers wanted t® impress upon
the Us political establishment that serious efforts vere actually
being carried out,in addition to the as yet limited diplomatic
initiatives,for the furtherance of Western ¿Arrooean unification,
and for the eventual 'liberation* of the Soviet-dominated Eastern
European regimes. The invitation to the conference proffered to
the United States vas,in fact,the first step in a protracted
series of co-ordination measures leading to the official launching
of the 'US Committee on a United Europe' ,and to the subs ecru ent
tarnishing of the European Movement by CIA under-cover agencies,
2
t'hich would reach a peak during the 1950* s.
The status of the overseas territories vas also a problem 
for the organising committee. Though the Belgian and Dutch vere 
partially involved in this question.it remained chiefly a concern 
to the British and French representatives,and required careful 
handling. While,on the one hand, the Joint International Conuittee 
did not vant to appear hostile or detached to the overseas ties, 
they did not vant,on the other hand,to stamp the*Congress of 
Surope' as an overt and up-dated imperial affair. However,»101» the 
broader ranks of the affiliated groups, especially the ueh and CFEU, 
there existed strong lobbies in favour of a continuing association 
between a united ^rope and the overseas ties of her member-state. 
The Committee consequently decided to invite various "observers" 
from thu Dominions .though not the Co-nonT'eal th in general, Co attsri 
the Congress. (The main discussion concerning the overseas terri­
tories took place the next day.vnen the Executive Committee vent 
into the details of the draft Political Report),
r .bi'ticiai minutes ¿ .3 .46 . .op.cit. Z. cf. p*. 253-263 .
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2) Draft Political Report: Executive Committee Meeting ¡¡arch 6
The eventual Political Resolution which emerged from the 
Hague Congress on May 10,1948,and vhich became the central tenet 
of the subsequent campaign of the European hovement .leading to 
the official creation of the Council of Europe in May 1949,had 
its real genesis at the crucial Joint Executive Committee meeting 
of March 6 ,at vhich the draft reports of the main member movemerts 
were submitted and discussed in considerable detail. The repre­
sentatives present at this meeting,held in the home of Duncan 
Sandys,included: Layton,Retinger and Delettre(II,EC)BrugmansJosqi* 
and Nord(EUF);Vermeil Courtin,Jacquet and i*oel(CFEP);Boothby,as 
an"observer" for the British All-Party Group;kebattet and Hartin 
(General Secretariat);and finally Sandys himself, representing the 
OEM,and acting as Chairman* The draft political texts submitted 
clearly bore the iapnnt of the latter*s guiding influence and 
determination behind the scenes in persuading nis colleagues of 
the need to pitch their reports'at a realistic level,vhile 
managing to retain a thinly-veiled commitment to the eventual 
supranational integration of Europe. In short,all the reports 
corresponded basically to the format originally issued by Sandys 
in December,in vhich he had proposed that the "ultimate" for* of 
European unity envisaged should only bf indicrted in general 
terms,vhile the "immediate" specific measures to be proposed
2
should fall within the scope of inter-governmental co-operation. 
In the meantime,hovevear, the Soviet take-over of Czechoslovakia 
in February had shaken the European campaigners into a new 
sense of urgency,vhile their actual ideas vith regard to the 
setting up of some sort of European Council had also been 
pre-empted by the pending agreement of the Five Brussels Powers 
for the creation of an official,though more limited,Consultative
3
Council. In other words,the inter-governmental initiative»vhich./*
1. Joint Eyecutive Committee meetinc,6 . 3.'l8. .official M m t M
(I C/M/6) . CAKH BROOGS. *---- ----- ’
2 ,  C f .  p p . 8 2 - 8 6 .
3* C f .  pp .  96
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• / •  Sandys had originally seen as the major prerequisite to the more 
protracted campaign for a real and effective political integration 
of «urope,was now an official-political reality.desùte the limits in 
membership and terms of reference. The proposals drafted in the 
various reports in question evidently took note of this fact,and 
as a result,went one step further than initially suggested,by 
including an essential link-up stage between the "ultimate asal" 
and "immediate steps":
As regards the "ultimate goal" ,each of the draft te^ts 
submitted spoke of an eventual political Federation of Burope, 
the sole exception on this point being the report issued by the 
EOF of all groups. The latter reportJin fact stressed,above all, 
the need to avoid creating a "centralised" European "super-state* 
European unity should instead be based upor. the principle of 
"self-government" and the maximum "decentralisation" possible in 
favour of "regional" and "functional" "co*nrunity-b.Tsed "démarra cy. 
In this respect,there vas no clear mention of a supranational 
political struetnre>but rather a united Eurooe formed around 
"federal bodies"(d'organismes fédéraux) which would be vested 
with limited sovereign powers passed on by the nation» partici­
pating in the scheme. The draft report submitted by the French 
2
Council,on the other hand,called for a "true Federation",based 
upon an effective "political and economic solidarity", indeed, 
though mention was made of the need to"safeguard" the autonomous 
and diverse elements within the eventual Federation.it was clear 
that the latter group envisaged a political fusion as opposed to 
a co-ordinated regional and functional decentralisation of the 
European states. In complete counter-position to the BUF report, 
they therefore suggested that the ultimate goal was a "Federal 
State" which could promote a unified political approach capable 
of removing the "national egoisms" that cnuse war. Similarly, . / .
X. BUF "Rapport sur la Politioue Générale "(IC /P /I3 )^CAEM BRUGGE.
2. CFEU Franç.-is de RAPPORT POLITIQUE" (IC /P /I4), CAEW
— ...... ..... ' —.............BRUGGE.
• the British report1 proposed a longtaxa policy for the creation 
of a "democratic Federation of Western Europe* based on the 
principles of "common dtlsenship,political freedom,representa­
tive and responsible government,vith a Parliament directly elec­
ted by the people", tven the official "note" submitted by the
oGeneral Secretariat called for an eventual "political Federation" 
and stressed the vlev that ne effective economic Integration of 
Europe «mid be possible without a parallel "political* strategy 
involving "s o m  surrender..or Joint exercise of sovereign povers".
Turning to the "immod^te steps", all the draft reports, 
including that of the BUF,repeated Sandys' original proposal 
for the creation of an intergovernmental European Council. The 
BOP,of course,did net use precisely the sane wording,though the 
sense vas Identical. In addition to expressing support for the 
officially-existing co-op eretiro* European economic organisations", 
and for the need te extend "inter-consular"coordination services, 
the latter report vemt en te call for the inter-gov ern*«ital 
creation of a "permanent official CoeMlttee” to meet at regular 
intervals la order te formulate Burepean foreign and economic 
policy and to being "the family of Suropoan states" more closely 
together. Additional steps advocated in the report vere mainly 
of a functional nature,including the creation of a special Baro- 
pean fund and study cewlttee in order to facilitate the official 
effort towards Burepean integration,especially at the legislative- 
fiscal level; the creation of permanent cenlttees to look into 
the problem Of the colonies;the creation of a "Buropeen Atomic 
Authority",in order te coordinate scientific progress in this 
field and to submit the industrial results to public scrutiny! 
the creation of a "Bccropoan Academy*;the creation of a"snpra- 
national Ceaalssien" for the protection of human rights,etc.
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1. British Keport (IC/r/15) CA W  BKOQCK.plus MACIAY PAPKKS.
" — — ^ ——  f
2. "Points for inclusion in Political Keport" Rote by Qeneral
Secretariat' --- C----
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Despit* the undoubted quality of this EOF programme,it must
be stressed once again that there was no ■ anti ms of any supra-
Inational political teropean Institution. It is true h w w g  that, 
in addition to the above proposals,the EUP also advocated the 
formation of a "Borepean Arsry Force”,but this vas envisaged as 
part of a earId farce(ie. probably vitkin the scope of the UV), 
and thus not having to undergo the direct supervision of any 
supra-national political Boropean authority. Indeed the only 
part of the report which eight have dealt with such a scheme 
rather vaguely skated over any specific proposal and instead 
meekly called for an *international!»ation of the parliamentary 
spirit" and for the formation of a * Boropean parliamentary tradi­
tion" . Mo precisian vas offered in any vay as to how or vhen 
this should come about,still less under what specific form. There 
vas certainly n* mention of a tentative Boropean political Assem­
bly whether of a deliberative,consultative or constitutional 
nature. In fact,the SOP report firmly steered clear of any hint 
to merge sovereignty at a political supra-national Boropean 
level* This vas in direct contrast to all the other reports:
The Coaseli Fran?ais,far example,clearly stated that in addition 
to the immediate necessity for • Berepeen intergovernmental 
organisation«equipped with an international secretariat and a 
regular conference qrttm, the"essential task" of this body would 
be to promote a "federal" Boropean political structure in which 
national sovereignty would be restricted while a "central Buro-
pean government",with an adequate parliamentary assembly,would 
2come into operation. The int«r-Iink method for achieving this 
work would be based upon a "conjunction“ of the efforts among 
the Bbropean Parliamentary groups active within the V C . ' 3
1. tovem the proposal for a "supra-national" Buropean commission 
on human rights vas regarded as being the Cultural CeasLttee's 
sphere of action rather than that of the Political Coienlttoo«
2 . This point was again stressed in the draft resolution for 
the Hague Congress presented in the CPED's report.
3. This point should net be underestimated in vie» of the 
joint Anglo-French parliamentary initiative of March .I8-19, 
1946,for a Boropean Constituent Asseedrty. Cf. pp-1*1-136.
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The British report vent eren further in this respect. First,** 
regards "emergency policy",it suggested the immediate setting 
tip of a "Council o£ Western taropé consisting of the represen­
ta ti ves of the Governments of the sixteen participating count­
ries, and Western Germany,«o lay down the broad lines of c o m «  
action in the political.economic,and strategic fields"« As a 
vital inter-link stage between this intergovernmental political 
structure and the eraitual "democratic Federation of Western 
Barope* mentioned earlier,the report above all vent on to 
declare:
•To achieve this objective H.M. Government,in co-operation 
vlth the other States of Western taropé,should take steps 
to convene vithim six months a constituent assmbly of 
Western taropé.composed of representatives chosen by the 
Parliaments of the participating States,to frame a consti­
tution for such a Federation".
It vas the most lucid statement from among all the reports In 
favour of a direct political strategy for the ultimate attain­
ment of a supra-national taropean Federation. The "note" pre­
sented by the General Secretariat,In turn,also called far an 
"Bnergocy Council ot taropé", equipped vlth a permanent taropean 
secretariat to deal vlth economic,military and political affairs 
but vhen It came to linking this body to the ultimate "poli­
tical Federation" envisaged,it more cautiously proposed the 
setting up of a "taropean Deliberative Assembly",arguing its 
case in the following gradualistic terms:
"The success of these measures vill depend upon making 
the different parliaments and the general public taropean- 
minded. The best vay of achieving this vouid be to create 
immediately some form of taropean deliberative body through 
vhich vievs could be exchanged and a common European opinion 
expressed on the major problems of the day. Whilst it could 
have no constitutional powers,this European Deliberative 
Assembly would be able to give most effective support to 
the taropean Council, The quickest and most practical vay 
of bringing such an assembly into being eould be for each 
parliament to nominate the necessary repres«tatives" •
- 121 -
The latter report la tarn stressed that It would really be 
wpto the "teergeney Cornell of Europe" , one* it had dealt with 
"immediate dangers",to consider "mere far-reaching aad permanent 
plans fer Buropean Integration”,Including:- a customs union,a 
unified currency,the "functional* integration of continental 
services and resources,a ceeiM wed Buropean Defence Force, a 
common dtlseaship and,"ultimately",a political Federation.
To sun 1 9 ,it should be sto-engly ophaslsed that,despite 
later federalist accusations that the so-called "unionist" member 
groups of the Joint International Committee had deliberately 
sabotaged and diluted in advance the contents ef the Political 
debate at the Bague Congress/the least forthright draft poli­
tical repart•pres«ted at this crucial executive Committee meetfag 
of March 6 was that of the BO? itself« Indeed,If any mambinr 
group can be singled eut at this stage ef the procedings for 
demonstrating a lade of ro— J tmeat betfc t» lerg tarn political unifi­
cation plans and te a sheer »-term supra-national political stra­
tegy. It is the HJF. Bowhere In their report can there be found 
a mention of ultimate supra-national political Fédération,still 
less,any ijmiedlate Buropean parliamentary assaably* Instead,the 
*0F docunent was Impregnated with an abundance of antl-etete and 
pro-"functional* pronouncements,along with the need for intemnl 
decentralisation* Their proposals for power-wielding 'federal 
bodies*(d'organismes fédéraux)should Indeed be seen within this 
light,that Is,as technical and "functional" co-ordinating bodies 
of the "living forces",unaccountable in the traditional political 
sense« Clearly,despite Brugnan's over-all responsibility far 
the document,which probably accounted for its "possibillst" 
moderate tone,the anti-poli tical corporatist views of Voisin,Hare 
and Hytte,e£c. had exercised a certain influence. The fusieoist 
political-juridical Masslnl school of thought represented by 
the Kossi-Spinelll MF* axis had been totally ignored.
By contrast, the Arttft Britfcb report was certainly the most 
forthright and radical document presented in terms ef a direct./.
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./. political strategy far teropean Federation. The outspoken tone of 
the report m  explained by the fact that its authorj were the 
two leading parlia*«itary supporters of th* British All-Party 
Group for Boropean unity,namely E.V,Q. Hack ay and Robert Boothby. 
The fori— r vas indeed clearly responsible far the proposal to set 
up a ■urApeam Constita«it Assembly,and would actually s o t *  a 
debate on a practically identical action twelve days later,in  the 
House of Gome iis. ISoothby, far his part.was responsible far the 
longer section in the report dealing with the «ore functional 
intergovernmental measures which the Boropean Council should soon 
put into operation,especially as regards currency stabilisation,
the execution of BF,> comprehensive European production Plan,
2Colomial developments,etc.
The over-all importance and most striking feature of the 
report vas . however', the way it inserted and specifically high- 
lightened the need for a direct political-parliamentary initiative 
as the crucial inter-link between actual intergovernmental co­
operation and the projected ultimate political federation. This 
approach vas keenly backed by the French report?thoagh evaded by 
the RTF. The note submitted by the General 8ecretarlat,on the other 
hand , influenced by ketimger and Saadys .stressed the need for 
a eore gradual and indirect political strategy, though the goal of 
an ■ultimate political Federation* remained the same. In other 
vards,rather than place the constitutional responsibility for such 
a plan upon a nevly-created Borepean parliamentary assembly,the 
ketlnger-Samdys axis clearly preferred tx> leave the initial offi­
cial action to be taken jointly by the actual governments concerne!. 
This did net mean,as federalist writers would later claim,that*/.
I. Cf* pp.X3>f_I3{.
2* Boothby had in fact already drawn up a very similar document, 
(without the call for a Constituent Assembly)for the DBM Gene­
ral Purposes Committee: "Memorandum on lurope"(GP P 6 ) CA* S W G S
3. At a second meeting of the Joint Executive Committee held on the 
same day,dealing with the draft Economic keport,the French 
Council chairman, Courtii^lMarly called out for a "bold" ^ preach 
and "Xo push the Governments” rather than "lag behind them" IC/H/J .March <,1948 CASH BETOOK.
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Retinger and Sandys remained strictly "intergovem aentalist" la 
approach and had a* supra-national aspirations concerning Bure- 
p«an unity. On the contrary, they conceived that the only reali­
stic method for the in itial progress fro* an intergovernmental 
political structure towards an eventual supra-national and effe­
ctive Boropean Federation vas to actively persea«« Governments 
themselves to take «cheeeeiree. This could not be achieved over­
night. T* call,therefore,for the immediate convening of a Boro- 
pean Constituent Assembly appeared to then to be nothing more 
than an idealistic plpe-dream. On the other hand,the mnch more
»
reasonable request for a supra-national Buropeaa Deliberative 
Assembly,vlth no formal powers,bat with a potential capacity to 
create the right popular climate and European political inpetus 
for a subsequent series ef far-reaching political ia itiatives , 
seemed to be the most serious option available at that time.
Vhen such a psychological stage vas reached, two years later,
Sandys did in  turn proceed to promote a clear strategy 
in favour of a *Supra-national Buropeaa Political Authority*.1 
Pot the moment hovever.both he and Ketinger pitched their plans 
at a less ambitious level. The SOP,on the other hand,were la no 
position to complain subsequently of 'unionist* moderation and 
over—cautiousness on this matter,since they avoided aay reference 
at all to the need for a European political Assembly in  their ova 
draft political report. Xa the discussions vhich ensued during 
the next fee veeks it  vas mot,la fact,the BOP report vhich caused 
any friction or d ifficu lties .bu t rather the difference of v ie* 
vhich existed betveen Meekay 's  proposal for a Buropeaa Constituent 
Assembly,and the Oemeral Secretariat's call for an in itial Buro- 
peaa Deliberative Assembly. Before proceeding to examine the 
final outcome and synthesis of Tiers on this vital pslat, however, 
a brief analysis of the proposals put forvard la the original 
draft political reports as regards foreign and m ilitary policy, 
plus the colonial questioa,is called fo r .
1 .  C f . p p . 4 < M - * » r .
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la  the n k i  of the Soviet-backed Commnnist coup d'Ktat in
Czechoslovakia on F«biniary 2 2 ,followed by th* resignation of
President Binds on February 25 n d  by the mysterious "suicide*
o f Foreign Minister Jan Mas aryl: on March 1 0 ,the Joint Bxecutive
meerting of  March 6 n  hardly predisposed to talc* a "soft line*
as regards Burope's policy towards Che USSi. This »as especially
the case o f  the British dralt political report in  which Beothby*
urgently warned:
"To a point which,a year age ,it seemed reasonable to hope 
might be arvold*d,the campaign far Baropean unity has become 
the campaign «gain* rameiiiil sm ,in its  present totalitarian 
m anifestation. I f  we are honest with ourselves,ve mast face 
the fact that this is  a werld-wlde conspiracy for the capture 
o f monopolistic power:and that,behind theStettln-lrteste 
line,where Russian power is absolute,the values of Western 
democratic civilisation  are being systematically destroyed."
Zn addition to advocating a united U estc a  tur-npum  effort 
to achieve economic stability  and industrial growth through some 
joint ’ deliberate planning of production"(including the rationa­
lisation end co ordination o f the heavy industries o f the Ruhr, 
Belgium, l<uxembourg and Lorraine under the "supreme direction of 
a supra-national Autharrity*)Jie therefore also pointed to the need 
for "effective strategic ee-operation". ■ Such steps,he claim ed,in 
▼lev of the. pending Brussels Faet,"can be achieved overnight - and 
should be"* The note issued by the Oeneral Secretariat also called 
for some urgent cohesion on these matters,stressing the "political 
as well as economic dangers of totalitarian Cemeunis**, end openly 
stating that "our ultimate tia  east continue to be the unity and 
liberty o f  all Boropa.aad we shall not at any time disinterest 
ourselves in  the fate of the peoples of «astern Bocrepe". ®ie B0F, 
on the other hand,though certainly opposed to Communism,and 
just as surely wanting to work for the unity of all Burepe,dld not 
want to be ever-identified as being part of a hostile westers 
alliance. The report presented by Brugmans thus stressed insteed 
the continuing need for some sort of third force terope,vith a n ./.
X . B00THBT was a close friend of Masaryk and had urged not te 
return to Csechoslovakia daring D.M . tal*s in Be* Yerk.
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• / .  " independent” fareign policy and a position of "neutrality* as 
regards the twe blecs,io  the hope of bringing about "mediation" 
or "coapremise".between the two. This thought was echoed less 
strongly in  the Preach report, though much aore space was devoted 
te the "Serum  problem" than to that of Cn—mn1 «■. After two 
wars within the space of one generation,the French delegates were 
indeed very aware of the need to integrate the neriy-industriased 
•German giant" within a Boropean economic and political organi­
sation capable of preventing any futur« "iabaiance" and potential 
"hegiiony". The solution pot forward therefore,especially in  iaae- 
diate terms,vas the setting up of a joint "ftiropean coal ce—opera- 
tive*» composed chiefly of France,Germany and Belgium *(This idea 
received acre detailed attention within the work of the *co- 
nomic Comaitteef. It  should be noted,however, that steel was not 
aentioned,in so m ch  as Prance at that tiae vas desperately short 
of coai,vhereas steel protection la Uarrain* vas not yet la a po­
sition to be challenged by Geraaa production.
As described earlier,another pressing problem for Prance, 
and eves acre so for Sri tain , vas the question of the territories 
overseas. Boothby,in a statement probably in line vith the perso­
nal thoughts of Sandys and MacMillan,though not vith the larger 
traditional imperial lobby in  the Conservative Party as a vbole, 
tackled the probl«a as follovsi
"To the question 'Can Britain enter a Western Boropean 
Federation and simultaneously maintain ant ties with the 
Empire?' , the answer most be an emphatic 'T e a '. The two 
policies a re ,in essence,complimentary. For the Empire u s t  
have the aarkets of Borope.and Europe most have the markets 
of the tap ire ,if cither are to regain a permanent and well- 
found prosperity. The task,set an eesy eae ,is  to graft the 
preference system of the one upon the o th er ...T he  truth of 
the matter is  that,by herself.Britain can ne longer play 
the role tewnrds the Dominions that she played in  the nine­
teenth century either as a provider of immigrants and capital 
goods,or as a market,or as a protector. Although the Deedjxi-ons 
are too tactful to say so,we hanre become,for that,a liability  
rather than an asset. The only way in  which we can become, 
one* again, a central bastion for their security and . / .
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./.p r o v id e  them,once again,vith an outlet for their primary 
products,is by union vith Western Europe.
The argument becomes even stronger when applied to the 
Colonial ta p ire ...T h e  conclusion is  inescapable. The w s t  
effective Imperial policy for Britain or any ether Bure- 
pean State in  the modern world is to do everything in their 
power to bring about the unification of western Burope*.
The note submitted by the General Secretariat sim ilarly stated :
"A United Burope n s t  of coarse include Burope’ s eoleniai 
dependencies...and vast be closely associated vith the 
British Dominions and the self-governing overseas partners 
of other Buropeaa powers".
Even the HXF,ln a clarification of its position,declared that 
Britain must be an "integral part* of the future Boropean Federa­
tion, and that therefore a policy of "very strier collaboration* 
and "solidarity " between Burope and the Ceeeonwealth was necessary 
The French report in  turn drew attention te the sacrifices made 
by B ritain 's  overseas territories during the war,and to the need 
te "affirm " that B ritain 's  ■embership of Burope would also involve 
her Dominions and a ^ i r e .
To conclude,this first  major exchange on the draft political 
reports indicated, in  broad terms,that there vas aore accor d than 
division between the mmaber groups of the Joint International 
Committee .. On the most important foreign policy and military 
Issues the anti-Soviet and anti-Communist position of each dele­
gation vas deer,though  the KUF naively stuck to its European 
third-force formula, along with the French representatives. Vitkin 
a few months,both succumbed te the pattern of vorld events and 
were reluctantly drawn into fully  supporting a Western democratic 
bloc. The cold var rhetoric «»ployed chiefly by Boothby soon be­
came common currency in  the international mov— «at as a whole, and 
vas on« of the striking features of the debate at the Hague 
Contes.Though the activities of the Soviet Union clearly gave 
Just cause to the movement's overt anti-communism,the more scep­
tical opponwts of the Boropean cause,especially within British 
lahonr rmto^nov had a useful veapen in  claiming that the m#vrn*nt, 
vith Churchill appearing to be at the head of It ,vas nothing ./.
- 127 -
. / .  >or« thee th« tool of European var-nongoring reactionary fare«». 
The strong support given to Boothby*s view,that a united Borope 
represented "the »ost effective Imperial policy for Britain", 
enforced the lapressloa th at the w u t vaa aer«ly th« instru- 
aent of th« rlght-vlng Buropean establishment. This vas a false 
picture . Indeed, vlth the exception of Britain,the eoveaent solidly 
represented all dwscratAc political parties and each section of 
social econ— lc l ife . The idea, however , that to sone a«abers a 
united Burep« represented th* only life- line for a continuance of 
th« actual political and «concede status quo,as veil as a means 
of supporting an anachronistic imperial cr— 1 t i n t  abroad,vas all ' 
too evident. Burop«,t« th« «ore Conservative grouping,clearly 
offerred the hope of "pouring old vine into a nev bottle*. To be 
fa ir  to Boothby and his colleagues,fceeevar,they im fact represented 
the aore farvard looking section of th« British Conservative Party 
and establlahaent c la s s  in  so auch as they identified a united 
Europe as being in  the real interest of th« overseas territories, 
as veil as constituting a v ital cwaaitaant so far as Britain 
should be concerned. The aor« traditional iaperial lobby,represen­
ted by Aaery and Bden,ves auch less progressive in this sense,and 
vas prepared te tel«rat«,at times even support In  in#ry ' a 
case,the concept of Buropean unity,so long as it  did net take 
priaary iap«rtaac« over Britain 's iaperial tics and continued 
leadership of th« Ci— u n v alth . T h is ,in  blunt teras,aeant that 
ne organic fear* of union should tak« place vlth B ritain 's  involve- 
aent.vhereas th« aor« progressive group, supported by the other 
aoveeents for Buropean unity,vere vorking towards precisely this 
geal. The proposal put farvard by Boothby and the other aaaber 
groups in favour of soa* sort of "supra-national* Industrial 
planning authority In  Burope vas iaportant in  this respect,and 
should b« recognised to have been quite a radical departure froa 
previous national planning concepts,or froa plain old-fashioned 
laisses-faire policies,vlth  vhieh the traditional Cooservative- 
i'iberal establishment vas best identified . Th« rather a o r « ./ .
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. / .  ra<^ :*-CB^ proposition , advocated by Labour K.P. KWG Mackay,in 
favour of o fficially  convening a Boropean Constituent Assembly 
"vithin six months" vas another indication that the movement 
did not simply comprise old Tory "die-hards" and imperialist- 
orientated a embers of the Boropean establishment« Sim ilarly, the 
General Secretariat’ s suggestion of a European Deliberative 
Assaatbly vacs alse a radical political departure.v ith in  the 
ce ate rt e f the. t±m e,fr*e the traditional riy i.4  inter-state norms 
o f political co-operation,though it  appeared to be less se aftor- 
vards. The internal debate over these two proposals gathered 
pace and impetus throughout the veeks following the crucial 
executive meeting of March 6 . The resulting formula vould clearly 
affect the outcome of the Hague Congress,held tvo months later.
In the meantime,Mackay experienced the first o fficial reaction 
to his proposal v im , in  conjunction vith a similar initiative 
taken by his CPU colleagues in the French Parliament,he 
presented his case for a European Constituent Assembly to the 
House of Commons on March 18.
3) The Parliamentary Initiative for a Buropoan Canft-f t-n^^ 
AssemblY.March 18-19. 1948
It most bo stressed,in viev of the Labour Executive's harsh 
opposition to participation at the Hague Congress of I 948(and 
presort-day opposition to Boropean union in  general),that the 
first major parliamentary initiative  in Britain in  favour of an 
organic•supra-national European political structure vas 
primarily organised by the Labour Loft,with S .V .S . Mackay and 
kiehard Crossmaa as the main motivoting forces. Indeed at the 
inaugural meeting of Labour's "Burope Group*,on ITaramhanr 2, 
IM 7,organised  by Mackay,Christopher Skavcxess and Sydney Silver­
man, and supported by labour's leading le ft-v ia g e rs  Crossman, Ian 
Mikar4e,Michael Foot and Leslie Hale,the main objective i n ./ .
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./.t h e ir  in itial campaign vas defined as "to find whether a posi­
tive British Socialist Pordgn policy may b« constructed on 
the principle of Buropean Onion."*  Within two veeks,at the 
subsequent meeting of December 1 6 ,the group «greed that both ■ 
"practical functional" method,and •  "blue-print"(constitutional) 
formula for the promotion of European integration would have 
to be employed together, sine* "Buropean Onion would not cone
2
either by natural growth or by artificial construction alone."
In  tarn,on January 9 ,1 9 4 * ,Crossman,Mackay, rtikardo and others 
sent an urgent letter to Bevin,demanding a "firm  declaration" 
from him In  support of European wnlty,and against "jealously 
guarding national sovereignty."3 Finally,at the next meeting of 
the group,on January 2 0 ,Cross*«» took the lead in  gaining the 
meeting's agreement that,in  viev of the crucial Foreign Affairs 
debate planned for January 2 2 ,"it  would be deplorable if  pré­
posais for European unity were to be put farvard by the Opposi-
4
Leaders and not from the Government Front Bench." On January 
22,Bevin in  torn made his famous speech in  favour of a "consoli­
dation of Western Euroye .P r e s s i n g  still further,the 'Europe 
Qroop' meeting of February 10 ,nov attended by other left-vingers 
iwrtaMrp Barbara Castle and Jenny Lee, considered various drafts
on Buropean Union,especially Hockay's proposed "Federalist
6
approach,and Crossman's "economic approach". By Thursday March
II ,f iv e  days after the crucial Bxecutiv* meeting of March 6 ,a 
final draft had b e «  agreed upon,comprising Crossman's urgent 
consideration of Immediate economic measures to be taken,and 
Mackay's long t«rm plan for full Buropean Federation,along 
witt his inter-link proposal la farour of a Baropcan Constituent
7
Assembly. The document in turn received the . / .
Ï . Meeting of 2 .1 2 .4 7 ,official minutes. MACIAY PAPERS.
2 . "Europe Qroup” .meeting 1 6 .1 2 .4 7 ..o ffic ia l minutes.MACIAY RAPHE
3 . "Europe Qroup",letter to Bevin,9 .1 .4 » .iMACI:Ay papers.
4 . "Europe Qroup".aeeting 2 0 .1 .4 8 ..o ffic ia l minutes.MACEAY PAP82S
5. C f. p p .102-104. ------------
6. "burope Qroup",meeting 1 0 .2 .4 8 .. o fficial minutes.MACIAY PAPRS
7 . Draft presented to "A ll Party British Connaîttee of the Buro- 
pean Parliamentary U nio n ",1 1 .3 .4 8 .,MACIAY PXPSSS.
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. / .  support of the All Party Parliamentary Group and vas formally 
introduced,as a Bck-Bench motion on Boropean Union»in the House 
of " ir iin a i the same day. By March 18 , the Motion stood la  
the name of 120 HP's froa all sides of the Boose ( la large 
part froa the Labour Left) «ad vas finally  discussed,though only 
briefly . The Motion, Introduced by Mackay, proposed that urgent 
steps shoal* be taken ia  consultation vith the British Cemmea- 
vealth to create a Western Buropeaa "political union“? For this 
purpose,the aoti on vent en to stress,"there should be an emer­
gency policy designed to secure in e d ia te  aad effective co-opera- 
tlon between the comatrie* of Western Burope,and a long-term 
policy designed to brlag late being a federation of Burope". 
la other verds.a tvo-phase policy similar to the strategy origi­
nally proposed by Saadys vas put forward,laying stress on speci­
fic  iaaediate measures to be put into effoct,vithout losing 
sight of the over-all goal at the end. The Immediate p lu  vas - 
explained as fellevs:
"That the emergency policy should establish forthwith 
a Council of »«stern Burope consisting of representatives 
of the governments of the sixteen participating countries 
ia  the Buropeaa Recovery Plan,and Western Oermany.to lay 
Aova the broad liaes of rennaoa action; that the Council 
should have power to set up permanent international staffs 
to co-ordinate social, economic aad defence policies; 
that the first and aost important task of the or ri noair 
staff vould be to frame concrete proposals far the stabi- 
lisatioa of the currencies of Westera Burope,for the deve- 
lopaent of trade,for the executiea of the Buropeaa Recovery 
Plaa.for a comprehensive production plan,including agricul­
ture and the heavy industries, and for Colonial developæ at; 
that the accessary staffs should act under the direction, 
and by the authority,of the Council of Western Burope,and 
should be continuous in  session."
Za turn,the motion briefly  outlined the eventual organic poli­
tical structure envisaged , declaring:
"That the long-term policy should be to create a democratic 
federation of Burope,vith a constitution based on the prin­
ciples of rumoa citiseaship,political freedom,aad r^>resen­
ta tive government, including a charter of humaa rights; . / •
I . Hansard 1 6 .3 ,4 8 . ,pp.23C2-2304.
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. / .  that such a fad«ration should hav« defined powers vlth 
respect te such u tt e r s  as external, affairs,defence, 
currency,customs,and the planning of production,trade, 
pover and transport*..■
Finally,the crucial lnter-link stage vhich Mackay had pressed
for at the International Executive Committee meeting ef March 6
»as presented,though in  a slightly modified form:
"..t h a t  t» this(Fedw 'ation)objective,the governments 
of the states of Western Europe should take steps bo 
convene,as soon as practicable,a constituent assembly 
composed of representatives chosen by the Parliaments 
of the participating states,to frame a constitution 
for such a federation".
Op until this moment Hack ay perhaps had every Tight te feci 
confident. He had,after all,managed not only to activate consi­
derable Back-Senefc support for his motion (indeed by mid-April 
nearly 200 H .P .'s  had o fficially  put their names to his pr*- 
p o sitio a ).In  addition,he had actually secured a majority of 
Labour HP’ s among his supporters,thus stealing Churchill's 
thunder,and avoiding any charge by Labour sceptics in  the WBC 
of his being a Tory stooge. Churchill In  fact vas hard pressed, 
not to say w barrassed,by Hackay's mobilisation of backbench 
Labour support far «bat he had regarded as his own pet—subject. 
Moreover,the motion's clear call for an eventual Federation and 
for the convening of a Borop«an Constituent Assembly,aas soon 
as-practicable",constituted a much more radical step towards 
European unity thaw envisaged as yet by the leader of the 
Opposition. As a result,Churchill gave only tepid support te V  
Hackay's plan,stating "vc on this side of the House,«h ile  not 
r o i l  ttlng ourselves to every detail of the phrasing of the 
Motion,or even te some ef the points vhich it  contains,never­
theless feel this is  a matter vhlch should be ventilated and 
discussed In the Bouse".1 la contrast,Independent MP lenncth 
Llndjqr,«n active member of the All Party Qroup,declared . / .
X . cmcHILL, Hansard I I .5 .4 I .  op ( i t .
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• / •  vith considerably BOT« enthusiasm that thi* vas "es* of the most 
Important Motion* which has been signed by Members ef all parties 
and pvt before the Gevemament for »any years.•*  The Government 
front~*>emfeh kmeerer r«m ined  unmeved,Herbert Marrisea refusing to 
provide offical debating time te the Mo tien. Clearly the Bnaaels 
Treaty,signed by Bevin the day before, represented the lia it  of 
the Government's carrent coamitmant.
It  is not certain v hethc  Mackay actually expected such a 
blunt rebuff to his veil-prepared motion,though his correspondence
vith Coudenhove Xalergl daring this period would suggest that he
2
did not. It  vas clear that the Government vas not going to be 
persuaded ov«r-night te adopt the radical and perhaps premature 
prograsme pat iorvard by Hackay. But in riev of the considerable 
back-bench support vhich be had managed to mobilise tar his matkn, 
Mackay almost certainly hoped for some sort of debate am the 
m atter,in vhich both fsont-benches vould hare been pressed to 
clarify  their position concerning the fundamental political aspects 
of Baropean Union. Hareorer, Mackay had deliberately modified his 
proposal for a Buropean Constituent Assem bly ,» longer suggesting 
that this body should be set up "vithin six months* - as he had 
at the International Executive Coralttee meeting tvelve days 
earlier,bat instead,as soon soon as it  vould be "practicable".
In  any case,despite this in itial setback,Mackay had not lest all 
hope or enthusiase in  his project; indeed,he gained more back­
bench support fear it ,and  cane back fighting in the important
3
foreign Affairs debate held on May 5 ,the eve of the Hague Congre»
In the meantime,a parallel motion to that presented by 
Mackay on March 18 to the House of Commons vas actually put 
forrard, on March 19, to the French national Assembly by Edouard 
Bonnefous(the influential head of the French Parliament's Foreign 
Affairs Coieaittee) , Paul Rivet (chairman of the parliamentary fede­
ralist group) , Edouard de Menthon(KPO vice-president)and André Reel 
(leading ■amber of the CFEU). The motion,supported by 140 French./
I .  LIMPSAT.Hansard 1 8 .3 .4 8 ~QP c it . 2 . MàCEAY PAPERS 
3* Cf• pp* 176-?.
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./.H P 's  fro* most partie»,and deliberately planned in conjunction 
vith the British parliamentary initiative, repeated 
the specific cell fer a "European Constituent Assembly*,to be 
aramed by the Parliamentary representatives of each nation 
w ining  t» become associated la a "European Federation*.1 
The selection process and date proposed regarding the 
meeting of this Assembly vere,hover er, Slightly less elear 
than in the corresponding British Motion. The Prach text 
in fact called ,fera*rapld* creation ef n e h  an assembly,and 
invited the French (Government to take up the initiative *'ar- 
ÿenty vith other governments, in order to reach an agreement 
ea the composition and eventual meeting date of the pro­
posed Constituent Assembly. In other vords,unlike the British 
proposition,which plainly Indicated that the Constituent Assem­
bly should be composed of "representatives chosen by the Par­
liaments of the participating states*,the French proposal left 
»11 options open on this important matter,though it  did stress 
that perilmaontariaas should be technically responsible far 
setting up ( • constituée" ) the Assmibly. It vas not dear  
therefore ,vheth«r the*Preach project intended that the Assembly 
be composed of Oovernment or Parliamentary-led delegations,or 
perhaps even be directly elected by universal suffrage. This 
vas a very important point.vhich led to considerable misunder­
standing and a vicious quarrel between Maekay and Booaefous at 
the Hague Congress Itself. Moreover,it should also be noted 
that despite the strong and radical stand which Paul Eeynaud 
vould take at The Hague on the subject of a Burepean Assembly, 
he vas nat one of tfee signatories to the motion presented to 
the French lational Assembly on March X9. On the ether hand, 
fermer French Socialist Premier,Paul Kamadiar.dld put his name 
to the motion ia question,theofh-'ftronleelly,as chairman of the 
Political Debate at The Hague,he triad to cast a moderating . / .
D0C0MEWT8 PABLWPPJlitS ASSWBLSB MATIOMAL«. Session de 1948, 
Séance du X9.3>48. Annexe M* 3889
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. / . Influence 1b  counter position to both Eeynmd and Bonnefons.
Other signatories te th* French Motion of March 19 included 
Edgar Faure,P.O. Lapie,Andr* Philip,Henri Teitgen,Yron Del bos, 
Maurice Schumann,Andr* Le Troquer, Bonaet, etc. — With such 
distinguished backing the Motion vas not officially ignored,as 
vas the case in Britain,but sent to t*a Assembly's Foreign Affairs 
Coamittee under Booaefeus tat farther elaboration. The positive 
results of the Committee's vork would subsequently come to light 
at a crucial time in the Buropean campaign,shortly after the 
Hague Congress.
The point that needs to be emphasised at this stage is that, 
despite the coordination between the KPO sponsored groups in the 
French and British Parliaments vith regard to the timing of their 
resolutions for the convocation of a Buropean Constituent Assembly 
there remained the lack of a real understanding betveen the tvo 
parliamentary groups coccamlag the fundamental question of tor 
the proposed assanbly vas to be composed. Furthermore,during the 
crucial period betveen the Joint parliamentary initiative of March 
18-19,and the actual opening of the Hague Congress itself on Nay 7, 
the leaders of the tvo groups made no real attempt t» commicate
oar reach a coao&on viev-point on the matter in preparation far the2
Congress. This led to a disastrous split in the important Politi­
cal Committee debate of May 8-9,re-enforced by the complete dis­
array and confusion among the participating federalist groups led 
by Brugmans. The result vas that the better-prepared and mere 
moderate strategy of the Sandys-Ketinger axis eventually ven tbe 
* • 7 .
On the other hand,the political and psychological importance 
of this joint parliamentary initiative of March 18-19 should not 
be under-estimated, since it did convincingly cut across national 
political boundries and actually illustrated the spirit o f ./ .
1. C
2. Information given to the vrlter by EDOUAKD BOHKJffOCS, 
interview July 1977»Paris.
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. / . parliamentary trans-nationalisai which was at the heart of the 
proposed European Constituent Assembly.1 Moreovar, the numerical 
backing which the joint initiative received in both countries 
from sober and - especially in the French case - influential 
parliamentarians could only help to boost the graving Motional 
wave of "Bnropeanisa* which the preparations leading to the 
Hague Congress had partly sparked off. The fact that experienced 
political leaders such as Remedies',Philip and De Henthon were 
ready t» put their names to such *  proposal also indicated that 
in Prance at least the idea of forging a direct strategy leading 
to political Federation was viewed with considerably less scep­
ticism than in Britain« In this sense,though Hackay1s proposal 
both in the International Executive Committee and in the House 
of Comobs was toe far ahead of official British opinion, the 
political establishment on the Boropean continent was anre 
sjnapathetic to his ease,though also wary of British Governmental 
caution and the Labour executive's opposition. The CPU S e c r e t a r y  
General,Coudenhove Ealergi.was also aware of this dilemma,and 
used it as an excus«'to cover his personal objections to playing 
"second fiddle" to Sandys in the Joint Caaesittee. Thus,despite 
the pending impact of the Anglo-French parliamentary initiative, 
he was still not prepared te coeaoit his movement formally to 
supporting the Hague Congress. In fact,on March 15 ,in the light 
of the Brussels Treaty negotiations,be brusquely Informed 
Sandys >
"Since the British Labenxr Qov*rnm«nt has taken the Pan- 
Bsropean initiative on the Government level,we w in  do 
nothing that wmld antagonise the British Government. Oar 
final attitude will therefor* b* determined by the degree 
of Labour eo-^peretlen"«
The subsequent lack of Labour co-operation,however,eventually
forced Coudenheve to swallow his pride and follow the lead • / .
I* An article in L* Monde ■.for example,noted this "spirit" 
betaind the Joint initiative as part of a larger Boropean 
ami federalist action. Seen«  " Le aouveirnommat
SABDYS PAPERS
./.a lre a d y  gire» by Mackay and otk«r EPU aesibers la  supporting the 
work of the Joist International Coaaittee.
4 ) Political Report: Final Synthesis
At the saae tiae as Maclcay and Bonnef ous »ere about to 
present their motions to the British aad French Parliaments,the 
International Executive Committee intensified its efforts 1b  
achierrlng a closer synthesis of views with regard te the Politi­
cal Report and the question of the European Assenbly in  partl- 
calar. To this end,an lsportant inner-meeting vas held In  Paris, 
an March 12-13,at which Professor Vermeil of the French Council 
presented yet another *raft paper covering all aspects brought 
up at the meeting of March 6 ,though laying particular stress on 
the 'Geraan problem'
The subsequent Draft Political Report,drawn up as a 
result of this last round of discussions, did not appear to be 
drastically differ « it  in  fora to the previous report submitted 
by the General Secretariat.3There vere,however,sone subtle altera­
tions in the contents. The preamble,far example,comprised soae 
of Boothby's most pertinent thoughts and reflections on the 
necessity for European unity. Of aore iaportance vas the accoaao- 
dation of Mackay's allusion to an eventual European Parliament,
In  the conclusion. An additional clause dealing vith the 
"Spiritual Values* of European Union vas also Included In  the 
report,as an attempt to reconcile the aore philosophical and 
idealistic currents of thought represented aaong the French and 
EUF groupings. Ob the specific structural issues In question 
the report nonetheless repeated the call for the setting up of aa
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1. E. VERMEIL.'Congres de l'Europe - Avant Pt o p o s '.March 1948, 
CAD! BRUGGE.
2. 'Draft Political Report. embodying the results of the discussion
at the aeetlntr of the Joint International Committee in
/■
3. Cf. (lC /P /1 2 ) .pp. Ill —I f k.
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. / • 'Emergency Council of Burope",stressing that this would be an 
"inter-governmental body at the ministerial lev el". Similarly, 
there vas no change In  its proposal for the creation of a ” tare- 
peen Deliberative Assembly", though,in contrast to the previous 
General Secretariat's report,which had specifically drawn attem­
tio * to the fact that the Assembly would hare "no constitutional 
powers",the present text evaded the question,while adding^with 
some ambiguity, that “whilst it  could at this stage have ne legi­
slative powers,this Buropeaa Deliberative Assembly would be able 
to give powerful support and encouragement to the Boropean 
Council". In  other words,the strict and categorical limits which 
the previous note had Implied as regards the role of the pre­
posed Assembly were now open to a broader interpretation,in 
which a gradual evolution in  the Assembly's powers,from one 
•stage* to another,was marked out. This indication of a Joint 
evolutionary process between the Buropeaa Assaably and the 
Council,along with the clear reference to a future "elected 
ftxropean Parliament with legislative powers",and fin ally ,a  
*complete federation" in  the "subsequent stages",all amounted 
to a rather more radical long-term strategy than might have at 
first been appreciated. Thus, even if  Mackay's proposal far a 
Constituent Assembly had not been accepted,the ultimate goal 
of a supra-national Boropean political structure had been 
stressed all the same. Moreover,the additions made in  the new 
report,with regard to the safeguard of human rights.compllmented 
the ovw-all message of *supr»-nationalism“ . The report now in 
fact went much further than the original GUP call for a European 
Commission on human rights .proposing instead that, among the 
"immediate steps" to be taken by the governments w illing to par­
take in  the Onion, there should be a joint "Declaration of 
Bights"»accompanied by the setting up of a "Boropean Court" and 
actual provisions for armed intervention by a "mixed Burepean 
armed force* in  the evmrit of any "flagrant or persistent . / .
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/.infringem ent" of the previsions I k  the Declaration,such as the 
prevention of free elections.1 This rather strongly-worded 
section of the new text had clearly been influenced by 
the events in  Czechoslovakia at that tie«,though the fact that 
the CUT had originally identified this issue as somehow being
the responsibility of the Cultural Report,for which Denis de
2
Rougement was new taking an -active preparatory part,may ills* have 
persuaded Sandys and Retinger te ensure that the Political Report 
and Debate,over which they had mere influence,covered the topic 
fu lly .
The final Political Repert?agreed upon shortly after, and 
eventually submitted to the Hague Congress by the International 
Ce»nittee, repeated all the above points,with only ninor - though 
soeietlaes interesting - alterations« The introduction notably 
repeated Beothby's-previous enti-r— nnist warnings that *he 
sixteen nations mi Western * enfeebled by ia t t fu l
division",faced  the prespect of “»oral and material ruin* and 
the "destructi on ml H h d r  free way of l ife * . But where there was 
"peril* in division,there was also "opportunity" in"unity* from 
the political,econom ic,and even the cultural standpoint.
The first ma&n section of the Report,entitled Principles 
and Objectives.want on te explain this message. While stressing 
that the "lasting basis" for Boropean unity would depend upon 
■moral" and "sp iritual" forces - "our cieemon belief In  the Aicprfgr 
o f man,ear e m o n  heritage of civilisation ,oar rn— on pride in 
the contribution which Barope has made in  the past te the program 
of hunanity" ,e tc . ,  the Report concentrated essentially upon the 
factual case for "Political Onion",putting forward the following 
argument;
1* It most of course be pointed oat that a Declaration of
rights and the need for a Buropeaa Court had long been cru dal 
tennets in  the o fficial WOT programme,but they did not figure 
In  any sharp form la their Draft Political Report IC /P /I3 .
2 . C f. pp.lSl*\S*
i .  " Congress of ■grope *he Hague-Hay, 1948 POLITICAL RBPORT
submitted to the Congress tnr the International Committee of 
the Movements for mropoan Bnlty" CAEM BROGOf .see  AKWDtB I
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■It 1» Impossible te keep problems of economic collaboration 
and defence separate froa those of general political policy« 
Economic and defence plans haring been made.political paver 
is  required to implement th m . The process of industrial aad 
military integration,even la  the early stages,inevitably give 
rise  to conflicts of national interests. These difficulties 
can only be resolved aad the accessary coeproeises accepted 
vhea the problen is  viewed ia  the light of vlder political 
considerations. Zf therefore the policy of mutual aid,adopted 
by the Severnncats of the Sixteen nations,1» He bear any 
. substantial fru it ,it  east be accompanied step by step vith 
a parallel policy of closer political union. Sooner or later 
this aust involve the renunciation or,to be more accurate, 
the joiat exercise of certain sorer eign powers*.
This key part ef The final taxt presented on May 7 had eviden­
tly been obliged to take late account the signing,on April 1 6 ,of 
the Coztm tioa fas Boropean ■conoadc Co-operation by the 16 West­
ern Buropeaa governments ia  the U .S . sponsored kecovery Programs, 
setting up a more rational organisation to ataimister the millieta 
of American dollars given to boost Burope*s productive capacity* 
Indeed,to an evea greater extent than before,the fiaal Political 
kepert nov clearly stressed that economic aad industrial co-ordi­
nation by Itse lf vena* not be s u ffid c a t  to act Burope upon a 
real course tovards Union,and that the crucial reauialag^ problems 
arising out of "conflicts of national interests* could only be 
properly salved vithia a mev political franevark equipped vith 
eventual tfcepra-aatiemal,rather than inter—gorernmenta l,povers. 
neither the Brussels Treaty alliance nor the O .B .B .C . «ere thus 
seea as constituting the real political means far Union,since 
neither took into account the ereatual transfer af sone'national 
sovereign pevars to a s^ra- aatioaai political authority.1 The 
actual tarns used In  the kepart regarding such a transfer of 
sovereign povers,hovever,vere not fully  federalist la scape aad 
aeaaiag. Indeed,by deliberately correcting the notion of •renun­
ciation" to actually naan "the Joint exercise* of certain sove­
reign povers,the Kepart allowed far the possibility o f an •/«
I .  This point vas later taken up by Mackay,vho complained that 
the OESC catered far "no transfer of sovereignty,or integra­
tion in  any s e n s e ...It  v as ,in  short,a purely intergovernmental 
organisation*. k .V .G . HACLAY Towards a Pnited States of 
to o pe  (Hutchinson,I96I )  p . 96.
./.e ffe c tiv e ,b u t  not necessarily permanently binding, transfer of 
sovereign powers t» ■ supra-national Bcropean political autho­
r ity . In other words,it allowed for the democratic and accoun­
table exercise of political powers at a supra-national l a r d , 
bat without stipulating any fall technical abandonment ef the 
national sovereign base froa which that political right derive* 
It  vas a delicate and aest ambiguous balancing act,and one 
w hich,in the final event,was at methodological odds with the 
d o e r  juridical-constitutional school of thought of the maxi- 
maliate KPK,plus other radical supporters of binding constitu­
tional Federation plans such as Mackay and Bonnafous. On the 
other hand,the aara corporatist inclined integral-federalists 
who objected to the notion of " indivisible sovereignty", plus 
the aere cautious unionists in  Britain who,in any case,prafenmd 
a loose confederal te a -fully»fl edged Federal Onion of Barepet 
could find soae comfort in  this less fusion!st phraseology, 
while Sandy* and Retinger clearly regarded an evolutionary, 
"step by step" policy towards supra-national Vnlon as by far 
the aast realistic  policy option. The straggle between the 
various groups and personalities over the precise meaning of 
"jo ist  exercise" of certain sovereign powers,however,did not 
finish  with the publication ef the Political Report. Indead,
-the notion of directly "merging" sovereignty at a supra-natio> 
level was re-introduced by Mackay in the drafting of the 
Political Resolutions on the eve of the Hague Congress,while 
at the conference itself this idea was again challenged by the 
aare conservative members ef the British unionist camp.1
The remaining part of the section on "Principles aad 
Objectives" dealt with the geographical scope and character 
of the proposed European Onion. The text carefully stated,on 
this rather d ifficult subject,that the basic requirement for 
the admission of a nation te the Onion vas "its  acceptance of 
democratic principles and its assurance to its  d t iie n s  of the 
fundamental rights of the individual". Thus,although the . / .
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. / . »unity of all Borepe" vas envisaged as the ultimate goal, tha 
text clearly stressed “for immediate practical purposes, all that 
Is  left of turope are the 8ixteen(0KEC)*ations and it  is up*n 
then that ve must for tha present found our plans". Any ef the 
in itial BTTF hopes for a "neutral" Third Force Borope .comprising 
bath the lastern and Western areas had therefore rescinded in 
the vake of the •▼«nts in  Csechaslovakia,alang vith the official 
launching ef the O K K . In  an attempt to shield the campaign fran 
being identified mere than necessary vith a Western bloc stra­
tegy, tha Report also,hmwerer,considered its plan for a United 
Borepa n  constituting the type ef "Regional Group* expressly 
provided far In  the Charter e f the 0 .1 .0 .
The two remaining problems with regard to the iru iw i tteien* 
Scape caaovaad Qexmmr *®d the over jam  ties of the member states.
AarepnA the a*cffla4"Geman Problem",which,as already noted, 
was of primary concern to France,the Separt clearly varnedj
* One of the most crucial problems is  to restore the 
economic life  ef Germany,without thereby exposing her 
neighbours to the danger ef renewed aggression. This 
risk w ill inevitably recur it  the formidable war potential 
of th« Rmhr and Rhineland is  allowed to revert te the 
exclusive control of a Oerman State*.
The "only solution" to this "dual problem",the Kepert vent on 
to suggest,vas the "integration ef Germany into a Boropean 
Union", which would not only allov German resources te become 
freely available again te the rest of Borepe,as veil as « a b le  
the period of military occupation to be reduced.lt would also 
allov Germany herself to gain fo il access to the resources and 
raw materials in the possession ef the other Boropean nations.
It  was not absolutely clear in  the report,however,if the propo­
sed solution was meant to apply only to the Western-contrailed 
«ones or to the whole of Germany»though with the subsequent 
dramatic Berlin crisis in  the stumer ef 1948 it  became clear 
that the plan eould comprise Western Germany alone.
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The problem of overseas ties vas subsequently covered. This 
subject vas evidently of primary concern to Britain,and accor­
dingly, the Report drew upon the strong consensus of opinion in 
the International Executive Com ittee in  order to stress bottiUm 
crucial role which Britain should have within a united Europe, 
and the need therefore to jive clear reassurances tw the aart 
doubtful elements inside the British unionist c n p ,a s  well as 
te British and Commonwealth opinion in general, about the Joint 
benefits of such a commitnent. Two substantial clauses 
In  the Report were g ivm  to explaining the matter,under the sub­
title  "Britain and the Ceeaonwealtb". The first clause made it  
clear that Britain was counted upon tn be an active member of 
the proposed Union, statingt
"Me scheme ferr Buropean Onion would have any practical 
value without the effective participation of Great Britain« 
The United lingdo* is  an integral part of Burope."
Adding that,at the same tim e,Britain was also "the centre of 
a world-wide commonwealth",the report continued to emphasise 
thrt this "dual position need raise no insurmountable difficul­
ties '«  This was explained la the second clanse,which drew upen 
a mixture of Boothby’ s thoughts and the views ef the French 
Council expressed in their reciprocal draft reports of March Ci
"economically,both Inrope and the Commonwealth would be 
greatly strengthened by being closely associated with one 
another. Politically ,the Dominions have as much te gain as 
the peoples of tarope. Twice in  a generation they have had 
to send their young men te die in  wars which originated in  
Europe;and they w ill certainly wish te help r — eve the causes 
of conflict at their scarce"•
In an additional paragraph,under the sub-title "Overseas terri­
tories” , the Idea that a Borepeaa Onion must Include In  its 
"orbit" the ■extensiens,dependencles and associated territories" 
ef the Bvropean member states was stressed yet farther, though 
the subsequent phrase,explaining that this meant preserving the 
■existing constitutional ties which unite them",was a clear re­
ference to Prance's preoccupation vith retataby *«r  metropolitan 
ties,especially  in  Africa.
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To sua up,this first section «£ the Political Report, dealing 
vith the "Principles and Objectives" o f Boropean Union,alluded 
to a Mixture o f national Interests,Western Boropean fears of 
Soviet iepeerialise .and to a certain continuing element ef post­
ear Boropean idealise. This latter factor should net be regarded 
as a piece of propaganda packaging. Indeed,despite a lleited 
tendency - nainly confined to the unionist coup - to perceive 
a futore Burepean Union as the only Means of Maintaining the 
political and economic status quo,there vas still at this early 
stage of the campaign an overriding enthusiasa for the "Boropean 
Idea",that is  to say,for the creation of a supra-national lure- 
peon society vhich veuld be based on deneoratic,tolerant and 
humanitarian principles.aad vhich,by its supra-national nature, 
vould be an effective safeguard against a reneval of nationalise 
and the International anarchy vhich had led to tve vorld vars. 
This vas the essential ■earning behind the phrase quoted above - 
"to help raaove the causes ef conflict at their source". The 
Hague Congress, in this sense,vonald be the first »ajar trans­
national conference ef its sort to be coeooed ia  Burope after the 
var f. and the opening stages of the Congress did indeed capture 
and illustrate an «Motional appeal far future comradeship aad 
peaceful har mony betveen the Burepean states,vhieh only three 
years previously had been at var vith each other .On the other 
hand, the Congress vas not only conceived to incite a strong 
psychological boost to the B o r e p r &^a tlc  inter governmental 
efforts tevards Burepean co-ordination.It vas also meant te 
constitute an influential platform in  favour of creating m i, 
specific Burepean institutions vhich voold provide the basis for 
subsequent progress tovards a truly supra-national political 
framework. The next tee sections of the Political Report thus 
vent on to deal vith the steps vhich vere necessary te take In  
this direction.
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The " Immediate Measures" proposed in  section II  ef the 
Political Report vere in  larg* part a repetition of the sugges­
tions put forvai-d in th* final draft text written after the 
Paris meeting ef March 1 2 .1 Thu»,as a first step,the creation 
of an 'Sam-gmacy Council ef Borep«" vas again proposed,though,in 
vi/m  of the actual signing of the Brussels tt***ty on March 17, 
the Kepert nee aise specified that the participating gereraraits 
of tha pact - Prance,Britain and Benelux - had indeed "la id  the 
foundations far this Cenncil" and should therefore invite all 
the ethos- free countries ef Burope to accede. The role of tthis 
enlarged Council ef Borepe vas meant to cover not only 
the probLeas of military defence and economic recovery(which the 
Brussels Treaty and the O B C  reciprocally dealt vith at an inter­
governmental le v e l)(It  vas also meant te deal vith "the task of 
planning the subsequent stages ef the political and economic in­
tegration of Borope". The text farther pointed out:
"The Council v ill ,o f  coarse,only be effective if  Governments 
are prepared in  practice to implement its decisions,even 
though these should involve sacrifices of national er sec­
tional interests"»
Hence •'the report did net openly adopt a counter position 
to the o fficial inter-governmental measures so far taken to unite 
Borope, but Cried instead to expand upon them. This strategy may 
have been to the distaste of some of the mere radical federalists, 
but it  should U s e  be stressed that the text, evidently influenced 
by Sandys and Ketinger in approach,also pointed out that inter­
governmental measures alone would not be sufficient to unite Bo­
x' ope effectively, and that a supra-national attitude vould have to 
evolve for such a purpose. This vas vhat they meant in  pointing 
the vay to "sacrifices of national or sectional interests" in 
the Council w hich,it should be noted,vas no longer referred te
in the purely "intergovernmental" and "m inisterial" terms that2
vera usad in tbe prerfcous draft* la short,Sandys aad fteting«r»A
I . Cf. pp. 1%6-t (ic /p /l€ )  2.Cf, p . 147
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./.c le v e rly  em itted  Benin's "step by step» policy tevards European 
unity, vhile, st the sane time, they remained a long step ahM d, 
proposing to boili upon existing inter-governmental foundations, 
and to conceive then In  a broader and «ore evolutionary light 
than had the British Foreign Minister. Their original strategy 
had,of course,been loosKly formulated before Bevin had actually 
yronocnc*! a spadQc Boropean unity policy;but they no« convenien­
tly  adapted even mere te his tone,if not to his over-all outlook. 
The first point that vas therefore stressed right at the begin­
ning of the Keport's proposed 'Immediate Measures* vas that the 
"fu ll  unification ef Burope can only be achieved progressively". 
In turn,when it  cane to describing the type of "adainistrative 
and planning staff* re<|uired for the independent functionalng of 
the proposed Council of Burope,the text not only looked Vo the 
setting up of rather pallid  Defence and Colonial Suctionsrbut 
also to an intensive icenomic Section.vhich should "formulate 
/ longer range proposals far the permanent unification of the Euro­
pean econoo^", and above a ll ,t *  a Political Section,in order to 
"develop a common Boropean policy; to secure combined action to 
uphold and strengthen the democratic vay of life ;an d  te examine 
the constitutional problem ef bringing about the organic unity 
of Burope*. To this vas added the call far a Burepean ■Declara­
tion of Sights" and a "Burepean Court",along vith the previsions 
fee area4 intervention described in  the previous d raft .1 Finally, 
the Political Xepert also put forvard the proposal for
the creation of a *Burepean Deliberative Assembly*, described in
2
the same ambiguous tone ef the former draft • Moreover, the text 
no* vent so far as to suggest that although the "quickest" method 
for establishing such an Assm bly vould be "far  each parliament 
to nominate the necessary representatives*,an additional phrase 
vas inserted suggesting that "later ,a  system of popular election 
should be instituted*. This again clearly is^lied  that t h e ./.
1. Cf.fp.Iiji-f 2. Cf.p.X*?
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./.i n i t i a l  Buropeaa political framework suggest«« in  th« report, 
v ithis th« context ef "immediate measures* te b* takas, vas net 
supposed to remain rigidly  stabl« .but vas meant .Instead t« 
rr*lr« towards th« d M p v  fora ef “organic unity" explicitly 
foros«on.
Th« final «action «I  th« Political Report,dealing vith
th« " Subsequent Stages* in  the Buropeaa unity process,
repeated yet again that,1b  addition to th« "provisional" orgeat
measures proposed, "plans oast be prepared for the parmanat and
organic unification ef Burope*. The»« plans included:
■ (a ) The grant « f  Coamon Citisenship,vltheut loss ef 
erigiaal nationality;
(b) Th« ereaties ef a single Buropeaa Defence Perce;
(c ) The development ef a unified economic system;and 
finally
(d) The conclusion of a complete Federation vith an 
elected European Parliam ent."
The text further contended,in vhat vas an evident illustration
of Bandys* diplomatic strategy vis-A-vis Bevia.that a clearer
official lead vas required:
"Under the pressure of d ra w sta n e es ,th e  nations ef 
Vestatrn Borope are taking concerted action te meet iw a  
diate d ifficulties and dangers. But it cannot end there. 
There cah be no turning bade froe the road vhich anst 
lead us on step by step to complete union. The rate of 
progress v ill  be greatly quickened and the dangers reduced 
if,in stead  of valting for events to compel u s ,v «  recognise 
not only the unavoidable necessity ef the first  steps,but 
the eminent desirability ef the ultimate d estin atio n .
The Report in  turn concluded:
■Let governments and peoples boldly proclaie that their 
aim is  nothing leas than the full and permanent unity of 
Burope and dedicate th«mselves to vork unremittingly for 
its realisation*.
- It  is  indeed d ifficult to claim that this final P o litic* 
Report presented te the Hague Congress vas the vork of over­
cautious members of th« unionist camp, as has b«en implied . / .
. / .b y  federalist w riter*1 . Indeed,the third section ef the text 
clearly stated that a fu ll Federation of Borope »as envisaged 
as the final goal ef the campaign,vhil* the first two sections 
attempted te provide both a realistic and adaptable sot of pro­
posals as regards the political base free out o f which this 
final Federation should evolve. I f  anything,the Report vas 
probably more explicit than either Sandys or Re ting«r had ori­
ginally envisaged,should ve Judge from the first memorandum
2
sent ent on the subject in December 1947. This notable 
radical sh ift, hovwrer, had little  to do vith any federalist 
pressure from the EOF;indeed,as noted at the beginning of this 
chapter,the o fficial EOF proposals vere somewhat evasive 
concerning the sovereign-political aspects of European u n ifi­
cation ." It  «as instead the actual course of political events, 
such as the sotting tip of the Brussels Treaty Organisation and 
0BBC,plus the pressures steealng from the joint parliamentary 
initiative for a European Constituent Assembly In which Hockey 
vas actively I n v o l v e d ,which pushed the organisers of the Poli­
tical Report towards adopting a more progressive tone? Sandys* 
political strategy in  the campaign vas,after a ll ,to  remain 
aivays one step ahead of officially-«spoused policy in Britain 
in her relationship towards Burope,while,at the same time,he 
badly needed the support of the European parliamentary groups 
in  order to provide the Congress of Burope with a sufficiently 
influential and representative political standing,in viev of 
Coudenhovo-Calergi' s stubborn reluctance to involve the ffU 
as an o fficial sponsor of the Congress.
Despite the considerable progress achieved in  the drafti^ 
of the final report,ttmre nevertheless remainedfepcrtant areas of 
uncertAitji This vas especially the case vith regard to t h e ./.
1 . See,for example,BRUGMARS L'ldfc* Buropfeenne op. cit.J> .I32.
2 . C f. IC /P /4  p p .83-« -------------
3. C f. p p .I I ? .5 ,121-2
4 . Mackay,for his part,also shoved a willingness to compromise 
and moderate his position towards a less direct strategy.
C f. p p .I?^—S.
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. / .  specific Methods envisaged for the evolvaaent of the laaa&lat* 
Inter-garem»ental stag«,first towards the deliberative organic 
political freaevork proposed,and later,towards the "conplet* 
Federation with an elected Boropean Parliament* which vas con­
ceived as tli* “ultimat« destination*. la  contrast to th* direct 
juridical approach,favoured by Mackay, Bonn ef ou*, and «specially - 
the MFB, Sandys based his hopes upon aa indirect political stra­
tegy vhich required a gradual change ia  the political d i a i t t  la 
f m o r  of successive steps towards Pull supra-national unity. He 
believed,in  ether vords,that effective institutional changes 
could eely eoae aboat providing a consensus ef political opinion 
alr eady approved sech aeasures. To reverse the process,and ac­
tually atteept te push through a program s fear vhich there vas 
yet no o w l d in g  support,would,he thought,lead only t* a flat 
rebuff by the political establishment,aad risk kluatl*v~the leng- 
tere prospects for a successful caepalgn. On the ether hand,he 
vas not,as vould be claimed by radical tor leaders, of the epi^ 
nion that the Movaaent should give no political lead vhatsoever* 
Indeed,as already pointed eut.his strategy vas always based on 
keeping "one step ahead* ef officially-espoused policy,but net 
to place hisself and the immediate campaign on another planet 
altogether,even though it  vas necessary to offer a general viev 
of the final goal. This aeaat,ia  turn,that a certain eetho- 
do logical vagueness vas im plicit vithin  his strategy,along vith 
an over-rttiance on somehow "muddling through* ,ia  the beet sense 
of British political and constitutional practice. This vas net 
always to the liking of his continental colleagues is  the caapefei 
Nevertheless, before «bark in g  on this rather hasardous Buropeaa 
venture,the in itial equipment - i f  not the precise route - vas 
thoroughly .prepared and veil thought out. Hence,the apparently 
“■Oderat«" in itia l proposal for a Boropean Deliberative Assembly 
vas couched ia  t e n s  a llo b a g  to a gradually increasing co ordi- 
natien role vis-A-vls t^e Council,vhich itself vas relied upon«/»
. / .t o  practice in  time a supra-national outlook1. Hew this should
actually come about was not technically illustrated as yet,
2
though 8aadys would later 4« so» It was d e a r . however, that tiM 
precaes eamld only succeed if  the Deliberative Assambly could 
create the right psychological climate sad poaittaa seeded
far such am evelwtien. Zt was ef cn ad a l importance »therefare, ' 
to ensure that the in itia l rekes of beth instltiitiens should 
be seen,as the Political kaport put it ,w ith in  a "provisional* 
light,and as a starting point for future *organic* unification 
Measures. In  ether words,they had to comprise aa in-built ex­
pansionary capacity,and be generally regarded free the beginai^ 
as being enly the T ir s t  stage"of a more coop H eated  s u ectuie» 
The foundatiens.la turn,had therefore to be secure but not 
rigidly  limited la scape. This was Indeed the first important 
step at the start ef the caaipaign,and eme for which the txecu- 
tive Committee ceroid already.realistically, find broad political 
suppert*pr»Tidiag a sufficiently popular end ian u e a tia i beest 
could. he «tram to the actual take-off of the project. At the 
sane tine,however, it  had to be made d o o r  to the mere cautious 
political elements that they ware not technically bound to any 
fundamental organic transformation,prior at least to a eouvin- 
d a g  display ef political maturity *nd consensus in the Assembly, 
at well as la  the Council itself* This was the way la  which the 
"historic* Comgaaas ef Borepe was essentially conceived by the 
majority of the organising Bxacutive Coaadttee-not as a mere 
sounding beard for over—cautious members of the unionist camp, 
nor as a platform for a »tauy ojod pseudo gathering ef the so- 
called " living ferea**«pretending to ha a 'Bureppean Kstates 
o— » i » ,but rather as a convincing majjr deneastratiea of illu ­
strious and influential Boropean personalities who were pre­
pared to publicly state their support for immediate stops 






Hot all the participants saw the Hague Congress In  this 
light. Some case deliberately In  order to vatox down the 
delicate balance ef opinion and strategy laid  out in the 
X«ports submitted. Others caaa expressly to radicalise the 
proposed programme,or direct it  tovards drastically different 
currents of thought. The subsequent scenes of heated confu­
sion and of occasional manipulation vere of minor importance, 
hovorrer, to the sound Overall mixture of realism and of 
idealism far the European cause presented in the Political 
Xepart at The Hague,(though admittedly the actual Draft 
Political Resolution drawn up did give rise to ambiguity).
On the ether hand,the Report was steered to a position ef 
realism as befitted the British rather than the Continental 
case,and Sandys to a large extent vas responsible far this 
emphasis ,»li*d ln s  to Bevln's frmAnailaCic policy. Yet it  must 
be equally stressed that,at this memont In  tim e,d«*plte a 
more progressive yearning among continental political circles 
fe r quick «r fundamental measures in  the unification of Europe 
it  vas also readily conceded that a United Europe vould be 
inconceivable without the participation of Britain. This
continuing dllm m a vould be the cause ef considerable friction 
during the forthceedag European campaign,and vould ,In  the 
final event, lead te a rupture vith  the graduallstic strategy 
still advocated by Sandys them a l l  the Evidence pointed to 
the fact that Britaia,vhethor lod by a Labour or Conservative 
administration,vas quite unprepared, to roally contemplate 
a coMitmemt tm the eraitual goal, laid  dovn in  the Political 
Bepert to the Hague Congress,of a ‘ permanent and organic uni­
fication of Europe"•
There vas no such disenchantment at the campaign* outset. 
Indeed,the in itial strategy advocated in the Political Bepert, 
and the subsequent astonishing success of the Hague Congress 
and of the European Movement in  attaining the o fficial creatine 
of the Council of Ihorope and a Deliberative European Assembly
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. / •t i n  May I9 4 9 .P W *  te bea deeàd-*» rie  tory fer -thè realistic 
enraant of thought represented by the Sandy»-*etinf«■ 
axis,and supported by th« orerrhelmlng Majority of th« 
International Kxecutiv« Ceonittee is  th« Spring of X9t*. 
lot everybody In  th* Mormeat as a whole,however,vas tetany 
convinced,on th« eve of the Hague Congress,'that this vas 
the best strategy! The nor* radical ■«■bears of the u x i-  
aalist V I  ving at Che SBF were openly cynical,and vere 
saving their counter-attack against the possibiliste EOT 
leadership for a aore opportune date. In the ■eantiae,just 
before the Congress vas held,the integral- federalists,vith 
D o ié  de KoagoMBt appearing at the head,made «ne last 
atteiq* to render the Congress mare attune to the ideas 
launched by the latter at Montreox for a European "Estates 
General■ of the so-called living farces. The efforts vhich 
ensued represented the last integral-federalist stand.
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CHAPTK8 £  TOMAEDS THE HAOTE COUSEBSS HAECB—MAY I»46
I) A "Bcropean Manifeste*? B u  last Federalist Hop«
" It  is  not to m u l  a itate secret", B m g u n s  ironically 
vrete,concerning the famous "Message to the Boropeans" «fetich 
Danis do KougoMBt delivered to the final session eg the Hague 
Congress, "that this text haé ït lse i i m  fears and m m  consi­
der able doubts • •  among th« unionists"«1 This vas a direct re­
ference to the tense saga,so coloarfully described by de Eouge- 
■aat himself,regarding the "battle" for the soul of the Hague 
Congress betveen his o n  federalist circle and the sore sober-
inclined International Executive CoM ittee .dominated by Sandys
2
and Eetinger. - Confronted by the fact that the Political 
Keport,coupled vith the actual Political Debate at The lafaa , 
vas fairly  veil contained by the Sandys-Ketinger axis,while the 
planning of the Icenomic Debate vas similarly dominated by the 
rather pragmatic experts among the XLBC leadership,the only 
area vhere a federalist 'last stand' might be taken vas in  the 
sphere of the Cultural Debate. It  has already been noted hov, 
in  this sense,the draft political repart presented by the HJF 
representatives on March 6 a tteste d  to enlarge the scope of 
the Cultural f a i l t t e e 's  institutional agenda,by directing the 
crucial subject of human rights and a proposed European Comads- 
sion to the letter 's  sphere of competence,and hov,in torn,the 
final political draft'countered this rathrr nlrrtM  ann aanhmaaf * 
In a more intriguing though apparently "innocent"v ay ,de Eouge- 
mont attempted a similar exercise,vith the help of some integi* 
federalist colleagues.
As mentioned in  an earlier chapter,the drafting of the 
Cultural Eeport had been entrusted by Ketinger to de Kougemont 
already at the begriming of the year. This decision vas . / .
1. BEUOMANS L'Idée Bcropéenne op,cit.,p .132
2 . DB KODCBKMIT "The Campaign of the Congresses" op d t .
3 . C f. pp. I i r .i l l n  4 . Cf. pp. I*?- *,145
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./.t a k e n  essentially ia  order te placat* the fader »list* , by
giTing than responsibility la ■ field  te which they,though not 
Sandys,attached considerable iepertanc«.1 This vas not quit* 
the vay dc Koogaaoat actually sav things:
•When Duncan Sandys,la January,then Joseph Ketingar,on 
25 Pebruary 1948 case to see ae . . .  Z knew nothing of what 
had passed since Montreux la the inner circles ef the 
eoaaittees. .  .
At Montreux,! had faranlated the aost radical federalist 
theses,bat it  was not ay friends free the DBF who cam« te 
seek ee eat in  ay Voltaireaa retreat - it vas precisely 
the Ben fro* London vhoa the federalists(rightly er wrengly) 
adstrustad the aest:ay innocence spared ae the crisis ef 
conscience vhicfe they had just gone thrtwgh*. 2
>vaa so , da RoogaMmt vas either su£fici«itly a vara e f  the 
stakes involved, er so lapulsively confident about his role ia 
the Cultural preparations, as to put forward, "very clearly*, 
three rather iaposing,and perhaps ais- placed,"conditions" far 
his agree*ent to take charge ef the cultural aspects of the 
Hague Coagressiaaaely:
*(X ) The Oulturai Coanission,far frea being a siaple orna- 
aentai adjunct to the sari ona cetaaissioas(pelitical and 
econoaic)aust assaae the decisive role in  defining the 
purpose ef the whole undertaking and its hoped for con­
sequences.
(2) la order to prove that it  shared this view ,the Joiat 
Ceaaittee should entrust te the Cultural Cni1ssten  
the drawing up of the Praaable defining the long-tera 
and shart-tar* alas ef the congress and ef the aoweaoat.
(3 ) Sine* this Praaatoa should contribute also to the 
codification of th* tarainology of the r*s*lutioas, 
its contents,dram  up by the cultural section,should 
be debated before the Congress by the leaders of tha 
political and econeai c sections." 3
la etho- wsfe.de Kougeaent vas actually proposing as a condi­
tion for his collaboration that the iaaeasely eoaplex efforts, 
entrusted chiefly te the leaders of the International txecftive 
C o n itte e ,in  achieving a balanced and realistic  Political Re­
port .outlining th* principles,objectives and long and short- 
tera aaasures o f the c a ^a ig n ,a ad  vhich la  turn vould b* sub- 
ait t*d to th* scrutiny of Burope 's  aost distinguished p u b lic ./. 
T- HwPrrrmmriftH 2 . DK E O OOB W T  op d t  p . 339 3 .ibid
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»/.personalities,should is  fact take second place to,and be sub­
s t it u t e  fo r,h is m  Preamble and his ovn proposed definition 
of what th« campaign vas all aboutI Furthermore,!» vas also 
insisting ttoat th* Cultural Coaed-ssiea should sanohor rmpla c a  
th« colloctiv« expertise of th« other tve Commissions, aad 
actually "asrune th« decisive rol«* la laying down th« mala 
rtiaroDC* points for th« sabsoqueit debates of th« a k m  
bodies* - And all this,ve r«Hieebor,vas being put as a eonditte 
by someone vho,i s  his ova vords,"kaev nothing ef vhat had 
passed sine* M ontrox" in the vorklng and «cecutive 11—  111 ■ ■ i 
of the »ov— «at. la  viev of the intense and .delicate vonrk 
required for the Political Kepart alone,the complexity and 
difficulty  ef vhich vas illustrated ia  the precediag chapter, 
de Kougemont's attitude towards the actual leaders ef the 
torm ent vas,to  say the least,a  lit tle  naive.
Ketlagcr nevertheless played along vith de Kougemoat, 
despite the obvious political complications vhich the letter's  
attitude presented the International Cem ittee* It  is  diffledt 
t*> believe,however,that the Secretary Seneral seriously 
entertained the thought e f handing over the Congress' soul to 
de lougemont in  the vay demanded. More likely , he intended te 
channel the letter 's  enthusiasm and federalist eloquence te a 
more isolated though harmlessly spectacular plane* H a s ,i t  
appears that Ketlnger actually obtained,■vith some d iffic u lty  
the agreement o f the organisers allowing de lougeeont te dUtav 
hds Preamble 1 m ediately after Churchill's Inaugural speech 
at The Hague(though the vrltor has found little  deacr mate­
rial related te this point)* 'Ketinger had supported me very 
sk ilfu lly *, de Kougemoat recalled,quoting from a letter sent 
to hie from the Secretary Oeneral on March 2 9 ,of vhich the 
following is  an extract:
*1 consider that this declaration ought to fore the 
starting point e f our joint work and after the Congress 
it  must become a manifesto of the vhole international• / •
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./.Boropean noreaant. Just like the peace pledge in  England
•  fee years before the war r u  covered with »one 13 
millions signatures - in the sane vay ve m s t  endeavour 
to hare this manifesto supported by millions of signa­
tures of Buropeans, thus creating a very strong popular 
movement as eaeh signatory would not fall to rem«nber 
his signature and his pledge. It  cannot fa il also to 
produce an additional pressure on timid and recalcitrant 
governments.
The launching of such a manifesto ought to constitute 
one of the principal and ianediste objects of the Congress 
and of our movement. It  ought,by the vork of collecting 
signatwres,tokeq> cur ideas constantly alive among the 
masses. Bvery meeting organised by our affiliated  bodies 
must end in  collecting those signatures(and eventually j 
a fev pcnce from each signatory to keep the vork going)■•
Tboarfi Imlipi t » i  clearly excited by the prospect of such 
a Boropean pledge,it vas equally evident,if one reads 
betveen the lines,that the precise conditions vhich de Kouge> 
mont had originally issued regarding the actual running of 
the Hague Congress itself had not b e a  met. The campaign for 
a popular Buropean manifesto vas certainly i^o r ta a t  and 
constituted the type of appeal to the "masses* which the SOT 
m ilitants would thrive upon,tint it  vas a campaign which wodld 
be effectively modelled after the Congress,learing the mere 
intricate details propesed for the Political and Bcononic 
Debates in  tact at The Hague. In  short,by the vary fact that 
such a European pledge,in order to be attractive and in telli­
gible at a mass popular level,needed to be concise,and to 
indicate in broad terns the principles aad objectives of the 
Boropean ca«*>algn,neant that de Kougenont's writing skills , 
rather than any deeper philosophical thoughts should be most 
called upon. Ho did net exactly see it  this way however* 
Already by the end of February he had enlisted the help of 
sone 50 Buropean philosophers,vriters,and academics. Soon 
after,1» M an* and April, numerous vorking coanittee meetings 
took place in  Paris,Oeneva and London,at vhich de Kougemont» 
federalist- 'peraonaliste' colleagues,such as Alexandre Marc
and Kobert Aron.took a leading part in  formulating . / ,
i . dk ftooomnrt.op cltT p . 340
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./ .t h e  Kepart «ad draft of Resolutions for the Cultural Debate, 
as veil as the text etf the Preamble for the Congress as a 
«hole,vh±ch «as far froa brief or general.
Hoverer,at the Joint Cowsittee meeting of April * ,in  Pari* 
it  vas suddenly decided that the text, nov entitledPream ble? 
vould constitute •  "Message te the Buropeans"(to be approved 
by acclamation, and therefore delivered only at the closinf 
session. Moreover,the nev format vas to be restricted te tve 
pages in  length., of vhich only the last ten lines vould actutf^r 
describe the pledge. Furthermore,representatives of all three 
sections vould examine the text frier to the Congress ,"te  ensure 
the necessary homogeneity ef the reports of the three Commis­
sions". 1  As if  this vas not enough,on April 2 6 ,in  London,de 
Kougmont vas also informed by the Congress organisers that 
there existed tve other Oultnrai £eperts,vhereas his project 
as*.* whole vas "too Ion?” and'spoke of federalism”, a stand vtdcfe 
vas not supported by a l l . Consequently,it vas decided to cir­
culate a il thro* texts plus a shortened version,vritten by 
de Kougaaont,incorporating the substance of ail the raports.
- As the latter recalled,vith  some b ittern ess ,..
”1  fa it  that ever the head of ay report,they vere 
aiming at the 'M essage', they vere trying to break the 
federalist point of the congress" . 2
The fact vhich de Kougeaont did not seem ta appreciate, 
hoverer,is that the Hague Congress vas not planned as a purely 
"federalist" gathering,still less the internal-orientated,phi­
losophical brand of "integral-federalism" to vhich de Kougeaont 
and his eioser colleagues adhered. The "Congress of lurope", 
as described in the preceding chapter,vas conceived by the clear 
majority ef the International Executive Coaaittee as a specta­
cular "historic gathering" of leading Boropean personalities, 
vho vould publicly declare their influential support for the 
supra-national"Buropeaa Idea",and for iia»edlate p ra c tic a l./.
1 . joint International Coenittee meeting,8 .4 .48 . .o ffic ia l 
mimites( IC /M /l I) .p .4 .-CA.BM BRUGGE.
2. DE KOUSEMOHT,op.cit,f .341 .
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. / . * easures to initiate.vhere realistically  possible, the »are- 
p i u  unification precess. There vas sieply no possibility, 
so far as the organisers vere concerned,te subject the many 
important personalities attending the conference to the irory- 
feaui passions of federalist theorists. The idea ef the latter 
group,that the Hague Congress should constitute a "lurepean 
■states Qenerai" of the "liYing forces",had d e a r ly  been 
repudiated early in  the year1,i f  net right at the start ef 
the «hole co-ordination effort. Indeed, there vas no tiling to 
step the integral-federalist Militants free organising their 
own pseedo "Bstates General",an a glorified Montreux basis. 
They chose net te,becanse they realised ,in  effect»that the 
Congress ef Burope,organised by such a veil-connected inter­
national b o d y ,v ia  such influential spokesmen,and vith the 
towering personality of Churchill apparently at the head, won.Id 
easily out-eetch a gathering of eostly unknown theorists. But 
having accepted(no eattef how reluctantly)that this vas the 
position ,it vas surely unfair for people like de Kougenont, 
and Marc in  an even aero aggressive Banner,te later asaert 
that they had soeehew been duped by the whole a ffa ir . Ike 
policy and tactics ««ployed by Sandys and Ketiager.vere x » -  
tainly epee to aero thae a touch of eaehiavellianisa.but on 
the other haad,it vas surely unrealistic,indeed absurd,of 
de Kougeaent te think that he could Monopolise the sense of 
the whole Congress according to his own thoughts and federa­
list  objectives. He had not,in  any ease, to tally given up 
the struggle. - As he concluded,after the series ef official 
rebuffs received towards the end of the preparatory stages
to the Congress: "We vere all nervous on the ere of battle".
X. Cf, pp. <ro
2 . DE XOUOSMOaT'Op d t .  p .M X
2
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2 ) Labor boycotts Th* Hague:repercussions
The biggest political problem still facing the erganisMcs of 
the Hague Congress, right to the ere e f the conference itself, 
remained the hostile attitude of the British Labour Party. ®»e 
reasons for th is  negative response te the Congress by the 
Party m achine,If net the Parliamentary Party as a »hole,and 
the dangers it  presented in undercutting international S e d a *  
list  rappert, hare been outlined la an earlier chapter ,vhich 
concluded describing the hostile decision of the Internatio­
nal Socialist Conference hold at Selsdem Park on March 21-22 
regarding the Bay«'Congress . 1  Op to this point,the much Mere 
enthusiastic Prmcfc Socialist Party had made appeals,but had 
not clearly criticised  the attitude of the Labour Kxecative 
on th» Issue . This vould no doubt hare rw ain ed  the position 
had Ouy Mollet con tim ed  vaakly to present the 6PI0 case to 
Labenxr. After the disastrous March »eetlng, however, Lton B i n  
vas comrincod that much eere pressure should be applied, and 
nov opened a bitter campaign against the Labour Party’ s narrow 
minded Burepean policy. The British Labour Executive,he ta ­
citly  ctaged.vere encouraging a dangerous partisanship that 
could veil destroy the unity mov— eat in its infancy,and in 
fact negate the very idea of Buropeaa unification. P u r t h w r »  
he pointed out that his Labour collaagues had fallad  te pro- 
sent any positive programme for the attainment of a Socialist 
Burope,vhoroas the campaign for a representative Buropoan 
Assembly nov held the key to an eventual federation. It  vas 
therefore necessax7 ,he firmly concluded,for the Burepean
Socialist parties to co-operate vith the International Co m I-
2
ttoe responsible for the Hague Congress.
Despite his strong criticism  of Labour policy,Biun vas 
nevertheless careful not to split ranks on the issue, 
at least not at this stage. In  a leading article p r in ted ./.
I', C f• ~pp. 95—X u . 2 . BLOM Le Populaire 2 5 .3 .4 8 . , see
also P .P . KITSCH The French Left and the Buropoan Ideaj
♦>•« 'Hfe), *MVT-7.
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. / . l a  th« Pr«ich S a d  »list dally, *Le Popnlaira'.he in  faet partly 
biased Churchill1 s personality,as th* honorary leader ef th« 
United »scrvp« Ho t«— nt.for labour's subsequent relapse late 
partisan pelltlcs orer Buropean unity:
"Mr. Churchill has a character too original and tee 
pewarful fer hia set te leare his mark on everything 
he tenches...Be  continues te play a part of the first 
importance la the internal politics of his corun try and 
in  international politics .
The i t u p  of his approval brought vith it  the danger 
that the European Federation would hare a character tee 
narrowly C bur-chilli an. Thus is  explained the embarrassment, 
circumspection and hesitation of the I»abcwr Party, and in 
consequence,of international Socialism . The Federalist 
movement would hare great d ifficulty  in emerging free 
the shadow ef a toe illustrious nam e".*
Churchill is  turn responded in  an open letter to Blue by firmly
rejecting the notion that his in itiative  should‘hare actually
prejudiced the cause of European unitgr:
“When at Zorich in September 1*4* I  rewired the ancient 
and glorious conception of a United Europe..which Z had 
supported for many years,Z had no idea it  would become a 
Party question. X thought it  would become a movement and 
an inspiration en a level far above Party politics lk any 
country. Indeed i f  we cannot rise  above Party differences 
in a common cause on which we all agreed,how can we hope 
te bridge the fearful gulfs of reciprocal injuries between 
nations great and small,and thus repair the ruin of Burope? 
This was I believe your view too,until you became aware ef 
the adverse decision of Mr. Shinwell and the Executive of 
the British Socialist Party. Zt would be a disaster te a 
supreme and vital cause if  ordinary Party politics in 
Britain were te obstruct this great international movement " .
The Conservatlwe leader la  t u n  argued:
"Nothing could be more wrong and foolish than for the 
Socialist Parties of finrope to try to create and maintain 
a monopoly of a cause and policy which belongs not to local 
Parties,but to whole States and nations.*«The idea that fecrwpe 
could be tented on a ime l*B'1y Socialist b a s is ... is  of course 
absurd. You w ill need all the help you can get and we shall 
need all the comradeship of which we are worthy,if we are 
to wia this great prise for all the peoples,for all the 
Parties 'for  all the men in all the la n d s '."
1 . BLUM, Le Populalre 2 6 .3 .4 8 .
2 . CBDXCKXU., letter to Blum 7 .4 .4 8 . , CA.BM BED 90S
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It  should be stressed at this point that neither Blua nor 
Churchill really intended to rebuke the ether. This public ex­
change of letters vas meant perhaps nor« Sac tie attention of the 
Labour leadership» Bln»,on the one hand,did not vast to fall 
T i e d «  te any collaborationist allegations,nor directly conAmt 
the pro-Labour Guy Mollet faction at the head of the BPZO.Tbus, 
by appearing to question Churchill' s Borepeaa credentials,bat 
bringing la  reality the partisan attitude of Labour More late 
light,the -veteran French Socialist leader effectively increased 
the pressure en Labour to shew greater European aagnaniaity. 
Churchill,for his part,publicly illustrated the difficulties 
which Labour's singular approach to Borope had placed upon the 
continental Socialist leaders,and he indeed took the opportu­
nity te conclude his letter to Blue with the following eloqueat 
plea for a united caapaiga:
"The British Socialist Party hare not threatened vlth 
disciplinary «assures er victim isation any of their am bers 
vho aay cone to The Hague as individuals,and Z trust that 
the Preach Socialist Party v ill allow full freedoe to its 
o n  aeabers; fer I aa sure that all vho fell oat ef the 
line in  these grave and aeloncholy times v ill expose them­
selves to the repreach of history. I hope therefore for 
all our sakes that the position aay be aade plain in a 
aanner conductive to the dignity aad independence of all 
Parties and to the causes aad principles which Parties 
exist to serve.
1 address this letter publicly to you,my deer Monsieur 
Blum,because of our association la the struggles of the 
past aad Z hope that our d o s in g  years aay see us united 
la  the aareh to what Is  nobla aad true«"1
B iua 's caapaign to induce a non-partisan approach to the 
Burepeaa caapaign appeared to bear fruit.- Za a veal-received 
speech on April 9 ,he thoroughly eom dtted himself to the idea 
of a Westera. European third Perce,in which socialisa would 
play a leading role la  co-operation with other B n p i  looking 
Parties: "The Third Parce” ,he stated ,"is  that aeams by which 
democracy at the national level w ill be transported to the
S
International level,aad  for th is ,socialise  east serve a* a pride."
Z . CHURCHILL,o p .c it . 2 . »Discours de Stresa» 9 .4 .4 « . ,see
L'Ouvre de Léon Blua 1947-50 ¿Paris,19631p.Zê9
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Hi» forceful approach apparently »on <rv«r M ellet^nd other Party 
leaders,and la the second week #f April the SFIO requested a 
special session at the forthcoming International Socialist Con­
ference la Paris to discusa yet again Socialist participation at 
2
the Hague Congress. The British Labour Executive also appeared 
to be open-edadad about the subject,haring effectively apprecia­
ted Bloa's earlier letter to Churchill.^ Indeed,just. a .fe *  days 
^*fere: the oe*far«ace,plaaaed fer April *4-5, Blua and his staff 
at 'fce Populaire* vere *iai«dlately optim istic*. Xobert Verdier 
was especially convinced that the Labour delegates »ere going to 
"soften their position and that S o d a llsa  would no» construct a 
realistic prograaae for achieving federation through co-op e r a t i«  
vith the International C aw ittee * .4 The preparatory neeting to 
the conference.on April IB, gave rise to further enthusiasm ,and 
the positive hope that so d a llsa  vould becoae the "animator of 
European federation.* Blua,as one of the leading French delagates 
to the special session dealing «ith  the Hague Congress ,vas no» 
ready for his aost crucial battle la  the European campaign.
The roality of feeling la the British Labour camp,bovever,
had not changed. On April 2 0 ,only four days before the coafe»
renee,the Labour International Ceaalttee of the V .E .C .
agreed that *the position adopted at Selsdoa Park should be
Maintained*,though »  as a rather pallid  atteapt to placate the
Preach Socialists - it  vas also agreed to "encourage the osta-
b ilshaeat of a aore poverful and permanent Socialist organisatial
6
la  Europe. An additional verting paper,entitled "Rote* on Euro­
pean Oalty^.and vtaich dealt only vith econoaic co-operationai 
aeasacras,«ould also be used as a basis for discussions. In  short, 
the Labour delegation to the Paris conference,led by Daltea, 
Morgan Philips and Denis Boaley,vas intent upon stubbornly./.
I* Ketlnger had also appealed to Mollet for support in à letter, 
dated 19.4.4«.,stressing non-partisan poli tics ,*rn*0« PAPBS
2 .  See P . P .  Kltch op*clt«p.I67» 3 .  See T im es  2 4 , 2 6 . 4 . 4 8 .
4 .  P . P .  Hitch op .dt^froa Verdier la Le Populaire , 1 5 . 4 . 4 8 .
5 .  I b i d , f r oa Le Populaire , 1 8 . 4 . 4 8 .  ________
6. I .C . «neeting,2 0 .4 . 4 8 . ,  official Minutes. TABOUS PAW * A1ŒMB
7 . Ib id . -------------
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./.r e s is t in g  any French pleas for co-operation with the Inter­
national Coamittee organising the Hague Congress,as well as 
any attmapts to push through proposals for a supra-national 
political unification ef Europe« Despite all the French en­
thusiasm which preceded the conference,the omens tar a happy 
outcome were not good.
In  the meantime,in the wake of the Joint parliamentary 
initiative  for a European Constituent Assembly,described 
earlier1 ,the Labour Parliamentary Party members of the "Europe 
Group” ,led  by Mackay and Crossman.had not lost hope of a 
successful Labour turn-out at The Hague,despite the national 
Executive*s o fficial discouragement, plus the set-back at the 
Selsdon Park meeting. Grossman's faith  in  a strong Lab— x 
lead in the growing Boropean campaign was oaphasised farther 
in  an. important leading article written for the March edition
of the Preach 'Revue Socialiste ',calling  ter closer Pranco-2
British socialist co-operation for the European ideal. By
the beginning of April,Mackay,for his part,was so confident
about the growing support for the European campaign that he
wrote to CowdenhoTe-talergi declaring:
" I  cannot at the moment say that Bovin w ill back 
the Hague Congress but there is  «w a y  indication that 
he w ill - . 3
Bren Sandy*,who was not often inclined to make rash political 
judgments,despatched a message to his organisation team that 
"representation of the British Labour Party at the Congress 
is  absolutely certain” , adding tlhet this information could be 
used privately toareassurea the other continental Socialist 
delegates. 4
1 . C f. pp .I2»- I?6.
2 . P .P . Eitch,op. d tv p .1 6 2
3 . MACIAY,letter to Coudenhovo-Ialergi,II.4 . 48.,MACKAY HU>KS.
4 . SANDYS,telegram sent to Bogholm,Rodd,Silva,Tonbacopoulos, 
Kerstens,Delattre plus Van Zeeland,2 6 .3 .4 B .>CASK BEDQQfi.
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A* a result of this growing confidence in  a strong Labour 
turn-out.plus the increasing prestige which the Hague project 
in  gene~al was acquiring,Coudeahove-Lalergi ,in  turn, bowed to the 
pressure with which Hacksy persuaded a crucial meeting of the 
KPU Council,held on April 9 ,to cawait the parliamentary mordent 
to supportinf the Congress on a formal basis. Zn consequence, 
the KPTJ also appointed o fficial representatives te the Joint 
International Committee. 1  Though substantial parliamentary 
representation had been secured beforehand, this impcrtant decision 
by the KPU now meant that .technically speaking,the HP0 itself 
would be responsible for issuing invitations for the actual 
Congress to European members of Parliament. Socialist parlia­
mentarians could therefore attend the Congress without appearing 
to hare been invited by a Churchill-led movement,as the Labour 
Executive had previously chosen to interpret. This point was 
im ediately  taken up by the 'Keep Left' European activist Ieslie 
Hale M .P .,w ho ,in  an urgent letter to Daiton,claimed that *a 
fundamental change" had now taken place ,and that there was no
longer any reasen far the National Executive to discourage
2
individual Labour MP's from attending the Hague Congress. At 
the subsequent NEC International Ceooaittee meeting of April 20, 
however,the Labour Executive’s attitude hardened still further, 
and it  was agreed that any action by Labour KP 's to actually 
attend the Hague Congress would be "strongly disapproved mi by
3
the Partyk* The Labour General Secretary,Morgan P h ilip s ,in  turn
personally inf aimed Hale tfcmttfcsc had b en  "some misunderstanding
as to the real attitude of the national Executive Coa*ittee te
the Hague Congress*"4 The o fficial EEC policy was subsequently
clarified  la  a stem  letter seat by Philips on April 21 to each
of the 42 Labour MP's who still to this date intended to go to
The Hague. The letter stated,in  the coldest of term s,that./.
t . Information o fficially  sent by Mackay to Hetlnger in  a le t t v  
dated X 3 .4 .4 » ., MACIAY PAPERS
2 . HALE,letter t* Dalton.1 3 .4 .4 8 . , MACIAY PAPIKS
3.- ItCi .m eeting,20 .4 .4 8 . .o fficial m inutes.op.cit.
Podips.letffer to gaia. X U * . , .
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» /.t h «  Labour Executive's attitude toward participation at th* 
Congress had been "Misrepresented" by those nenbers who still 
thought that they were free te attend as individeals»despite 
o fficial discouragement. The Labour General Secretary there­
fore reminded these members:
•that the Rational Executive C-ommittee strongly 
disapproves ef ■ambers taking part in the Hague Congress, 
whether as individuals er as representatives of 
organisations. "
Be then vent on to warn:
■The national Bxecntive Com ittee is  unconditionaily 
opposed to any action which eight appear to associate 
the prestige of the governing majority in  Great Britain, 
however indirectly,w ith an organisation calculated te 
serve the interests ef the British Conservative Party ." X
He longer vas the Party Bxeeutivc simply advisim# Labour HP's 
not to support the Hague Congress,it vas now clearly threa­
tening then net even to attend in  an individual capacity, 
since this would be a breach of Party policyl At a tine when 
the Bxecntive was already carrying out a vitch-hnat against 
Labour HP 's who had shown, thiir sympathy for th«j—  Hieeasist 
leanl Socialist Party in  the Italian elections of April IS ,
leading to the expulsion of J . Platts-Hiils MrP . fron the •2
the Labour Party,the dangers entailed by confronting such an 
o fficial threat war« apparent to a ll . Bale for one,however, 
was net deterred and wrete an equally stern letter te Morgan 
Philips rightly Indicating that for sone tine the Labour MP»s 
intending to go to The Hague had acted,with the t a d t  i molve- 
nent of the Labour leadership and Party whip,on the assuaptien 
that they could attend the Congress as individuals,despite 
the lack of encouragement fron the Executive. Be then added:
"In  all these circumstances Z an very deeply concerned 
that an action which must have been known to the Bxecntive 
far aeny weeks should now be the subject ef what appears 
te approach very near to an o fficial b a n .."
I .  Official letter by Morgan Philips sent to the 42 Labour 
HP's Intending to go te The Ha^ue,2 1 .4 .4 * ., MACEAY PAPOtS
B.
3 . HAL*,letter to K. Philips, && .4  U S . ,  MACEAt PA^BtS
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Broceeding to defend his position on the grounds that the 
Hague Congress was effectively regarded as an all-party 
conference,and that it  would be each wiser "to try te capture 
the Conference for the socialists" than to let Churchill steal 
the shew,he forcefully concluded on the following point:
■X as writing enly for myself,but the 40 odd members 
who have made all axTangeaents to go th the Hague represent 
the most loyal and aost active supporters of the Q*v- 
ernnent.
If  X myself mm confronted with the decision that X 
have either got to go te ay constituency and say that 
X have abandoned the decision X publicly announced,and 
which X announced as what X considered to be a great 
step for world peace,and i f  we are to leave Hr.Churchill 
to go He The Hague and point to twe and three hundred 
enpty chairs,and that although the socialists of Europe 
have publicly announced their intention to eo-eperate, 
they have abandoned their idealise In  response te the 
W hip,I should regard it  indeed as a major political 
d is a s te r ,...X  do net think it  is  a decision X could 
possibly take. Certainly X would prefer to resign ay 
seat,and to continue as a loyal aeaber of the Labour 
Party outside the House.•  1
Hot all among the 42 Labour HP 's who bad agreed to ge to 
the Hague Congress displayed the same courage and tenacity as 
Leslie Hale. Already,on April 2 6 ,the influential Labour spoke» 
man on Germany,John Hynd M .P.,appeared to be backing out,on 
the grounds that individual Labour representation at the
Congress would new "hare vary unfortunate interpretations
2
placed on i t " .  Hale tried te pre-empt such hesitation aaong 
his colleagues by privately gaining an assurance froa Morgan 
Philips that the XSC had net actually placed a ban on aeabers 
going to The Hague,they had siaply felt obliged "to reiterate
3
their strong T ie r ". Mack ay and Crossman readily took up this 
news ,4 and along with ether aenbers of their group, addressed«'' >
X. HALE,letter to P h ilip s ,2 2 .4 .4 8 .,o p .c it .
2 . J.HYKD,letter to H ackay ,26 .4 .48. , MACEAY PAPHtS ,
3 . "Meswrandum on an interview between Hr Morgan Philips and
i4r Leslie  Uaie on April M AUIY PAFBE.-------
4 . m r .------- —
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./ .t h e  following paints to Morgan Philips the day before tha crucial 
Labour Executive meeting #f April 28:
•..T h e  pesition we tr* piacad la la an exceedingly 
unfortunate o n e . We coont oar*air«* amongst the most 
loyal members of the party,aad are deeply disturbed at 
the suggestion which is  constantly being made in the press 
that this is  a defiance ef a Party decision,or something 
in  the nature of a rebellion« Throughout these Tery long 
arrangements we have kept the Party in  every way informed 
as to oar a c t iv it ie s ...
We felt at tha cim— m cement that it  would be a tragedy 
If ,a t  the Hagne conference,vbicb « il l  inevitably be described 
as a representative conference,we were allowed to go forward 
with the ease(European unity)on the basis of Mr. Churchill'* 
speeches,which we felt were based on a fundamental « 1  sunder- 
standing and misconception of the real needs of the situation 
and we felt it  right to se«k an opportunity of asserting 
the Socialist faith  la  this »attar at this important meeting. 
. . ..B a t  the second purpose of the Hague Conference,aad the 
purpose we seek to achieve,is the federation of all the 
organisations which have been adumbrating proposals for 
Western Onion. If  this is  to be done,we most have *n the 
controlling coonittea of the federated organisation substan­
tial Socialist representation. This we hope to ach ie v e ...
Furthermore,we are informed that many ether Socialist 
Parties in  Barope w ill be represented,on the basis of our 
annoonceient that we propose to attend".
As in  the past^hovever,the I K  meeting ef April * • ,  under
shlaw ell's hard-line chairmanship,regained totally unmoved,and
reaffirmed that it  weuld be “undesirable for m«ibars ef the
Labour Party to attend the Hague Conference*, and that it  would
also be "Inconsistent with the Labour Party 's international
policy* should they became n b e i  of any permanent ergaai-2
satioa set up at The Hague. Morgan Philips la  turn informed 
Leslie Bale of the decision,adding in  conclusion!
•In  the view of the Eatioaal Executive Coaaxittme, the «fejacts 
which we all have in  view can best be promoted by ensuring 
the successful development o f. .Socialist instruments,rather 
than by dispersing the energies and Interests of «embers of 
the Party over a large number of organisations some of which 
are dominated by political elements hostile to the British 
Labour Party aad to European Socialism ." 3
1 . Joint letter seat to Morgan Philips oa 2 7 .4 .4 8 . MCTAY PAPKES
2 . KEC meeting,28 . 4 ,48 . , o fficial m inutes.op. c it .
3 . PHILIPS,letter te Reii;"!28.4.4B. , HHUUt PAPERS.
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Proa the point of vie» of European Social!*«.however,the 
Labeur Bxecutive's behaviour at the International Socialist 
Conference at P a ris ,en April 24-5,was hardly exemplary! Hugh 
Dalton and his teaa arrived vith the fir *  conviction ef net 
budging an inch in  their opposition to Socialist participation 
at the Hague Congress ,amd despite strong pressure frem the ether i 
Italian.Belgian,Dutch and French delegations,thej forced their 
intransigent views upon the reluctant conference, Léon Biua,vbe 
Bade hiaself the chief spokesman for those vho favoured a non­
partisan approach toward lorepean unification,and vho vanted te 
support openly the Hague Congress,vas indignant and deeply dis­
illusioned by Labour's in flexib ility . "For two days, the elder 
statesman of French socialism ardently championed his beliefs , 
while the Labourites steod firm , Onable to shake the British, 
Blum,frustrated,charged the Labourites with faithlessness toward 
Socialist ideals; vas it  not,asked Bium,a traditional policy of
socialism to support all democratic efforts at internationalism;2
vere,then,the Labourites true Socialists?" The parties represen­
ted at The Bague,he vent on to contend,vere all deaocratic,even 
if  soae vere non-Social1 s t ,and a Socialist-orientated Federal
Europe could never be achieved without working in co-operation
3
vith other parties, ft eased tyDriBm* unwavering resistance, however, 
the c o n f e r e n c e  decided ultimately to maintain the British policy 
of non-participation at The Hague,and non-co-operation with the 
International Coa»ittee,though in  the final resolution soae vague 
references were made to an eventual "supra-national* Boropean 
federal structure,along with the aare lmaediate need te set up 
an epheaeral lorepean Socialist lafermatiea Centre. 4
1. In  a tough speech to a mass Meeting organised by the SFIO on 
the eve of the conference,for example ,Dalton clearly warned 
against mixing the Boropean ideal with the "cco*ruption"of 
"reactionary po liticians". Speech 2 3 .4 .48. , DAI TO H PAPOtS
2 . F .F . Kitsch,op C it . p .168.
3 . PB58XNOS COITTEHPOKAET ARCHIVES 1948 p .9272. See also articles 
in  Manchester Puardian and Times-, »lus Le Monde 25- 6.4.48 
and particularly "Socialisme et Fédéralisae" 1 le Monde1 2 7 .4 .4 8 .
4 .  O fficial Resélution of Paria Conference 2 5 . 4 . 48.DALTDH PAPR £
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Ob April 2 7 ,the National Council of the SFLO,acting cc the 
instructions of the International Socialist Coaference,made 
non-participation at t*e Hague Congress the o fficial party 
policy1  It  vas a decision taken vith considerable reluctance 
and much bitterness toward the Labour Executive. Quy He 1  let, 
vbo had beam so cautious in  the past,»as now openly sceptical 
about Labour's European policy,while LAon Blum finally  decided 
te break ranks vith Labour and raiala loyal to his long-founded 
Socialist intom atienal principles ,even i f  this meant having 
to transcend party policies and prejudices« On Hay 7 ,the tired 
and frail veteran leader of the French Socialist Party,the 
tormented and leneiy figure-» head of democratic humanitarian 
socialism,who had fought off the ruthless boieherikisation of 
his Party in  X920,vho had resisted the prote-fascist attacks 
on French democracy in  1934’and inaugurated the most compelling 
scries of social reforms in French history in  1936 ,rho had 
courageously or ear turned the trial bf  his Vichy accusers in  
I 941 and vent on to survive the lazi concentration camps,no*, 
at the end of his years,stood up to Labour scorn and Party 
timidity and attended the opening session of the historic 
Congress of lurope,accompanied by felloe Socialist,Paul tlMmttmr.
The Congress,moreover,vas attended by numerous other
Socialist HP 's from all over larope,though none vith Blum's
experience and standing, Bven Paul-Henri Spaak,in the final
event,failed to turn up through deference to Labour« Yet,in
a vay,Labour vas also unofficially  represented. Despite the
threats and accusations of the Labour Executive,23 Labour HP's,
including Mackay,Hate,Shavcross and Hynd did actually take
part at the Hague Congress,and were subsequently castigated
2
for doing se at the Labour Party Annual Conference in Hay*
1 . F .F . Kitsch op c it . p .169 .
2 . C f. ft 264.
Hackay would subsequently write to Sandys " I  alvays felt 
guilty about our bet,so  I am enclosing a cheque fo rl5 to 
square it  up. The bet vas for 25 HP's and in  the long run 
only 23 vent»(ie to The Hague)I , MfcCEAY PAPttS
Three days before the opening of the Hague Congress,ho»ever,
14 among the 42 Labour HP's whe had originally intended to goto 
the Congress timidly backed d o n , and on the eve of the Congress 
itse lf they were joined by another 5 members of the delegation, 
including Eichard Crossman*who subsequently had very little  te 
do with the 'Borope Qroup', and who vould eventually confor* to 
the Labour,,establishment's Beropeaa policy -«■ despite the rebel­
lious courage he shoved on ether international.questions*
All in  all,th e  Labour Party's record over the Congress of 
Borope vas a dismal and small-minded one. Despite Churchill' s 
Inevitable presence,this Congress v a s ,after all,th e  first mass 
psst-vw Buropean rally  of Its kind>and in its o n  historic 
vay,paved the psychological path for European intégration 
in  the future. It  vas a Congress upon vhich great 
statesmen such as A ld d e  De GesptEi and Conrad Adenauer staked 
their subsuquent political career,vhile veteran Socialist 
leaders like Léon B l n  had the magnanimity and vision to dedi­
cate their historic reputation to its success. The British 
Labour Party, hovever , - the most powerful and respected Socia­
list  Party in  Buropa,vith a Government the most capable and 
most looked te for a Buropean lead - threw avay much mt its 
international prestige and admiration for narrov and short­
sighted political reasons,and has subsequently done little  in  
the Buropean field  to restore its immediate post-war reputatieiv 
In im cdiate  terms, Shinvell and his colleagues la the Labour 
Executive had complained that the Hague Congress would not be 
•representative*; by refusing to participate »a n d  by attempting 
to force the other Buropean Socialist Parties to do likewise, 
they themselves deprived the Congress of this very possibility*
I .  For Labour Party representation at the Hague Congress,see 
the gfficiai final list a£, b kug g k .p iu s  the
following articles: Manchester Guardian , 'Delegates to con­
ference on Buropean O nio n ',1 7 .4 .4 8 .: Sunday Dispatch, 1 Socia- 
lists  and the Hague Congress',9 .5 * 4 8 .
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3) Conclusion tc the Preparatory Stages
Despite Labour*s boycott of the Hague Congress*and the 
pressure put on other Socialist Parties tn follow suit,the 
energetic efforts of the Joint International Ceaaittee.and 
especially Sandys and Betinger,ensured that the ever-aii compo 
sition e f  the Congress «as both impressive and representative 
in the general sense« Indeed,the efforts of the caapaign organ­
isers seem ,if anything,to have redoubled in face of Labour's 
attempted sabotage. 1  In this,they w*re substantially helped by2
the IPO 's  o fficial decision»on April 9 ,te  spouse» the Congress, 
along vith the formal entry ef the B E ,u n d er Bebert Bichet.te 
the International C»— i ttee ,on April 8.^  the USSE,also accorded 
considerable private help, especially in  Prance and Britain,and 
would be classed as an unofficial sponsor of the Congress« As 
a result of such co-operatien,the organising coaaittee could 
indeed d a i a  that the preparatory stages to the Congress had 
been succesful. The o fficial publication of the European 
Movement, printed one year later,described the outcoae as AUoss:
■The Congress succeeded beyond all expectations. It  prewsJ 
te be the aost reaarkable and representative gathering of 
prominent international personalities that has ever been 
asseabled to discuss the fate of Borope. It  was attended by 
seae 800 persons of almost every Buropean nationality. The 
delegations included veil-known statesmen,among thea several 
f iB N r  prime ministers and a number ef ainisters in  o ffice ; 
Members ef Parliaaent of all shades of deaocratic opinion; 
bishops and prominent churchmen of all denominations¡leading 
industrialists and tr*de-«tnionlr?s; eminent lawyers, economists, 
university profess*rs,scieatists,artists,poets and anthers; 
and aeabers of a wide variety of women's,youth and ether 
organisations. Whilst all were invited in their individual 
capacity they could,as a w h o le ,d a ia  to represent with 
authority every i^o r ta n t  aspect in  the life  and opinions 
of Burepe.” *
II The International Coamlttee meeting.8 .4 .4 8 . . o fficial iriiMtM 
( i C T V l p .Pltts the subsequent invitation report 
prepared by Sandy»(IC /P /I6)indicate an acceleration of effort 
en this natter. CA*i BS006B.
2 . C f. p .163
3« ,8«4«46«,opad t «
4 . European Hoeeaent and the Council of teropo , °P . d t .  (p .36
I
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It »as no nnpty statement. Among the official list of 
delegates to the Hague Congress^there figured the names of fbbcds 
past,present and future Baropean prim* ministers,ineluding:-  
Churchill,M en  and MacMillan for Britain;Herriot.Daiadier, 
Keynaud.Bamadier.r. Paure and Chaban-Delmas for France(pius the 
initial presence of Léon Blum) ; Van Zeeland for Bel gira»; Adenauer 
for Germany;D* Caspar! for Italy,and so on. Other famous politi­
cal personalities and ministers »ho attended,in addit i n  to 
those already active In  the Joint International Coawittee,inclu­
ded:- Francois Mitterrand,François de Menthon,P Ierr « Henri 
Tel tfea.M . Schumann‘ ,Aa*r* Fr*»çeis-Peneet,Bg# La Haifa,P»tey 
Therm eym ft/81» Maxvelft-Pyfe;6±r Arthur Salter,plus active 
Socialists such as Georges Bohy,Paul Kiret,Victor Collins,Hugh 
Delargy, fiordon Lang,Carlo Schmidt,Ignasie S iione,Aldo Garosci, 
etc .(the  latter being the leading anti-fascist comrade of the 
murdered Kostel11 brothers)• The lis t  of economists, trade union 
leaders,tndm*trial and cttitt t *  figures is toe long to describe; 
suffice to mention names such as Bdnond Giscard d* Bstaing,Lord 
McGowan,Bob ■dvards.Paul Finet,Salvador Madariaga.Bertrand 
lussell,e tc . The religious side vas equally veil represented, 
the Congress receiving the support of both the Anglican and 
Catholic hierarchy. In short,it certainly vas a most spectacular 
Baropean gathering,Labeur's  hostility notwithstanding. In 
the sober assessment of Harold M acM illan,"it vas indeed one of
the nest rm arkable and representative collections of famous2
Baropean personalities ever brought together",vhile Paul-Henri 
Spaak,despite his reluctant absence,later stated that the Hague 
Congress vas to become "an historic landmark in  the annals of 
Europe«“^Léon Blum,fer his part,declared at the end of the (feqpa 
that "a  ne» phase in  the history of the vorld" had been lamched?
1 . See Annexe
2 . H .MACKXLLAN, Tides of Fortune , op C it . p .15®
3 . P .H . SPAAX , The Continuino Battle ,op. d t .  p .201
4 . LEON BLUM t Le Populaire «editorial on The Hague,12 .5 .4® .
The final run-up to the Hague Congress d id ,of course,posa 
a considerA&a amount of organisational work at the location of 
the conference Itself,where Senator Ierst «is took charge. Lest 
minute problaau also occurred at the international, level. The 
o fficial boycott policy of the International Socialist Confer 
rence was obviously the aost important set-back,even if  the 
decision was net carried out by aost Socialist Parties vith 
any firmness. Another pressing problem, however,resulted from 
the crucial Italian  elections of April 1 8 ,and the subsequent 
political re-organisation In  that country,which in turn diverted 
the attention of aany Italian  politicians who otherwise would 
have attended the Congress,though de Qasperi did actually turn 
up* The Italian  delegation to The Hague was consequently retacad 
to almost half, with a total tarn oat of only 57 representatives 
This was an important point,since the Majority of the Italian 
Parliament wes favourable to Buropean Federation and,had the 
delegation been numerically strong«» the Political Debate at 
The Hague would probably hare been metre orientated toward ra­
dical proposals for ■urtpean unity* Instead,despite Count 
Carandinl's formal ceamitment to Buropean Federation,as Italy’s 
main spokesman and as the effective mouthpiece of the KPE.the - 
Italian  delegation as a whole maintained a low-key presemce at 
the Congress,just as Spinelli had suggested at the MFB confe­
rence in February^and as he,for once,now acted upon. On the 
other hand,the more gradualistic inclined British and French 
delegations to The Hague were increased to a significant extent; 
accounting for about one hundred and fifty  parsons each,thus 
amounting to not much under half of the eventual representation 
at the Congress* This considerable Anglo-French weighting to 
the affair was indicative of how Sandy*' in itial conception 
of working through a British and French based United Europe 
Movement bad actually affected the make-up of this historic 
Congress of Borope. The low Italian  turn out,plus the relati­




./.Denm ark ,12 for Horvay,I9 for Sveden) .provided a further 
weighting of opinion favourable to Sandys' realistic Euro­
pean unity approach.
To this vas added the fact that the British delegation 
te the Hague Congress vas extremely veil organised in  a&nmce 
as a coherent vorking group under thenoainatin chairmanship 
ef Mackay.and perhaps mart iepertaatly,under the actual 
chairmanship of Boothby for the Political On— 1ttee,Layton 
for the Bceneadc Ceand ttee, and Lindsay for the Oultural 
Coaaittee - the fonaer tve personalities remaining in  liaison 
vith Sandys. In addition , Sandys'close assistant,T .B . 
Martin,vould ect es Secretary to the vhole group,thus enswfcg 
the Sxecutive Chairman' s pu-tial supervision of the t e n . 
Purthansore, at the International Executive meeting in The 
Hague,»a May 3 ,attended by Sandys, Herstens,Retinger,Bmgm*ns, 
Mackay,Silva and Boel.the priaary Steering Coaaittee for the 
running of the Congress as a vhole vas chosen,and again em- 
suredthat the realistic  current of opinion,identified vith 
the Sandys-ietinger axis,vould be dominant over that of the 
federalists. Out of the main personalities in  this Cew ittee 
Brugmans vas in  fact the only W  vei*e ,tke  ether members 
being Sandys,Lersteas,van Zeeland,Mackay,Ceurtin,&etingar 
and fcebattet» At the last Executive Coamittee M eting ,held  
on the eve of the Congress itself,Sandys secured a final 
safeguard against any over—radian. statements of intent vhich 
Denis de Kougtnont night have vanted to make far the federa­
lists ,b y  gaining the Coaaittee's agreement to approve the
letter 's  'Message to the Europeans' only vhen' "certain
2
passages" had been re-drafted. Moreover,the "broad lines of 
the organisational arrangslants for the caapaign to be con­
ducted after the Congress" vere to be explained in  the closing
3
session by Sandys h iaseif.
I .C . meeting,3 .5 .4 6 . ,official minutes(IC/M /I2)CABH BEUGGB 
3* Ibid *eCting»5- 6.5.46..o ffidal minutes(IC /K /I3 )
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Despite these tactical moves by Sandys la the actual 
organisational framework ef the Congress,it was sorely only 
reasonable that be, as the executive chairman of the Congress 
and of the international aevem st which had made it possible, 
should have at least a vert! ever the orientation of the campaign 
to follow. He woold.ia any case,be H a lte d  te ’ incorporate the 
Tiers" expressed at the final Executive Coosnittee meeting.* 
Sandys,more than any ether person involved, bore the brant of 
responsibility for the «access or failure of the Congress. It  
would therefore have been naive to expect him to release the reins 
of power,after nearly a year of hard preparation,to federalist 
spokesmen such as de Eoageeont.rhose views neither expressed 
the feelings of the overwhelming majority in the preparatory 
co— ittee,nor the bulk of opinion among the delegates to the 
Congress in  question. On the other hand,the BJT vas alse clearly 
an important international organisation involved in the project, 
even i f  most of its adherents were relatively unknown* Its i i e t a  
and leaders certainly had a right to make their opinions known,
bat not to monopolise or take over the Congress as some vould
2
have wished. When this fact finally  dawned upon some of the mere 
radical federalists towards the end of the Congress,they tried 
to wreck the whole entreprise,while Spinelll would later claim 
that the organisers prerented the« froa being heard3. That there 
was some manipulation during the course of the debates at 
The Hague is  not in  doubt. This manipulation,as we shall se e , 
was n et,ia  fact,wholly activated by Sandys(despite appearasms), 
bat by rather more sceptical Conservative members of the
British unionist earn». I f ,  however, there was one major reason why
* /
1» Official minutes (lC/fa/l3 op. cit.
2. Paul-Henri Spaak.in this sense,would note two years later that 
the "decisive" merit of the Hague Congress,in contrast to pre­
vious federalist gatherings, was the fact that it  re-united 
famous political personalities "of the first order" rather 
than unknown "idealists" of earlier times. See OKQAKIZZAZIONB 
lirrawpiOim ,g.speech on " Buropean P a l y  « .5 .5 0 . P .H . SPAAI
3 . SPIKELM . ' S tori a e Prespettive del HTjft.o p .c it« pp .163-4.
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./.t h e  federal Baropean point of T ie* was not dominant at The
Hague,it was,above all,because of the doctrinal and irresponsive 
divisions which existed betveen the various federalist groups 
themselves at the Congress. The utter lack of solid preparation 
vithin the WOT led te squabbles and misunderstandings betveen 
its various integral- federalist,pessibiliste,and fusienist wiaps, 
«fell* its MFB members,for the most part,sulked in the backgrood 
On a broader scale,parliamentary political personalities,such 
as Meek ay and Bonnefous, found themselves at edds over the ques­
tion of the Baropean Assembly,whereas Keynaud appears to have 
been misunderstood by his own partner,Bonnefous,on the very 
sane questionI To tep all this confusion,the veteran BPU Secre­
tary General .Coudenhovo-Zaiergl, would create panic and apprehen­
sion throughout the whole debating chamber by talking about the 
“revolutionary" changes the project would bring about. Yet all 
these parliamentary personalities vere fundamentally in  agree­
ment vith eachother about the steps to be initiated for tbe
eventual creation of a Buropean political federation. Had they de­
voted a little  time to seeking a joint presentation and position 
the Congress would have been spared some of the long and hostile 
intra-federalist battles*though it  is  doubtful whether the V O  
members could havo reached «nr compromise vith the integrai- 
foderalists in the HJ7,since the form e1 were working toward 
fusion .while the latter were working toward diffusion ,of poli­
tical power in *erop«.
In  th is  connaction,before going on "to ieseslb« the political 
Debate at the Hague Congress,it is  first necessary to appreciate 
the slight change of attitude and strategy which H*ckayt*s a 
central figure in  the debate,adopted in  the immediate course 
of events which preceded the opening of the Congress.
X. The earlier chapter dealing with the joint-parliamentary 
initiative  for a Baropean Constituent Assem bly,Cf.pp. 135-43, 
described these renown points between Mackay and Bonnefous, 
as well as their lock of a common understanding before the 
actual convening of the Hague Congress.
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It should be recalled that la the first o ffld &l British 
Draft Political Eeport,presented on March 6 to the International 
Executive Co«ittee,Mackay had called for the creation ef a Bur»- 
pean Constituent Assembly , to be composed of parliamentary dele­
gated representatives and to be convened "within six months".* 
This sigpwtlen t u  confronted with the General Secretariat's
■ore noderate proposal for the convening of a Baropean Delibera- 
2
tive Assembly. In the subsequent Bouse of Com obs notion of 
March I8,Mackay unsuccessfully requested an official debate on 
his prep*sal,backed by about I2C * s, far a Bar opean Cons ti tu eat
3
Assembly to be convened "as soon as practicable” . In the subse­
quent Foreign Affairs debate,on Hay 5,Madcay again drew attention 
to his motion,now backed by 190 MP1s,but deliberately «»Aerated 
the tone of his approach by describing the type ef Assembly in 
question as "a constituent assembly of some kind” which,he vent 
on to reassure more sceptical members,was "not to settle a fora 
of constitution like that which the Americans or Kussians have, 
but so that an opportunity can be given to people to discuss the 
for« of political organisation to be devised in the future for 
the proper working of the Federation of Europe and the United 
States of Europe’ .*  In other words,his proposal was no longer 
that of creating a European Constituent Assembly in the full 
direct-ptíütical sense, but rather an Assembly perilously similar 
to the European Deliberative Assembly called for in the final 
Political Report submitted to the Hague Congress,which would 
have a aach vaguer political-constitutional competence? This 
ouch was indicated in Mackay's speech of May 5 ,wh«o he 
stressed that this "European Assembly"(excluding the term Const Jr 
tuent)would be composed of HP's from Europe who could "sit to­
gether for two or three months to work out a method or way in 
which there might be some kind of union between the European 
Powers."6 He then added,in terms similar to the thoughts./.
t . C f.p .I20  2. C f.p .I20 3 .C f.p .I3 I 4 . HAKSARP 5 .5 .48 .
5. Cf. pp. 145,pin* I£?. 6. ihid p.1282-3
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./.expressed  in the Political Report, that ’ there vould be nothing
blading” la the work to be done by this Buropeaa Assenbly,’ it
would here to cone back to the Parli— nts for ratification.
"I*  not",he  la tara concluded,"the tl>e arriving for something
like that to be done? " 1
Thus,despite the fact that Hack;ay vas still doggedly
pressing the Oarer-ament "to transfer the sovereignty of this
country to another authority.. . tx> face the problems of union
2
which «eans merging lato a vider sovereignty" rhe had toned 
dovn his previous direct oonstirational strategy to a conside­
rable extent,relying upon a much looser and more ambiguous 
political phraseology la order indirectly to adieee ttae seme ends. 
Though his position vas s t ill ,la  the final event,a juridical 
one,he had learned quite enaq£from the March 16 episode,plus 
the subsequent direct opposition of the Labour establishment to 
political Federation plans,to realise that the softer and more 
slippery approach adopted by the Sandys-Retinger axis had some 
merit to I t . This shift of emphasis in  Madcay's strategy vas 
la tara of crucial significance ia  the context of the Political 
l>ebate at the Hague Congress. Indeed,at the International Exe­
cutive Committee meeting at The Hague oa May 3,Mackay,?lus 
Brugmans and André Noel vere given responsibility for drafting 
the Political Resolution which,upon the approval of the Inter­
national Committee,vould be presented to the Congress for 
»
debate. This draft Resolution v as,of coarse,meant to be based 
upon the proposals listed in the Political Report,-about which 
there had been so mueh discussion. - Nevertheless,it vas also 
obvious that to draw up a crisp and succinct format for t h e ./.
1 . MACIAY.HANSARD op cit p . 128* C f. also pp .IW - *0
2 . Ib id  p .1283.
In  the course of the same debate,Mackay received valuable 
support from A . Salter H .P .,who called for a "new conception 
of sovereignty” and to "pool some degree of authority*,vfaile 
Boothby also added that "the supreme object of oar policy 
(v a s ) ..the creation of a United States of Vestcra Europe"r 
based upon "a series of organic acts of onion". HAKSARD
3 . Official of — etlng(IC /M /I2 )op. d t .
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./.a c tu a l twa-day debate of the Political Conadttee vas a aost 
iapartant responsibility,and one for which Sandy* aost bare 
had «officiant confidence In  Mackay,as veil as Brugaans for 
that Matter,to carry oat according to the veil-defined guide­
lines airaady arrived at. This confidence vas well-placed, 
and in  the final draft Resolution submitted to the Political 
CoMalttee the key clause referred only to •  "Baropean Delibera­
tive Assembly*.while la  his actoal presentation of the Keselu- 
tion,Haekay,vho along with Coortln vas designated Rapporteur 
to the Ceaalttee,stressed the need "to avoid getting into such 
phrases as 'constituent assem blies'"»preferring instead to 
refer siaply to "an Assm bly that can do something. " 1  The point 
to stress at th£s stage,in  any case ,is  that, by the tiae the 
Bagne Congress vas actually held,Mackay’ s approach to the 
probleu of convening a Baropean Constituent Assembly had consi­
derably chaaged,though unfortunately neither Bonnefeos nor 
Keynand had been sufficiently vam ed about this i n  guise.
The draft Keports and Resolutions had now been prepared. 
Bearly 000 iaportant Baropean personalities ware due to arrive 
at The Hague,where the crovds vere busy anticipating above all 
the arrival of their var-tiae hero Vinston Churchill.The world 
press corps and mass-madia vas already present. The aembetr- 
aoveneats of the organising coanittee vere nervous and agitated. 
Leading Socialist politicians vere either sulkingly looking 
froa afar,or actually draving upon their sometimes frail re­
sources to show up,courageously, despite Labour vrath and Party 
apprehension. - Zn short,the scene vas nsv set for the aost 
exciting and surely aost extraordinary post-war Biropean Oon- 
greaerTet there remained one outstanding problem(vhich Indeed 
vas only finally  settled on the eve of the Congress itse lf: 
the question about which flag to usel . . .
I .  The draft Resolution and the presentation of views on the 
question of the European Assembly w ill be analised in the 
next chapter.
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At the International CcnrdUe« ■oeting of fterd". 5,it vUl be recalled,
Sandy» bad proudly presented his own design for the Congress - ft
broad red ' for Borope. However,once the EPU had officially
decided to sponsor the Congress,in April,Coudenhove~Iaiergi at
once became very agitated abont this artistic creation by his
r ir a i , and actually pleaded with Churchill to change the proposed
flag,arguing that ' E' would be seen as representing * &igland’ :
" I  am sure that you w ill understand my feelings: f er m  
this is as if  someone would suggest to you to replace 
the Onion Jack with the letter ' B*!*
Defw ding his ewn Pan-Bnropa flag,he continued to argues
"As a matter of fact,the red Cress has been Borope's 
flag for nine centuries,since it  has been the banner of 
the Pan European armies of the Crusaders, Its background, 
the golden sun,xepresents European civilisation enlightening 
the w orld." I
As if this lurid description was not enough.Cbdetnt vent so far
as to c lail that his flag vas actually "burning in  the hearts
of millions of Europeans as a promise of a brighter future" 1
Churchill,hover er,does not appear to hare shorn much interest in
the matter,despiteCtxdafcote* assertion that "symbols are even
more important than programmes."  ftandys remained rigid  on
the issue,explaining that his mblem vas not a European flag
but simply a symbol for the Congress,whereas Coudenhove's flag
vas teo controversial. Subbing salt into Coudenhove's wounds,he
vent on to state flatly  that the letter's  artistic design vas
in  fact "a  lousy flag - almost entirely dark blue,relieved only2
by a yellow ball vith a small red cross on it "!  The red 
thus remained the flag for the Hague Congress,and would later 
be used as a symbol of the European Movement, though the colour 
vas changed to a more sober green. - It  vas not a personal defeat 
which Qxriatprc took well,and amid the array of blowing 'B 's  at 
The Hague,and one year later at Strasbourg,there could be seen 
the more colourful individual signs of Coudenhewe'a resistance.
1 . COODEHHOVS-EALERCI,letter to Churchill 1 4 .4 .4 8 . CABf BRESGS
2. SAHDYS,letter to Mackay,CAEM BRTOGE.
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Vith this final problem oat of the way, everything vas nor 
ready for the opening of the Congress- tt least nearly etery thins 
since there would also be some aliasing incidents at the Congress 
itself caused by minor organisational slip-ups. This lighter 
side of the story apart,the Congress vas indeed a trenmidous 
success* In  the vords of Joseph Ketinger:
•K e r w  in ay long experience of public l ife  hrwe X seen 
such an imposing gathering« Important people volunteered 
to cone and spend their time working out practical proposals 
for implementing this new(European)idea. They did not know 
what the reaction of the public voold be;many of then did 
not knov what would be the reaction of their government» or 
of their respective parties« Many of them realiied  that 
because of the positions they held they vere taking on an 
enormous responsibility. They could derive no special glory 
fro« it  sine* they vere too many for anjr one of then to 
claim much credit,and they therefore had to work more or 
less anonymously."I
Ibis description by Ketinger of the d ifficulties and anonymity
facia# participants to the Hague Congress vas for the aost part
true, lot everyone vho turned up at the Xiddersaal M a c e  m  Mqrl
however,came vith the idea of shunning publicity,as ve shall
see.
I . RKTIMSBK,memoirs op.Cit.,pp. 220-221.
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B. THE CONGUESS
E ^  THE HACOE CONGRESS MAY 7 - IO.X948
I) THE OPENING PLENARY SESSION.MAY 7
"People called us Otopians and starry-eyed idealists,but 
today the first step towards E u r o p e a n  Union has been taken. 
...Burope is uniting,but unless we make sure that the Onion 
is a federal one it may not help us very much. Economic 
Onion must be accompanied by political union. We need a 
European Parliament elected by us,the peoples of Burope, 
to control the European planning so that it does not become 
a European Big Business monopoly...We must control the 
controllers.«.Our Onion must be based on a Charter of 
Homan Rights..»
We,the people,have got to show our governments this is 
the only sort of Onion ve are interested In,and ve must 
make our governments agree to create this sort of Onion - 
not a mere Alliance.. .but a real Onion with conmon citizen­
ship and a com»on government for our common affairs;an open 
Onion which the other peoples of Burope can join.■I
-This eloquent plea,delivered on radio by Miss Josephy Just a few 
days before the start of the Hague Congress,in many ways sunmed up 
the deeper longterm issues involved in this unique Biropean con­
ference. The novelty of the gathering vae not eiaply the in- 
ilu ecttd array of Boropean "Notables", as Paul Reynaud described j 
them,who actually attended the Congress,but the effective trans­
national popular appeal which the whole project was attempting to 
conjure and subsequently channel behind the growing European cam­
paign for organic political unity. Not everyone who attended the 
Congress.lt is true,felt as strongly about the longterm integration 
measures In the same way as Miss Josephy and her federalist friends, 
but there was nevertheless a broad desire among most delegates to 
push the Boropean governments a step further than the inter­
state co-operative measures taken hitherto in the unification of 
Burope. The Hague Congress was also , in a rather more dramatic 
sense,» kind of irresistible ceremony .creating new bonds between 
the Boropean peoples,and exorcising the past national spirits of 
hatred and of conflict which had led to so much sufferring and 
destruction» As befitted such a ceremony,the Initial setting e n d ./.
1» KISS JOSKPBK, text of en address on Radio Luxembourg 2 .5 .46 .
CAEM BKUQQE
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. / .  opening celebration at The Hague created the right psychological 
mood« Sa&le da Kougemont described this almost artificial 
atmoerpbere In the following war:
■Presidents and rapporteurs,we had crossed the hall in 
procession,Churchill and his wife leading the wmy up to 
the tribunal where Juliana and Prince Bernhard were already 
seated. There were flowers wverywherwand fanfares in the 
. courtyard of the palace.'It might be a wedding' whispered 
Lord Layton..*1
The Opening Plenary Session«held on the Friday afternoon of 
May 7 in the 'Kiddersaal• Palace at The Hague ^ set the 
tone for this historic "Congress of Burope” . It was,above 
| all else, a spectacle,a significant and symbolic demonstration,
1 shoving the vitality and sense of cowon purpose which the 
ideal and objective of European unity could summon among people 
whose nations only three years earlier had been torturing,mur­
dering and tearing each other apart in the most barbarous and 
hideous,nationalist inspired war in their histmry. In this 
immediate and compelling sense,the Hague Congress was certainly 
an ez«nplai7 success in terms of displaying European 
humanism and a joint endeavour to exert peaceful and fraternal 
solutions and goals upon the existing problems and future dangers 
facing Burope and the world at that time. The staging of the 
Hague Congress indeed defied the rigid national barriers and 
ethnic divisions which had so often and so recently submerged 
the Buropean continent into a calamitous blood-bath. It 
brought to the attention of public opinion the humane possi­
bilities and decisive relevance of the European Idea,setting 
the flitch and generating further the enthusiasm for the practice, 
action and official policies of the years to come. - As V.tt Ci«k 
commented in a leading article for 'The Observer't
"The meeting vas in fact not a Congress but a political 
demonstration - the most impressive and authoritative de­
monstration that has been held for years or even centuries.”
I .  DE KOUGKMOMT,"Campaign of Buropean Congresses* op. cit^p.342 
2* V.D. CLAXX,"Hopes st The »ague".'Observer' .1 6 .5.4&.
- However, he also remarked:
"..but nevertheless only a demonstration* If this meeting 
and all that may flow from it is understood to be part of 
a political campaign - an agitation,spontaneous.determined 
and purposeful - then it may well produce results - even 
great results«
But these meetings must not mistake their ovn charact*V 
or conceal the real limits of their power» The delegates 
are not elected,they have no mandate,and their deliberations 
can enlighten but not direct the peoples of Europe.
This blunt statement of the factual limits of the Hague
Congress,as veil as its crucial role and duty, illustrated
the dileaM ,feX  by many of the delegates,between the idealistic
urge to rush towards the attainment of full Boropean unity,and
the sense of realise with which the means for achieving this
goal had to be tempered. In the words of Harold MacMillan,
"The extravagances of some of the younger enthusiasts had
naturally to b* restrained by the efforts of the more experien-
2
ced and prudent members.* But such prudence did nfct suit 
everybody,the result being that the main debate mixed the 
"admirable" vith the "grotesque",though it did at least have 
the advantage of "forcing the partisans of a united Burope to 
define their position."3
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The first main speaker to do so was the Honorary Fresldent 
o f the Congress,Winstan Churchill. Mounting the rostrum,after 
the in itial welconing speeches by the Boargenastes- of The H^jue 
and by the Qwh— a of the Dutch organisation Coanittee, the f ormer 
British var-tine lead«? proceeded to make his ia m m i "Qrand 
Design" speech which,in terns of actual coMaitment and oratory, 
outshone even his Zorich speech in  favour of European unity«
It was,furthKBcn,the only major speech which Churchill 
delivered to The Hague Congress,thus deflating Labour's 
accusation about his eilfm lly dominating the vhele project.
X. Cl»ARK,ibid.
2 . H* MUICKILIAR, Tides of Fortune , op. cit..pp .X6X- 2.
3 . Western Europe Since the War. ,o p .d t .,p « 4 7 .
4 . V.CHCKCHILL,speech delivered at the Opening Plenary Session
of the Hague Congress. 7 « 5.46»-fJ fflTy *
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Kef erring Initially to tit* historical background of the 
European "Orand Design” ,dating to Henry of Nsvarr« cad his 
"greet Minister Sully", Churchill dre* attention to his ovn 
Zorich speech of 194 6 ,and vas adaaect In stressing that the 
European Idea vas above the petty party squabbles vith Thick 
Labour appeared to identify the Issue:
"This is not a movement of parties but a movement of 
peoples« There is no room for jealousies« If there la 
rivalry of partie*,let it be to see vhich one vill 
distinguish Itself most for the coimaon cause. No one 
can suppose that Borope can be united on any party or 
sectional basis,any more than any one nation can assert 
an overveening predominance. It must be all for all.
Europe can only be united by the heart-felt vish and 
vehement expression of the great majority of all the 
peoples 1b  all the parties in all the freedom-loving 
countries,ao matter where they dvell or hov they vote."
Paying tribute,in fact,to the vork done by Bevin.as veil 
as by Spaak and Bidault in this field, Churchill vent on 
to claim that the Congress,by bringing together such a rich 
and varied grouping of representatives,effectivelly consti­
tuted the "voice of Borope” - that is,of a free and tolerant 
Europe,liberated free tyranny and var-time hatreds,and rejoic- 
ful in Its vast cultural inheritance. He in turn attempted to 
give definition tb ttw Ideals vhich the aovonent should
aim fort
"The movement for European Unity,as our draft Report 
declares,must be a positive force,deriving its strength 
fr o m  our sense of common spiritual values. It is a dynamic 
expression of democratic faith based upon moral conceptions 
and inspired by a sense of mission. In the centre of our 
movement stands a charter of human rights,guarded by 
freedom and sustained by lav. It is impossible to separate 
economics and defence from general political structure. 
Mutual aid in the economic field and joint military defence 
must inevitably be accompanied step by step with a parallel 
policy of closer political unity."
He then added:
"It is said vith truth that this involves some sacrifice 
or merger of national sovereignty. I prefer to regard i t . / .
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./ .a s  the gradual assumption by all the nations concerned of
that larger sovereignty which can alone protect their diverse 
and distinctive customs and cfttrfecteristics and their 
national traditions all of which under totalitarian systems, 
whether Nasi,Fascist,or Comunist,would certainly be blotted 
out forever."
Thus,by pitching his definition of the movement's broader 
alms and conceptions so closely to the official draft Report, 
Churchill dearly  intended to remain within the centre-ground of 
opinion at The Hague,neither identifying himself with any strict 
co-operative current,nor with any piatonic visionary view of 
full-scale federalism. In adopting this middle-course,he was 
almost certainly influenced by Sandys. Hence,while accepting the 
general need for some sort of "larger sovereignty" for Baropean 
affairs,he also made it clear that in his opinion this did net 
necessarily entail any drastic sacrifice ,at one particular moment, 
of national sovereign rights and standingjrather,just as his son- 
in-law had consistently preached,it was a matter of gradual change 
and development in this direction.,In accordance with outside 
circumstances and internal consensus. The external threat of 
Soviet expansion,and the need therefore to rebuild Burope upon 
a Franco-German reconciliation,was also evident in his speech. 
Thus,repeating his Zorich message,Churchill boldly stated:
”Boro>pe requires all that Frenchmen, all that Germans and 
all that every one of us can give. I therefore welcome here 
the German delegation,whom we have invited into our midst.
Far us the German problem is to restore the economic life 
of Germany and revive the ancient fame of the German race 
without thereby exposing their neighbours and ourselves to 
any rebuilding or reassertion of their military power.
United Burope provides the only solution to this two-sided 
problem and it is also a solution which can be implemented 
without delay."
He in turn declared:
"..W e seek nothing less than all Europe. Distinguished 
exiles from Chechoslovakia,almost ail Eastern Europe nations, 
and also from Spain,are present among us. We aim at the 
eventual participation of all Baropean peoples whose society 
and way of life are not in disaccord with a charter of human 
rights and the sincere expression of free democracy.We . / .
./.welcome any country where the people own the Governments, 
and not the Soreraiaat the people."
Later in the speech,his criticism of the Soviet bloc was even
clearer:
"Why should they(the Eastern European nations)nov be 
regimented..»by variously labelled forms of totalitarian 
tyranny,all fomented by wicked men,building their own 
predominance upon the misery and subjugation, of their 
fellov human beings? Shall so many millions of humble 
homes in Europe,aye,and much of its enlightenment and 
culture,sit quaking in dread of the policeman's knock?"
(. . .)
"That is the question ve have to answer here. That is 
the question which perhaps *e have the power to ansvcar 
here. After all,Europe has only to arise and stand in her 
own majesty,faithfulness and virtue,to confront all fores 
of tyranny,ancient or modern,Nazi or Communist,vith forces 
which are unconquerable,and which if  asserted in good tiee, 
may newer be challenged again."
The rest of Churchill speech vas mainly devoted to the 
more specific requirements which the initial steps tevards 
E u r o p e a n  unity should take. I n  this,he drew attention to his 
war-time call for a Council of Europe as a necessary part of 
the future «arid organisation,and in partnership with the "vast 
Soviet Onion” on the one hand,and the "United States and her 
siste* republics in the Western Hemisphere" on the other. The 
present attitude of the Soviet Onion towards European unity, 
however,eeant that such a partnership could only be initially 
reached in the West. Of major interest in this speech 
was Churchill’s commitment to include Britain within the 
proposed Buropean project. Thus,while stressing the need to 
"move in harmony with our great partners in the Commonwealth", 
Churchill clearly stated that he envisaged "the Council of 
E u r o p e  Including Great Britain linked with her Bmpire and 
Commonwealth." In explaining the type of institutional machinery 
required in order to establish such a Soropean Council,the 
British Opposition leader urged the Conference to be valiant 
but not to overestimate its actual role and competence:
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"I  take a proud Tier of this Congress. We cannot rest
upon benevolent platitudes and generalities. Our powers
may be limited,but we know and we must affirm what ve 
mean and what ve want. On the other hand it would not 
be vise in this critical time to be drawn into laboured 
attempts to draw rigid structures of constitutions. That 
is a later stage,and it is one in vhich the leadership 
must be taken by the ruling Governments in response no 
doubt to our impulse,and in many cases to their own 
conceptions. We are here to lay the foundations upon 
which the statesmen of the Western Democracies may stand, 
and to create an atmosphere favourable to the decisions 
to which they may be led. It is not for us to wield the 
authority of Governments to confront each ether or the 
world with sharply-cut formulas or detailed arrangements. 
There are many different points of view which have to 
find their focus.*
Be In turn described where such a synthesis of views might be
reached in an official European capacity:
■The task before us at this Congress is not only to raise 
the voice of Europe as a united whole during these few 
days. We must here and now resolve that in one form or 
another a Boropean Assembly shall be constituted which 
vill enable that voice to make Itself continuously heard 
and we trust with ever-growing acceptance through all the 
free countries of this Continent."
It was clear therefere that in Churchill's view the 
Congress should not attempt to put forward precise proposals 
for a Boropean Constituent Ass«ibly,still less for an l*ediate 
demand upon governments to establish a European Federation 
according to a plan issued fro* this unofficial gathering at The 
Hague. As he perhaps rightly implied,if the project was not to 
be rejected outright,the complications and sensitive views
surrounding the issue necessitated * patient and resist*: scrategr. 
Just as Saadys had continuously advocated,a broad official and 
popular consensus was first required before proceeding towards 
a deeper form of organic union. Thus the role of the Congress 
vas first to "raise the voice of Burope" in the general sense, 
and secondly,to call for the official creation of «hat Chmrtitn 
evidently Intended to be a Deliberative Boropean Assembly,in 
order to achieve agreement at a more important level. The./.
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• / .  essential weakness and ambiguity in his presentation,however, 
vas his failure to indicate whether the Assembly in question 
was actually meant to formulate "the sharply-cnt formulas or 
detailed arrangements” which were outside of the scope of the 
Congress itself. The text of his speech instead only referred 
to the rather general role which the Assembly should have in 
upholding the case for Boropean unity,bat not necessarily any 
specific programme of action. Vas this the limit of Churchill's 
commitment? - He did iaply that a "stage" would later be 
reached when "structures of constitutions” night be drawn up, 
but this was to be within the competence of the European 
Governments,"in response no doubt” to the impulse of the Assem­
bly and Boropean campaign as a whole. The precise nature of 
this "impulse" nevertheless remained in doubt,unlike the more 
explanatory evolutionary steps proposed in the Political 
Report drawn up under Sandys' chairmanship.* Churchill's 
evasiveness on this crucial issue would be challenged by 
R.V.C. Mackay,the next day,in his presentation of the Draft 
Political Resolution.2
Tar the moment,Churchill concluded his historic 
opening speech at The Hague stressing the "high and solemn 
responsibility” which rested upon the Congress not "to cast 
away forever” the opportunity which it presented for a united 
E u ro p e . - His discourse was received with intense and sustained 
applause. The Dutch evening press reports wexw also full of 
praise for his stately address, calling it "a masterful defini­
tion of the necessity for a United Europe",or presenting it
3
under the headline "Welcome” • Vi thin the next few
days his speech received positive front-page coverage through­
out the international press as a whole,with only the Comamnist
and Labour-orientated journals seeking to diminish its contents
4
and importance.
I . Cf. pp.13?,144 -I4£. S T c f . pp. 209-1*. Het Binnenhof t
^f"TTleSfl?na^ HPYSCil,rOC* lly 7*8*48, “  Evening press reports
4 . International press collection CAEM BRDGGG.
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After a dignified interval following Churchill's opening 
speech,the Chairman of the Plenary Session and former French 
Premier,Paul Ramadier,addressed the Congress in a rather lov- 
key discourse illuminated only by his praise of Churchill's 
past actions for a united Europe and present realism about ho* 
to vork towards it through established governments and national 
institutions« This moderate and pragmatic approach vhich Ram»- 
dier supported vas rather a contrast to his previous position 
apparently in favour of a European Constituent Assembly • tie 
no* in fact publicly stated that "Europe would not be constitu­
ted by a type of coup d'Etat",nor vould it be created by "a 
sort of federalist revolution,vhich vould veaken the run i iwiml i 
vlthout strengthening the collectivity." Instead,he appealed 
for a campaign vhich vould promote the "internal evolution* of 
the official Brussels Treaty Organisation rather than launch 
» "destructive shock" against it . Only a gradual approach,he
concluded,could succeed,vhile the alternative vould offer no 
2
salvation.
In contradiction to his eminent French colleague,Couden- 
hove-Eaiergi,vho nov mounted the rostrum,openly declared in a 
rather emotional speech punctuated by a mixture of French and 
Ekiglish .that the creation of a United States of Burope "sur­
passed the mandates of our Governments", and that a Constituent 
arrangement vas the "Immediate and radical solution" to the 
European question. He then pointed to the efforts already 
takes in this field by his European Parliamentary Onion vhich, 
he claimed,"represented the peoples of Europe and not their 
Governments", and as such constituted the European "evant-garde." 
The rest of his speech dealt mainly vith the support given to 
the Buropean campaign by the United States,and he quoted parti­
cularly from a personal letter given ty the Head of the Senate 
Foreign Relations Coij ttee. Senator Pul bright, fully supporting*/-
X • Cf . p . x 33 •
2. Plenary Session Verbatim Report 7 .8 .4 6 .,
the Congress and its aims. Be then finished his address lay 
pointing out that the creation of a united Burope must be 
based upon the two "noblest foundations” of its past ,
"Greek individualism" and "Christian socialism",and perhaps 
above all on the "dignity of the human person»" Its aims should 
be to assure a permanent Boropean peace,a good standard of 
living and the freedon of Its citizens.*
Despite the visible and overriding agreement on the need 
to construct a united Burope as a living symbol of freedoa and of 
individualism,in contrast to the totalitarian regimes in the 
Eastern European bloc,the two distinct currents of thought 
vhich would characterise the debate at the Hague Congress were 
already clear. On the one side,there was the pragmatic evolu­
tionary approach to European Onion put forward by Churchill and
supported by iamadier. On the other side,Coudenhove—talergi
2
dismissed his earlier pro-governmental prudence »rejected the 
cautious advice of Borope's elder statesmen,and rode the popu­
list hobby-horse of 'Federation now!' His radical enthusiasm 
for "immediate solutions" would be even more noticable in a 
later stage of the Political Debate. Op until this moment, 
however,there had been no real federalist speaker. This was 
soon rectified by the »ext two delegates to address the 
Conference , Count Carandini,as leader of the Italian delegation 
and the only effective mouthpiece for the maxlmaiiste MFB, 
and Henry Brugmans.as head of the EOF,and proponent still 
of a rather moderate brand of integrail-fed*r4.1is*:
Carandlni,after having drawn attention to Italy's parti­
cular economic and demographic plight,lost no time in 
arguing that diplomatic or economic pacts alone vere of no 
lasting value in the European campaign. Instead,the crucial 
issue of Boropean sovereignty had to be clearly tackled.
1. COODElfHOVB-ZALQtGX, Opening Plenary Session , V.K. .7 .5 .4B . 
op. cit. pp.IX-14.
2. Cf. p .135.
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This could only be done,he said.by having a »guarantee of a 
collective and disciplined supra-national political accord" as 
an essential precondition for the setting up of a "uniform sys- 
t«n" of union. He vent on to explain that the success of an 
economic unification of Barop* depended upon "a true ant dis­
ciplined political federation of the Bnropean states.?1
The initial part of Brugmans' important opening speech, 
later published by the BOP under the title "La Question Préa- 
lable"?appeared to support fully Carandini's maxiraaiiste poli­
tical stand: "Never” ,the EU? Executive Chairman declared,"vafld 
a gathering of sovereign States save us from nationalism." The 
intergovernmental and interministerial meetings of the OEEC and 
of the Brussels Treaty powers would inevitably represent Only 
the "reasons of state” . Nothing would really be achieved until 
the "sacred dogma of national sovereignty" was overturned. The 
"immediate*and "realisable" goal of the Congress,he therefore 
urged,vas to "federate E u r o p e "  and "envisage" the setting up of 
"a Government and European Parliament.” However,Brugmans also 
clearly declared,in staunch defence of integral-federalism,that 
"European federalism is not uniquely a political order. It is 
at the same time functional.” Indeed,he went on to stress the 
accompanying need for the "organisation of things” ,for the 
setting up of coimeon "specialist bodies,autonomous and linked 
at the same time” . In other words.despite his personal inclina­
tion for acne sort of ultimate democratic-political control, Brug- 
mans felt obliged to support what he considered to be the more 
fundamental integral-federalist cause of devolving powers to 
the autonomous "living farces”. This was in contrast to Caran­
dini's call for a "uniform" and "collective" political Federa­
tion at a supra-national '"disciplined" level, prior to any 
localised devolution outside the realms of political accounta­
bility. Nevertheless.it should be stressed that Brugmans./.
1. CAKAHDIHI,Opening Plenary Session V.R. 7 .5 .4$ . op cit,pp.I4-
17. --
2. Pamphlet edited by EOT Geneva.see CBC GENEVA.
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. / •  did at laast put forward a less dogmatic and less anti-political
case for integral federalism than »as supported by his more
doctrinaire colleagues. The pressures on hiB,hovever,to
state more clearly the precedence of the so-called "living
forces"over the traditional type of political representative
institutions came to light in his "disastrous" Iinterv«ntion
later in the Political Debate. For the moment, however, he
concluded tfais first speech vith the following eloquent plea:
■Et si nous saisissons cette dernière chance,nos petits- 
fils diront de nous:
Ils se sont ressaisis en pleine misère.Ils ont su 
dominer leurs servitudes et leurs faiblesses. Ils ont 
démontré que rien ne brise l'élan des peuples libres.
Ils furent Justes,ils furent forts et pacifiques. Ils 
ont bien mérité du genre humain."2
The next speaker,Oregoire Gafencu(former Romanian Foreign 
Minister), dr ev attention to the desperate situation in 
the Eastern half of Europe,dominated by Soviet totalitarianism. 
The vord "Europe” ,he stated vith deep feeling,provoked the 
strongest and most emotional reverberation among the Easters 
European nations,who regarded the initiation of unity in the 
Western half of the continent as a "promise of peace” and even­
tually a "promise of liberation." He further added that the 
complementary economic potential of both halves of Europe made 
it indispensable to visualise an eventual re-establishment of 
links between the tvo. He also insisted that if Western 
Europe did not take a strong stand nov,Soviet aggression vould 
expand even further. The conclusion he therefore reached vas 
that a "positive and courageous” policy had to be adopted;there
3
vas no better option than that of the "federative principle."
1. Brugmans' ovn description of hi* later intervention. - 
Interview,Brugge,July 1977.
2. BXUGMhNS, Opening Plenary Session V.R. 7 .5 .48 . Op. c it .pp.17- 
21.
3. GAFEHCU,ibid. pp.21_25>
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The illustrious former and future Premier of Belgium, Paul 
▼an Zeeland,responded to Gafencu's passionate appeal for the 
unity and liberty of all Burope by proposing at the end of 
vhat t i s  otherwise a slightly dull and cautious spMch the 
following special i«solution:
At the start of the deliberations,the Congress affirms 
that its object can only be fully realised when the whole 
of Burope is united and organised. Therefore,sixteen nations 
haring up to the present decided to co-operate,they empha­
sise that their gathering does not constitute a closed 
conaunity and send fraternal greetings to all Peoples."^
The Resolution was adoptad unanimously to warn applause, 
and this first Session of the Hague Congress came to a digni­
fied end.
It was indeed a successful Opening Plenary Session,full 
of enthusiasm yet tempered by a sense of responsibility. On 
the one hand,there were*revolutionary' calls to break down 
national barriers and build a united Burope based on universal 
moral principles of freedom,democracy and social justice. On 
the other hand,there was the rather •grandfatherly' guiding 
spirit,associated with Chxcrchill,Kamadicr and van Zeeland,advi­
sing caution and restraint. The Congress was clearly united in 
its horror and abjuration of the Soviet regime in Eastern 
Barope,yet apparently confident that a West European Onion 
would somehow eventually alleviate the plight of their fellov 
Boropeans on the other side of the 'iron curtain'. The Congress, 
above all,had a certain dignity vhich appeared at times to 
be almost stage-managed. Differences of opinion could already 
be discerned,bat there was as yet no bitterness or petty squab­
bling. These differences were nevertheless highlightened by 
various press reports. 'Le Monde',for example,drew attention
to the contrast between Churchill1 * and Brugmans' position,and2
actually appealed for some "conciliation" betveen the two.
1. VAN ZEELAND,Opening Plenary Session V .R . 7 .5 .48 . Op. d t .  
pp .25-7.
2. Le Monde ,in  depth report 6.5.4ft.
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The pro-federalist journal 'Combat', however.maintained that 
the Congress,as the effective "voice of Borope’ ,had the right 
to put forward its views with "force and precisio n ."1 In the 
Preach Coommist organ, 'Humanité' (on the other hand, the-«  was 
no attempt to understand or portray the various divisions and 
issues at stake at The Hague. The Congress was instead descri­
bed as a "masquerade" and as an attempt to unify "America's
2
Western Boropean colonies" for a future war against the Bast. 
The British Labour weekly 'Tribune' merely remarked that "the
3
Congress «t Burope was a great occasion for Hr. Churchill."
The Opening Pl«iary Session of the Hague Congress had, 
without doubt,been a success. The disciplined and vell-organi- 
presentation of views would soon be shattered,however,by the 
subsequent antics and procedural chaos which ensued during 
the two—day debate which commenced the next morning,on Satur­
day Hay 8 , when the Congress split into three working committees- 
political,econom ic and cultural. This study w ill be mainly 
concerned with the work of the Political C w m ittM .
2) TH8 POLITICAL COMMITTEE DEBATE AMD EgSOLnTIDMS• MAY E-IO
The meetings of the Political Committee were held 
in  the dining room of the Hague Botanical Gardens and Zoo.
There were times when this particular location seemed to be 
a rather apt setting for the debate which followed. Indeed, 
with regard to the contrast between the previous dajr'a 
stately Inaugural cereaony and the actual amateurish scenes 
in  the first session o f the Political Debate, a press report 
from the Manchester Guardian commantedj
1 . Combat »article on the Hague Congress by federalist 
Bernard Voyenne,8 .5.46.
2 . Humanité rarticle by Pierre Courtade,S.5.48.
3 . Tribune , "What» Happening" - article "The Hague Labours"
14.5 .48.
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"The session . . . v a s ...deplorable. Several hundred 
delegates and observers gathered. . .  and sat at small tables 
as though for a smoking concert. The chairman,H. Ramadier, 
and his committee had a platform too low to give them 
command of the meeting. The speakers vere on the floor 
level and could not be seen from the back. Places had not 
been marked out,and the delegations vere split up according 
to the time the delegates arrived. There vere no tellers 
appointed and there vere no steering committees. Waiters 
clattered about vith cups of coffee,young men distributed 
packs of cigarettes,and almost half the delegates vere 
strolling about and talking during both speeches and trans­
lations. Somebody had tiptoed intc the tulips at the side 
of the platform and a vorkman sloviy mopped up the pools.
If one had seen 'Hon Eddy Oray” quietly juggling in one 
corner it would not have seemed incongruous."
Harold MacMillan,vho vas one of the key participants in the
Political Debate,gave a similar though less drastic account
of the scene:
"The conference,like all bodies of this sise,proved 
somewhat unwieldy. Three committees vere formed.. .  
presided over by suitable figures of distinction,each 
aided by its managing 'bureau1 and attended regularly by 
a solid core of devotees. Others of us wandered about, 
like students at a university,from one classroom to 
another,attracted by some notable speaker or by some 
specially keen debate."s
- Despite the interest aroused among delegates ty the Japirtant 
Economic and Cultural Comittee deliberations, it vas clear thBt 
the Political Debate attracted the chief attention of the perti- 
dpanes and observers alike,as veil as the international press. 
The original draft Political Report, it will be recalled,had been 
sumcrised dint» a more suitable draft Political Resolution, 
drawn up by M»ckay,Brugmans and Noel,and approved by the Kxe-
3
cutive Committee on the eve of the Congress. The full contents 
of this crucial text are printed belowl-
1. Hancheslf"» Qn^-i-d-i»» , article,"Congress of Burope goes 
Warily",10 .5.48.
2. H. MACMILLAN, Tides of Fortune .op. d t .  p. X6X.
3. Cf. p. 17?.
4 . Draft ReaolutionCPolitical Section) .delivered to the 
Hague Congress 8 .5 .46 . both in Fr«nch(T 28) and in teglish 







The ravages wrought by six years of cor and by the Occupsiicr., 
the dimunition of '.vorld fooC production the destruction of indus­
trial capacity, the creation of huge debts, the caintenence of 
military expenditure out of all proportion to the resources of the 
people, the shifting of econocic porer, the rancours left ty •lar 
the progressive evils of nationtlisr. and the absence, iecpite tie 
iforV of U!;0, of any effective international authority to proviii 
la« and order, constitute an unprecedented menace to the well- 
being and the security of the peoples of iurope and thrcattr. th*.; 
with ruin.
In accordance rith the principlesr'ob;ectivss »rJ-~scrar?g 
set out in the Political Report submitted ty the Interregional 
Cossr.ittee ,
The Congress.
■1. Recognises that the nations of Suropa *ra ¿r-' il* tr;:
lor.~c*r to survive os isolated ecor.os.Ic ai,d >=iiticsl ur.its
4
and are incapable of assurir«£ security i.tu scci&l prc;". vis 
to their peoples.
2. Notes with approval r a cent 3teps •.;hiei. have t«ct. :;:er.
by some European Governaents in thj direction of economic 
and political cooperation, but baliaves that ^in ti.« preeen
4
emergency the organisations creHted are inadequate to 
provide any lasting reoedy.
3. . Declares that tha time has come *./lien tho Ruropaan 
nations ciust transfer or» merge sone portion of their sovo 
roign rights so as te socuro coronen political ar-¿ econoeic 
action for the intsgretion end proper dov^lcpcer.t cf their 
connon resources»
4. Demands the convening as soon as practicable of a 
'¿uropeon Dalibirative Assembly chosor. by Ins rarlin=?r.ts c 
the participating nations, fror, aaicng thair ncebers end 
others, designad
a) to stimulate end give expression to Surc^an Pulic ouir.
b) to Pdviae u?cn icr.sdi&to practical Eoasíijs'-s dcsirr-i 
progressivjiy to bring about ths necessary cccr.cj.ic -r-r.'j 
political ureter. of Europe;
c) to examino the Juridical and constituticnel icjlissticr¿ 
arising out of tha creation of such a union or fádera^i 
s*tA their aconczic and racial csnsocusncc-;
«
d) to orcparo tho necassary tlcns .
Such An issces&ly r.ust hi.Vj full r i£:ht ox" £cc;.-f tc ill  
sourcca of inf?rr.aticn urj r.u~t be sdoqiiaUly sts.fijfi f :r  
corryins out of 2 1 1  its functions.
- 197 -
-2-
European nations democratically gov:-rn<.‘d end v;Mch ur 
take to respect a Charter of Hixian Rights.
Is convincod that in the interest of human v£.1ujs ari 
husan liberty, tl'.a Deliberative A£fCr.bly should Kski prop? 
for the establi-shrwr.t cf courts of justice rith eaaquita 
sanctions for the ir:plor3r.*2tion of this Charter.
Declares its conviction that the only ultiri.tc- solu* 
the ecor.onic and political problens of Gsr.T.3r.y is its ir.tc 
tion in.a federated* Suropo.
Considers that any faderotior of Europe should ti dc£ 
to protact the Gecurity of its constituent peoples, should 
free from outsido control, end should r.ot te iircctv-d '-¿¿i 
eny other nation. -
Declares that the Union sust hove as cr.e of its cc^.c 
the improvement of economic, political tzni rocia 1 sttri^riL 
in dependent or associ-ted territories, and should prui.rv 
tias -rhich now bind its constituent parts to othir cour.tr i 
boyoreJ the seas.
Declares that ths crcation of a United Europe- is sn 
essential elc.-r.ent i»> the creation of a unitsd v.orli.
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In view of the laborious process involved in the prepa­
ration and drafting of the Political Report, the final 
draft Political Resolution distributed to the meeting vas quite 
short and at times rather vague,perhaps even a slight anti-clteac 
Ho the vhole affair« The most sensitive points vere nevertheless 
ineluded either in written word or in between the lines. Clouse X, 
for example,vas clearly a reference to the Soviet threat. Simi­
larly, the"German problem*,and the necessity to allow the full 
re ■ emergence of that country within a Buropeaa as veil as a 
national setting,vas advocated In clause 7, as vere the 
important safeguards vith regard to overseas territories 
in clause 9. The free and democratic nature of a European 
Union vas clearly stipulated in clauses 5 and 6 ,stressing- the 
need for a Burop«an Court and Charter of Human Rights. In the 
same vein , the Preamble«plus clauses 8 and 10 ,emphasised the 
peace-loving nature of the projected Union. without doubt, 
however,the most interesting proposals vith regard to the precise 
political-institutional framework of the proposed Vnion vere put 
forvard in clauses 2 ,3 ,and 4 . Host of the debating time in the 
Committee would be taken up by these draft proposals. - Clause 2 
varmly applauded the recent inter-governmental initiatives 
towards European unity vhich the setting up of the Brussels 
Treaty Organisation and OEBC represented,but vas equally firm 
in stressing that the cooperative rapport set up vas wholly 
insufficient. Clause 3, in turn,appealed for effective Boropean 
supra-national links,proposing not only a transfer but indeed  ^
a merger of some portion of national sovereignty. This term,to 
•merge* sane sovereign right* vas asst important, and vas almost 
certainly inserted by Mackay, for it implied a permanently 
binding fusion of sovereignty rather than the less federal- 
orientated taro used in the original Political Repart,which 
referred "more accurately* to the ■joint exercise of certain 
sovereign powers*.1 It vas a clause . / .
X. Cf* pp. IJ3-40*
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./.which would soon stir up considerable controversy and ill- 
feeling in the debating session. Similarly,clause 4 would in 
turn monopolise the attention of all those involved in the 
Congress,and was certainly the most publicised debating point 
taken up by the press and later by the European Movement itsftf. 
The first phrase in the clause distinctly called for the quick 
setting up of a "European Deliberative Assembly*. Yet the 
subsecuent four sub-clauses implied a whole range of duties 
for the Assembly far out-stretching the original qualification 
gives. Indeed,only sub-clause (a) referred to the deliberative 
role of the Assembly;sub-clause (b) implied that it should 
have some sort of consultative role;sub-clause (c) actually 
aspired to some sort of pre-Constituent Assembly and,in combi­
nation with sub-clause (d).effectively meant a real Constituent 
AssemblyI Clearly,despite the perhaps moderate call for a mere 
Deliberative Assembly,there was plenty of scope within clause 4 
to discuss a whole variety of choices. But this was probably 
not the intention of the drafters either of the original Politi­
cal Report, or of the draft Resolution. Itre HkeOfcthey preferred 
a relatively neutral title for the proposed Assembly so as not 
to sound over-radical in their demands. At the same time, 
they did not want to restrict rigidly the scope or potential 
role of the proposed Assembly - at least not at this stage, 
hence the need for ambiguity. This point would come across in 
the subsequent presentation of the draft Political Resolution 
by the two rapporteurs to the Committee - Courtin,and more 
specially, Made ey.
After Paul Ramadier,as chairman of the Political Committee 
formally opened the session,Ren£ Courtln was the first to ^>«ak: 
Stressing the representative character of the Political Report 
and equally the heavy responsibility which Sandys had assumed 
in the presentation of the final synthesis,Courtin strongly 
appealed to the delegates to retain a sense of reality. The 
European Idea,he bluntly stated,hat) not yet acquired a m s s . / .
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following;still less had it penetrated the traditional institu­
tions of national power and of established interests. He there­
fore warned the meeting not to alienate public and Governmental 
opinion by rushing the cause which the Congress represented.
"Ve know perfectly*, he admitted in regard to the draft political 
text,?that,as a consequence,it lacks vigour and bite,that its 
points have been softened and it is up to you to see if you want 
to re-intensify it. Ve were determined to establish a minimum 
text.it is for you to see if you can go further along the way to 
the realisation of Burope." That much said,he drew attention to 
the open character of the Boropean Union sought,in which both 
Germany and eventually Eastern Europe should be included . In 
turn,he stated the emotion he felt as a former representative 
of the Resistance in holding such a Congress. He subsequently 
expressed the organising coannittee's approval of the recent 
inter-governmental measures taken to unite Burope,but reminded 
the audience of the "catastrophic" failure of the co-operational 
pre-veer League of Nations and the actual "paralysis" of the 
United Nations. Thus,despite his continued call for prudence in 
the Boropean campaign,he did stress that there vas one "revolu­
tionary* point which they shoOd not fear in making:the need to 
rise above national sovereignty. In the same light,he pointed 
to the proposal far a Boropean Court capable of protecting indi­
viduals from totalitarian Governments. He then vent on to ex­
plain the need to set up a Council of Europe which would be 
less vague in character i-h»» th* actual OSEC or Brussels Treaty 
committees and in which,he proposed,» "ad hoc Minister of 
Boropean Affairs" fro« each participating country should parti­
cipate. (It should be noticed at this stage that the actual draft 
Political Resolution made no precise mention of the proposed 
Council,presumably because it vas accepted throughout the Poli­
tical Report as a body inter-linked to the more exciting Euro­
pe*" Assembly ,which was the main foc®l point of the debate).
Plnaiy, Courtin raised the crucial question of the proposed./. ^
. / .  Burcrpean Assembly:
Without doubt,he said,from among all the various proposals, 
it vas the European Deliberative Assembly idea vhich vas held 
"particularly close to heart" and vhich vas a "very great 
novelty"."This Assembly",he vent on to declare,"should v«ry 
rapidly become the conscience and mind of Borope before then 
becoming Its animator and organiser." Hovever,stressing again 
the potential opposition of Governments and Parliaments,he 
urged the M e t in g  to adopt a gradual strategy, favouring, 
first«the establisj»«t of a "Consultative Assembly" vhose 
members vould be selected essentially by national Parliaments, 
and secondly,the replacement of this body, "m lthin the shortest 
delay",by a European "Deliberative Assembly" directly
"elected by universal suffrage",vhich vould thus become the 
"mouth-piece" of the European people in general. This latter 
Assembly,he yet again emphasised,vould not at first have any 
formal legislative pavers,though he vas apparently confident 
that it vetad gradually gain such povers through the growing 
recognition of its sovereign role.*
It vas certainly a skilful and stimulating presentation 
to the debate. Unfortunately hovever,Courtln did not really 
explain hov,throughout this gradual process towards an effec­
tive Boropean Parliament,the more cynical or negative Govern­
ments vould be persuaded not to take protective measures ty *«* 
an encroachment upen their formal powers. Presumably Courtln 
vas confident that a controlled and realistic evolution in 
the Boropean Assembly towards political maturity and accouKtztike 
respectability vould be sufficient to alleviate the main doubts 
and criticisms of national Governments and Parliaments alike* 
This vas a notion vhich had all the hallmarks of Sandys' 
perception of the campaign,and vas not to the liking of the 
more juridically-inalined supporters of full federation in 
attendance at the Congress.
X. K. COUKTXH,opening presentation,Political Commit*»« v.i.
8- 9.5.46.tFp. 2—6 CABM BE0GG£.
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&.V .G . Hackay, speaking as the second rapporteur to the 
Political Committee,vas considerably «ore forthright 
and vigorous la his reasoning. Baropean Anion,he argued,could 
not simply be achieved by the co-operation and good-will of 
Governments. This vas the "illusion" which daring the inter­
war period had wrecked the Briand Plan and rained the League 
of Nations. Vhat was needed at the outset instead was the 
clear conception that a united Burope was effectively about 
real "power" and about "Government". By looking back and by 
drawing lessons froe the past,the Congress should not be afraid 
in its conviction that it was actually trying to "interfere" 
with the states of Burope. He therefore went on to declare,in 
apparent contrast to Courtin's earlier cautiousness:
"..th is  congress is going to succeed or fail according 
to whether the resolution we are passing is going to have 
teeth in it ,is  going to be a strong resolution and is 
going to really produce something different to the con- 
aqrtfcms of Buropean organisations than have been produced 
before."
Kef erring in turn to Churchill's statement the previous 
¿Lay,and the letter's apparent preference far a united Burope 
which did not imply a "sacrifice of national sovereignty* 
but rather a "gradual assumption of a larger sovereignty",
Hackay went on to challenge the Conservative Party leader, 
pointing to -the deeper issues at stake behind these words:
" . . I don't think it greatly matters whether you talk 
of a surrender of sovereignty,of a merger of sovereignty, 
or an enlargement of sovereignty so long as it is quite 
clear at all times that the individual states of Burope 
are giving up some of their rights to exercise powers 
which they cannot exercise without Interfering with the 
other states of Western Burope."
He then emphatically announced:
"H. ie President,! think that this is really the «ost 
fundamental issue we must face today. Zt may be a natter 
finally of dra/ting,but the point we have got to decide 
is that If  we aean to unite Burope,if we mean that there 
is to b* a Oovei m «nt of Bux'ope of son« kind, if there is 
to be I  political authority which can exercise power ever 
problets which «re common to ail the Buropean states,• / •
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./.then that must involve of necessity that giving up of the 
exercise of those povers by the individual parliaments of 
the existing European states."
Many advocates of European unity plans,Mackay vent on to say
in a guarded svipe at Churchill and some of the «ore sceptical
"unionists" in his entourage,"used the phrase vithout conveying
any of the ideas". There vas too much "loose language” about
European Federation,some of vhich "may mean nothing". It vas
therefore necessary,in Mackay1s view,to form concrete projects:
" . . i f  the Union of Burope is to mean anything,it must mean 
a political organisation vhich has pover;vhich has power in 
respective matters such as external affairs,defence,currency, 
probably customs and the planning of trade and the develop­
ment of production vi-thias the trading area. It must have 
specific powers of that kind vhich it can exercise itself 
and vhich cannot be exercised in conflict vith i t ."
There could be bo doubt to Mackay's resolute supra­
national viev and fusionist interpretation of the united Burope 
to vork for. Hovever,he vas also careful to mention that fats 
ovn Government regarded it  as an "ideal" vhich might be diffi­
cult to construct in practice. As a result,Mackay’ s conception 
of the proposed European Assembly vas a mixture of juridical 
boldness and cautious ambiguity: On the one hand he stressed:
• ..v e  must have at the earliest possible mom«»t,or the 
earliest practicable moment,an Assembly of people chosen 
by the different Parliaments of the different States of 
Burope to vcrrk out the full,the nev political organisation 
of Burope.”
Be th«i added however;
”X am trying to avoid getting into such phrases as 'consti­
tuent Assemblies'; that seems to be a vaste of time. What 
ve vant is an Assembly that can do something, and therefore 
let us just call it an Assenbly."
Nevertheless,it vas clear fron the rest of his speech that
Mackay intended that the Assembly in question should have
some direct official role in drafting constitutional plans for
the unification of Burope. He thus stressed that the Congress
must be "determined to get an Assembly,constituent,or otherwise
an Assembly for the specific purpose of filling in the details./
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./ . ,o f  working out the plans,of facing the problems.." The 
campaign launched at The Hague,he therefore concluded,had 
to concentrate on getting Governmental approval for the con­
vening of such an Assembly.(The remaining part of his speech  ^
concentrated on the German problem,Britain's inclusion within ' 
Bar ope, plus her overseas ties).1
The Political Debate was launched,but within minutes 
it vas marred by din and confusion about the wording and 
translation of the draft Resolution,as well as by difficulties 
over voting arrangements in this rather fluid and noisy gaths'iig. 
There followed some comical inovations in procedure,with mem­
bers being asked to indicate their voting preferences by 
either standing or sitting. Finally,irritated by this sudden 
babbling lapse of the meeting.and by Kaaadier's hesitant and 
ineffective chairmanship, Mackay interrupted to suggest that 
a steering committee be constituted so as to arrange in order 
the list of amendments and speakers. The proposal was accepted 
and,while the steering consul ttee got to work,a stream of gene­
ral speeches were made by leading delegates.
Paul Keynaud,the former French Premier,chose this moaent 
to mount the rostrum and take the Congress by surprise in 
advocating a much more exciting plan as regards the proposed 
Assembly than had been heard until now. Expressing his support 
of clause 2 in the draft Resolution,that the existing inter­
governmental Boropean institutions were "inadequate in meeting 
the emergencies of the time, he clearly looked to a Axttre Euro­
pean Assembly as the only fundamental remedy,and noted the 
historic importance of the Hague Congress in this respect. 
However,he then waraed against "deceptions" as regards the 
creation of such an Assembly along the lines indicated in 
clause 4 of the draft text. A European Assembly nominated by 
national Parilaments,he argued,meant that its members would./.
X. R.V.G. MACIAY,opening presentation,Political Committee VI.
8- 9.5 .48.,pp.6-11. CASH BRUGGE.
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•/■ be qualified and conditioned by a "purely and exclusively 
national mandate." The result would not really be a Euro­
pean Assmbly, but rath«r a "club of national MPs." The popular 
impact of such an arrangement would be nil. While this elite, 
national-appointed European clique would effectively enjoy the 
fruits of political tourism,the national Minister» would simply 
continue to dominate European affairs and defend only their can 
national Interests. i U  this,he claimed,would be a loss of 
precious time and,as far as fceynaud was concerned,Burope was 
already living on borrowed time.-The danger of war.The mounting 
tension in security and the arms race. % e  pressing and urgent 
economic problems confronting the European nations as a whole* 
The insufficiency of American aid in overcoming the dollar 
defecit in the Western Buropean balance of payments,plus the 
fact that this aid would not last for ever and was partially 
dependmt on an American market surplus,and above all,on the 
annual approval of funds by the U.S. Congress vhich had granted 
the existing sun on the understanding that effective Buropean 
integration measures would follow.- All this,in Keynaud's 
opinion,rendered the problem of organic European unity and re­
construction absolutely imperative. The best way to proceed,he 
' therefore advocated,vas by creating a truly European Assembly 
vhich would be capable of capturing popular opinion and stirring 
public support for Buropean Union at an effective supra-national 
level and thereby * circumvent petty national interests, 
and overcame general national egoism by appealing to a n«v Euro­
pean sovereign source as opposed to the divisions of national 
mandates. In short,the famous ex-Prender of Prance proposed the 
'i creation of a Buropean Assembly vhich would be directly elected 
by universal suffrage. - In his own words,mritten after the trett
"At the Hague Congress I pointed out how difficult it 
would be to make the interest of Burope prevail over the 
self-interests of each nation,and declared that the omly 
chance of success vas to shock public opinion in all coun­
tries. I  said that ve must therefore appeal to the peoples./.
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. /  . through the democratic mechanism of elections. I proposed 
that the Assembly should be elected by universal suffrage, 
with one deputy for each million inhabitants voting not 
as Englishmen,Frenchmen or Italians but as Europeans.” *
It should be stressed,hovever,that contrary to what his joint- 
sponsor la this project, Edouard Bonnefous, has later vritten on 
the famous episode,Keynaud categorically stated at The Hague 
that he was not proposing to create ’ straight «way" an 
actual ’ European Parliament'. Indeed,he emphasised that he 
vanted to "keep an equal distance' of "dangers” both of this 
sort and of creating "powerless" European institutions. The 
actual motion which Reynaud and Bonaefous presented to the 
Political Committee,reading as an amendment to the draft Reso­
lution, infact suggested the following formula:
" I .  That there shall be established a European Consultative 
Assembly charged with formulating solutions to the 
problems of European revival and with advising on the 
best distribution of American aid;
2. that those members of the Congress who belong to par­
liaments in those countries vhich are receiving American 
aid shall bring in and support a Bill to elect the 
members of this Ass«nbly before the end of the year;
3. election being by universal suffrage and according to 
the electoral regulations in each country,on the basis 
of one representative for every million of population 
or any fraction of a million greater than half.
He concluded his address with an impassioned plea for such a
direct and clear political initiative in order to render Western
Europe a new independence and control over its own destiny.
"Magnificent speeches” ,he said,were not eneogh;the Congress
should above all come to a "firm decision." *
Seynaud's speech was in fact warmly received and loudly 
applauded by the meeting. Similarly,the international press 
was pleased not only with the news-worthy story Xeynaud had./«
1. P. EBYKAOD, "The Unifying Force for Burope*, FOKKIGH AFFAIRS 
Vol. 28,January 1950,pp.255-864.
2. Bonnefous, »1stjfcmnly recorded that Jie and Eernaud dfmanded-tte 
"immediate convocation o f. *
3.
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• /»so famocertly provided,but also by the excellent and lively
performance vith vhich he had delivered his "bomb-shell■.
As the ' Manchester Guardian’ commented,
"He is no» »ell over seventy,but is still the trim 
lively little mm that he vas eight years ago when it 
looked as though he would rally France."
There was indeed little doubt that the former French
f. Prime Minister had in effect "stolen the show" *  The Hague.
A leading article In 'Le Figaro' in fact stressed that,amid
considerable confusion and timidity,Reynaud’ s proposal vas
2
the "only concrete proposition of the day."
Nevertheless,his efforts to rally Europe on a popular 
radical note were not met with unanimous approval. Harold 
MacMillan,for example,vas the first to stress the slightly 
"ungenerous" mood vhich seaned to prevail vts-fc-vis the actual 
inter—govein»« t a l  European machinery set up so far,adding 
that he broadly supported the draft Resolution as It stood.
He therefore appealed to the meeting to retain a sense of 
enthusiasm but also of responsibility. "let us not shrink 
back",he declared,but "let us not be led into making proposals 
that are not practical." Scandinavian delegates Eristensen 
and Saitt Ingebretsen also stressed their reluctance to move 
too quickly,the latter pointing out that the Congress.however 
important it may have been,had "a remarkable lack of authority 
and that it should be “cautious not to spoil the possibilities 
to transfer the(European)ideal into political realities." 
Duncan Sandys,for his part,vainly attempted to intervene and 
direct the attention of the Congress to the less divisive 
policy topic regarding the situation In Eastern Europe.
Reynaud1s timely contribution to the debate had,however,lit
3
a fuse vhich would not burn out so easily.
Yet It should be emphasised again that the former French 
Premier,at this stage of the proceedings,vas far from • / .
1. Manchester Ouardian article 10 .5 .48. Op.cit.
2. Le Figaro .article by H.Chatelain 9-10.5.48.
3. KkCkaLLAH; ERISTfWSEH, 11«EBRETSEN, SAHDYS V.R. O^.cj-t.^
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./.advocating an unpopular cause. Despite grumbles and diversions 
fron the "unionist" benches,plus some opposition fro« among 
the integral-federalists vhich vould cone to light later on 
in the debate,Eeynaud indeed appears to have te»porily caufht 
the idealistic mood of the meeting. As the'Manchester QuBR&arf 
again commented,in vie* of MacMillan's bid for a more rmirtrws 
approach - "This did not seen to make much impression on an 
audience of this character.”* Moreover,it should also be noted 
that the official draft Political Report presented to the 
Congress had alluded to an eventual elected Boropean Parliaaa^, 
vhile Kent C<rartin,as an official rapporteur to the Political 
Conwittee,had actually suggested that a directly elected 
^iropean Deliberative Assembly should be constituted "within 
the shortest delay" after the initial creation of his proposed 
indirectly selected Consultative Assembly? Mackay.for his 
part,had not been over-concerned with the representative 
quality of the Assembly,so long as it retained some official 
formulating pavers. Keynaud's proposal was not so much out 
of context as out of step with these previous suggestions.
He vas not demanding a directly elected Buropean Constituent
4
Assembly,as Bonnefous vould later carelessly seem to indicate, 
still less an iimediate directly elected Buropean Parliament. 
Instead,he vas simply advocating that the type of advisory 
Buropean Assembly which the Congress was apparently- contem­
plating - be this a Deliberative or Consultative Assembly - 
should be directly representative in a Boropean sense rather 
than in an indirect national-mandated sense. It was certainly 
an exciting project,hut hardly one which would throv official 
decision making bodies and institutions into real turmoil.
In the context of the time,it was perhaps an unrealistic first 
step in the direction of full Buropean Union, but not onetdch 
was really revolutionary or necessarily impractical. Keynaud* 
motion indeed was essentially radical only in the way it . / .
1. Manchester Guardian .article 10 .5 .48 . Op. cit.
2 . Cf. pp .IS?,14*. 37 Cf. p .202. 4 .C f. p. 220-1.
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./.attempted to arouse a popular European frame of mind almost 
at a stroke. It was a psychological "shock" which Reynaud 
vanted to administer,but tovrds public opinion and not as yet 
with regard to the real official decision-making framework 
throughout Western Burope. Transformation in this area would, 
he conceded, only becoeie possible once that the popular 
mood had Itself adapted to a supra-national way of thinking.
His mistake »however, was sorely in the idea that 
direct elections by universal suffrage would somehow submerge 
national mandates and national egoisms. The reverse situation 
vas rather more likely,at least during the initial stage of 
change,and especially in view of the fact that there was bo 
effective trans-national Party organisation at that time 
which could appeal abeve national interests. This notwith­
standing, Keynaud's appeal was hardly a comenceraent to any 
drastic convulsions in the European political economy.
Coudenhove-Ialergi's sudden conversion to a direct 
strategy,and the strong support which he now promptly gave to 
Reynaud's notion was,however, the equivalent of giving it 
the kiss of death. Blatantly unperturbed by any outside poli­
tical-governmental feeling,the E.P.U. Secretary General chose 
this moment to upstage the actual contents of Reynaud's pro­
posal,and delivered his own fatal address.on the subject. 
Describing the proposed amendment,repeatedly, as being "revo­
lutionary" and the formulation needed for all those delegates 
who favoured an "Immediate solution to the European question", 
Ooudfflhove indeed unwittingly stamped the motion with a much 
more radical and unrealistic lable than it actually comprised. 
The type of Assembly proposed,h* proclaimed,would,despite its 
nominative Deliberative or Consultative title,actually coaatA- 
tute the "biggest authority vhich would exist in Burope and 
no Government would dare oppose i t ."  *
I .  COUDE^HOVE-LAAKRGI,V.R. Op. cit. pp .27-8.
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- It vas precisely the type of support vhich Reynaud least 
needed,though unfortunately even his ovn joint-sponsor,Edouard 
Bormefous,vould also qualify the original notion in a similar 
revolutionary light. For the mo*ent,however,this inte­
resting interlude to the official course of the debate vas 
brought to an end by Ramadler .vhe.in resuming the chair,read 
out the ordered list of amen aments, which had by nov been compiled 
by the steering commit*®« and vere ready for examination.
The sub-cowittee at first appeared to have done its vork 
veil,and the various amendments to clauses I and 2 of the draft 
Resolution,dealing vith the general need for a Buropean approach 
to actual problems and the first steps taken in this direction 
by Governments,vere stream]Iwed,made to sound a little less 
dramatic and vere passed vithoat difficulty* Hovever.vhen it 
came to clause 3 and the crucial reference it had originally 
made t» ’ transfer and merge" sovereign rights vithin Europe,the 
steering committee.under Hasnlnaham Bailer's sceptical "unionist" 
influence as chairmanihad managed to introduce an undeclared 
mendment of its ova,cutting out the reference to "merge” sove­
reignty, and thus leaving the more pallid phrase preferred by 
Churchill and the Conservative-"unionist” group about some 
"joint exercise" of sovereign rights. As if this already veak 
phrase vas not enough, the Dutch delegate,k .Tendeloo, vanted to mta<- 
mine the vhole significance of the clause by adding as a further 
oualification: "on a basis of eauality"tby vhich she meant similar 
powers between the smaller and bigger nations in the proposed 2
union,thus rendering a confederal rather than federal structure. 
MlSS Josephy, hovevccr,vas one of the few delegates both to see 
the underlying meaning of this latter amendment,as veil as the 
manipulative tactics adopted by Manningham Buller’ s personal 
amendment process. She first questioned M»im<wgh»« Buller1s 
effective cutting of the original text:
1. Manningham Buller vas a leading member of the "unionist" 
camp and a Conservative M»P.
2. M.TKKDELOO.V.R. Op. cit. pp. 29-30.
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" . .X  vant to resist both amendments that have been moved 
to this danse of the resolution. It seems to me that the 
vhole guts,if I may use a very British word,of the reso­
lution are in this clause. Either ve mean vhat »e say,or 
ve don’ t. If ve mean vhat ve say there is no use just 
talking about joint exercise of sovereignty,ve've got to 
admit that ve have to transfer and merge some of our 
sovereignty in a common authority.■ (Applause)
Anybody can talk about joint exercise and sovereignty. 
If a governmental body vants to give some powers temporarily 
to a joint organisation,they can do so. And that is a 
joint exercise of sovereignty. What ve vant,is that every 
country that joins the European Onion,or Federation as I 
prefer to call it,shall legally transfer some of the rights 
that it nov exercises by itself to a coranon democratically 
elected authority vhich shall represent both it and its 
partners in the Onion. And that is vhat this clause vants 
as it stands.Q.e in original draft formjAnd the first thing 
I'm asking you is to reject the [Manninglian Boiler)amend­
ment on the ground that it does not,- not,I  repeat,- give 
us the comon exercise of sovereignty that is only possible 
if people transfer part of their present rights to a 
common organisation.”
She then vent on to oppose Miss Tendeloo's amendment:
’ . . I  think she doesn’ t realise vhat Federation means.
If you have an elected European authority,it does not 
represent the states,it represents the peoples. How ve 
in Britain have a saying,that vhat ve vant is: one man 
one vote...Csbe put it more sinply} one bloody jean one 
bloody vote...The thing ve must have is a representation 
of people as people,and that is where you get yoir eouallty 
in your Federation. Hot through trying to give equality 
to a m ail State in relation to a large State. Xt is every 
person as a person that ve say has rights. And that is 
vhy ve vant to see this idea of federal government dependfcig 
on the peoples,and not on the States».."
In conclusion,Miss josephy therefore urged the meeting to
reject both amendments to clause 3 and leave the original
draft in tact.*
This vould not be the last time at the Hague Congress
that Miss Josephy,as a veteran leader of Federal Union,vould
make a crucial interjection in order to clarify the real
issues at stake. Her position vas essenbiOiy that of the fusioaist-
Federation school of thought vhich,stemming from pre-war
Britain,had been the original impulse to Federation plans./.
I .  JOSKPHY, V .R . Op. d t .  p . 30.
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./.taken up by the continental European Resistance,whose supra­
national thoughts had been most receptive to precise poli­
tical formulations for the merging of sovereignty at a Euro­
pean level. This,of course,had been especially the case in 
Italian resistance circles,and it cane as no surprise that 
now at The Hague Hiss Josephy's argument ran very similar 
. to the collective-juridical and political thoughts of the 
KFE wing in the UEP. Hot all federalists,however,were con­
vinced about the merits of a democratic supra-national Fede­
ration based upon a unified political conception of equal 
sovereignty, summarised in Miss Josephy's amalgamated tern: 
"one man one wot«". One of the leading French supporters of 
integral-federalism,Van Vassenhove,was the first in effect t» 
directly challenge Miss Josephy's notion of Boropean Fede­
ration. Rather than concentrate on a merging of sovereignty, 
he instead attempted to isj*ect safeguards emphasising a 
radical dismemberment of state sovereignty throughout the 
proposed Federation on an internal non-political sc ale, giving 
sovereign and administrative autonomy to the diverse "ethnic, 
cultural and linguistic" groups involved? Ramadier in turn 
only complicated matters further by attempting to link Vasom- 
hove's amendment to Tendeioo's amendment,while actually not 
appearing to realise that Hannighan Boiler had effectively 
changed the original draft clause itself! Mackay.for his 
part,did not seem to think that Vassenhove's amendment was 
even relevant to clause 3 or whether it had actually been 
vettmd by the steering committee. On a similar note,Leslie 
Hale angrily denounced Manningham Buller's apparent manipu­
lation of the draft text,while other delegates now started 
to connect clause 3 ,on sovereignty,with clauses 4 and 5, 
dealing with the proposed Assembly and European Court. By 
the time that the actual issue was thus put to a vote,nobody 
quite realised for what they were voting. On the first 
I .  VAR VASSENHOVE, V.K Op. cit. pp.31-32.
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./.th e  amendments polled 60 votes for and 60 votes against. It 
soon became apparent,however, that many delegates had voted 
in error and that some who had no right to vote had been 
counted. On a second vote,this time only for or against the 
original draft clause itself»hardly anyone vas discovered to 
be in opposition to it I There had been no continuation of the 
debate between the vote on the amendments and the vote on the 
original clause,but a great many people had somehow changed 
their minds on this crucial subject within the space of a few 
minutes. This switch,however,had also resulted from the alarm 
felt among the Conservatives in the British delegation when 
Leslie Hale and his fellow Labour MPs had threatened to go 
hone if the rather bland attonpts to frustrate and manipulate 
their efferts at finding serious proposals for real Buropean 
unity continued.
In this climactic way , the vital clause 3 of the draft 
Political Resolution remained in tact,and the Hague Congress 
was to go down as having clearly adopted the supra-national 
cause of Boropean unity. Indeed,at the final plenary session 
dealing vith the Political Resolution,the ambiguous phrase 
referring to the "exercise" of some sovereign rights in common 
vas actually dropped altogether from the text,which now cleaxty 
declared that the European nations must “transfer and merge" 
part of their sovereignty together. It was an important vic­
tory for the international federalist camp,but a paper victory 
all the same. The practical measures needed in support of 
this fine-sounding theoretical stand were to be found in the 
more pallid proposals for a European Assembly listed in clause
4 of the draft Resolution,to which the meeting now returned 
its attention. However,the clause in question was not,in 
fact,debated in this rather demanding Saturday afternoon 
sitting of the Political Connlttee. This was again due mainly 
to the attempts of ttamxingham Buller,as head of the steering 
committee,to manipulate the debate unfairly,going so far as»/*
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./ .t o  omit the Reynaud-Bonnefous amendment from the existing agenda 
on the ground that it vas impracticable!
Harassed and confused, President Ramadier agreed to these 
ridiculous technical objections,his ruling being received vith 
justifiable outbursts from Reynaud and his supporters,pounding 
on their desks in protest and shouting vehement charges of 
unfairness. In the end,the steering committee vas urged to 
think again and straighten out properly this time the list of 
amendments for the evening session. The first sitting of the 
Political Committee came to an end on this uproarious note.
The afternoon session opened in a somewhat milder 
■ore amicable atmosphere,and the Political Committee soon got 
to work on the less controversial clauses in the draft Resolution 
vhile Ramadier promised that the crucial clause 4 vould be 
discussed at length later in the evening vhen all the amendments 
vould be ready.
The meeting bsnce turned its attention to clauses 5 and 6, 
dealing reciprocally vith proposals for a European Charter of 
Human Sights and a for the establishment,upon the proposition of 
the European Deliberative Assembly,of European courts of justice. 
The first clause in question vas broadly supported,apart from 
slight grumblings by Paul Bastid that the tJ.N. vas already in 
the process of draviitg up a similar charter and that it vas 
better to support the application of this charter for the pur­
poses of Europe. J.M. Drapier however,a close colleague of Paul- 
Henri Spaak,preferred some immediate specific action and there­
fore proposed the setting up of a European Commission vhich 
could straight avay consider and prepare a draft charter 
dealing both vith Human Rights and Democracy,vhich should be 
produced vithin three months. The amendment vas accepted and 
the meeting moved on to consider clause 6.
At this point,Drapier again spoke to conplaia about 
the discrepancy between the draft French text and the ratker./•
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./.loosely phrased &iglish version. He therefore proposed an impor­
tant amendment in which it was clearly indicated that the 
Congress was actually proposing one European Court only and 
that its duty would be to uphold the rights expressly laid 
out in the proposed charter. The amendment vas passed by 31 
votes to 12. The French delegate, ftne. de Sazarmet.in turn 
stressed, in a highly emotional speech alluding to the recent 
var-time oppression, .how it should also be tacitly understood 
that every individual European citizen would have access to 
the proposed Buropean Court. Her point vas strongly supported 
and the final text subsequently emphasised this right of indi­
vidual redress before the court.
These two impertmt proposals for the establishment of a 
European Charter of Human Rights and a European Court above 
state control were indeed among the most tangible clauses in 
favour of a free and democratic supra-national Europe to be 
put forward by the Hague Congress. !loreover,in the context of 
the time,the issurfinvolved were so fundamental that both the 
Political C om it tee and the Cultural Committee felt obliged 
to take up the proposals. The stimulus given to the subsequent 
Buropean campaign by these pronouncements proved to be of andai 
significance both in demonstrating the humanitarian and demo­
cratic vision of the proposed union,as well as directly aiding 
the immediate attempts after the Hague Congress to set a 
European Consultative Assembly. The most outstanding result of 
this initiative taken at The Hague,however,vas in the official 
signing by the Ves-tera European nations at Rome,in November 
I 950,of the Baropean Convention of Human Sights,followed 
later by the constitution of a European Court. - The Hague 
Congress, at least on this point,vas a practical success.
The Political Committee,at a later stage of the proceedings, 
also commended itself to the general public in its straight­
forward recommendations stressing the independent,peaceful. / •
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./.and  open nature of the Onion envisaged,indicated by the larg&y 
unamended draft clauses 8 and 10,vhile the acceptance 
of Europe's continued ties vith the overseas territories,advo­
cated in draft clause 9 ,plus the insertion of an additional 
clause indicating a démocratisation and economic enrichment 
of these countries in question,pleased both the Qirpire and 
Comraorrvealth orientated Conservative-"unionist" delegates, as 
veil as the »ore socially-winded progressive thinkers vho 
attended the Congress. Perhaps of much more psychological 
importance,hovever,vas the «notional though stately vay 
in vhich the vast majority of the meeting addressed itself, 
at its final Sunday night session on May 9 ,to the so-called 
“German problem*.
The draft clause concerned vith this sensitive Question 
had clearly stated that the “only ultimate solution 
to the economic and political problems of Germany is its inte­
gration in a federated Europe.,I  The overwhelming mood of 
the conference vas in agreement vith this radical notion, 
and there foil loved a long rov of speeches approving it. A British 
delegate,Miss Govan,for example,spoke not only of the obvious 
economic asset vhich Germany* s re-integration held out for 
*urope,but hov tore m i d  »i*o be established a secure basis far 
future peace and réconciliation. Lionel Curtis in turn stressed 
the need to provide Germany vith nev hope and the possibility x>t 
future inclusion vithin a united European defence force. Dr» 
Braun,as a representative for the Saar,spoke of his ovn region 
as an economic m eeting-point for a new Pranco-German reconci­
liation vithin a European framework,vhile Dr. Eraner spoke of 
the German people's strong appreciation of the initiative 
taken at The Hague,in vhich for the first time since the var 
his country vas officially represented at such an important 
international gathering. He in turn appealed to the moral 
supra-national spirit vhich had guided the Buropearn Resistance 
to serve es an example for the basis upon vhich European./.
1. t f. clause 7 P-XS6 •
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./.Federation «ad Germany*s re-integration should be constructed. 
This thought vas also echoed by Sviss delegate,H.G. Eitzel.vho, 
having once been condemned to death by the Hitie- regime,no» 
pleaded that the new Germany should be given hope and a legal 
basis upon vhich to build and expand the rights and liberty of 
her people.
The draft clause in question vas thereafter put to the vote 
and accepted u n a n i m o u s l y ,accompanied by a prolonged applause and 
and evident signs of relief. A i  Ramadier pointed out,no amend­
ments had been presented. To everyone’ s delight,it had been a 
dignified,symbolic and significant act»bringing Germany back 
into the Buropean fold vlthout any recriminations or upsets. If 
indeed there vas a moment vhen The Hague Congress in effect 
exorcised the past tragedies of var,then this vas it . The frater­
nal dignity with vhich this clause 7 vas passed,hovewer,did not 
prevent a subsequent proposal by France*s leading delegate on 
German affairs,François Poncet,pointing art that a future Buropean 
Federation vas not,unfortunately,the "magic key" to the current 
industrial and political problems of that country,and that a 
special commission should be set up by the International Committee 
to analyse Germany's difficulties in relation to Burope. He vas 
supported in this by A.Hynd M.P.,British parliamentary ex­
pert on German affairs. Miss Josephy,in counter position,argued 
that it vas not up to the organising committee but the proposed 
Buropean Assembly itself to look into this matter. The tvo 
rapporteurs,Mackay and Courtin vere split on this procedural 
issue,and the atmosphere in the hall once again became highly 
charged vith numerous delegates shouting "au vote",*die Itaepierand 
Sviss delegate,M. Stellan,pleaded for a compromise by vhich a 
separate clause in the Resolution vould stress the need for a 
co-ordinated review of the German situation by the sponsoring 
movements involved. After more confusion,the compromise vas 
finally accepted and this part of the debate came to an end.
I .  For German debate see V«R. up. c it . pp. 66-84.
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The main climax to the Political Debate at The Hague 
had taken place the previous evening of May 8-9,when the crucial 
clause 4 dealing with the proposed European Assembly had finals 
been discussed and argued in full.
The debate had in fact opened on a rather inauspicious 
note when,having concluded his chairmanship of the steering 
committee,Manninghan Builer reluctantly admitted to the nervous 
meeting:
"The subcommittee has been sitting continuously for a 
considerable time on this problem of clause 4 and 1 regret 
to say that ve have not been able to reach a conclusion as 
to the manner in which the amendments should be disposed 
of in relation to this very important article." 1
Despite these evident "unionist" doubts with regard to 
the course of the debate,the meeting nevertheless went ahead 
vith its discussion of the decisive subject. It was at e 
point that the more outspoken members of the integral federalist 
camp finally intervened in force,and attempted to gain the 
momentum which the fusion!st Federation plans of Reynaud and 
Bonnefous had effectively taken from them. Thus french federa­
list, M. Lussan,started the counter-attack by supporting the 
initial notion of convening a European Deliberative Assembly, 
but not according to the restrictive parliamentary-selective 
process advocated in the draft Report and Resolution. Instead, 
he argued in favour of some partial direct iqresmtatlon in the 
proposed Assembly of the 'living forces',that is - of the 
"diverse professional trade union,cultural and social organi­
sations" , etc: "If",h e  declared,"you want an assembly which 
really represents the countries,you must incorporate the living 
forces of these countries and not simply the political parties.* 
This,he further implied,vas also the view of the EOF chairman,
Brugmans.vho best represented the movement's aspirations about2
"internal" federalist plans. It vaa not altogether the case 
howver, as vas subsequently shown in the deluge of differing •/.
1. V .R . Op. c it . p .46 i .  LtlSSAH, Ibid. pp.47-49»
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./.integral federalist demands and amendments that followed,the 
most radical of which was Claude Hytte's call for a European 
Constituent Assembly in vhich 50% of its representatives vould 
be dravn from among the "living forces*.outside the traditional 
political-parliamentary sphere. The EOF delegates,in fact,were 
disastrously divided on the issue of the European Assembly, 
this split not simply ocurring betveen the varying brands of 
integral federalism,but also betveen the integral federalists 
themselves and the Supra-national,political orientated federa­
lists among the MP8 and Federal Union. This posed grave prob­
lems not only in connection to the mainly unpopular integral 
federalist amendments, all of which vere defeated,but also vith 
regard to the crucial amendments in favour of a resolute supra­
national approach to the question of the European Assembly, 
vhich the Eeynaud-Bonnefous motion best represented,and to 
which the integral federalists vere completely opposed,due to 
the "mechanical* and fusionist conceptions of Federation implied 
in the motion.- As Jacques Preymond later wrote on this episode:
« . . .  the federalists were themselves divided. There were 
the so-called ’ international1 federalists,who.. .wanted to 
go beyond national sovereignty..,and there were the so- 
called 'integral' federalists who thought that the nev 
European structure should preserve 'the national,profes­
sional, and spiritual communities that are the infrastructure 
of national collectivities'."I 
The full effect of this division became only too apparent in 
the subsequent discussion of the Keynaud-Bonnefous amendment, 
which was now finally debated.
Boimefous' formal presentation of the amendment did not, 
in fact , demonstrate the same political skills and debating 
ambivalence of his more senior colleague in the project.
As a piece of rhetoric,it vas most certainly quite an anti­
climax to the complicated scenario vhich had preceded. Bat if 
the performance vas relatively lov-key,the implied message./.
I .  Western Europe since the War op.cit. p .47.
Freymond vas refering to a text written by Olivier Philip 
on the Hague Congress.
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. / .  let loose a vave of panic in the debatmg-faail. In short, 
like Coudenhove-Lalergi before hire, Bormefou* described the 
joint amendment vith an aura of radical transformation vhich 
it did not vholly entail. - Whereas Reynaud had actually stresafl 
that he vas not proposing any "immediate" institutional over­
haul of European political administration,Bonnefous instead 
chose to present the notion for a directly elected European 
Consultative Assembly vithin the context and light of his 
preceding- initiative in the French Parliament for a rapid 
convocation of a European Constituent Assembly. Though he vas 
not actually proposing such a measure, there can be no doubt 
by the tenor of the speeches vhich followed that this is how 
the meeting appeared to understand his repeated reference to 
a European Constitution. Indeed,the tired and confused Political 
CoimeLtte* had just gone through a colourful barrage Of radical 
integral federalist amendments alluding,for the most part,to a 
word form of Constituent Assembly; Bonnefous' proposal for a 
directly elected Assembly to boot vas siJtply more than it 
could nov tolerate!
Scenting the nev mood of the meeting,Harold MacHLllan vas 
the first to pounce upon the apparent implications at the 
amendment and,unlike his earlier assault against Reynaud,this 
time his ruthless opposition struck a heavy blov to the motion.
- As the 'Observer' contented:"This bold proposal raised the 
political temperature to a level at vhich Hr. Harold Mac Kill an 
M«P. felt impelled to pour a heavy douche of cold vater on3
the sealots." - The proposal,he declared,vas simply "too much 
and too soon*,pointing to the considerable legislative and 
administrative difficulties vhich vould have to be faced by 
the diverse Bnropean political institutions in arranging direct 
electieui
1. Cf. pp.I32-I3*
2. BOHHSTOPS.V,R. op. cit. pp.50-51.
3. Observer , article by W.P. Clark 16 , 5.48. op. cit.
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" . .  Hcr» are they to do this within a year? By what machi­
neries, by what legislative actions? We a n  have emr dif­
ferent systems,but I 3herald be very surprised if any of 
the Governments of any of the European Parliaments would 
in fact introduce legislation,and pass it by the end of 
the year which introduced a system of a European Parliament 
to be elected upon this basis. It does not seem really to 
me to be practical politics. Who is to make the list of 
voters,how is the voting to be? Is it to be on proportional 
representation? Who is to be the returning officer? Under 
whose authority are the elections to be held? What is to be 
Its juridical basis? Why,all these great Question* have 
got to be decided if we are to do anything except write 
constitutions in the air. It is quite easy to write consti­
tutions. What is difficult is to make the* effective and 
durable."*
- By swooping down on the new apparent constitutional sig­
nificance of the Keynaud-Bonnefous amendment,MacMillan indeed 
showed himself to be the astute political operator of later 
’ Super-Mac1 years. It was an easy demolition job: Of course 
the whole European constitutional and legislative framework 
could not be overturned overnight and,in this sense,all his 
"practical" probings were completely justified and necessary. 
Yet,had Bonnefous not so unwittingly provided the opening for 
the smashing of the direct elections case,thus in effect com­
mitting political hara-kiri,had he in other words kept to the 
sage and judicious phraseology used by Reynaud,then perhaps 
MacMillan's powerful offensive might not have been so well 
mounted or received. Indeed,MacMillan's practical criticisms 
wore reasonable odgr because the presentation of the amendment 
appeared to touch upon some constitutional undertaking at a 
European level. But in reality this was not the case ; the 
direct election of a European Consultative Assembly did not 
actually involve any formal commitment by national Governments 
or Parliaments alike to even the minimal transfer of juridical 
or legislative powers,neither did it necessarily imply any 
official initiative towards drawing up even the basis of a 
European Constitution. In short,the view that the Consultative 
Assembly should be directly elected did not really alter the ./, 
-I.-Tf l U m U M T O .  op.cit. pp.52-53.
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./.fact  that its strict nominative status ensured that it would 
have no formal power at all to initiate action not condoned 
by the national governing bodies. Direct elections would 
surely increase the Assembly's popular standing and eventual 
influence,but they did not represent any practical eneroachraait 
upon the actual powers and decision-making structœss of natio­
nal political institutions. Seen in this perspective, 
MacMillan's insistence on the impossible requirements for 
administrative precision and exactly comparable electoral 
methods in the democratic selection of the proposed Assembly 
appear to be rather pedantic and restrictive,as recent 
experience of the 1979 direct Buropean elections indicates.
MacMillan,nevertheless,was far from isolated in his 
highly efficient opposition to the Reyneud-Boiusefoas amendment. 
The much respected French delegate,André Noeltvas also ouick 
to follow suit,skating over his previous support in the French 
Assembly for a Buropean Constituent Assembly,and pointing out 
the need for a gradual approach to the problem. In each couilry 
involved,he forcefully argued, there were forces stronger qpuaal 
to Buropean Federation who would be well armed by any lack of 
"political maturity" shown by the Congress in supporting the 
type of amendment in question. Moreover,the cause of Buropean 
unity would also be "gravely compromised" should the Congress 
went to "impose" it* wishes in such a way upon Governments.1 
Subsequently, other respected international parliamentarians, 
notably Arthur Salter and B.P.U Vice-President Maccas,stressed 
the need to progress step by step,the former arguing in par­
ticular that the Congress had already committed itself to 
the longterm goal of going beyond national sovereignty and
that it was best in the initial stages not to go "too far or
2
too fast»" Frmch delegate,Pierre Bourdan, however,came
to Reynaud's and Bonnefous* defence,declaring that the major
events of the last year had permitted the Boropean idea to ./.
1* A.NOSL,V,R. op* d t *  pp»53«5^*
2. SALTSR.TOSCAS.ibid- p.57.
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./«penetrate public opinion as never before and that the Congress 
had the duty to "strike the iron while it was hot." It vas not 
a mattes' of pushing the Governments into actions which they 
did not want to take,but rather the need of the Congress to 
take the lead and point the way in submitting strong proposals* 
A gradual approach in ail this,he passionately argued,would 
be long and complicated,and would serve only to "discourage" 
Europe1s unification.
The tone of the debate was rapidly acquiring a bitter and 
resentful air,each personality seeming to speak from a virulent 
and entrenched position,and refusing to accomodate the views 
of others. In such an atmosphere,Henry Brugmans also felt com­
pelled to defend the ideological position of integral 
federalism at the expense of resisting the collective-federation 
plans of the diminishing Reynaud-Bonnefous camp,whose views
lie regarded «s pure "jacobinism at the European level.*2 
He therefor« intervened with a key speech in which he dafended 
the extra-parliamentary conception of the'living forces' agatat 
charges of it being corporatist,while saving most of his 
energy to attack directly the traditional state and central- 
parliamentary conceptions of European democracy,thereby also 
indicating the fundamental differences within the SUF itself 
whose MFE wing clearly supported such political arrangements 
at the supra-aationai Buropcan level. The EOF leader thus 
stated that European unity must entail "other forms" and "new 
forms of federal democracy", involving a "social enlargement" 
and "functional decentralisation" of the present political 
framework rather than any centralised political-electoral basis 
of one per million inhabitants as Reynaud was proposing 
for the Buropean Assembly. Such a procedure,Brugmans xrgued,. / •
1. P. BOURDAN, U L . op. cit. pp .57-59.
2. See Brugmans " L'Idée Européenne". op« cit. p .I33 .
3. André Noel had in fact commenced his speech making this 
charge against the federalists. V-R. op. cit. p .54.
4 . Brugmans also pointed out this split with the W B  group 
at The Hague,see L'Idée Burppéqme fibid. p .133.
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./•would, lack respect for the "basic comnrunities, the regional, 
national and functional communities",and vould instead be 
working in the direction of a "super-state" accompanied by 
"prejudice constitutional formulas." In opposition to this, 
he therefore supported the Lussan amendment.*
As if this contribution vas not already sufficient in 
{lacing the nail on the coffin of the Reynaud-Bonnefous amend­
ment, the "unionist" camp vas delighted still further by the 
final and most poignant interjection to the debate vhen 1-tack ay 
decided suddenly to arouse the fatigued meeting vith a rather 
angry and abusive speech condemning the amendment and accusing 
Reynaud of wanting,in effect,to steal the show and gain a lot 
of publicity{vhich perhaps vas not totally untrue). Mackay 
indeed thought that it vas a "very silly amendment...quite 
unrealistic.vhich makes fools of everyone in this Congress and 
vhich will make the Congress the laughing stock of Europe."
In a clear indication that he too had understood that Bonnefous 
vas actually proposing the creation of a directly elected Euro­
pean Constituent Assembly,the veteran Labour campaigner for 
Europe in turn took pains to point out his own support for an 
eventual directly elected European Parliament,but that the 
constitutional arrangements for such a goal had to be worked 
out in consideration of the reluctance of national Parliaments 
and Governments, He then added:
"..Let  us look vhat ve are asked to do now. The French 
Parliamoat has had a resolution down for an Assembly 
for a European Federation for the best part of the last 
three months.• .but I have yet to learn that it has been 
debated by the French Parliament. Why does not M, Reynaud 
go to the French Parliament to have a little action there 
instead of coming here and bewitching people and try to 
ask them to come to some fooliBh idea of trying to get 
this through vithin six months in this silly vay? If they 
mean action,vhy don't they take that action in their ovn 
Parliament? We have at least done it in Britain,ve have at 
least debated it in Britain,ve put our resolution down . / .
I .  BROGMAHS, V.R. .op. cit. pp.5»-60.
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. / .  vithin two months. And ve have debated it  nov and That has the 
Government said? The Government said: • We agree vith the ideas 
of your European Onion,ve agree that sovereignty most be prcawi 
But ve are not prepared to convene a constituent assembly at 
the present time*. And yet,in the face of that,in face of the 
strongest socialist...Government of Europe having decided 
that they are not prepared to take this step at the moment, 
ve,vho are here planning a Onion of Europe have been asked 
to fly in the face of that and say that ve vant this done 
in six months. I do ask the members of this Congress to 
really face this problem vith a little reality. It may suit 
very veil for the papers tomarrov to contain this great 
resolution from M. Reynand...But that is all moonshine and 
it is of no value in a practical vay to secure the end that 
ve vant."I
I t  vas indeed u n f o r t u n a t e ,and also indicative of the lax 
preparation vith which Reynaud and Bonnefous had decided to 
launch their amendment,that the most savage and cutting opposi­
tion to it at The Hague should have come from a man so passiona­
tely committed to the same ideal and conception of Federation as 
they. The "unionist" barrage,launched by MacMillan and supported 
by Noel,plus the integral-federalist critique and MPB isolation 
■ade certain t h a t  the joint amendment vas henned in from all 
sides,despite the initial positive reception keynaud had received 
Moreover,his ansver to this heap of criticism and abuse somehow 
failed to be recorded in the Coflwlttee's official Verbatim kepcrt,
vhlle the meeting^ minutes mention only his appeal not to delay
2
European Onion. The various newspaper reports nevertheless 
recorded that the ruder parts of Mackay's speech vere severely 
deplored by President Rammdler,vho prevented their official 
translation into French,vhlle Keynaud "gracefully and neatly 
pricked Hr. Mackay by »arying that (me of the drawback* of Par­
liamentary experience vas the custom of using adjectives rather 
freely."3
The debate on the Reynaud-Bonnefous motion ended on this 
rather sad note and in the final event the amendment only polled 
about a do sen favourable votes. Bren Car andini, leader of the./.
1 . MACIAY.V.K. op. cit. pp.60-61.
2. Political Committee minutes.p . X I.CABM BRUGGE.
3. Guardian .article 10 .5 .48 . op. d t .
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./.more European-minded Italian delegation,felt obliged to steer a
moderate "reasonable" course^n spite of his open “sympathy" for
Reynaud's T ie r s *though apparently Aitiero 6pinel11 did Tote in2
f«tots' of the proposed amendment. The "large majority“ of the
3
Congres*,hoverer.remained unfavourable, and the crucial clause 4 
vas left in tact but for a slight change,proposed by Manningham 
&ol1er and supported by André Noel,to refer simply to a "Uuropeaa 
Assembly*, thereby not draving attention to its specific delibera­
tive quality, - As Paul Reynaud later commented:
"Why vas I so obstinate? First,because in a democracy no 
assembly can hare prestige,uni-te people,take any effective 
action,uni ess it stems directly from the »or«reign people»
Also because if  ve » a t  to raise the interests of Europe 
above those of the different nations it vas necessary to 
give a psychological shock to public opinion in those nations« 
So it is to the people themselves,! argued,that ve must talk 
by the democratic means of an election-.
A British Conservative member of the House of Commons 
tie. MacMillan)turned against me the old French proverb:
'Make haste siovly'. To this I replied that it vas strange 
advice to give a man vho vas about to drown in a river and 
vho vas clutching for a branch to hold on to.
The congress at The Hague did in fact assemble some 
remarkable men and pass some excellent resolutions. But 
its timidity on the key Questions of unity vas so great that 
the Council of Burope,created a fev months later on the 
principles laid down at The Hague,vas afflicted from birth 
vith congenital veakness."*
In a similar vein,Bonnefous recorded:
"The Hague Congress did not achieve all the objectives 
proposed by the more ardent partisans of European unity.
A certain timidity,explicable by the desire to reconcile 
opposing tendencies,to. smooth over transitions,to decline 
from asking the impossible,vas veil illustrated during the 
discussion! and vas translated into the final text of 
resolutions."5
1. Cf.p.t-V
2. Information given to the vriter by A. Spinelli,interview,Jan.
1976,Rome.
3. See Bonnef ous Face de son Destin , op.cit.p .100.
4 . See Seynaud, Unite or Perish ;( Simon & Schuster.I95I)jpp»I9&-3.
5. Bonnef ous, op • cit. p. 100.
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Such disillusioned verdicts vere not shared,hovever,by all 
of the French delegation at that time,despite the rather Pranco- 
British orientation of the battle which developed in the Political 
Committee. Paul Eamodier,for example,accuser' Reynaud of being 
"ahead of the times" - an accusation which Reynaud gladly accep­
ted.1 Similarly,Paul Bastid strongly argued in an editorial he 
wrote for 'L'Aurore* that the essential role of the Congress
had been to stimulate" the European campaign rather than disturb2
or confuse possible progress *dth difficult proposals. René 
Courtin,on the other hand,displayed considerable sympathy for 
the Reynaud-Bonnefous amendment in a long article which he 
wrote for ’Le Monde’ on the Hague Congress: "The majority",he 
stated,"wanted to avoid all adventure; it therefore made pro- 
nouncements contrary to its profound sentiments." Fro« the 
British point of view,however, which was both mindful of the 
Labour Government's scepticism and of the Conservative Party's 
restlessness as regmis the continued Bnpire and Commonwealth 
ccwwnitment,the ambiguous and less ambitious formula arrived at 
on the crucial issue of the European Assembly received general 
approval, Duncan Sandys in turn summed up this feeling when,in 
a speech made just after the Congress,he declared:
"The European Assembly for which the Hague Congress 
asked can at present have no legislative or executive 
powers but It can,none the less,play an important part 
in bringing about the unification of Europe. It will voice 
the desire of the common peoples of all countries to live 
together in unity and peace. This assembly,which most be 
chosen by the various parliaments with regard to existing 
party strengths.vould provide a forum in vhich the problems 
of European unity could be publicly discussed. The meetings 
of such an Assembly will enormously help to develop among 
the peoples of our Continent the sense of being Europeans 
and of belonging together. This common outlook is the 
essential foundation without which no durable political 
or economic structure can be built.
1. See Reynaud,"The Unifying Porce for Europe".FOKEIGH AFFAIRS 
op. Cit. p .262.
2. Bastid editorial - L'Aurora ,12 ,5 .46 ,
3. Courtin,articles for Le Mowte .May 1948.
4 . Sandys,press release after speech at Streatham 17 .6.48.
.............  SANDYS PAPERS.
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It vas a fitting conclusion to the drawn-out debate at 
The Hague over clause 4 of the draft Resolution. The project 
for a European Assembly,vhich would be neither rigidly fixed 
at sm uaauthoritive level nor immediately elevated to an un­
realistic demand upon Governments,resnained more or less at the 
sane gradual pitch vhich Sandys had consistently advocated.
The idealistic urge of the more impatient supporters of European 
unification at The Hague had been resisted,vhile the federalist 
camp itself had been hopelessly split. Yet even nov,as the Poli­
tical debate drev to an end,some of the more sceptical members 
of the British "unionist" camp vanted still more blood,and OEM 
delegate J. Henderson Stevart attempted to introduce an additio­
nal sub-clause emphasising the key inter-governmental role 
and initiative vhich the Council of Europe project as a vhole 
vcmld retain vis-A-vis the Aw whir itself. Again, it fell to the 
perceptive Miss Josephy to clarify the issue and vake the tired 
and voro delegates to the hidden dangers of this last-minute 
amendment:
"I apologise for getting up to speak at this hour of the 
morning but I do vant the delegates to realise vhat they 
are doing if they pass this amendment. It is a very clever 
amendment,very clever indeed,it tries to put in something 
vhich all of us agree vith at the beginning. It tries to 
put in that ve vant an emergency council of Europe. So ve 
do...But please note vhat(it)..goes on to say,and this is 
the danger. It goes on to say that this emergency council 
of Europe having done all the things that ve quite agree 
it should do,should also plan the subsequent stages of the 
political and economic integration of ¿urope. Hot on your 
life,Mr. President,ve can allov that to happen. The emergaacy 
council of Europe is a governmental body pure and simple 
and the future of Europe must be planned and can only be g 
planned effectively by the representatives of the people."
In this she vas also supported by Leslie Kaie.vho added:
"The amendment vould completely stultify the rest of the 
dause(4)vhich ve have deliberated vith so much care for 
the last fev hours." 3
The amendment vas subsequently defeated,but it vas again
I .  V.R. nr,.Hr. n .62. 2. JOSEPHY,V^R. ibid. p .63.
3. HALE.V.R. ibid. p .63.
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./•indicative of the shallow tactics vhich some members of the 
British "unionist" group thought fit to employ at The Hague.
The Political Debate at this historic 'Congress of Europe’ 
came to an end the folloving evening,and on the Monday morning 
of «ay 10 the final Political Resolution vas submitted to the 
Congress as a vhole,nov gathered together in full plenary 
session under Anthony Eden4» chairmanship. It vas indeed quite 
ironic that he,as the future British Prime Minister vho vould 
be a dogged opponent of organic commitment to a Europeantmion, 
vas actually given the duty to read out the important list of 
proposals put forvard by the Political Committee at the Hague 
| Congress. Paul Remedies',as President of the Committee,vas is 
turn called upon to explain the motives and difficulties vhich 
vere involved in draving this final Political Resolution.
His report vas both detailed and veil balanced. First he drev 
attention to the generally agreed opinion that "the hour had 
come to constitute Burope" end to create a force capable of 
influencing political,economic and cultural affairs,as veil as 
representing Idealistic and humanistic aspirations and values. 
Sisdlerly.vhile he pointed to the geographic natty of Burope, 
he vas also careful to stress the free and open union sought 
plus the broadening of horisons and collective progress vhich 
Burope vould bring as a pillar to vorld peace. Yet such a 
process could not be rushed. Though he vas personally la favour 
of Reynaud’s plea for trans-national direct Borope an elections, 
this should be seen as a "final goal" rather than the first 
step* Moreover,there vould be many hurdles to crose before 
such e stage could be reached,and there vas also the seed to 
protect Burope’s diversity and particularities, nevertheless, 
Ramadier strongly appealed for e supra-national Buropean spirit 
of justice and freedom,and concluded his powerful Speech by 
asking the Congress to denonstirate such faith la Burope’ s 
"destiny" by voting in unanimity is  favour of the proposed . / •
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•/•Political Resolution.1
Eden accordingly opened a brief general debate on the 
Resolution in question.allowing first Italy's Nicolo Carandini 
to take the floor« The latter sadly summed up the general 
opinion of his delegation by explaining to Reynaud that his 
amendment had vent over "our hearts,but not oar reason”« He then 
added:"We had to follow the counsel of reason.” Reynaud, in 
turn,replied with a rather bitter but polite speech,again win­
ning the sympathy and applause of the Congress» Accepting that 
the amendment had been defeated,he warned that the vicious 
circle of national interests and identity would continue if it 
was not broken by an appeal to the peoples as Buropeans and not 
as members of individual states. He also pointed out the rather 
"macabre irony” which MacMillan's ouip - "make haste slowly” - 
entailed for Europe in its actual state of crisis,while fina&mg 
his speech with a dry and determined pledge to continue the 
struggle for the idea put forward in his amendment until it 
would be finally achieved,if by then it vas not too late!
The fighting tone of his speech was subsequently received 
by Eden in an embarrassed and evasive remark: "I am sure we 
are all grateful to M. Reynaud for the brilliant eloquence of 
his speech and the loyalty of his expression." After a flow 
of more general speeches,including one from the U.S. "observer" 
delegate Walter Macyuire,the Chairman rather nervously Bade the 
following ambiguous point before putting the Resolution to the 
vote:
”1 feel I ought to make it clear that no individual 
delegate nor indeed any nation?! delegate nor indeed any 
national delegation can be bound by every detail of every 
decision of the Congress. In an unofficial Congress of this 
kind,immensely valuable as it has been,ve c m » do no more 
than lay down the issues upon which the majority of the V 
delegates are »greed pnd the lines on which we are all 
invited to continue our work.”
The following Resolution was then carried unanimously and the
session closed!
I .  KAiiAPiSK v.ii. Plenary session 10 .5 .48 . pp.89-95. 2.ibidg>.9i-
__________ —“V  -lu
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g r o s s lv c ly  to  b r in e  a o o u t the n e e e s a a r -  e c o n o c ic  end 
p o l i t i c a l  c n lo n  of ¿u r o p o ;
to e z c s ln c  the j u r i d l  e e l ar.d c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  i - p l i c c t l o n s  
a r is in g  out o f  the c r o c t lo n  o f  *uch a u n io n  o r  f e i e r a i i o . i  
and t h e ir  c c o n o a lc  and s o c i a l  e c n s a Q u i.-ic e s ; 
to p ra p c rc  th e  n e c e s s a r y  p la n s .
Co ¡a ld e r s  th a t  tfca r e s u lt a n t  u n io n  o r f o d .r a t lo r .  sh o u ld  
be open to i l l  E u ro p e a n  n a t io n *  d e a o c r a t l c a l l v  fo v e rn a d  
and w hich u n d e rtak e  io  r c s p a c t  a C a r t e r  o f  :iun*-. l U f . i i s , 
and r e s o lv e s  t e s t  a C a n a is s lo n  th o u ld  s e t  up to u r . ie r -  
;a L e  m e d i a t e l y  t h j  d o u b le  t a s k  o f d r a f t in g  su ch  a C h a r ­
t e r  and o f  la y in g  docn a ta r.d a rd s  to  n h lc h  a ~ s  t« te  » u s  » 
c o n f o r r  I f  i t  l a  to  d e s e rv e  th e  na=e o f a d jo o c r o c -- . 
D c c la r c s  th a t  I n  no c l r c i u j t a n c e j  s h a l l  a £ t ^ t c  be e n ­
t i t l e d  to  bo c a l lo d  a d t c o c r a c ^  u n le s s  i t  d e e c , lr .  f a c t  
as w e l l  I n  la w , g u a ra n te e  to I t s  c l i l s e n s  l i b e r t "  of 
th o u g h t, a s s s n i i y  and e x p r e s s io n ,  a s  w e l l  os th e  n ; h !  
to  f o r a  a p o l i t i c a l  o p p o s it io n .
3c-quests th a t  t h i s  C o s a ls r . io n  s h o u ld  r e p o r t  t>.ree
o o n th s on I t s  la b o u r s .
Ia  c c n v ln e c d  th a t  let the i n t e r e s t  o f huaon v a lu e s  and 
hunan l i b e r t y ,  ¿ho A a s c a b ly  c h o u ld  s a k e  p r o p o s a ls  f o r  -h :  
e a t a i l  is h a e n t  o f c  c o u r t  o f  J u a i l c a  w it h  a d e q u ito  s a : :e - 
t lo n s  f o r  t i j s  l u ^ l^ - e n t c t io n  o f  t h i s  C h a r t e r ,  end to 
t h i s  and an* c i t iz e n  o f the c * 3 o e lc t ; d  c o u n t r ie s  s h a l l  
h are  r * d r o s s  b e fo re  th e  c o u r t ,  a t  a n y t l r . c  and -» It . :  the 
le a s t  p o s s ib le  d o la y ,  o f any v i o l a t i o n  o f h ia  r i j h t a  as 
f o r n u la t e i  i n  I ' m  C h a r t e r .
D a c ia  r u t  I t *  c o n v ie t io r .  t h a t  th e  a o lo  s o lu t io n  o f the ‘ 
oco r.oule cad p o l i t i c a l  p r o t l.e .s  o f  Corar.ny 1*  i t s  in t e ­
g r a t io n  m  s f e d o r a t c d  ¿ u r o p e .
C o n s ld a r s  t h a t  an y o n io n  o r f a d : r a t l o n  o f Euro pean f > o u ld  
be d e a ijn o d  to  p r o je c t  the s e c u r i t y  o f i t s  e o n s t lt u o . it s  
p e o p les^  sh o u ld  b« f r e e  ir o n  o u ta ld o  c o n t r o l ,  «nd sh o u ld  
n o t bo d lr o c t c d  J ^ a l n t t  a n v  o th e r n a t io n .
A s u lfn s  to a U n ite d  Europe th a lc z tw d la te  te a k  of e a t a -  
b l lc h ln e  p r e ^ r e c s iv t lv  a d . a o c r a t i c  s o c i a l  s -ra t.e e , the 
a i r  of « h lc : i  o i i a l l  be to  f r e e  s a n h ln d  f r e e  a l l  tvj<as 
o f  a lD v e rv  and .‘ ro n  a l l  ,'c o n o s lc  ln s e c u r l  *•', aa p o l i t i ­
c a l  dem ocracy la  ln to n d o d  te  p ro to e t  i t  a g o ln s t  tho 
o x e r c H o t  oi" « r b it r a t r y  pew o r .
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ü e e l î r : ?  i t  t h e  u n io r .  o r  f j d o r r t l o r  h v / i  a o  o : x
o f  i t s  o ’î j . ï t l v ; *  v h s  l a p r o v e j e n t  o* u c o n o a l r ,  p o l i i i -  
CDl, sosial ï:<1 c u l t u r a l  s t a n i a r c s  o!  cr l r .  l u d - n u i d  ,'nx o r  
a s s o c i a t e d  t e r r i  t o r i - ' S ,  w i t h o u t  i . i - o j u d l c s  t o  ixs d i s  
w h i c . i  . 1 3 »  b in d  i t *  c o n s t i t u e n t  p a r t s  « 3  o t h e r  c o ^ r . ; r i c c  
b e y o n d  i u  s o a a .
D e c la re *  t lia t  the c r e a t io n  of o U n ite d  Euro pe in  ca 
c a a c n t ia l  o la u e n t  in  O ;  c r e a t io a  ol a u m t ; d  w orld . 1
3) SURVEY OF THE ECONOMIC AHD CULTURAL DEBATES MAY B-IQ
Economic Debate
If in the Political Committee the delegates had been split 
mainly in terms of those favouring gradual or radical progress 
tovards European Union,the Economic Connittee vas more divided 
betveen the "Right" and the "left" ving in each national dele­
gation as regards the precise economic ideology and doctrines 
vhich a united Burope should actually operate. This polemic in 
turn spilled over into exhausting argument about Europe's poli­
tical and ideological position vith respect to the groving East- 
West bloc confrontation.
The Economic and Social Report submitted to the Congress, 
in fact,gave a clear picture of its ideological preference on 
this matter,stating its less than enthusiastic view of those
countries vhich accepted a certain degree of central economic 
planning,but adding that vithin a European Union "free enter­
prise and individual initiative" vould probably have prune 
place,along vith necessary "common plans and the common assump­
tion or delegation of responsibilities." In the same context, 
the Report also drev attention to the catastrophic collapse of 
the European economy after the var, and Jnedctfs gwercus aid in the 
subsequent attempts at reconstruction. The debate vhich took 
place did not demonstrate the same overt sympathies that 
figured in the report.
1» Final Political Resolution passed by the Hague Congress,ia5«4fi» 
CASH BRUGGE.
2. Economic and Social Report submitted to the Congress,CA.Q4
— BRU©H
3. Economic Debate,T .R ..CAB4 BRUGGE.
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The arguments began early in the first session when the 
founder leader of the USSE and main British Trade Union spokes­
man at the Congress,Bob Edwards,warned that Europe must prepare 
for "the coming trading war" vith the United States. He vent 
on to declare his belief that the world was not so such split 
into two Ideological blocs but rather that, on the one hand, 
the Soviet Union was seeking- the "political domination" of 
Europe,while on the other hand,the United States sought the 
"economic domination" of Europe. He further warned,in a phrase 
that well indicated his ILP background,that the U .S.A. had an 
"abundance" of goods which would be ultimately dumped in Europe 
and thereby bring about "unemployment and a third world war." 
Another delegate shouted in reply:"We thank God far that abun­
dance! * The debate in turn centred on a concerted effort by 
British Labour MPs and French and Belgian trade unionists to 
table a motion speaking of two blocs,East and Vest,neither of 
which corresponded to the needs or aspirations of Burop*. They 
therefore demanded instead that "to avoid any danger of totali­
tarianism” the workers md their representative organisations 
should play a part in managing the European economy. This impor­
tant amendment was deferred, after much discusstan, to a drafting 
coauittee. In the revised version however,the term "management" 
of the economy was changed to "associated vith the governing 
body.” This was opposed by a gr oup mainly of British economists, 
and especially- Lord Layton,who argued that it simply was net 
true that trade unions ware a safeguard,or the only safeguard 
against totalitarianism,and asked why a particular "minority 
interest" should be associated with the running of Europe. In 
the subsequent compromise,an insertion - "and other groups 
interested in production".was made. At this point,14 French 
and Belgian 'syndicalists’ walked out together.
Still bo re trouble was in store at the final econo­
mic plenary session held on the afternoon of Monday 10 Hay,
.after a storay all-night debate which lasted until € 'o clock 
that morning. Indeed,when the agreed Economic Resolution was 
finally read out,the ter» referring to the role of workers and 
«heir representative organs t» be closely associated with the 
European ‘ governing body* was somehow omitted altogether in the 
list of proposals I At this,the leading French trade unionist,
K. Hath*, sprang to his feet and protested wgriiy against yet 
another sign of calculated manipulation from the more conserva­
tive orientated Comalttee leaders. He furthermore explained 
that certain French delegates who were members of the hard- 
pressed union 'Force Oovriere* were by no means assured of the 
backing of the work-force in their support of European unity, 
and they really needed to create the conditions favourable to 
obtaining worker involvement fas well as having to protect 
thenselves against the easy charges being levelled against then 
by the Communist trade unions, on their left flank,that they 
were simply selling out to international capitalism.
The situation facing the conference appeared to be 
serious. A «ajar public split on such a sensitive issue would 
effectively wreck the great, progress achieved in other spheres. 
This message,however,did not appear to impress Lord Layton,vho 
stubbornly pointed out that it was impossible to solve major 
problems of economic philosophy and development within the space 
of 24 hours. Meanwhile,the French delegates started to challenge 
the Chair from the floor of the Hall. A tumultous and disastrous 
split seemed to be inevitable. It was at this crucial point 
that Churchill made an impromptu entry,in a rather hurried 
effort to end the dissension:
"I  think",he pleaded,"that we may congratulate ourselves 
on the success of this remarkable adventure. The experiment, 
tried in conditions necessarily immature,in some cases 
adverse,is none the less an experiment which all have need 
to help and which I believe none of those who have taken 
part in it will have cause to regret...
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./.M e have not in this gathering to dvell particularly upcm 
our differences but upon our unity."
The conference calmed down à little,but the French 
delegates continued »till to press their Tie»,and in the end 
the platform decided to accept Mathé' s amendment. Lord 
Layton conceded this ruling on vorrker participation and control 
vith the grudging comment: "ve are all vorkers." The Economic 
and Social Resolution vas subsequently passed vithout dissencbn, 
and vith the announcement:"Europe is unanimous." The main 
points in the text show just hov much the Economic Debate 
at the Hague Congress vent beyond OEBC limits sad foreshadowed 
the latex •functional' integration of Burope:
The declared goal of the conference vas full European 
economic unity. The immediate measures needed to put this 
policy into action included:-the progressive elimination of 
commercial obstacles and the reduction of customs duties be- 
tveen the European states; the necessity to pave the vay for 
the free convertability of currencies and for the institution 
of multilateral clearing facilities; the promotion of a con­
certed programme in order to stimulte the development of agri­
culture and food production; the encouragement of specialised 
and common productive techniques.notably in the coal industry; 
the draving up of a common programme of development Sat Europe^ 
basic industries;the promotion of labour mobility throughout 
Europe and the improvement of vorking conditions.plus a coordi­
nated effort to ensure full employment. In addition,a list of 
ultimate objectives vas formulated,stipulating that European 
Union should assure:-the free circulation of capital,monetary 
unification,concerted credit and budgetary planning,an even­
tual customs union and the harmonisation of social legislation 
throughout the Coiwunity. The Committee also suggested that 
further studies should be carried out vith regard to 
the establishment of a commission for migrants and displaced
persons;the economic and social possibilities arising from./»
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./.Marshall aid;the possibility to travel more freely throughout 
Europe; the elimination of double taxation and the harmonisation 
of fiscal charges;the economic problems and possibilities of 
the Ruhr area,etc. - It »as a fornibable list of proposals 
and vas cemplemented by the crucial clause in the preamble 
to the Resolution insisting upon the direct involvement of 
“workers and their representative organisations" in the 
creation and development of a united Europe's economy.
Cultural Debate
without dowbt.it vas the EUP federalists who attached 
the most importance to the Cultural Debate at The Hague,in 
addition to D«nis De Rougemont's "Message to the Europeans", 
vhich vas now programed to b e  put at the final session of 
the Congress. The meagre federalist impact In the Political 
Debate was a further stimUant. Indeed,federalist writer Jean- 
Pierre Gouzy has emphasised that if integral federalism made 
its mark at this Congress of Europe it was precisely in the 
"Message" and in the deliberation of the Cultural C o m m i t t e e .^  
similarly Henry Brugmans has pointed to the "concrete and 
useful suggestions” which were advanced by the Cultural Com­
mittee,despite the relative lack of attention vhich it re­
ceived at The Hague.4
The Cultural Commit tee, under the chairmanship of Salvador 
de Madariaga and vith de Rougemont as chief rapporteur,did 
in fact complete some important theoretical and practical 
work at The Hague,but did not actually endanger the gradual 
"unionist" stamp which the Congress subsequently projected 
In the movement's major political campaign for a European 
Assembly. Nevertheless,«« jor contributions concerning a . / .
1. Pinal Ecenomic and Social Resolution passed by the Hague 
Congress.10 .5 .48 . CASH BRUGGE
2. Cf.pp.151-15?.
3. Gousy, te ftdferallsme d’Alexandre Marc ,op. cit. p .14.
4. Brugmans, L'ldfee Burop^enne' , op. cit. p .132.
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./.Charter of Human Rights and a European Court "above the states" 
were put forward,though by now the Political Committee had 
taken up and monopolised these issues. Of more fitting value, 
perhaps,was de Rougemont*s Cultural Report and his attempted 
definition of "European Man". Twenty years of "personalist"- 
federalist thought were put into this presentation,and its 
synthesis of humanism,chrxstianity,individualism and collecti­
vism is far too profound and sophisticated to analyse properly 
in this limited historical study. Suffice to say that it vas 
a rather moving though optimistic report,stressing Euro-Man's 
qualities as opposed to the brutish acts which European society 
itself had fostered. - As de Rougemont stated:
"To whatever party or vhat ever country we belong,we 
realise that the present crisis in Europe involves some­
thing deeper than our economic and political systems. It 
involves a belief in Man and in Freedom which is ,in  the 
last analysis,our true common heritage. Only on such a 
basis can the sure foundations of this Union be laid. 1
In short,de Rongenont's basic message vas that Buropean Man
must bee cm« both "master of himself and a member of a wider
community."
Hot everybody,however,was in fundamental agreement either 
vith de Rougenont's personalist conception of Euro-Man or his 
main tangible proposal for the creation of a European Cultural 
Centre. The ensuing debate has been well suarned up by de Rouge­
mont himself:
"The debates on my report...unfolded in the usual 
confusion,well illustrated by the following declarations: 
the novelist,Charles M o r g a n ,vished matters of culture to 
be referred back to the governments,monbers of the Brussels 
Pact; the former minister Kenneth Lindsay thought on the 
contrary that 'our duty ...is  to set up a body competent 
to continue the work of the Congress' .  Qroup Captain 
Cheshire,frow Moral Rearmament,demanded first a return 
to God and went on to denounce my report as 'anti-Christian'. 
Finally,Lord Russell,while stressing that 'there is no 
reason to claim the superiority of Europe's heritage ',./.
I .  Cultural Report submitted to the Hague Congress,and drawn 
up by Denis de Rougemont. CAE-1 BRUGGE. More details about 
the drafting of this text can be obtained at CEC GENEVA.
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./.sa id  that 'a Centre vould assist men of different countries 
to maintain close contact and learn to knov each other's 
point of v4«*r’ . . .  In the end the vhole positive contest of 
the Report vas passed in the Resolution.voted unanimously. 
Centre,Charter of Sights and Supreme Court...All this sav 
the light of day from 1950 onvards vith the application 
of the Resolutions of the Hague."I
- The Cultural Debate in fact had only taken one day to come
to agreement; it vas an astonishing contrast to the tedious
argum«ts of the other tvo Conmittees.
4) CLOSING PLDiAXY SESSION,MAY 10 - CONLUSION
*..The Congress has laboured heroically" vrote the 'Times'.
- It was an accurate description. For nearly three days the
Congress had indeed succeeded in getting through an enormous
volume of vork,spending night after night arguing about policies
and aims for a Burope yet to be uni ted. .but .through the compelling
example given by this spectacular gathering, nov on the way to
the crucial psychological breakthrough needed to auireae OBEC
and re-activate popular European solidarity. - In the vords of
Joseph Retinger:
■The Congress received enormous publicity and the parti­
cipants,once dispersed,added to it further and confirmed 
its impact. As a result the idea of European Unity vas 
strikingly brought to the attention of public opinion."
The Closing Session of the Congress,held under the chair­
manship of van Zeeland,and folloving on from a most successful
3
open-air rally the previous evening ,did indeed express the 
emotion aed joy of the tired delegates in their'unanimity'for 
Burope and in their political confidence that the subsequent 
campaign vould succeed. As even Edouard Bonnefous admitted:"On 
leaving the Hague most delegates vere persuaded that the edifi-
A
cation of a real United Burope vas near." The immediate lead-./.
Z. Oe RougMont, "Campaign of the Congresses” op. cit. p .342. 
Also consult V.R. Culturel Debate,CAEM BRUQGE.
2. Retinger, Memoirs op. cit. p .221.
3. A Srwdian report commented on this rally that Churchill might 
veil have befci *tke'Ptrslrpresident of Europe", 10.5.48.
4 . Bonnefous, Europe em Face de son Destin op. cit. p .100.
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./ .u p  to the ceremony,her»ever,had not lacked its moment of final 
drama when the federalists,disappointed by the main outcome 
of the C o n g r e s s ,threatened to withdraw and publicly disassociate 
themselves fro« the Resolutions. Their point of Tie» was put 
across very veil in an official EUF press statement claiming 
that,despite the enormous contribution vhich the holding of 
the Congress had made towards influencing public opinion about 
•the European Idea,the actual "balance of the debates" and the 
"value of the conclusions" had been considerably "««promised." 
The Federalists notably "deplored" the procedure adopted in 
the organisation of the Political Debate and the lack of defi­
nition concerning the role of the "living forces" in the pro­
jected convocation of the European Assembly. Similarly,the 
Economic proposals lacked a social basis. In conclusion,the 
EUF confirmed that "half measures and palliatives” vould not 
be enough to forge Barope,and that federalist principles of 
■justice and liberty" ware needed.1 - Despite the severity of 
this statement,Sandys managed at the very last moment to 
persuade his federalist critics that for the sake of unity 
they should stay and support the vork of the Congress.2 
Another crisis had been averted.
The Closing ceremony at The Hague vas tfcu allowed to 
commence and,after John Masefield read a poem of thanks to the 
■etherlands Organising Comlttee followed by the presentation 
of a comemorative book to Churchill and by some pledges of 
support by leading women delegates,Duncan Sandys mounted''the 
rostrum la order to review the results of the Congress and 
outline future plans,in his capacity as Executive Chairman of 
the International Coimnittee. His speech effectively sumed up 
the real progress made by the Congress,as well as the risks 
and difficulties iarvolved in reaching broad agreement on the 
sain issues, and the need to retain a sense of practical politic« 
1* EOF Press statement,Hague Congress,CAEM B2U0GE.
2. Private information.
3. SANDYS,speech to ClosiiM Plenary Session,10 .5 .48.
V.R. pp. JO_33 CASH BRUGGE.
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As b reminder to his federalist critics,he started his 
speech emphasising the three official objectives vhich the 
Congress had been conceived to propagate,namely:-to deaoastrote 
widespread support for European unity,to exchange views and 
arrive at agreed recommendations for action,and finally,to 
provide a new and powerful impetus to the campaign. He in turn 
pointed to the "great risk of failure or fiasco" and to the 
potential weakening of the campaign had the Congress revealed 
"deep rifts in our ranks or irreconciable divergencies upon 
policy." Despite vhat he preferred to describe as certain 
"differences of opinion”, Sandys believed that the debates had 
in fact resulted in "a most remarkable measure of agreement", 
and the hard tedious work of the Congress had demonstrated the 
striking seriousness.responsibility and determination of the 
participants to bridge differences and to find a basis for 
the realisation of the common European objective.
Looking to the current inter-governmental measures taken, 
he vent on to declare that "the process of uniting Europe has 
nov passed out of the theoretical stage." The continuing cam­
paign, hovever, would be neither easy nor straightforward:
"But let us not in oar enthusiasm exaggerate the progress 
that has been made or underrate the distance ve have yet 
to travel. We are still a long way from the setting up of 
an international Boropean authority endowed with effective 
powers and that is ultimately the real test of our sincerity 
and our determination.
Zt is also well for us to recognise that as we move for­
ward fro« the stage of proclaiming principles to the stage 
of putting then into practice the difficulties will increase.
Ve know that the union of Europe will bestow untold 
benefits upon all people in all lands. But there is no good 
in pretending that this can be achieved without some tem­
porary interference with certain national and sectional 
interests. Ve must,I am afraid,expect that vigorous resi­
stance will be put up by those vhose interests are adversely 
affected mod tfcattfcey win. make every effort to mobilise and 
misuse patriotic sentiment,with the object of holding back 
their Governments. If  the Governments are to be able to 
withstand these pressures,they must have the solid backing 
of informed and convinced public opinion."
This was,he stressed,the essential role of the European . / .
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./.campaign in its initial stag«. It had to create a "counter - 
pressure of popular support" for the auropean cause by setting 
up a large and varied international organisation representing 
the cause in all its different aspects. He then explained that 
the limited role and composition of the actual International 
Committee vas no longer sufficient to carry out such a mass 
campaign:
"Ve vho have been privileged to play some small part in the 
initial stage are the first to recognise that it is no longer 
appropriate that this great Movement should continue to be 
confined to a limited circle of pioneers.
If  our Movement is to be equal to the magnitude of its 
responsibilities,^ must rest upon the broadest and surest 
foundations. The international organism vhich directs the 
campaign must derive its mandate from authorative bodies in 
each country.vhich are representative of all that is impor­
tant in the political,economic and cultural life of the 
nation.■
The idea of constituting a more poverful and representative 
democratic front for European unity vas thus officially launchad, 
and the • European Movement",as a concrete conception,can be 
dated from this moment.
Sandy* subsequently suggested that the overall organi­
sation of the Movement sfcstQd be focussed upon u  International 
Council capable of giving thrust to the campaign? After the 
Congress,he developed the idea further(C.f. pp.257-266>,vhile 
at the conference itself he publicly explained the proposed 
profile of the post-Hague European campaign:
"The campaign must be conducted through every channel 
open to us. Parliamentary action vill become increasingly 
important. The European Parliamentary Union provides an 
effective instrument for the initiation and co-ordination 
of efforts in this vital sphere.
Outside Parliament ve must employ methods available to 
us - public meetings,national and international youth rallie* 
studies and conferences upon special subjects,continuous 
contact vith the press and every medium of modem propaganda. 
.. .V e  must seek the co-operation of organised bodies of 
every kind - political parties,trade unions,professional 
and learned societies,youth movements and so forth.*
1. The idea of setting up a lazger movement vith an InternatioA
Council had been briefly discussed tj Hi i»mm| ...... March 6, see
(ic/»v7) cabm ukuggk.
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Having arrived just before the final Closing Session of 
the Congress armed with his long-standing "Message to the Euro­
peans” .which vas to be read out and then signed by all the 
delegates led by Churchill.de Rougemont vas suddenly called for 
by Sandys. - The rest of the story is his to tell:
" ..A t  the back of the hall.near the main entrance,I found 
Duncan Sandys and Randolph Churchill,who said to me:'You 
want,I think,the congress to pass unanimously the text of 
eoimitment which ends your Message. Now I know at least 
thirty delegates vho vill oppose it because of the phrase
- We want a common defence.- ' Sandys added:'This phrase 
has not been debated by the Congress. I 1* sorry,but ve mist 
forget about the Message.' My interviewer had followed me, 
his microphone in hand,trailing the vire behind him. I 
signed to him and speaking into the microphone X repeated 
vhat had just been said to me and ended: '01! During the 
next European congress,Stalin vho is stronger than you are, 
vill send fifty delegates. Et 1 'Europe ne se fera pas.'
I think thay X raised my voice a little. The ushers asked 
us to leave. X sent for Retinger and raul van Zeeland,vho 
were on the platform. In a little room near the entrance, 
ve sat down,six or seven of us,and after ten minutes of 
heated discussion,Paul van Zeeland vho was to preside over 
the last meeting»proposed a compromise: I vas to read the 
Message,leaving out the small incriminating phrase. This 
seeaed sensible and harmless. In reality.it meant that the 
Message could no longer be signed,as that small phrase vas 
part of i t ."
After Sandys'concluding speech to the Congress(described above), 
plus some additional final remarks by.de >iadariaga,Bichet and 
Ramadier.the highlight of the ceremony had been reached and 
de Rougemont vas called to deliver his closing address:
"I  vas still very pale.it seems,vhen van Zeeland asked 
■e to read ay text. When I began the final conitaemt.
Sandys made an imperious sign with his hand that no one 
should rise in the hall. I had a small revenge(but only 
of self-respect)while Senator Eerstens vas reading my 
message in Oiglish. I had returned to my seat on the 
platform,just behind Churchill vho vas tilting his chair 
backwards and forwards and I heard him say aloud:'But vhy!
We should stand up at that! We should all stand up I* No one 
moved, hovever, and the congress ended in a blaze of wuHm s Im b , 
but it had just killed the germs of any hope of a popular 
campaign,which vould have reverberated throughout the whole 
of Europe."1
X. DE ROUGEMONT."Campaign of the Congresses" op. cit.pp.344-5.
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The practical tone of his speech and the clarity of his 
proposed strategy for the subsequent campaign indeed made 
the last-minute federalist critique of the Congress appear to be 
rather partisan and simplistic. Nevertheless,Sandys as usual had 
«ell outlined the methods and tactics for the European campaign, 
without actually defining the immediate institutional goals and 
ultimate political destination envisaged. He did,however,make an 
honourable cavalier-like gesture in declaring that the eventual 
European authority set up would be the ultimate and"real tesfof 
"sincerity" and "determination" in the campaign. One year later, 
a Council of Europe with a Consultative Assembly vas indeed 
achieved,while at a slightly later stage Sandys did in fact for­
mulate precise proposals for the evolution of this joint insti­
tution towards a supra-national European Political Authority. He 
vas good to his word,despite federalist accusations to the con­
trary. It was only when European political circumstances drasti­
cally altered,in the Spring of 1950,that his position and policy 
changed course,in response to the political realities of the time. 
For the moment,in any case,he concluded his speech at The Hague 
Congress on a radical note that even the federalists could not 
deny:
"Our only adversaries",he claimed,"are the timidity vhich 
arises from lack of imagination,the scepticism vhich springs 
from a restricted national outlook,the obstruction of sectio­
nal interests based upon a failure to comprehend the larger 
and overriding benefits to be derived by ail,and lastly,the 
general inertia which throughout the ages has always been the 
chief obstacle to all great causes. These we can and shall 
overcome,by the strength of our own faith and the revolution«? 
zeal with which we proclaim it ."
- It was Joseph Eetinger who perhaps best summed up Sandys* 
powerful contribution to the Hague Congress,vhen he recorded in 
his memoirs: " I did not always see eye to eye with Duncan Sandys, 
but I must admit that he was superb at the Congress,displaying 
his organising talent,energy,tenacity and,far once,admirable 
The redoubtable Denis de Kougemont,however,came away vith •  rather 
different opinion.
l.Am.LW,i5fc, newcirs,op. cit. p .221.
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- It vas perhaps a rather fitting end to this climactic and 
extraordinary ’ Congress of Europe*, though de Rougenont's nega­
tive conclusion more than underestimated the remarkable success 
vhich the subsequent political and popular campaign for Europe 
had in its Initial stage,and vhich the folloving chapters vill 
describe in detail. The vithdraval of the signed piedge,more­
over, vas veil compensated by the fact that nearly all the 
hopes expressed in de Rougemont's final Message vere actually 
fulfilled in the years vhich followed on from this historic 
Congress. - The Message concluded by declaring:
”1. We desire a United Europe,throughout vhose area the 
free movement of persons,ideas and goods is restored;
2. We desire a Charter of Human kights guaranteeing 
liberty of thought,assembly and expression as veil 
as the right to form a political opposition;
3. We desire a Court of Justice vith adequate sanctionsV 
for the implementation of this Charter;
4 . We desire a European Assembly vhere the live forces 
of all our nations shall be represented;
5. And pledge ourselves in our homes and in public,in our 
political and religious life ,in  our professional and
* trade union circles,to give our fullest support to all 
persons and governments vorking for this lofty cause, 
vhich offers the last chance of peace and the one 
promise of a great future for this generation and those 
that vill succeed i t ."  *
The Hague Congress vas in turn pronounced officially 
closed,and the delegates stood up to applaud "United Europe!"
- Not every one,perhaps,vas quite sure whether they vere applau­
ding the beginning of si historic venture • or the end of a truly 
unique Buropaan experience.
I . Pinal ' Pledge1 in de Rougmont's "Message to the Europeans" 
Closing Plenary Session V.R..P .3 8 .I0 .5 .4 8 .
- It should be noted hov de Rougemont managed to slip in 
the notion of the "living forces" being represented in the 
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PART II THE CAMPAIGN; THE SETTING OP OF THE COPKCXL OF EUROPE
MAY 1948 - MAY IM P
"The total results may appear slight. But the Hague Congress 
nonetheless marked a step tovard the building of the new 
Europe. It was,first of all,the culmination of a movement, 
consecrating the heretofore disparate and uncoordinated efforts 
of the European militants. It vas a major event for everyone 
vho participated in it;fro« then on,the creation of Europe 
vas to be taken seriously. The number and quality of the 
participants,their importance both in Buropean affairs and 
in the politics of their ovn corun tries, contributed to the 
groving influence of this spectacular demonstration. The 
continent,once apparently condemned,seemed to come to life 
again. Itat Europe still had Intellectual resources and men 
capable of original ideas could not nov be denied after these 
discussions in vhich soae of Burope's most brilliant minds 
had confronted one another." I
-The astonishing impact vhich the Hague Congress had upon the
European political and diplomatic scene can be judged by the fact
that nearly one year to the day later the main proposal for an
official European Assembly vithin the framework of a Council of
Europe vas actually accepted and established by a formal treaty 2
signed by the ten most Important Governments of Western Europe.
The subsequent inauguration of the ‘Council of isurope'ta Hay B49,and 
the first session of the European Consultative Assembly in the 
sunaer of the saae year,appeared to give concrete for« 
to the hopes and ideals expressed at the historic 'Congress of 
Europe' of May 1948. The campaign vhich led to this speedy achie­
vement vas best summed op by tvo of the Honorary Presidents of the
• European Movement' in their foreword to the story of the creation 
of the Council of Europe, published on behalf of the Movement itself.
- Paul-Henri Spaak.for example,stated:
"We,in the European Movement,have the right to be satisfied 
vith the vork ve have done so far. The Hague Congress vas a 
splendid and historic achievement. It vas there that the idea./.
1. J. Freymond, Western Union Since the War ,op. cit. p .48.
2. Statute of the Council of fciurope .signed 5.5«49. by the Govern­
ments of Belgium,Denmark,France,lreland,Italy,Luxembourg, The 
Netherlands,Norvay,Sveden & United Kingdom. Cf. pp.415-20
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./ .o f  a United Europe passed from the world of dreams to 
the realm of reality. When the impartial history of these 
efforts to unite Europe comes to be written it will be 
recognised that it vas thanks to the Hague Congress and 
to the subsequent campaign of the European Movement that 
the Council of Europe vas established."I
Similarly,Winston Churchill declared:
"The Hague Congress unanimously called for the creation 
of a European Assembly. Vithin a year that Assembly has 
become an established fact and its first session vill 
shortly be opening at Strasbourg. Our Movement has made 
swifter progress than anybody versed in political affairs 
would have thought possible. The success vhich has so far 
crowned our efforts should inspire us to press forward 
together with renewed vigour in this momentous enterprise.
It was no idle claim that nobody, not even Sandys , 
had dared to hope in May 1948 that just one year later the 
first major objective in the European campaign would be attained 
with the minimum of international disturbance and upheaval at 
governmental and parliamentary levels. Yet it was precisely 
this by - passing of national-institutional transformation 
which in the long run deprived the enterprise of its fundamen­
tal goal of organic European political unity. The apparent 
enthusiasm and optimism shown by the leaders of the European 
Movement in the summer of 1949 in fact concealed a very real, 
and ultimately essential defect in the edifice which they had 
to ftoudly moulded. The European Assembly had no political teeth. 
It had no formal powers. Its legitimacy derived not froo any 
directly mandated or accountable sovereign base,but rather from 
an international ambassadorial treaty,while the finished product 
itself was modelled by Government* whose enthusiasm in some 
notable cases was rather limited,as was their vision of the 
Assembly's future role and development. The control vith which 
they were allowed to hamper and harness the Assembly was total. 
In short, the European Assembly lacked a firm and clearly defined 
autonomous-sovereign base,strengthened by the resolute force of 
popular consensus. It was an Assembly inspired by a growing./.
I .  Spa a k , foreward to Th» arrgpean Movement and the Council ofi. MSiiKSS?””-
- 24B -
./.number of European militants,but actually translated into 
reality by a limited number of pragmatic personalities vhose 
actions »ere at times restricted by the complexities of the 
situation and perhaps by a rather narrow sense of the possible. 
The European Assembly vas an important and successful European 
forum,stimulated by deep and -visionary debate;but in the final 
event it proved to be a vacuous political institution unable 
to gain the necessary powers needed far fundamental structural 
change in Europe. It vas not,nor did it ever become,a European 
Parliament.
Nevertheless.it should be stressed again that in the con­
text of the time the campaign vhich led to the creation of the 
European Assembly vas most successful. It also Illustrated the 
same dilemas and arguments between "realists" and "idealists" 
vhich had marked the Hague Congress and its preparatory stages. 
At the centre of the campaign it was the realistic views of 
Sandys and Retinger which prevailed,and evolved into a shrewd 
policy of countering and defusing the "practical" criticisms 
and objections of the more cautious Governments,not by out- 
rightly opposing or ignoring these views,but by cleverly acco­
modating and reconciling official negative opinion within an 
ambiguous programne which nevertheless pushed towards an 
active and concrete European commitment. Paul-Henri Spaak later 
credited Sandys and Retinger as being the "two men responsible" 
for the success of the campaign,adding,vith regaxd to Sandys,that 
"all doors were open to Him and he visited all capitals,laid 
siege to all the ministries and overcame all opposition."
There can be no doubt that Sandys and his team performed a 
very astute and delicately close operation,leaving almost no 
scars upon the European governmental establishment. He in turn 
hoped and actively fought for longer-term change in the role 
and power of the European Assembly,with the influential backing 
of the European Movement. In the final event,however,it vas not
altogether d e a r  whether the European governmental estabtiament,/. 
i.. h 'a a i . The Goniuuim  nattTe , op.cit .pp.201-2
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./ .o r  the Bnropean Movement itself became diverted towards an 
approach less vigorous than originally intended. - It is vith 
this theme in mind that the following chapters will attempt to 
discern the fascinating campaign pursued after the Hague Congres 
for the creation of an official European Assembly.
CHAPTER
A.. TOWARD THE fIVS-POWER AGREEMENT OF JANUARY 28.1949 
7 .  THE DIPLOMATIC BREAKTHROUGH MAY-AUGUST 18,1946
I) Post-Hague Campaign Strategy — definition and dlr-wpfinri
The three week interval between the closing ceremony of the
Hague Congress and the subsequent meeting of the International v
Committee on Hay 29-30 was a period of delicate planning and
action behind the scenes,and of deep re-assessment among the
groups involved with regard to their subsequent policies and
eonnon strategy within the growing movement for European unity.
The Congress itself had recommended that a broader coordinating
body,representing all democratic tendencies in Europe, should be
set up as a "central organisation",which would include a "general
Council" representing the various movements and "eminent persons"
involved in the campaign,along with an "executive Committee",
assisted by a "General Secretariat"and various sub-committees.1
The embry of such an organisation,of course,already existed in
the actual International Committee. But it was n o w  dear  that a
larger and tighter organisation was needed to ^roadand bolster the
campaign and gain greater influence,connections and,perhaps above
all,direct access to as many interested politicians as possible.
Sandys,as Chairman of the Executive Committee,had already outlined
his plans for the future organisation of the campaign at the2
Hague Congress itself. He now lost no time in formulating his 
strategy and proposals in more detail,and within two weeks he had 
already submitted two confidential memoranda to the International 
Committee on the subject.
The first draft,dealing with the "organisation of the future
3
campaign", stressed that the co-operation hitherto betneai the m a n s  
European pressure groups had been of "unquestionable advantage./.
1. Doc. T .35 "Permanent Organisation of the Congress" CAEN BRUGGE.
2. Cf. pp .240 -24-3.
3. Sandys memorandum IC/>/g4,May 1948, CAEM BRUQGK.
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./.fo r  the general cause".The Hague Congress had in turn provided 
a "common mandate and programme of action." He varned,hovever, 
that if the campaign vas to have the maximum effect upon public 
opinion,parliaments,and governments,it had to be conducted as a 
■single concerted operation." It vas therefore necessary for the 
participating movements to vork through an "International co­
ordinating body", charged vith formulating joint policy and the 
overall piaiming of the cootkmi campaign. This vas particularly 
important in the forthcoming political campaign,in vhich a single 
organisation vas needed to conduct relations vith both Govern­
ments and the mass media vithout any "duplication and inconsis­
tencies." Above all,this single unified body should be responsive 
for the most important immediate goal of the campaign, described 
as:
"..th e  formulation of proposals far the constitution of 
the European Assmbiy; the planning of a concerted,popular 
and parliamentary campaign of action to secure the adoptions 
of these by Governments; the drafting in common of the popular 
manifestos,parllamentary resolutions,press statements,etc. 
necessary for this campaign;and finally the practical organi­
sation of such an Assembly in the event of Governments 
declining to take the initiative.”
The actual division of responsibilities proposed by Sandys far
this co-ordinating body reflected his constant apprehension in
assigning the more adventurous groups involve« a free hand in
carrying out a bold and boisterous campaign vhich vould probably
misfire and not reach the declared target. Thus,vhi1e assuring
each group of their "continued autonomy in theix respective
spheres',he In fact strongly hinted that the EOF should not
interfere vith the polltical-parliamentry campaign,but should
instead concentrate on vinning over public opinion. The Anglo-
French committees vere also supposed to act vithin this sphere,
but it vas clear fro* past expereience and present circumstances
that Sandys had no intention of restricting his ovn political
moves,nor those of his closer colleagues vho sharec his opinions
and strategy. Of considerable interest,hovever,vas the olive
branch vhich he held out to the EPB»vhich,he suggested,should./.
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./ .b e  recognised as the "appropriate organism for carrying out the 
parliamentary aspects of the common campaign and as the channel 
for coordinating and directing action inside parliaments and 
between parliaraentry groups and for organising international 
gatherings of a parliamentary character in support of the cause 
of European unity."(The ILBC,as usual,vas to be left to carry 
out its own economic and social studies)» The final part 
of his report repeated bis earlier structural proposals for a 
broader international Council based upon "truly representative" 
national groups,plus a balanced Executive,a General Secretariat, 
and various sub-committees. To this he added that the existing 
International Coordination Committee,since it vas constituted on 
a similar basis .should act as a provisional directing group , along 
with the current Executive,up until the permanent Council was 
officially constituted. The Secretariat,moreover,vould continue 
to be based in London and in Paris,thus enforcing the Anglo- 
French grip over the organisation.
The second memorandum circulated by Sandys dealt more with 
the "objectives and plans" of the campaign itself. Bight at 
the start, he emphasised that the Hague Congress Resolutions 
should be the basis and guide for all general propaganda purposes 
This was clearly intended to counter any federalist initiative. 
The aost urgent politic* aspect of the campaign, however,involved 
the organisation in each interested country of "representations 
to Oovemments" in order formally to present the Hague Congress 
proposals. Sandy* put forward the following format:
"Each national deiegation(to The Hague)should be asked 
to form an influential and representative deputation to 
call upon the Prime Ministers or Foreign Ministers of their 
respective country. The deputations should explain the con­
texts of the resolutions and urge the adoption of the specific 
recommendations.. ”
He then added
"Special emphasis should be laid upon the request for the 
immediate creation of a European Assembly." V
1. Sandys memorandum IC, P/25, May l^nb, CAEM BRUGGE.
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JTfae main emphasis In Sandys' report.it should be noted, 
concerned the feiropean Assembly. It vas an important 
reflection of his growing enthusiasm for the project,vfcich 
vas further illustrated by his recognition of the proposed 
Assembly as the key to the vbole European campaign:
"Whilst all the decisions of the Congress are of importance 
the demand for the inmediate creation of a European Assemtty 
is the one vhich is most capable of striking the public 
imagination. Moreover,such an Assembly,once created,vill 
provide a *ost powerful instrument through vhich continuous 
pressure could be exerted to secure the realisation of all 
the various objectives adopted by the Congress« The doaand 
for a European Assembly should,therefore,be made the certral 
and dominant feature of the vhole campaign,which should be 
pursued vith the utmost energy through every channel that 
is open to us."
This,in short, entailed a popular and parliamentary campaign 
operating at every representative level. It also meant having 
to tighten up and clarify demands about the role of the Euro­
pean Assembly itself. Sandys therefore suggested that a sped*, 
committee be set up in order to "formulate proposals for the 
composition,method of selection,and terms of reference of the 
desired Assenbly.” Such a committee,he vent on to state,should 
contain a two-thirds majority of parliamentary representative 
and should vork along-side the EPU. Finally,as another indi­
cation of his determination to pursue the European Assembly 
project,Sandys even appeared to entertain the eventual 
possibility of having to go over the heads of governments, 
declaring towards the end of his draft that'"to establish an 
autharitive European Assembly on an unofficial basis vill 
require about twelve months intense preparatory vork." - Cisatr^ , 
despite his enthusiasm for the Assembly,he did not under­
estimate the doubts and scepticism of some of the govenaMnts 
concerned,nar,on the other hand,the momentu» vhich the Hague 
Congress had given to the European campaign. His hopes for a 
tightly unified plan of action,however,did not fully take into
consideration the scepticism and outright hostility among cer­
tain groups in the European unity movement itself toacntimring
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•/•the  campaign under his somewhat dominating and abrasive direction.
Already before the Hague Congress,in fact,serious doubts vere
expressed by the EUF leadership about the desirability of working
under Sandys within a future organisation. In an important letter,
sent on April 12, the SUF General Secretary, Raymond Silva .informed
Sandys of his movement's views, cl aiming that "whether one likes
it or not,the public will regard you you as a Conservative,a former
British Minister and Churchill's son-in-law". He then added acidly]
"Europe can not be conceived without Mr. Churchill..but Europe will
not exist either without the Socialists." - The meaning was clear.
To the EOF, Sandys was now regarded more as a bogey-man than an asset.
Nevertheless,the federalists still desired some sort of unity
in the European campaign,though Silva explained that the movement
should be much more sensitive to,and a greater reflection of,public
opinion. His main structural suggestion, therefore : ,was the idea of
setting up a more balanced "Presidium",comprising three personalities,
Sandys included? Alexandre Marc had explained the significance
of this proposal in an interesting EUF circular.dated April 29,in
which he called for a "re—enforced" Executive, along with a movement
organised "according to federalist principles* - in other words.with
considerable internal autonomy. The actual Executive,he suggested,
should be directed by three Presidents dealing respectively with
2
general coordination,popaganda,and liaison with Governments.(Op until 
now,Sandys had effectively monopolised both the former and latter 
function). Marc,moreover,was far from enamoured with Sandys* style 
of leadership,and the Hague Congress precipitated his resignation 
from the International Committee on this point. His protest 
was clearly registered to Sandys in a strongly-worded letter dated 
May 25 ,in which Marc bitterly complained about the latter's “unila­
teral , arbitrary and authoritarian" mode of decision making,and the 
"stifling" atmosphere in the movement provoked by secretive back­
room conversations and tactical initiatives.3
1. SILVA,letter to sandys,12 .4 .48. EUF PAKIS.
2. marc " Projet d'Pne Organisation Européenne" , 29.4.46. CSC GENEVA.
3. MARC,letter to Sandys,25 .5 .48. EUF PARIS
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Similar feelings could also be discerned among the KPU
leadership,despite Sandy*' efforts to enlist their support.
At the CPU Council meeting of May 12 ,held in the Chateau d'Ardenn*
clear irritation was registered with regard to the Moderate
evolutionary line taken at the Hague Congress and,in consequence,
the Council strongly approved of forging much closer links with
movements of a more overtly "federalist" persuasion,especially
with the EUF,USSS and NEI. The Council furthermore proposed that
a new co-ordination comaittee be formed,with Coudenhove Lalergi
as Honorary President(along with Churchill,Blum and Luigi Sturzo),
and Bohy as effective President,while Sandys would be relegated
to the post of Vice-President(along with Brugmans,Bichet and van
Zeeland)? It was 4*  other words,a re-echo of Coudenhove's original
plan of November 1946 to form a revived Pan-Europe under his own
2
colours. Sandys had not reacted positively to the first initiative 
and it was rather unlikely that he vould willingly accept this 
current EPU proposal. The situation was Indeed perfectly'- 
clear to the EPU leadership. The tiae had come for
i a 'coup de force'. Coudenhove explained what was 
really meant by the plan in a letter written at a later date to 
Mackay:
"At our Council meeting at the Chateau d'Ardenne,you 
declared that we must try and eliminate Sandys from the 
Presidency of the Coordination Comn.ittee and to replace hia 
by Bohy. Upon your insistence,we took up negotiations with 
the Federalists and other groups to assure this change. In 
Paris we pledged to these groups that we would help them 
overthrow Sandys,and you vex* charged with proposing Bohy 
as Chairman of the Coordination Comsittee,
On the decisive day of the meeting of the International 
Comaittee in Paris(May 2 9 ) ,the planned 'coup'.however,went drasti­
cally wrong. Indeed,despite the preparatory arrangements for the 
removal of Sandys,Mackay actually took the lead in . / .
1. CPU Council meeting 12 .5 .48 . official minutes, MACKAY PAP EES
2. Cf. p.tel ,
3. GOODEKHOVE,letter to Mackay 1 4 .1 .4 9 ..nACIAY PAP«**.
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./.nominating him as Chairman! The EKU and EUF delegates vere left
completely stunned and appalled. As Coudenhove again explained:
"Without having consulted or informed anybody,you rose 
at the decisive meeting of the Coordination Committee to 
propose as its Chairman not Bohy - but Sandys! This surprising 
action of yours violated the unanimous decision of our 
Council and also our pledges to the Federalists and other 
groups.*1
The fact that the election of officers vas not even on the agenda 
was now forgotten,in the hastily improvised counter proposal by 
Coudenhove that Bohy and not Sandys should be nominated as Chair­
man. Brugmans,as originally planned,aiso gave his support to Bohy. 
Sandys in turn delivered a soft ‘killer punch'«exploiting the 
open panic and disarray among his critics: It vas not correct, 
he ironically pointed out,to accept his nomination as Chairman 
by Mackay,since this would be a matter for consideration only 
vhen the Council itself would be constituted. Bohy in response 
felt obliged to withdraw his candidature in a timid gesture 
which indicated his personal unease at this premature attempt to 
unseat Sandys,as well as an appreciation that Sandys still com­
manded the mood and majority of the meeting. As a result,Sandys 
vas then able to ride upon the band-wagon of apologetic good-will 
from among most of the other representatives,and was in turn 
"unanimously" re-affirmed as Chairman,up until the projected 
Council came into being. The EPU delegation,angry and deceived, 
withdrew from the meeting altogether,though Bohy nevertheless 
gave an assurance that they would keep in contact and work for 
the implementation of the Hague Congress resolutions.despite 
having no further direct association with the International
2
Committee.
1. Letter to Mackay,op. cit.
2, International Committee meeting.29-30.5.46..official minutes 
(EX/44/ I ) . p1tis accompanying papers, CA EM BRUGGE.
Attended by:Bas*d,Brossolette,Courtin,Dautry, Noel(CFEU); aert»s, 
lerstexis, MacMillan, Ketinger, Serruys(IIi EC) ;Bi chet, Soyer(KEl); 
Brugmans,Josephy, Silva, Voisin(EUF) ; Bohy,Coudenhove, Maccas, 
Mackay, Trinquea-(mi) sting-Hall,Lang,Layton,Sandys - chairman 
(UBM).
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Mackay, in open rebellion with his EPU colleagus,decided to 
stay put,however, and remain a member of the Comittee. The reason 
for his strange and apparently treacherous behaviour is indeed 
difficult to gauge,in the sane vay as was his perceived volte-face 
at the Hague Congress. Always one with a predisposition for amateur 
intrigue and tactical manoeuvring,perhaps he had been persuaded 
by sandys at the last moment to change sides,especially in viev 
of the latter*s growing enthusiasm for the European Assembly and 
the potential influence he might have upon the international poli­
tical scene as a messenger of the powerful Churchill lobby. There 
is certainly evidence to suggest that Mackay maintained 
a friendly rapport with sandys during this period.1 Perhaps,on the 
other hand,Coudenhove had simply overestimated Mackay's lead in 
pulling the 'coup' against sandys,while underrating his serious 
misgivings about the EPU itself under Coudenhove's control. By 
December,is any case,not only had Mackay fallen out with Sandys* 
cautious political strategy,he also led a rebellion in the EPU 
Council against Coudenhove. By January 1949,he started making 
overtures again to sandys and the European Movement Executive1 
This will be explained later. For the moment nackay remained 
loyal to Sandys,and thus provided a potential opening for the 
organisation of a strong parliamentary group which,as already 
noted,the latter dearly wanted. Likewise,Brugmans and the EUF 
delegation sew reluctantly felt obliged to remain within the move­
ment, even if this meant working under Sandys. The 'possibilist' 
Viewpoint thus still prevailed,much to the dismay of the more 
radical and anti-unionist circles in the EUF,who did not seem to 
appreciate Brugmans’ real fear of his movement becoming an iso­
lated federalist sect. The £UF chairman would in turn pay dearly 
for his moderate approach at the next EUF Congress in November. 
Sandys,for his part,proved to be a little more adaptable and open 
towards other groups in the Committee after this 'red alert1, 
■seking refuge instead by trying to exercise undue authority./.
I . See for example Fn.2,p.l6fi.
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./•ov ff the Secretariat. 1
The sensitive issue of chairmanship having been settled 
in Sandys' favour,the meeting subsequently adopted tte ne^r j*rt of 
his proposals for closer organic unity betveen the groups involved 
in the European campaign. It vas thus agreed that the movement's 
future coordinating machinery should consist of an International 
Council(based on representative national organisations),an execu­
tive,« Secretariat(centred in London and Parisiplus special com­
mittees dealing vith different aspects of the campaign. The pro­
visional Executive would include Sandys as Chairman and Retinger 
as Secretary General,along vith four 'Vice-Presidents' - Dautry 
for the CFEU.Brugaans for the EtJF,Bichet for the NEI.and Sir Harold 
Butler far the XLSC. The special cownittees would start operating 
immediately and be composed of one representative for each respec­
tive member group,vith Brugmans in charge of the committee for 
the popular campaign,Butler for the economic and social comnittee, 
Ramadier for the crucial institutional comsittee(vhich vould put 
forward proposals regarding the composition,convoking and terms of 
reference of the projected European Assembly),Madariaga for cul­
tural affairs(to be assisted by de Rougemont and Gibson), Eing-Hall 
for press and radio,Beddington-Berhens for finance(assisted by 
Christian Monnier and Silva),and Drapier for the committee dealing 
vith the proposed Charter of Human Rights. The idea of forming 
other conwittees concerned vith the projected Youth Campaign,
Eastern Europe,overseas attachewents,Germany,and the plan far a
3
European Court vas also to be considered at an early stage. The 
one rmaining gap in the campaign,resulting from the EPU withdraws, 
vas the need for a parliamentary sphere of operation. Either some 
sort of reconciliation betveen the Committee and the vas ./.
1 . This led to strong protests from Retinger for a "mutual respect, 
confidence and understanding" of roles within the movement, and 
to a personal accusation that Sandys vas trying to run a "one 
man show". - letters to Sandys dated 17 .7 .48 .,18 .11 .46 . RETIHSER
PAPERS.
2. Berhens soon ceded this post to Monnier.
3. Official minutes(t3C/M/1) op. cit.
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. / .  necessary,or an alternative parliamentary group had to be set tip 
from within the existing movement itself. Mackay and the British 
All-Party Parliamentary Group for Europe eventually proved to 
be most useful in this respect. Par the moment,however,Sandys 
still held out some hope of patching up an agreement vith the 
somewhat malleable and well-intentioned EPU Chairman,Georges Bofay, 
Moreover,Ramadiear's speedy consent in accepting the chairmanship 
of the Institutional Committee proved to be of immediate invaluable 
help in political circles,since,in addition to his considerable 
influence within the Preach Socialist Party,he also became 
a leading member of the French Government and Cabinet,first as 
Minster of State in July 1948,and then as Minister of National 
Defence from September 1948 to October 1949. These key cabinet 
posts soon provided a crucial launching pad in the diplomatic 
breakthrough achieved by the European movement,with the help of 
the Preach and Belgian Governments,in the summer of 1948. Before 
considering the effects which the European campaign had upon 
governments,we need first,however, to appreciate the growing ten­
sion over Europe which now reached crisis point on the interretio- 
nal scene,and the way in which the European movement reacted to 
this challenge
2) «Cold War1 Politics:the setting up the 'P .S . Committee 
on a United Barope’
During the six weeks before the next meeting of the Inter­
national Executive Committee,on July 17 -IB, there vas a sharp tun­
ning point in East-West relations which clearly affected the HUro- 
pem campaign. Indeed.it vas during these few weeks that the 
difficulty hitherto described as the 'German problem' suddenly 
broke out into the full-scale 'Berlin crisis'.bringing with it 
the irrepairable splitting of Europe into two hostile ideological 
blocs,and the first major international confrontation in Burope 
since the war. The restrictions plus openings which the escalatlcn 
of the 'Cold War' presorted the European Movement were crucial.
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The 'Cold War' background to the "German problan" and to 
the decision to rehabilitate Vest Germany within the One con­
text has already been sketched out la an earlier section.1 
»ifflee at this stage to aunarise the following eabsequent 
developments:- After. the joint allied communiqué of March 7 
favouring the setting up of a iederal Government,the Western 
ton ., of Germany w.re la t a n  included la the April jrp plan.
Th* region's economic realign anent and political rehabilitation 
with the ¥*stem Jferopean powers was finally sealed on June 4 
vhen,following a conference in London between the British,French 
and Benelux Governments, the setting up of an International Authority 
vas announced,with a view to boosting and supervising the iadustdal 
development of the Kuhr, On June 12 ,the Russians declared that 
the London recommendations contravened the Yalta and Potsdam 
agreements regarding the dismantling of German war industries. 
Finally,on June 18 ,the Western powers,acting with the 'German 
Economic Advisory Council1, announced a currency reform for Western 
Germany,and on June 23 ordered that the nev currency should also 
be applicable to the Western sectors of Berlin.* The Russians 
responded by introducing a nev currency in East Germany and by 
imposing a complete blockade on all forms of traffic into Berlin. 
On June 25 ,the famous allied air-lift to Berlin vas launched. The 
Russians in turn announced,on July X,that the Four fr’ower admini­
stration of Berlin had ceased and that the Western Povers no longer 
had any right to ro u ia  there. - For the first time since 1945 
the fear of another war,even w r t  destructive than the last,vas 
widespread throughout Korope.
The 'Berlin Crisis' understandably accelerated the attachment 
of Western Europe to the United States of America,leading to the 
expansion of the Brussels Treaty Organisation into the North 
Atlantic Treaty Organisation. On June II,the Dnited States 
Senate overwhelmingly approved Senator Vandenberg's decisive 
resolution supporting the provision of military aid to western./.
t t w . «e t :2. francs only rsluctaBtly aoowtei this measure.
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. / . Europe,and authorising the U.S Administration to join the Mussels 
Treaty Powers in an enlarged defence pact. On July 6 ,the issue 
vas discussed betveen high-ranking delegates from the C .S .A ., 
Canada,Britain,France and Benelux. Another meeting vas held on 
July 21 vhich gave the impulse to the final spurt of negotiations 
leading to the official signing of the N.A.T.O. treaty on April 4, 
1949,(Denmark,I c e l a n d , I t a l y , Norway and Portugal also becoming 
members). The 'Atlantic Alliance' between America and Western 
Europe thus became a fundamental feature of European Governmental 
policy,and the development was not lost upon the leaders of the 
European movement,despite some nagging doubts fay the former 'third 
forcists'. Sandys,in fact,clearly stated his own position in this 
context when he reflected back.some years later at the Council of 
Europe,that the 'Atlantic Alliance' vas from the start the most 
■essential element" in any "realistic" European policy.1 His 
initiatives' on behalf of the European movement during the 
specific crisis period in question illustrated that this vas 
■ore than a mere altruistic thought:
It vas precisely during these tense weeks in June-July 1946 
that Sandys went on an important mission to the United States, 
accompanied by Retinger and Honnier. At Washington,he managed to 
call upon President Truman,to whom he explained that the United 
Europe vhich he and his colleagues were trying to bring about
2
vould vork in "very strict collaboration vith the Unit«) States.” 
Sandys also contacted the influential U.S. Foreign Relations 
Cownittee activist,Senator Pulbright,who had been a major
3
force behind ERP and a leading supporter of European unity plans. 
The purpose of the mission.hovever.was not simply to cultivate 
connections and enlist powerful support for the European ca^xdm; 
it was also to find some hard American capital with which to 
finance directly the develojmmt of the projected * ttiropean Hweaatti.
1. SANDYS,speech at the Consultative Assembly of the Council of 
Europe,May 5,1965. 4th. sitting.
2. Sandys recalls,ibid.
3. See,for exagple.Fulbright's article 'United States of Kurope', 
THE AKNALS OF AMSRICAH ACADEMY OF POL.fc SOC.SCIENCE,XPj-
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This attempt to raise American funds »as clearly explained in 
a confidential report,written later by Monnier:
■Last Suwner",he stated,"Mr. Sandys,Mr. Re ting er and 
myself went to America to explore the possibilities of 
forming a powerful American group capable of providing 
funds for «nor Movement. The basis of a very powerful 
Committee was formed,but it was impossible to go further 
up until the Presidential elections. The collection of 
funds was postponed till the following day of these 
elections and till the day when we can send a new dele­
gation to the United States."
He then added:
• "I  an personally convinced that a new visit,in appropriate 
conditions,will allow us to gather a very considerable sum 
for the European Movement in 1949." 1
- Vhat was the nature of this newly-emerging and potentially
lucrative American Cosnittee? Who represented it? Who was behind
it? The group,in fact,became known as the 'American Comittee on
2
a United Europe'. Its three leading executive directors were 
William T. Donavan( chairman), All en w. Dul les (vice-chairman ), and 
Thomas W. Braden(director). The organisation supporting it,and 
to which all three leaders were directly linked,was the newiy- 
formed U.S. Central Intelligence Agency.
Important personalities such as Donavan - founding director 
in 1941 of the U.S Office of Strategic Sevices,and Allen Dulles
- former head of the O .S .s. office in Geneva,were clearly well 
known among Churchill's war-time entourage. Moreover,it "was 
highly unlikely that the well-informed and secretive Joseph 
Ketinger did not suspect the organisation which backed these 
two figures,who were both more than instrumental in transforming 
the war-time O .S .S. into the 'Cold War* CIA. Alien Dulles 
in fact became Deputy Director of the CIA in 1950,and Director 
from 1953 to 1961. Indeed, any claim that the European movement 
delegation was "unwittingly" in contact with the CIA in the 
summer of 1946 must be treated with scepticism. However . / .
1. MONNiœ, 'Rapport__du Président de la Sous-Commission Financier*
( EX/P/53).4 .12 .48 . CAErl BRUGGE. >
2. The U.S. Committee was overtly backed by American big-business 
interests. See U.S. Committee file CAEM BRUGGb.
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. / . i t  should also be stressed that the CIA at this time vas above 
all regarded as a respectable and very necessary organisation of 
'Ivy League' specialists in foreign affairs. It had not as yet 
been tainted vith the list of "dirty tricks" later carried out 
under Dulles and his followers. Nevertheless.in the vake of the
• Watergate- Affair' and the subsequent release of information 
about the CIA.it has now become an established fact that the 
'US Committee on a United Europe' vas meant to carry out "covert“ 
operations and secret funding on behalf of the CIA vithin the 
European netvork. The less familiar figure of Tom Braden vas 
crucial in this sphere and he actually became head of the CIA's 
International Organisations Division betveen 1951 and 1954. He 
later publicly stated that he vas actively involved in the "pump 
priming" of the European Movement. The sums acquired by the M ove­
ment were,hovever,mainly offerred during the 1950's,and do not 
directly concern this study. Suffice to say that an estimated 
1 .72. million pounds vas received by the Movement betveen 2951 
and 1959,most of this sum being used by the European movement' 
Youth Campaign - a relative trifle compared to the estimated 
20 million pounds provided by the Soviet Union to the East-Bexlin 
Communist Youth Sally in 1951. The point of interest,nevertheless, 
is that the ambiguous contacts already made in the summer of 1948 
indicated the ideological turn vhich the European movement and 
campaign vere taking,and the eventual undermining of a completely 
independent political line vhich the relatively vast sums later 
acquired from the CIA effectively implied.
I .  For the U.S. Committee,the CIA,and the European Movement,see: 
Sunday Times articles 'CIA Ghost Walks from Europe Past',
----  25 .5 .7 5 .;
'US light on British Spy Secrets', 
12 .8.79.
Le Bonde .article 'La CIA a financé Force ouvrière et ..
Mouvements européens',1 8 .6 .75 . ;
Time Out .article*Uncle Sam Goes to Market' , May 1975; 
Libération-.leading article,26 .4 .77.
See also Brugmans L'Idée Européenne ,op. cit. p .131.
- Much information is apparently given in an unpublished 
Oxford thesis on this subject by Xavier Rebattet.son ef the 
the e . m. Paris Secretary daring this period.
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3) Representations to Governments
During the same period as the 'Berlin Crisis' further Jolted 
the atlantic orientation of European governmental policy, as veil as cf 
the European campaign,the International Committee vent ahead in 
organising representative and influential deputations to the heads 
of the various ®vemments considered in the Hague Congress resolu­
tions, urging especially the speedy creation of the proposed tjuropem ‘ 
Assembly. These representations vere carefully prepared,and vere,for 
the most part,veil received,giving added impetus and publicity to 
the European campaign. This vas especially the case in France and 
Belgium where the two delegations,led respectively by Dautry and R«ynaud, 
and by Hoste and Drapier,vere accorded the Close attmtion of President 
Auriol and Premier ¿»chumam for the French Government, and tt-ime 
Minister &paak for the Belgian Government.1 Similarly, the Italian 
deputation,led by Carandlni and Spineili,held positive talks with
Prime Minister De Gasperi and his Foreign Secretary,Count Sfaria, vho,
2
according to Spinelli,"listened cordially and had much to say."
The ffcsima reception given by the British heads of Government, 
however,upon vhoa.it was broadly acknowledged,western European 
policy as a whole depended, was not particularly positive. The 
bitter accusations made by Hugh Dalton at the Labour Farty Conference 
in May against the few Labour MP's who had gone to The Hague almty 
Indicated the concern and alarm of the Labour establishment about 
ceding any governmental power to the "doctrinal altar of a federal
3
Western Europe." It vas clear in advance,therefore,that the Europe» 
movement deputation of June 17 would not be welcomed with the same 
enthusiasm as were most of the delegations on the continent. — Hardd 
MacMillan described the start of this episode as follows:
1. Deputations.Committee report (¡¡X./P/3) CAEN BRUGGE; also Re ting er 
letter to the various delegation leaders,9 .7 .4 8 ..RETINGER PAPERS
2. Personal Diary of Altiero Spinelli, 7-14.7.46.
3. See report of the Labour Party 4&th Annual Conference,Scarborot^y 
17-21.5.48. pp. 117-119,172-179. LABOUR PARTY ARCHIVES..
R.V.G. Mackay and H. Hynd effectively defended their attendance 
at the Hague Congress,charging the Labour Party with disleyaly 
to its European partners.
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’ ** all met la Churchill's tcob in the Hcuae of Ceram«, to the n ib tr  
of a doren or more. After agreeing our procedure,we marched la 
solemn procession,through the New Palace Yard,across Parliament 
Square,up Whitehall,till we reached Downing Street. Churchill 
led,vith the usual cigar and the equally inevitable V-signs.
The policeman on duty seemed a little surprised,as we dutifully 
followed our leader,tvo by two,like a school crocodile. But 
the traffic was stopped for our benefit,and we reached No. 10, 
into which Z do not suppose Churchill had entered since the 
summer of 1945,in reasonably good order. - The Prime Minister 
and Foreign Secretary(with a number of other Ministers)rece±ved 
us with appropriate courtesy and gravity."1 
2
The actual meeting was opened by Churchill,who briefly outlined 
the aims of the European campaign and the emphasis which was placed 
upon a strictly "Non-party,All-party and above-party* approach to 
European unity. He also stressed that there was no desire whatever 
to obtrude on the Government's position,and that the deputation 
and Movement as a whole rested content with the purely unofficial 
presentation of ideas. In the same light,he also drew attention 
to the fact that the central proposal for a European Assembly 
entailed no commitment to any rigid constitution and no appropria­
tion of any legislative or executive power. The Assembly would 
meet instead with the approval of Governments in order to discuss 
as a forum the whole question of European Unity. He therefore con­
cluded by asking for the Government's broad official approval for 
the unofficial work of the European movement.
The Hague Congress Political Report and Resolution were la 
turn delivered by Mackay,who retaliated to the battering which he 
received at the Labour Party Conference by sharply pointing out 
the democratic and representatlwe character of the Congress of 
Europe,which had been attended by 285 parliamentary representatives 
of all shades of opinion. Turning to the key proposal for a Euro­
pean Assembly,he not only claimed that the resolution in question/
1. MACMILLAN. Tides of Fortune op. cit. pp. 161-2.
- The delegation included: Boothby,C.Davies,H.Uelargy,H.HynH,
Layton,Lindsay,P.Macdonald,Mackay,MacMillan,Salter(all MPs¡kplus 
Berhens, Butler,Bonham-Carter, Hopkinson, Josephy, ting-Kall,Rhys- 
Hilliams.and Sandys— BUT Bulletin.July 1946. CEC GENEVA.
2. ' Report on tt*visit of the capotacta to thePJi 17.6.48. CAW4 BRUGGE.
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./.fo llow ed  remarkably closely the lines of Attlee's own pronounce­
ments on Western Union,he also drew a fine distinguishing point 
to Churchill's broad interpretation,stressing that the AssentOy 
should offer "practical* and "effective" advice,and that althaicfc 
the Assembly's decisions would not be binding upon individual 
governments they would have to be referred back to each govern­
ment for consideration. In other words,Mackay wanted to insure 
that fervernmental support for the project meant a clear commit­
ment at least to the idea of drawing up some specific plan for 
a United Europe,if not a binding agreement to accept such a 
plan.in  advance. It was an ambiguous but crucial dividing line 
with Churchill's more co-operative and vacuous conception of 
the European Assembly.
The meeting subsequently dealt with the Economic and Cultu­
ral Reports,presented respectively by Lord Layton and Eenneth 
Lindsay. Attlee,in  turn,attempted to lay most stress on the 
relatively harmless Cultural report,saying how he and Bevin 
very much welcomed the "ventilation" of ideas and the need to 
carry out the suggestions put forward in the latter report, a s  
regards the proposals of the siuropean campaign as a whole,howver, 
he stated that he was in agreement vith the "general aims” of 
the movement,but that irt was an unofficial organisation and oust 
not "clog" or "overlap" the practical vork of Government,nar 
impinge upon the extreme Importance of working closely with the 
Commonwealth. On the subject of the European Assembly,he appa­
rently ceded a little  by saying that the Government needed to 
study the idea more closely,especially if  the proposed Assembly 
was meant to be sponsored and mandated by Governments.
At this point,Mackay immediately realised that Attlee was 
attempting in  effect to classify the Assembly as a purely inter­
governmental body,and he interrupted to reiterate that it  was 
to be composed on a mainly parliamentary basis vith no advance 
mandate in the sense hinted at by .the British Premier.
Attlee failed to respond to this clarification,but Bevin •/•
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./ .a s  Foreign Secretary,soon spoke up to make it clear that he was 
rigidly opposed to entering into any commitment vhich w old  
entail discussions about sovereignty,and that he vas even more 
concerned about the Communists "getting a foot in" the proposed 
tiuropean Assembly, vith. all the de-stabiUsing effects this 
would bring upon European policy. He therefore countered 
Mackay* s point by stating:"If the Delegates vere to be chosen on 
a Parliamentary basisjow vould it be possible to keep the 
Communists out? It was exactly the sort of organisation that 
they vould do their -very efficient best to infiltrate."^ln pri­
vate conversation after the meeting,he again emphasised this 
fear,while at the reunion itself he tried to stress the serious 
work involved in constructing sound foundations for European 
unity,and that the European Assembly should only be a "cap" to 
the gradual preparatory stages still in course.
The meeting mare or less ended on this note,though Hackay
did manage to snatch Attlee's consent to prepare a more detailed
memorandum on the subject,somewhat to Churchill's shock and
displeasure it vould seem. Sandys later described the results
of the deputation in a rather optimistic light,stating that "We
had a full discussion lasting about an hour and a half. Attlee
vas most sympathetic,though Bevin vas rather more reserved...
The deputation(he added)vas veil reported in most of the nevs-
2
papers and on the BBC." The report on the meeting .later drawn 
up by the European movement,also concluded on the same note:
"The impression given 1 » . .private conversation vas that 
the work of the Movement as a whole had the Government's 
full approval,but that Mr. Bevin felt so strongly about 
the question of a European Assembly at this stage that it 
would be difficult to get his blessing if it vas decided 
to go on with the idea."3
1. BEVTH,quoted in the report if the meeting,op. cit.
2 . SANDYS,letter to Coudenhove-Halergi, attempting to show the 
latter personality that the European campaign vas still 
making important political progress,18 .6 .46 . CAEM BXtloOE.
3. Report,op cit.
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The campadgn for the European Assembly of course continued, 
but Bevin’ s sharp objection and criticism »ere veil-heeded and 
vould be met in part by proposals later distributed by the Move­
ment . In the meantime,Sandys and Retinger concentrated on irivaLOy 
securing the support of oths- European leaders,as veil as atten­
ding to their interests in America. Mackay,for his port,soon 
drew up his ovn memoranda» on the European Assembly project, anxi 
even enlisted Churchill's partial collaboration on the matter.
The actual proposals vhich he formulated at first appeared to 
very similar to the Hague Resolution dealing vith the European 
Assembly. There vere,however,crucial differences of emphasis,vhich 
in turn changed the gist of the original text in favour of 
a much firmer political commitment: For example,the initial sub- 
ciam*« is the Hague. text.describing the deliberative role of the 
proposed Assembly(ie.”to stimulate and give expression to European . 
public opinion” ) ,was now cut out altogether,leaving much more 
stress on the "practical measures" to be carried out by the 
Assembly in 'the.gradual quest toward the "Onion or Federation of \ 
Europe” ,and the "juridical and constitutional" implications ari­
sing out.of this.. ' Moreover;Mackay went on to link’ these 
proposed measures and plans to some s«rt of formal governmental 
initiative in this area,the proposals having therefore to be 
reported back to the Governments concerned.(There had been no 
mention of any governmental link In the Hague Resolution). FindEft 
he proposed as an additional clause that the Speaker in the-1. 
British Parliament should assume the responsibility for carrying 
out the necessary steps for the convening of the European AsseAQy, 
as would approprimm authorities abroad, thus ensuring that it was 
above all a p a r l i a m e n t a r y - sponsored initiative,independent of 
Government designs and mandates,-"Half way to federalism” was
the way Sir Arthur Salter" enthusiastically described this new
2
personal mwaorandua of wackay. The direct private action taken./.
1. Draft memorandum on the European Assembly,June 1948,MACIAY
. . PAPERS
2. SALTER,accompanying n o te ,ibid.
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./.b y  Mackay .however, on what vas after all the main political
proposal of the Hague Congress, and which was now a central theaie 
of the European campaign as a whole,was not appreciated by all 
quarters of the British unionist camp,as the subsequent period 
of internal debate and tentative reorganisation Illustrated.
4) Internal Debate:the problem of coordination.2nd usse cnm r***
Puteaux.June 22.1948
As the political and diplomatic campaign started to gather 
pace,the need to initiate the approved recommendations made by 
Sandys,regarding the formation of an International Council based 
upon representative national organisations,became a pressing 
objective. This was especially the case for the Anglo-Prech United 
Europe movements who up until now had managed to retain the 
structural leadership and initiative within the Movement as a 
whole. The British USM General Purposes Committee lost no time 
in this respect,and by July 12 provisional recommendations for 
the setting up of a 'British Council' were already put forward. 
The proposed designation of posts within the Council,however,was 
not quite as balanced as one should have expected. Prom a formal 
and honorary point of view,there was of course an attempt to 
present the movement in a politically representative light,the 
proposed 'Residency' of the Council going to the three Party 
leaders - Attlee,Churchill and Davies. Similarly,efforts were 
made to achieve some sort of equilibrium among the 'Vice-Presi­
dents, who included Sir Harold Butler,Lady Violet Bonham-Carter, 
Victor Gollancx,Bden,Amery,MacMillan,Lady Snowdon(President of 
Federal Union),Arthur Oreenwood,Gordon Lang,Mackay,Bob Edwards, 
Bertrand Russell,plus leading Church and regional figures. - 
However,the chief executive and functional posts were a three-to- 
one monopoly of leading unionist UEM figures,Lord Layton being 
proposed as Chairman of the Council,and Sandys as Vice-Chairman, 
while Boothby was offered the post of Executive Committee Chair­
man ,-along with the lone federalist voice of Miss Josephy a s ./.
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./.Exccutiv* Vice-Chairman. Mackay,vhose courageous leadership of the
Labour Party European group and vhose tactical efforts in supoj^. of
Sandys at a particular sensitive moment had effectively put hHw at
risk vithim his ovn Party and split him from his EPU colleagues,
vas rewarded vith no specific organisational post or duty. He had,
it seems,been put forvard as Executive Chairman instead of Boothby,
but clearly his outspoken manner and unreliable federation views
and activities convinced the UEM leadership that Boothby - for all
his cockiness - vas a safer option. The membership of the proposed
Council itself vas to be limited to six persons nominated by each
member organisation(ie. DEK,XLEC,British Ail-Party Group, Federal
Union,and perhaps the USSE),plus another 50 members representing
the political, economic and intellectual life of Britain.^
The French Committee,in the meantime,also looked into the
possibilities of forming a tighter and more representative
Council,hoping to exploit the more favourable attitude of
the French Socialist Party. Indeed, by the summer of 1946
the SFI0 leadership vas persuaded,especially by events in Germany,
that an active European policy vas nov necessary,even if this meant
engaging the wrath of the British Labour establishment vho hitherto
2
had been regarded as the key to European Socialist unity. Blum and 
Ram«dier,as the 'old guard' of the French Socialist Party,had of 
course already taken such a decision in April,and both had attended
3
the Hague Congress. After the Congress, Blum jubilantly wrote 
that a nev "bright horizon" and a "ne* phase in the history of the 
vorld" had been opened up,and that the "old traditional dogma of 
national sovereignty" had been seriously challenged by the concert: 
of a collective "supra-national order" of Europe.4 Similarly,at 
the 40th Congress of the SFI0 in July,André Philip spoke for the./.
1. UEM General purposes Committee meeting,1 2 .7 .4 8 .,official minutes 
(GP/M/3) CAEM BRUGGE. Those present included Bonham-Carter, 
Boothby,ting-Hall,L o n g ,Rhys-Williams,Sandys and Amery(chairman).
2. See F.F. Ritsch The French Left and the European Idea,1947-9 
op. cit. pp.I7I-I9I.
3. Cf. pp.ISt-161.
4. BLUM,editorial in Le Populaire ,12 .5 .48 . CAEM BRUGGE.
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./.s ilent  majority vhen he declared his open support for the event 
European campaign and the need to "invite the Government to or­
ganise Europe-"1 Even the pro-Labour Quy noilet reluctantly joined 
his Kuropear-minded French Socialist colleagues in this policy 
by September.
The key te a more effective socialist commitment in France 
to the gitwtig European moveoent lay .however, with the rather more 
doctrinaire activists in the influential French section of the 
USSE. Four leading members of the DSSE international comittee, 
namely Marceau Pivert,Andre Perrat, Jacques Piette and Gerard 
Jacquet.were in fact representatives of the SFIO Direction 
Committee. Pivert,however,as the long-standing chief of the 
SFIO left-wing,was still adamantly opposed to committing the USSB 
to a pluralistic European movement organised by Sandy»,and with 
Churchill apparently at the helm. Thus,despite some indications 
that other members of the USSB, such as Bob cidvards, were 
favourable to forcing some sort of association with the 
Joint International Committee,a lot of ground-work,persuasion 
and moderate infiltration ws-e still necessary In order to sway 
the socialist movement behind the unified European campaign, 
and thereby refute the accusations made by Labour about its 
"representative" quality.This much vas appreciated by tebattet, 
French Secretary of the International Committee in Paris,when 
he informed Sandys that an inner debate vas being held by the 
USSE on the subject of "organic unity" with the b'uropean nxrveamt,
adding that he personally doubted whether the pre— t Landers would2
accept such a policy. This debate soon came out into the open 
at the 2nd USSE Congress,held at Puteaux on June 22.
It Is worth noting that on the eve of the Congress L*on 
Blum delivered an important pre-opening speech. He left 
the delegates with no doubt about his views in favour of a ./«
1. F.F. Kitsch,op. cit. p .177.
2. REBATTET,letter to Sandys(GR/MCT/87’6) >9.6.48. CASH BRUGGE.
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./.unified  concerted effort In the European campaign,including the
active participation of Socialists,rather than their withdrawal
into a doctrinaire recluse awaiting the day when only, a Socialist
Europe could be brought into being:
"Do we have to wait for this majority before realising the 
United States of Europe? European Unity will not be installed 
only by the forces of socialism.. . (but)a federal European or 
universal organism will itself be the start of socialist 
realisation."1
As outgoing President of the USSE.Pivert did not appear
to agree with this analysis and attacked the malaise of the SFIO,
warning that world bipolarisation could only be halted by the
2
creation of a purely Socialist Western Europe. The subsequent 
election of the equally dogmatic Luxembourg Socialist,Michel 
&asquin,as President seemed to confirm that the USS* would conti­
nue in its purely socialist European strategy,as Philippe Serre 
and Gorkin advocated. However,the Congress was also attended by 
more moderate elements,especially the Dutch delegation under Jef 
Last,who found it "incomprehensible" that the U&£>E should be so 
reluctant to join the united campaign for a European Assembly. 
He therefore proposed,on behalf of the Dutch delegation,that the 
USSE should "adhere totally" to the International Coordination 
Coimittee. Brugmans.who also managed to slip into the conference 
as a member of the Dutch Labour Party,similarly appealed for the. 
USSE's full participation in the European movement,in order to 
strengthen the "progressive federalist minority’ is the Joint 
International Committee,and to resist the "chaotic nationalism" 
which was still rampant throughout Europe. Henry Frenay, vho was 
also present and eager to stake out his federalist-socialist 
credentials,suggested instead that the USSE could apply for 
"observer status" in the Committee,thereby avoiding any rigid 
policy commitment and loss of autonomy. The proposal was backed 
by leading British ILP delegates,Bob Edwards and Fenner./.
1. blpm .Puteaux Congress, quoted in EOF "Bulletin Ho .2 ,July 1946
CSC GENEVA.
2. F.F. Kitsch.op. eit. p .176.
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./.Brockvay.as veil as by the Belgian Socialist EPU ^resident.Gegams 
Bohy. Alexandre Marc,also in attendance at the conference, 
remained uncommitted and sceptical about this proposal,preferring 
instead to deliver a rather unpopular anti-parliamentary diatribe 
in favour of Europe's 'living forces'. After much debate and 
argument,the Congress finally supported Frenay's compromise 
proposals for "observer'1 membership of the International Committal 
though it vas clear that President Eosquin vould hardly rash 
such a request to the Conmittee. On the other hand,there vas 
strong feeling that the DSSE should develop broader "organic" 
links vith other 'progressive' groups in the European campaign 
vho favoured at least a minimum of economic piarming, such as 
the EUF,EPU and HEX. - In this sense,the rather obvious effort 
made by the federalist participants to cover their left flank 
appears to have been quite succestful.
In the federalist camp itself, however,the deep divisions 
of outlook and organisational objectives vhich the EUF had 
openly displayed at The Hague had nov reached snch a point 
that Brugmans' moderate brand of leadership vas seriously called 
into question. The post - Hague internal debate gave rite 
to a fundamental fight for power vithin the movement, the more 
extreme integral-federalists,on the one hand,attempting to clear 
the vay  for an extra-parliamentary campaign of the 'living forces', 
while on the other hand,the pelltically-ainded MFC,nov under 
Altiero Splnelli's reneved leadership.finally put up a strong 
resistance in favour of a fully-fledged campaign of support for 
a European parliamentary policy.
The French integral-federalists vere the first to seise the 
initiative,and at the 'Fédération* sponsored congress of June 
II-I3 Marc and Voisin stoutly defended the need to set up . / .
I .  2nd USSB Congress.Puteaux.June 1946 - official minutes plus 
accompanying papers. CAEM BKUGG4.
Note also EUF Bulletin No.£.op. C it .,since the official 
minutes are not far from complete.
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. / . extra-parliamentary "corps-speciaux",vhile Louis saileron,the
one time writer for "Je Suis Partout" and leading apostle of
extreme right-wing manrrassien corporatism, ■brilliantly"
described the fundamental principles of federalism."I In contrast,
Keynaud,Bonnefous and other parliamentary participants at the
congress vainly argued in favour of direct political elections
to the European Assembly and the need for establishing a new
2
European sovereignty.
In the meantime,Altiero spinelli was somewhat ambiguously 
elected President of the MFE at the Milan meeting of June ID?and 
in the first 'MFE Bulletin' of July 6 he launched into a stubborn 
appeal for the creation of a "real and actual higher supra - 
national state with a democratic structure..a European Parliament
4
..European citisenship,and supra-national sovereignty." At the 
subsequent EOF Central Committee meeting of July 15,he was more 
explicit,claiming that the EOF was in danger of becoming an 
organisation for the promotion of "sacred regional particularism." 
He in turn stressed the need to work strictly in line with the 
EPU,stating his preference to see the parliamentarians in the 
front line of the battle for the convening of a European AssentOy, 
while the federalists should act as a broader and progressive 
back-up movement. This was in strict contrast to the EUF Execu­
tive Bureau report,which had emphasised the need for the tlPD to 
recognise the major role which the 'living forces' should have 
both in the projected European Assembly,and in the current cam­
paign. ^  The main divisions in conception,however, became es«i more 
pronounced on the second day of the meeting,when the EOF . / .
1. EOF Bulletin No. 2 . ,op.cit.
2. ïbid. - For more details on the 'Fédération* congress,consult 
1948 press file CAEM Brugge.
3. On Spinelli's election,see Brugmans letters to Osellini.Cabel- 
l i , Monti fc Olivetti,26 .6 .4 8 .,plus Brugmans letter to ipineOi,
6 .7 .48 . EOF PARIS.
4 . A.SPINEXLI.'Lettera Federalista ft.I',MFE Bulletin,6 .7 .48 .
' .... MFE TURIN.
5« EOF Central Committee meeting,I5.7^6.,a££iciaL-Biautfis
CEC GENEVA.
6. Official EOF note on coordination with the EPU,June I94B
CEC GENEVA.
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./.agenda for the second major congress,to be held at Rome la Novem­
ber, vas at the centre of the discussion.
Spinelli came veil prepared to the meeting,having vorked 
since his election in June with Rossi and Calamandrei upon pro­
posal* favouring the convocation of a ’political* European Consti­
tuent Assembly ,vhich Calamandrei would himself present to the 
EUF Congress. Furthermore,Spinelli had insisted prior to the 
Central Conmittee meeting that Brugmans should allov the Calaman- 
drei report to be delivered to the Rome Congress as a condition 
for future co-operation between the mfb and the EOF.(  The other 
conditions stipulated by Spinelli were:-no interference by the 
EOF in MFB affairs:the Italian delegation to Rome should consist 
soley of MFB »ent!*«rs; the EUF should break off relations vith 
other Italian federalist movements;and that he vas prepared to 
ally himself vith Brugmans,but not vith Marc I) Hovever.hls diary 
of the meeting on July X£ recorded that he had to "fight hard"in 
crder toaeenrt that Calamandrei‘ s Constitutional and Political 
Report could be delivered at Rome,vhlle Bmgmans,it appears,vas 
more interested in discussing "functional problems” .and Marc .along 
vith Voisin,attempted to diminish the potential impact of the 
C&lamandrei proposals upon the debating arrangements of the Con­
gress. The official minutes of this EOF Central Conmittee meeting 
clearly confirm Spinelli*s staunch defence of a strong political 
approach to the European campaign.and the support he received in 
this policy from Miss Josephy,though by no means the majority of 
the Committee. . In the final event he nevertheless.managed to ' 
secure a place for the presentation of the Calamandrei Report at 
Rome,along vith all the political implications arising from it, 
but had to accept that it risked being submerged in a general 
mixture of ’ functional” reports dealing vith extra-parliamentary 
European activities.— As he privately reflected: "Voisin finally 
managed to gain approval,with only my vote against,for the setting 
uptf a dooem co—eetees.to dea vith various problems - agriculture,uni­
versities, and Clod knovs vhat else...The federalist level of this 
Central Committee is really exasperating. There Is nobody in i t . / .
./•»1th  a real political mind."1
What Spinelli,perhaps,did not appreciate fully enough at 
this stage,however,was that the EPU itself,in which he placed so 
much confidence,was also entering a period of crisis and reassess­
ment, in preparation for the parliamentary conference at IntexUceo, 
to be held in September. It is true that both de Menthon and 
Mackay »ere preparing radical proposals for some sort of 
European Constituent Assembly,of which Spinelli greatly approved, 
but this did not prevent the fact that,as a movement,the EPU 
lacked a firm homogeneous base and was frought vith personality 
differences,especially concerning Coudenhove's rather sensitive 
style of leadership. Moreover,Mackay vas up to his old tactical
tricks again,and vas actually planning the submerging of the EPU
2
into the more general 'Inter-Parliamentary Union' , in the hope 
of buying Labour Party support for a broader and less incrindnatng
3
Western Union campaign. After gaining some initial double-edged 
help,however,he appears to have dropped the idea,thougk he still 
remained rather an aloof figure in the £PU as a whole, concentrating 
instead on leading the British All-Party Group,which under his 
influence actually rejected the somewhat ungenerous UEM proposals 
regarding the formation of a single 'British Council' for the 
European campaign.
In conclusion,the post-Hagte Congress debate within
V
the European movement let loose a chain reaction of doubts and 
inner struggles for power and influence. It vas indeed an impor­
tant transitional period for the groups involved in the European 
campaign,and reflected the considerable problems posed by the./.
1. SPIHELLI Diary; 18 .6 .46.,1 .7 .46.,15- 16.7 .48.
EOF C.C. meeting 15-16.7.48. official minutes,op. cit.
2. Inter-Parliamentary Union¡founded in 1899 as a voluntary study 
group of international parliamentarians,meeting twice yearly.
3. MACKAY,letters to Dalton 1 4 .7 .4 8 .,and to Morgan philips 7 .7 .48 .
5 .8 .48 . MACKAY PAPERSjNEC International Committee meeting,




./.need for unified concerted action. Nevertheless,despite the 
internal battles and confusion over strategy,the International 
Executive Committee itself.under Sandys' strong leadership and 
Setinger's tactful persuading powers and dogged determination> 
managed to maintain a united front and eventually carry through, 
the proposals for European political unity Into the realms 
■of official decision making.
5) The_J^eajcthrgugjK_we~T>oranda_of July 18 and August 18,1948
The concentration of efforts within the Executive Committee, 
after the Hague Congress, on the primary objective of creating 
a European Assembly was now starting to have an effect upon 
key political circles on the European Contin ant. The Congress 
itself,of course,provided the chief source of momentum to the 
campaign,followed by the representations to Governments,and aidad 
considerably by the fears provoked throughout Europe with the 
'Berlin Crisis*. Added to this were the discrete but decisive 
private efforts undertaken chiefly by Sandys and Ketingar la 
persuading sympathetic European Government leaders finally to 
take a strong public stand on the issue. The Belgian Premier, 
Paul-Henri Spaak,had already,In fact,delivered bold statements 
about the need for European unity,but could not afford to take 
up a definite programme of action which risked isolating him 
in official diplomatic circles ,or draving opposition from vithin 
his own vacillating Party,despite the popular note which the 
campaign appeared to strike. Likewise,the French Government did 
not wish to create friction with Britain or destabilise its 
fragile domestic make-up, although it too was favourable to<aaser 
Bisopeen unity «»aaursG. The 'Berlin Crisis', and the rather heavy- 
handed American-British effort to force the pace of Vest 
,/ Germany’ « econanic and political recovery upon the Preach* 
authorities,finally broke this diplomatic inertia. The process, 
ironically, was triggered off with th# fa ll of the Sc human. / .
I .  See RBTIHGER memoirs.op. clt. p .223.plus SPAA* Cf. p .248.
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./.Government on July 19, after'being defeated in tie Naturae Ass«*üy errer 
military credits. A new French Government vas only formed five 
days later,during vhich time Bidault,as acting Foreign Minister, 
still attended the Brussels Conference of Ministers.vhere he vas 
perhaps in a position to be even more outspoken and Impulsive 
than under normal circumstances. He did not vaste this valuable 
opportunity. The initiative vhich he took at the decisive meeting 
of July 20 ,hovever,would not have been made possible vithcrut the 
crucial intervention of the European movement.
Precisely tvo days earlier,the International Executive 
Committee had been re-convened in Paris under Sandys’ chair*an- 
shipfand lost no time in draving up three important memoranda on 
the proposed European Assaably,vhich were to be delivered respec­
tively to the "sixteen" Prime Ministers and Parliaments of Western 
Europe, and to the Conference of the "five" Brussels Treaty Foreign 
Ministers. The first memorandum,sent to the Prime Ministers, 
struck the most cautious notier emphasising that the European
Assembly envisaged vonld not interfere in any vay vith the2
authority of national Governments and Parliaments. The memorandum 
sent to the Parliaments,on the other hand,stressed the practical 
role of the proposed Assembly in formulating European plans and 
recomendations for Governments, as veil as the necessity to set
3
up the Assembly by the beginning of 1949. The most pertinent 
mémorandum in immediate terms,hovever,vas despatched tor the immi­
nent attention of the Five Foreign Ministers. Kef erring to 
clause(4) 6f the Bague Political Resolution on the European 
Assembly,the nev document further suggested that the Parliaments 
of the "sixteen” Western European nations,plus the corresponding 
body for West Germany,should be "invited to pass a resolution"./.
Z. International Executive Committee meeting,17-18.7.48.,official 
minutes (EX/MTS'). - Attended by: Aron, Courtin.de Men thon, Philip 
(CFEU);Berhens,terstens,Ketinger, Serruys,Vallée-Poussin, van 
Zeal and ( XLfiC) ; Brugmans, J osephy, Silva, Voisin(EUF) ;Bichet, Lanella, 
Soyeur( NEI) ; Eing-Hall,l.ayton, bang, Sandy »-chairman ( U EM). CAEM 
8. Accompanying paper PC/P/1, annex A BRUGGE.
3. Ihid. annex B.
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./.asking for the coirvening of this Assembly. The memorandum vent 
cm to add that further agreements would have to be reached as 
regards the "precise tenu  of reference of the Assembly" and 
the "procedure to be adopted in selecting the members of the 
Assembly",as veil as the specific organisational,administrative 
and budgetary arrangements to be made.* In other vords,the 
Comaittee dre* beck from thé .temptation, of proposing a precise 
plan for the European Assembly,in order to avoid a définit* reci­
procal rejection by the Ministers, instead,they first sought to 
gain the Ministers* general approval of the project in principle, 
after vhich a commit»ent could then be extracted vith regard to 
specific arrangements. Moreover,the leaders of the European cam­
paign realised only to veil that the project could only succeed 
if  the European Ministers themselves appeared to be opting 
upon their own initiative. The initial idea of convening a European 
Assembly vas brought to official attention.but the Ministers had to 
show their ovn public interest in the matter if the project vas 
to make any further official progress. Nevertheless,the fact that 
much respected European politicians such as André Philip and Pad 
van Zeeland vere among those responsible for the presestation m£ 
the menorandum of July 18 to the Council of foreign Ministers 
certainly lent authority to the document,vhile in the meantime 
Bidault and Spaak(in his capacity also as Foreign Minister)hnd 
been softened up ,If net fully informed,as regards the plan.
In due course, on the morning of July 19, Senator terstens vas 
despatched to the Ministerial meeting at The Hague vith a letter 
vhich he vas to deliver personally, on behalf of the International 
Executive Committee,to the Conference,requesting the Ministers
to give their "earnest consideration” to the proposals listed
2 .
in the memorandum concerning the European Assembly. On Tuesday./.
1. ' Memorandum regarding the Convocation of a European Assembly*
dravn up by the International Executive Committee 16.7.46.
CAEM BKtJGQS.
2. Official minutes.(EX/H/t/l.op . cit.
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./.Ju ly  20 ,Bidault,speaking still in the name of the Prench Govern­
ment, gare his tenuous official support to the memorandum,calliirçj 
for the creation of a European Assembly and declaring that the 
European Governments should facilitate the realisation of the 
"great movement of opinion launched at The Hague."I The arguments
vhich he put forward were those vhich had in actual fact been2
developed at the ‘ Congress of Europe*. It »as certainly an 
historic diplomatic initiative by the Prench Foreign Minister, 
though inevitably diminished by the fact that he no longer in 
effect held, office.
Though no objections were apparently raised to the idea in 
principle,Bevin »as quick to point out that the project vas 
"premature“ and in need of mcrre precise formulation. The European 
Governments and Parliaments,he maintained,should not become 
involved as yet in such a plan; the proposals and clarification
3
should best be left instead to "private organisations". What 
Bevin in effect meant ty this vas that the project should be offi­
cially shelved until the proposals were of such a precise nature 
as to warrant an eoually precise veto. The role played by Paul- 
Henri Spaak at this point was crucial. Initially he agreed with 
Bevin that a »ore precise formula vas needed and should be dravn 
up by a private organisation. Bat this vas not with the intention 
of thereafter rejecting the new proposals. Spaak hoped instead 
that the Governments would "seise* this clearer project,without 
thereby becoming directly involved in the initiative. He appeared, 
in this sense, to be at strategic odds wxth the European movement, 
though it has bean noted that Sandys also contemplated the idea of 
having unofficially to convoke a European Assembly as a last 
resort.4 The Belgian rremter-Foreign Minister explained his 
motives shortly after,on July 24 ,in a private meeting with . / .
1. See Chronique de Politique étrangère 1946. Vol 1 No.3;p.36, 
Vol. I No.5 ,pp.16-20.
2. Article written on Bidault*s initiative of 20.7.48. by w. terr 
in Mew York Herald Tribune .
3. Chronique de Politique étrangère,op. cit.
4 . Cf. pp. 252 ,253»
- 281
. /.Ramadier,when he admitted that he had apparently bean influenced 
by Berin's useaoected firs opposition to the project ts it stood, 
ts£ tbe fact that Sidjra.lt t m  ia e=y case a ’"ri-.istr-e ae*±s- 
siennadre" and would not hare to pursue the proposals made. Spaak 
thus maintained that in actual circumstances the campaign for a 
European Assembly had a better chance of succeeding if it vas 
initially pushed from an unofficial level.'
Sandys had in fact already appreciated the point and,as a 
result of the ministerial conference,wrote on July 21 to all five 
Foreign Ministers stating that if neither Governments nor Parlia­
ments would take the responsibility for convening the proposed
European Assembly the International uommittee vould be willing
2
to do so. Speak,in turn,grasped the initiative and declared in 
the Belgian Senate,on July 29, that he was in favour of a Jiuropean 
Assembly, and that upon receipt of detailed recomendations 
from the International Committee he would be willing to approach 
other Government* with a view to securing their agreement. As 
he had explained to Kamadier a few days earlier,no Suropem 
governmental action car .comitment would be taken until 
the unofficial European movement itself took the risk of fourni- 
shing much dearer recomnendations. He nevertheless stressed that 
his own preference was for some sort of governmental involvement, 
in order to ensure the proposed European Assembly some "official 
value and effectiveness;-" With xamadier's forceful collaboration, 
moreover,the Belgian Premier ceded that the establishment of some 
sort of limited inter-parliamentary study group,set up by the 
Brussels Treaty Governments but not necessarily engaging the 
responsibility of the latter,stood a chance of success is promo­
ting the European Assembly proposal,especially since such a group 
would appear in geveramental circles to be pursuing the specific 
issue "neither too rapidly,nor too energetically." The chief 
difficulty in all this,however,was Bevin's concern about
X. Confidential summitry of points raised in a discussion between 
Spaak and Kamadler,2 4 .7 .4 8 .,about the convocation of the 
proposed turopean Assembly. CAE« BEUGGt.
2. SAKDYS,letter to the "five" Foreign Ministers,2I.7.4&.
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./.Coiwtunlst membership of the European Assembly,which led bpaak and
Eamadier to agree that restrictive measures in this area should
be proposed in order to placate the British Foreign Minister's
main apparent reason for objecting to the project. The same point
was again stressed in private conversation between spaak and
Vallée-Poussin in preparation to the Belgian Premier's important
declaration of July 29. - Hot only should the Hague Committee
propose dear  suggestions as to the election of members to the
Assembly in question.it would also "be easier to rally Bevin's
sympathies if the mode of election would have the effect of exclu-
2
ding the Communists."
In response to such requests and advice,the leaders of the 
International Executive Committee prepared a ' nreliminary Memo­
randum' to be submitted to the "five" Governments,signatories to 
the Brussels Pact. The document was drafted early in August and 
was mainly the work of Sandys and Ramadier(as President of the 
key 'Institution Committee?), along with de Menthon and Reynaud,
3
and in consultation with Brugmans and Bichet. Sandys also met
Spaak for private talks in London,on August 9 ,and subsequently
informed Brugmans:
"I  think this document will be acceptable to the Belgian 
and French Governments,and Spaak would be prepared to submit 
it on behalf of his Government as an official document for 
consideration by the next meeting of the Five Brussels Treaty 
Powers."*
Sandys indeed had every right to sound confident. Not only was 
the Belgian Premier becoming actively involved with the view to 
taking official diplomatic action, the new Krench Government,farmed 
on July 24 under André Marie,was also openly committed to the 
growing European initiative, and contained several major Ein'opean. /•
1. Note on Spaak-Ramadier talks,24.7.48. op. cit.
2. Information in a letter written by Vallée-Poussin to Rebattet,
24 .7 .48. CAEM BRUGGE. On Spaak’ s declaration of 29.7.48. see 
Chronique de Politique étrangère.Vol. I No.3 ,p .36.
3. Information in letters from Sandys to Bohy,6.8.48.,and to 
Brugmans,9 .8 .48 . CAEm BRUGGE.SANDYS PAPERS.
4 . SAXDYS,letter to Brugmans Ibid.
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. / .  c amp signer*. including Blum(Vice-rremier).Schuman (Foreign Minis­
ter) ,Reynaud(Finance ninistex),P. Pfimlin(Agriculture), and Rara*- 
dier(Minister of State). Furthermore.the political climate in 
France vas rapidly moving In favour of a direct European initia­
tive. Already en July 16 Blum had confided that the majority of 
French deputies supported the idea of a European Assembly.1 By 
July 26 ,over tvo hundred deputies had actually signed the motion 
presented by de henthon and Bonnefous in favour of a European 
Constituent Assembly,vhile on July 28 the National Assedflyfe Fose&i 
Affairs Committe« adopted the same motion by a substantial majo­
rity. Even the French resident,Vincent Auriol.publicly identifiai 
himself in favour of a European Assembly. The French press simi­
larly spoke out in favour .and looked to Bidault* s dramatic gesture 
of July 20 as a continuation of the French "revolutionary tradi­
tion", as opposed to the "sloe evolutionary" methods of the "Azgk>-
Saxons.■ Whether Bevin liked it or not,a "unique" atmosphere far
2
"making Europe" nov conditioned French political thought.
The diplomatic breakthrough of the European campaign 
vas close at head. In the vords of Joseph Retinger:"Suddenly,on 
August 15 ,Paul Ramadier,vho had then become a Cabinet Minister, 
told us that he vas villing to put «his (European Assembly)pro­
posal before the French Government,asking it to take the initia­
tive in calling a meeting of the Western Foreign Ministers..to
3
discus our ideas." According to Sandy*,the French leadership 
vas actually "pressing" the International Executive Committee 
to present their recommendations in time for consideration at 
the next full meeting of the Government ,on August 18.4 The 
Conwittee Bureau subsequently met on August 18 and rushed through 
the final approval of the text to be presented to the "interested 
Governments" in Europe, specifically vieving the "five" Brussels*/«
1. BLUM,private talks cited in Spinelli Diary. 16 .7 .48.
2. See Année Politique I948(Julv)p .26 .. Le Monde editorial
23 .7 .48 .
3. RETINGSR memoirs. op. cit. p .222.
4. SANDYS,letter to Bohy,I9.8.48. CAEM BRUGGe..
5. Bureau meeting,IB.8 .4b ..official minutest£K/H/3 ).CAeW BRUGGt. 
-attended by sandy*, Bichet, w>urtin, uuti er, Nord, te etingetr.
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./.Pact covers,and especially France. The actual document,drawn up 
as a memorandum,clearly illustrated the influence which Ramadier 
and Spaak had exerted over the strategic thinking of Sandys 
and his Executive colleagues. In addition te repeating the broad 
terms of reference layed dovn at The Hague regarding the proposed 
European Assembly,and the hop* that the Assembly would "ultimatAy 
embrace all the nations of Europe",the memorandum concentrated 
above all on proposing a scheme vhereby Governments would be 
called upon officially to authorise the project,while having no 
direct involvement in the tentative formulation of procedure to 
be proposed vith regard to the actual establishment of the Mseratty. 
The text thus suggested that, "for reasons of speed and administra­
tive convenience” ,the Five Brussels Treaty Governments should act 
as the convening authority for the European Assembly,and in turn 
secure parliamentary agreement for the setting up of a 'prepara­
tory conference' ’«kich could by itself consider all matters 
relevant to the eventual convocation of the Assembly in question. 
This'preparatory conference,the memorandum suggested,should be 
composed of about seventy five parliamentary and non-par liant en tary 
delegates(one third of the seats being distributed respectively 
to Britain,Prance and Benelux),and should specifically consider 
the countries to be represented in the Assembly, the number and 
allocation of seats,the method for selecting candidates,the rules 
of procedure,the place and date of the first session,and the 
agenda for this first session. The memorandum also emphasised that 
the scope of the Assembly should include all OEBC countries,and 
not simply the Brussels Pact nations,though it was to the Govern­
ments of the latter formation that the conference recommendations 
should be presented.1
In other vords,the International Executive Committee still 
shrank back from making any specific proposals concerning the 
actual convening of the European Assembly,iWle at the same time./.
I .  ' European Assembly - Memorandum submitted to the Governments 
by the International Committee of the Movements for European 
Unity' .18 .8 .48 . CAW BRUGGE
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. / .a  major effort had been made to meet Spaak's contention that the 
British Government vould veto any move vhich threatened to direc­
tly commit i t ,  in advance,to the effective convocation of the 
proposed European Assembly. The memorandum in this sense attempted 
to present the "five" Governments vith a tentative plan of action, 
but not one vhich necessarily called for governmental participate» 
or prior approval of the recommendations. The preparatory confe­
rence vould only be entitled to the amount of authority vhich the 
Governments themselves vere prepared to specifically transmit to 
it,be this at a diplomatic or parliamentary level. The main purpose 
in proposing a preparatory conference,hovever,vas to transform 
the hitherto unofficial level of the European campaign to a level 
recognised by Governments and Parliaments,even if the precise 
formula ftr the Bur op a an Assmbly could not be forseen. Indeed, while 
the campaign remained soley identified vith an unofficial mcrvemert; 
as Bevin and Attlee preferred,it vas only too easy for the latter 
personalities to discount any proposals made as being "prema­
ture” and "unrepresentative”. If,on the other hand,the British 
Government, along vith the other European Governments,conld be 
sufficiently Associated vith the European Assembly scheme,without 
thereby being committed to the idea in full,then at least Bevin's 
objections vould no longer be directed thereafter to "private 
organisations” ,but vould have to be addressed instead to official 
European Governments,vho,by this stage,vere more likely to 
support the scheme and resist any outright rejection.
The memorandum of August 18 vas subsequently sent off to the 
sixteen OEEC Governments,and delivered vithin hours by Ramadier 
and Schuaan before the full meeting of the French Govemnent, 
held that same day under the chairmanship of President Attriol.
The document vas endorsed in less than four hours, the main driving 
force behind this rapidity being Schuman himself,vho considered 
the matter as very urgent.1 As the‘Manchester Guardian' also 
commented however,"the presence of M. Ramadier and K. Reynaud in 
the Government could only reinforce the tendency to support . / .
~  Continental Daily Wail 19 .8 .46 . .article by H. ting .
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./.th e  cause of European unity“ ,adding that "such a proposal 
has been expected for some time.’ *
At the end of the meeting the following official communique 
vas issued front the Elysée Palace to the international 
press:
"The Government has considered the Memorandum submitted 
by the ¿¡uropean movement regarding the convening of a 
conference to prepare for the creation of a European 
Assembly. The Government has decided to give this project 
its active support and to initiate all necessary action. "2
In turn,the Prench cabinet spokesman and Information Minister,
François hititeafand,elaborated upon the comatunique,stating:
"Mr. Schuman, communicated to his colleagues the broad 
lines of the memorandum...The Prench Government agreed to 
supoort the essential principles.. . and to commend then to 
the other nations concerned. For this purpose contacts vill 
be established betveen the Foreign Ministers of the various 
nations«notably the States of Benelux and the United Kingdom 
in order to arrive at a common standpoint and,if an agreement 
is reached,to try and operate the provisions of the memoran­
dum.
The diplomatic breakthrough of the campaign for a European 
Assembly had been achieved in just over three months after the 
Hague Congress. It vas indeed the most crucial stage in the 
campaign,since the failure to secure official recognition vould 
have considerably reduced the status and attraction of the 
scheme,and might veil have led Ho an abortive attempt to conjure 
a European Assembly on a popular and «unthoiitatlve basis over 
the heads of governments, as vas unsuccessfully attempted in later 
years among federalist groups. 4 Moreover.it vas also decisive 
that France,as the most influential pover on the European conti­
nent and Britain's closest diplomatic ally,had been the first 
to extend official governmental recognition and approval o f ./ .
1. Manchester Guardian .article and editorial on the French 
Government's initiative, 19 .8.48.
2. Creation of the Council of Europe p .5. - European Movement 
publicationdMF/lO/E) 1949. See also The European Movement 
and the Council of Murope .op. cit. p .52.
3. Hevs Chronicle ,19 .8 .48 .
4. Cf. p. 46S-4-?4
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./.th e  European Assembly cause,since such a diplomatic initiative 
could not be ignored by the British Government. The Belgian Premia? 
seems to have recognised the advatage involved vith the Prench 
Government’ s rushed approval of the European Assembly memorandum, 
despite the fact that he too had seriously considered the possi­
bility of launching the official campaign himself. - As Retinger 
later explained:
"This vas all done in a hurry and Paul-Henri Spaak.vho vas 
resting in Biarritr,could not be kept fully informed. However, 
ve telephoned him and told him that the French Government 
intended to accept our proposals. He then agreed to leave it 
vith them as it vould be easier for France than for Belgium 
to take the initiative and make the idea a success." 1
- The next few veeks soon illustrated vhethe' this strategy vould
prove successful.
1. KSTINGER.memoirs.op. cit. p .223.
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CHAPTER £  HROAdEHTBG OF THE CAMPAIGH AUGUST-OCTOBER,1948
I) International Reaction
•The response of France", commented a leading British press 
report."came sooner than the most sanguine of the memorandum's 
signatories..could have hoped for. The rapidity of the response, 
it was stated in official circles..shovs how great is the 
importance which the French Government attaches to the issue.
The French Government had indeed acted quickly on August 18, 
and despite the rather fragile circumstances in which it was heading
2
power ,its European initiative received the broad support of the 
•third force’ French political press. For example,the MRP organ - 
' L'Aube'- soon declared,on August 22 ,that "federalism no longer 
seems a generous drea*:lt is a practical necessity.. .The solemn 
offer of August 18 is the first of the important acts of Robert 
Schuman at the Quai d'Orsay." Similarly,Orestes Rosenfield empha­
tically exclaimed in the Socialist Party 'Populaire' that the SFXO 
would support the European Assembly proposal, adding that "the 
moment has come to act. Only the creation of a federal parliament 
and a federal government can respond to the vital necessities of 
the hour." Léon Blum likewise expressed his strong approval of 
Schuman.' ■ decision in support of the European Assembly, and anxiously 
awaited British Labour reaction.
The British Government,however, showed no marked enthusiasm 
for the project, as was publicly demonstrated in an interesting ex­
change of letters on the subject between Churchill anil Attlee, 
published im the press on August 25. In the first round of this 
artificial dialogue Churchill argued ardently,in a letter 
•written to Attlee on July 2 7 ,that the "creation of a Biropean
Assembly vould represent an important practical step in 
the advance towards a United Europe'1, and that in this "the lead 
should be taken by Britain." Replying on July 30 ,the British 
Prime Minister stated that although he vas "in  sympathy vith . / .
1. News Chronicle .article by V. Forest,19 .8.48.
2. Cf. p . 298
3. European Movement J're-» file  1948, CAEm BRUGGE;F.F. Ritsch cp.dt.
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./.th e  movement",he thought that the matter in question was too 
important to be left to "independent organisations” , adding that 
"I think it is not the right time for Governments to take this 
major initiative,when their hands are so full already with urgent 
and difficult problems." Three weeks later,in view of the French 
Government initiative,Churchill wrote again to Attlee,on August 
2 1 ,expressing his disappointment at the "negative character“ of 
Attlee's letter,and said that in view of the fact that the French 
Government had now taken up an active policy in favour of the 
European Assembly memorandum,he hoped that the British Government 
would in turn "find it possible to place themselves more in line 
with Western European opinion." Answering the same day,the Britlsb 
Premier once more repeated his doubts on the subject,drawing 
attention to Bevin's arguments and to the need.in any case,to 
consult the Commonwealth nations before being able to express 
"any definate view.”1
The British press,in contrast,was for the most part rather 
enthusiastic about the official French proposal. The 'Manchester 
Guardian',for example,was particularly favourable,claiming on the 
one hand that the European Asseably "could do little horn” ,while 
on the "positive side” ,it  could bring Germany back into £.1rrope 
and create a new European idealism and sense of solidarity. "It 
would be a grave responsibility” , the same journal argued,"to 
stifle this by rejecting the first concrete proposal. There are 2
times when even British caution and empiricism may be overdone." 
The 'Observer', for its part,was most sympathetic to the French 
position:"Ve understand,they might say,that you British do not 
want to plunge head over heals into deap water;but what are we
3
to think if you even refuse to test the water with your toes.”
The widely read ’Daily Mirror' also added its weight in favour 
of the campaign,exclaiming that "Europe can't wait!",and . / .
I . Churchill-Attlee correspondence July/August 1948:see leesinq-s 
Contempary Archives 19*8 p .9498,plus press reports 26.8.48.
2* Manchester Guardian »editorial on the European Assembly,ia848
3. Observer , editorial 22 . 8.48.
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./.complaining that the "Prime Minister's views are disappointing.
They are vague and tepid." The ’Daily Mail' for its part
criticised the Government for being political^dogmatic on the 2
subject ,vhile the conservative 'Daily Telegraph* appeared to he 
unconvinced about Attlee's preoccupation vith Commonwealth op ink», 
whose "solidarity" could in any case be counted upon,is view of 
the fact that no "irrevocable commitment" was involved in the
3
European Assembly project. In reply,the Labour Party organ - 
the 'Daily Herald' - defended the British Government's cautious 
approach,arguing that its "hands are-full" and that there should
4
be "no rushing" the issue. The left-wing Labour weekly,'Tribune', 
was not,however, totally convinced about the Government's evasion 
of the French initiative,and called out for a reciprocal British 
governmental statement stressing the economic co-operative 
road to western Union.5 Other Labour circles acted with, even 
more blunt criticism of the Government’s European policy,Hugh 
Delorgy HP. taking the lead in stating:*! think the labour Govern­
ment in this country has shown a definite lack of leadership in 
this »atter.*6 Yet it was perhaps the stolid editorial chiefs of 
the 'Times' who best reflected upon the deeper reasons behind the 
Labour Government’ s reluctance to be drawn into discussions over 
the proposed European Assembly,commenting immediately after the 
French initiative of August 18 that a moderate pragmatic approach 
to the question would best serve all interests:
"To bind the Powers of western Europe together is the first
objective of British foreign policy. The signing of the
Brussels Treaty and the institution of the Organisation far
European economic Co-operation are both intended to bring
about a close combination of the resources of western Europe
in support of a conwon policy. All are agreed that this is
the condition of surriTal. The question is,where the proposal 
for a European Assembly fits inv The tasks of military . / .
1. Daily Mirror , 27 . 8.48.
2. Daily Mail .article 'Western Disunion',2 6 .8 .46 .
3. Daily Telegraph' .26 .8 .48 .
4 . Daily Herald ,26 .8 .48 .
5. Tribune , editorial 'European Assembly*,3 .9 .4 8 .
6. H. Delargy,quoted in Catholic Herald-.2 7 .8 »48.
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./.preparation and economic regeneration by vhich vestem 
rJurope is faced,call for practical decisions, swiftly 
taken and firmly enforced. It is not likely that a large 
elected Assembly,called into being to debate publicly 
and at length all matter» of common interest,could help
V  the western European Governments to discharge these tasks. 
Every move to bring about greater unity in riurope demands 
encouragement and direct support and not a diversion from 
the serious business in hand.
The British Govc'iunent'indeed had irnch serious business in 
hand: Outside Europe , the commonwealth and Dominions vere
undergoing the strains of Indian independence,Irish separation. 
Communist agitation in the far-East, and open var in Palestine; 
while inside Europe,the Berlin crisis and the deadlocked negotia­
tions in Moscow,along vith deep disagreements vithin the Council 
of the OEEC.vere increasing the state of tension to a dangerous 
level. Moreover,the same French Government vhich so boldly took 
up the European initiative on August 18 ,actually fell fro* power 
on August 28 ,amid social upheaval and parliamentary opposition 
to Reynaud's proposed austerity measures,Communist-led indust­
rial strife in the mines, and •boulangist’ agitation from GatiUist 
quarters. The subsequent Government, formed under Schuman. .lasted 
little more than a week. It hardly posed any serious attraction 
to the British Government to become involved in "continental 
politics. Yet.it vas the very dangers of disunity and internal 
collapse abroad vhich surely should hove motivated British 
political leaders to take svift and drastic action,not siaply in 
the economic and strategic affairs of Europe,but above all,in her 
political and structural capacity to survive. - a s  Harold Mac­
Millan sharply quipped: "Mr. Attlee seens bom to doodle vhile
2
Europe burns.”
If ,in  Britain,the Government shoved a marked procrastination 
in replying to the French Government's urgent call for a European 
political initiative,this vas not the case among the other./.
1. Times .editorial 'European Unity',20 .8 .48 .
2. H. MACMXUAN,speech made at Gosport on 26 .B.48. .reported in
Sunday Time» and Observer 29 .8 .4 8 ., Guardian 30.8.4#.
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./.Western allies< The U.S. State Department.for example,indicated
support for a European Assembly on August 27» issuing the follaving
stater*ent frex Washington:
"The U.S. Government strongly favours the progressively 
closer integration of the free nations of Western Europe.
We believe that the vorld today requires the talcing of 
steps vhich before the war w old  have seemed beyond the 
range of practical politics. We favour the talcing by Europeans 
themselves of any steps which promote the idea of European 
Unity or vhich promise the study of practical measures and 
the talcing of such practical measures."I
Similarly,in Italy there vas *ost positive reaction to the deci­
sion of the French Government, and on August 24 an official dec­
laration of support vas issued. On August 26 ,Count Sforza elabo­
rated further in a long article published in the 'Corriere della 
Sera',in vhich he posed the question:"European Federation or vers 
vithout end?" The Italian Foreign minister vas by no means isola­
ted, despite the hostile attitude of the Communists and Neani 
Socialists. Indeed,the leader of the moderate Socialist Party, 
Giuseppe Saragat,strongly velcomed the French initiative,and 
called for a fully-fledged "federation of peoples",vhxle his
political colleague,Umberto Calosso,declared the urgent need for
2
a European Constituent Assembly. At the sane tine,the Dutch 
Prime Minister,Willie Drees,made a "friendly but non-committal 
statanent" to a deputation from the UEM,on August 27. He vould 
consider the proposal to form a European Assembly "as soon as
3
the project vas deemed opportune." It vas in Belgium,however, 
vhes-e, despite the initial vavcrings of the acting Prenier - Paul 
Struye , the most decisive action vas taken. Upon his return to 
Brussels, Paul-Henri-Spaak took over responsibility and.» redense 
to requests into formal negotiations vith France ,idtk a
viev to forming a joint diplomatic strategy for the success o f ./ .
1. See Times ,28.8.48..
2. Corriere della Sera 28 .6 .48 ., L ' Umanità 28 .8 .«*8., BUF BtfDetin
Ho*- 4 . (September 1948). See also L. Levi Trent'Anni di vita 
del Movimento Federalista Europeo . (Milan,1973),p .I09 .
3. Creation of the Council of Europe IHF/IO/E .op. c it .,
Manchester Guardian »article 'Dutch caution*,28 .8 .48 .
- 293 -
./.th e  European Assembly project.The outcome of his direct consul­
tations vith Schum an vas a crucial joint agreenent issued by 
the French and Belgian Governments on Septenber 2 ,pledging their 
support for the European movement memorandum of August IS , and 
their intention to submit the report for recommendation to the 
Brussels Treaty Permanent Corralssion In London.*
The Chairman of the Commission,Gladvyn Jebb,reluctantly 
announced on septenber 8 that the Franco-Belgian proposal for 
discussion vas accepted,and as a result,the memorandum was 
considered by the Foreign Ministers of. the Five Brussels 
Povers at their next meeting in Paris,held on October 25-26.
It vas fortunate for the European campaign that this Minis­
terial meeting vas attended both by Spaak and by Schuman .the 
latter having retained his post of Foreign Minister under the 
nev and more stable French Government formed under Heiri Queille 
on September 10. By mid-OctobS',however,the British Government 
decided to propagate its own alternative European strategy, 
stressing economic rather than political integration meawires. 
The protracted discussions which ensued must first be seen in 
the light of the political battles and debate vhich continued 
throughout this period vithin the European movenent itself.
2) Internal Developments;2nd EPP Congress.Interlaken
September 1-4.1948
The International Committee had not been inactive during
these important veeks vhich folloved the French Government's
declaration of August 18. Sandys.in fact,held tvo important talks
vith Spaak in order to discuss the French initiative,as veil as
the Belgian Premier's potential role vithin the European movement2
itself. Similar moves vere soon taken in hand in Italy.vhere./.
I . See The European Movement and the Council of Europe p .52, 
op. c it .: The Creation of the Council of Europe (INF/IO/E). 
op. c it .; P.H. Spaak The Continuing Battle pp.202-3.op.cit., 
Hews Chronicle article ' BeigLum joins demand for a European 
Assembly',9 .9 .4 * . 2. News Chronicle,ibia.
./.Retinger held private talks with de Gasperi and Sforza,^hile
at the same time Rebattet and André Philip vere actively at
vork in Prance trying to secure Léon Blum's official participation 2
vithin the movement. At the subsequent meeting of the Interna­
tional Executive Committee,held in t-aris on September II-I2, 
it vas*announced that Blum,Spaak and Churchill had agreed 
Ho accept the joint Honorary Presidency of the ' European Move­
ment’ , about to be officially launched,and that de Gasperi vas
3
soon expected to join their ranks. Meanvhile,the "tentative 
attitude of the Dutch Government" vas also discussed,bandys in 
turn being charged to approach the rather cautious Dutch Foreign 
i-iinister, Stilcker, in an attempt to gain a more favourable conmit- 
ment. An all-round effort vould also be made to contact and 
convince the Cownonvealth leaders of the need far European ~ 
unity,prior to their international meeting at ixmdon in mid-Octo-
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All matters considered,there vas indeed a strong feeling of 
optimism among the leaders of the European campaign, though bant^s 
still visely refused to allow these high spirits to conceal 
the real difficulties vhich lay ahead. - As he confided to Sir 
Harold Butler:
"Yes,I think ve can be veil pleased vith the progress ve 
have made over the European Assembly. Hovever.ve cannot 
regard the matter as clinched until the support of the 
British Government is secured, nrovided the Dominion Prime 
Ministers do not raise objections,! do not think that Bevin 
and Attlee »ill feel strong enough to stand out against the 
increasing current of opinion...A great deal more attention 
vill have to be given to viming the support of the Dominion 
Governments.
Similarly,he pointed out to his Executive colleagues:
"It vill be seen that the only serious obstacle to the 
creation of the European Assembly is the attitude of the 
British Government. That,in turn,depends to some extent./.
1. Note on Retinger's visit to Rome,October 1948,RETINS Bn PAPtXS
2. Information in letters from Rebattet to Philip 30.7.48. ,25.9.48.,
7 .10 .48 . (Correspondence Rebattet)CAtM BRUGGE.
3. Official Minutes (Ex/M/4) . CASH BRUGGE 4 . Ibid.
5. SANDYS,letter to Butler 1 .9 .48 . CAaW BRUGGE.
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./.upon the attitude of the Governments of the British Common­
wealth. Whilst this hesitancy in official quarters in London 
may result in some delay,it is unlikely that the British 
Government will vish to be the only one to resist a proposal 
vhich enjoys such vide-spread support not only on the 
Continent but also in the British t'srliament and in the 
United States of America.1,1
The groving opinion vithin the British rarliament in favour
of a stronger European political initiative c u e  more into
2
light in the important European debate of September IS.
In the meantime,hovever,the thoughts of the International Execu­
tive Committee vere concentrated upon the svelling support and 
publicity vhich the tFU Congress at Interlaken vas attracting.
The need for some sort of unity vith the international rarliamen- 
tary group vas clearly a pressing issue. To this end.bandys 
already tried again,vith the help of de Menthon, to .secure a 
renewed agreement vith the EPU.and vrote to Bohy on August 6 
pleading somewhat undiplomatically that "despite the reticence 
vhich ve have experienced on your side we still sincerely desire 
co-operation*" The conditions vhich he proposed for such 
a joint agreement included an official public recommendation at 
the Interlaken Conference itself for a single permanent liaison 
committee,the subsequent representation of five delegates 
vithin this committee,and above all,the joint preparation of 
the Interlaken project for a European Assembly,to be drawn up 
by both the Joint International Committee and the EPU leadership. 
More pressure vas quickly applied after the French Government* s 
declaration of support on August !8,Sendys immediately appealing 
to Bohy that the International Committee's campaign was receiving 
broad approval from prominent parliamentary and political quarters, 
and that it vas more than eve- necessary to establish the ‘ closest
3
collaboration" between the tvo movements.
The EPU 1eadership, hovever, decided to press ahead on it s ./ .
1. SAMUYS,executive memorandum ' Future Plans for the Campaign' 
September 1948. bANDYb PAPERS.
2. Cf. p .3os
3. SAHDYS,letters to Bohy 6. 9.48. ,1 9 .9 .4 8 . CAEK BituGGE.
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./.own,discounting any co-operative measures which risked the
reduction of autonomy in their parliamentary campaign? This vas 
especially the case as regards Sanays' potential intervention in 
the Interlaken proposals concerning the European Assembly and 
the joint scheme to be put forward by de Menthon and Mackay for 
a European Federal Constitution. Mackay,moreover,was also distan­
cing himself from Sandys and Coudenhove , in a tactical political
attempt to enlist Labour Party approval and European Socialist
2
support for the Interlaken debate. In the final event, however, 
there was a rather lame response to his hopes of rallying offi­
cial Labour recognition. Morgan-Philips.it is true,made efforts 
to assure the European Socialist Parties that Labour did not 
object to their attending the Interlaken Congress,but he refused 
point-blank to carry out the same exercise within the Labour
3
Party Itself. Meanwhile,on August 20,Mackay sent his draft pro­
posals for the convening of a European Assembly to Attlee,but
4
received no official response.
The Interlaken Conference of the EPU vas officially opened 
on September I,and for four days laboured in an exclusively 
parliamentary re-run of the more spectacular'Congress of Europe', 
held four months earlier. All the active participants at the 
conference were parliamentary representatives .amounting to 250 
in total,avong who* 25 formed the British delegatxon(I8 Labour, 
only 5 Conservative,and I Liberal). In further contrast to the 
Hague Congress,the Interlaken Conference centred around Coudenhoie, 
as Secretary General of the movement, and as the sole non-pariia- 
mentary member? His opening address had all the mock parapher­
nalia that was expected at such a lofty gathering: "I  should./.
1. This message vas clearly indicated in letters from Bohy to 
Silva and Paul Rivet,(31.7.48 .,27.8 .4 8 . ) ,affirming the exclu­
sive parliamentary nature of the EPU Congress. CSC GSN&VA
2. Cf.p.2?£
3. M.Philips letter 'to.the Secretaries of all Socialist Parties 
in ¿urope',2 8 .7 .48 . LABOUR PARTY PAPERS,.AC^AY PAPERS.
4 . MACKAY,letter to Attlee.20.8 .48. MACiAY PAPKES
5. Churchill had actually been invited to share Coudenhove's
platform,but politely declined.-c^rre|^onoence CEC GEN1SA
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./ .l ik e  to welcome",he proclaimed somewhat grandiosely,"you,the
legitimate representatives of 250 million citizens of Free Eurcpe, 
vho have met here to ensure the convocation of a European Parlia­
ment and to establish the principles of a European Constitution.
In similar terms,flohy rashly announced that the conference 
might well set ia aotioa the official convocation of a
2
European Constituent Assembly "within a space of six months."
- It was as if  all of Europe was awaiting the results of the 
conference.
Despite such positive stirring words,the majority of the 
EPU Council still had little intention of conducting their cam­
paign in strict harmony with the International Committee under 
Sandys' chairmanship. Coudenhove,above all,was still smarting 
from his embarrassing defeat in trying to oust Sandys from his 
post,and argued to the EPU gathering that co-operation between
3
the two movements risked antagonising potential Labour support.
In another bout of political ambidexterity,hovevex,Mackay once 
again challenged the EPU Secretary General by taking the issue 
out of tne Council's hands and putting it to the conference as 
a whole,with his strong recommendation for re-newed coordination 
between the two organisations. The EPU Congress in turn over­
whelmingly voted in favour of forming "organic links" with the 
International Committee,leaving Coudenhove to communicate this 
message to the Committee.5
The actual political resolutions passed by the conference
6
hardly facilitated the establishment of such links. Indeed,the 
tone of most speeches and declarations «bout the proposed ; / .
1. COUDENHOVE:’Annual Report to the Second European Parliamentary 
Congress' . Interlaken 1 .9 ,46 . CEC GEWEVA.
2. BuKY,Opening speech,ibid.
3. COUDENHOVE,Opening speech,ibid.
4 . MACIAY,draft recommendation on farming a 'Liaison Committee' 
EPU Council meeting,Interlaken,4 .9 .48 . official minutes.
MACXAY PAPERS
5. EX/M/4 , op. cit.
6. Most speeches,declarations etc. on Interlaken Congress can be 
found among i-jackay's pepers.plus the CEC Geneva.
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./.European Assembly contrasted strongly vith the moderate-sounding 
pragmatic approach taken so far by the International executive 
Committee under Sandys' guidance. The final resolution on the 
subject,in fact,gave prime place not to any potential delibera­
tive role which the Assembly might assume,but stated quite 
clearly instead that the task of the Assembly was to submit 
"immediate practical measure*" for European Onion. In addition, 
the proposed convening authority was not the Fire Brussels 
Treaty Powers,but the 16 OEEC nations plus West Germany,the 
OEEC General Secretary being able to take charge of all neces­
sary arrangements. Above all,although the representatives 
to the Assembly were to be initially selected by the existing 
national parliaments,'"®»« among their members and others",a 
syvten of direct elections by universal franchise was tacitly 
envisaged,while the European Assembly itself was to be regarded 
as the "necessary starting point for the constitution of a 
Earopean Federation." This message vas actually sent out by 
the EPU conference to all 16 Governments and Parliaments,«dasif 
this was not enough,the Congress also submitted a draft 
Federal Constitution,envisaging the setting up of a supra-natio­
nal European Parliament with a directly-elected first chamber 
and an Executive chosen by,and collectively responsible to,this 
sovereign legislative body. Moreover the powers of the Pederal 
Parliament vere to be extensive as regards foreign and economic 
policy,while supra-national constitutional safeguards were en­
visaged in a Federal Judicature,vith power vested in a Supreme 
European Court. In short,the Interlaken programme as a vhole 
vas the *ost audacious and clear-cut call to this date for a 
supra-national European political order.
It came as no surprise,therefore,that the small Unionist-
Conservative delegation,led by Boothby and Peter Roberts,./.
I . ' The Union of Europe - Plan for a European Assembly to be 
convened forthwith to consider Proposals for the Union of 
Europe*. EPU Interlaken Conference i-4.9.4-8.,plus »Charter 
of European Federation September 1948* - sent to all OEBC 
Governments and Parliaments^ CuC SERKVa , * ACiAY PAPERS.
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. / .  argued strongly against the constituent role proposed
for the European Assenbly,suggesting that it should only have a 
consultative voiee.aad protestisc further that the Interlaken 
Conferemce had no authority to draft a constitution for Burape. 
Mackay replied fiercely:"Do ve want a federal union,yes or no? 
Or are ve simply to be content vith a vague military alliance 
decorated vith pleasing vords and good vill?" To this,he later 
added that "the effect of nr. Boothby* s aimiendments vas not to 
have a Federation at all,but to create an advisory body." The 
ammendments proposed by Boothby and Roberts.calling for a Euro­
pean Foreign Ministers' Council as the Tiain transitory organ 
tovards unity,vere,in any case,quite soundly defeated,vuth only 
the Conservative group voting for them. At this point Roberts 
announced to the Conference,in the name of the Conservative 
deputation,that,since the British Conservative Party vould not 
support the Interlaken Flan,the delegation vould have to leave. 
As Hack ay commented, "If  Hr. Roberts' amendments contain the 
conception of vhat European Union is according to the Tories, 
they don't mean union at all ."
Boothby,for his part,angrily denounced the Interlaken Con­
ference as a "dismal fiasco", adding:
"Nothing practical has been achieved and the British 
delegation is split vide open.. .Although the Congress 
is not representative and possesses no credentials,it 
has attempted to draft a comprehensive Federal Constitution 
for Europe,thus usurping the function of the Assembly 
vhich it has expressed a desire to convoke. Instead of 
discussing the principles and objectives of European 
Union,it has indulged in an orgy of constitution-mongering 
to no useful purposes.. .The steamroller tactics of today's 
(debate)chairman,Hackay,were no nore succesful than the 
lassex-faire policy of yesterday's chairman,M.Bohy." 4
1. MACXAY.'Memorandum op Interlaken' nACEAY PAPERS 
Manchester Quardi an article 'Federated Europe MP's disagree 
over Assembly's pover',4 .9 .4 8 .
2. BOOTHBY,article about the xnteriaken conference, Nevs of the 
World ,5 .9 .4 8 . See also Boothby's letter to the Times ,
1 .10 .48 . - Cf. p.
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There vas no doubt to the fact that the Interlaken Plan
deeply troubled the more moderate leaders of the International
Executive Committee. This much had already been spelt out on the
eve of the conference when varnings vere sent out to the parliMi-
tary delegates to avert a policy position which was not "parallel*
to the memorandum submitted to the Governments oa August 18 ,and
which risked provoking still further objections by the British
Government.* After the conference itself, Sandys vas quick
to disassociate publicly the International Committee proposals,
nov officially supported by the French and Belgian Governments,
from the much more ambitious Interlaken r”lan, stressing that "the
creation of a deliberative European Assembly entails no conseauen-
tial commitments and certainly no constitutional changes of «my
2
kind." Mackay,in turn,refused to accept that there vas any real 
difference in. objectives between the Interlaken programme and 
the Frunco-Beigian initiative:
"If the French Government proposals mean vhat they say.vhat 
is the difference? Why is one of a less ambitious nature than 
the other? Both vant the Assembly to consider practical 
measures to secure the political and economic integration 
of tiurope. The French ask the assembly to make recommendations 
far action;the Interlaken plan asks that any reconaendations 
be eitodied in a constitution and a draft agreement. Is this 
a fundamental difference? Mr. Duncan sandys suggests that 
the Interlaken plan confers on the assembly constitution- 
making povers,which the French does not. This is quite 
incorrect. Under the Interlaken plan the assembly hac no 
such pover: any proposals it makes must be submitted to 
the respective Governments for their acceptance or rejection.
If recommendations for action are to be made for cfctropean 
Union,some document,be it a memorandum,a constitution,or a 
treaty must be prepared."3
-Hack ay 1 s real criae in all this was not so nuch the goal
which he envisaged,but the fact that he had indicated it so ctearl> 
At this delicate stage of the proceedings,the pragmatic leaders./.
1. Letter from kebattet to Vallée Poussin,23.8.46. CAEM BRUGGE
2. SANDYS,letter to the Times ,22 .9 .46 .
3. MACXAY,letter to the Times ,28 .9 .46 .
In a private letter to Morgan Philips,(1 2 .9 .4 8 .) ,Mack«y furthar 
commented that the Interlaken Plan was completely in line with 
the "consequences" of the Hague Resolutions. MACtiOf PAPERS.
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./ .o f  the International Committee wanted to avoid at all costs the 
laying down of a "blue print* for supra-national European Union, 
which,in their opinion,would only assist the Labour OorcraieBt 
to object even more strongly to a political initiative,and periraps 
give cause to the French and Belgian Governments to reconsider 
their diplomatic opening of the wuropean campaign. The Hague 
Congress,in this sense,vas regarded as the most suitable basis 
for the campaign,since it used "catch all" phraseology,without 
attempting to define closely the fundamental conseouences of 
such a political tiuropean initiative. This could be done at a 
later stage by legitimate representatives,within an established 
European political institution. For the moment,the European 
Assembly itself had first to be secured. Nevertheless,as the 
Interlaken debate had well illustrated.leading spokesmen for 
the Conservative—unionist camp had serious doubts about the 
perceived goals of the European campaign as a whole. These doubts 
would be expressed with more force at the Conservative t'arty 
Anuual Conference,held shortly afterwards.^ In the meantime, 
evan the more rebellious wing of Coneervatlve opJniai*aa chaimo-
terised by the unpredictable Boothby,expressed deep concern 
about Mackay's motives and the issues involved in the Interlaken 
programme. TLike all fanatical federalists",Boothby argued,"Mr. 
iiackay persists in the attempt to force the pattern of events 
into the strait-jacket of his own blue print." He continued to 
state:
"..The  Interlaken proposals,as they stand,would not be 
accepted by any European Government or Parliament. Not 
only are they quite unrealistic,but they do not touch the 
fringe of the problem which now confronts us. We have to 
create a comprehensive western union within a measurable 
space of time in order to save our civilisation from the 
suffocating tyranny of the Communist Empire." 8
The first priority for Boothby was therefore the setting up of 
some semi-intergovernmental western European council with execu­
tive power in "certain specific fields",especially in joint • / •
1. Cf. p.306-?
2. BOOTHBY,letter to the Times ,1 .10 .48 .
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./.defence and economic policy. A "deliberative assembly",he further 
stated,vould be of "immediate value from the social and cultural 
point of view ."1
In other vords,even among the more progressive elements 
of the Conservetive-unionist group,European Union vas conceived 
at a joint-executive and functional level,as a confederal rather 
than federal enterprise. The .distant and unclear objective of a 
more intricate European Federation vas at best regjrdad as the 
ultimate destination of the project by personalities such as 
Boothby,MacMillan,and more so by Sandys. But in immediate and 
foreseeable terms.it vas the perceived Cownunist threat to Burope, 
and the decline of Britain as as imperial pover.vhich provided 
the main spurt to the campaign.
In contrast,Macksy identified the "European crisis" not in 
terms of external threats and imperial decay,but as a fundamental 
internal structural defficiency,resulting from inherent political 
insularity and increasing governmental incapacity to resolve 
modem socio-economic problems. "National sovereignty is the 
problem",he later stated,"which any political advance in the vorld 
must attack and tame. Any regional or vorld political authority 
to be effective must have pover to deal with those political and 
economic questions vhich the member states cannot resolve by 
themselves...Insistence on state sovereignty is a jnnch greater
2
evil in the modern vorld than capitalism,Connunism,or Fascism."
Mackay's fusionist brand of European federal thought,and the 
EKU' s radical stand as a vhole in favour of an effective European 
Constituent Assembly,found strong support among the sympathetic 
supra-national inclined militants vithin the The SPU,Spinelli 
enthusiastically declared,should nov become the "parliamentary
3
nucleus for the future radical federalist party." He in turn./.
1. BOOTHBY,op. cit.
2. MACIAY Towards a United States of Europe (Hutchinson 196i ) , 
p p .I I ,92.
3. SP iN tH l,' Lettera Federalista' , mfb Bolletino Mo.3 , 22 . 9.46.
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./.wrote to Bruginans,exclaiming that the "dubious" unionist stand 
previously taken at The Hague had no* been "dissipated" by the 
bold Interlaken Plan,and that it was time to form a "federalist 
league" between the EUK and the Ei*Utwhich would result in the 
unionists being forced to "rally" to this new movement and thus 
"resolve the Churchill problem."1 Brugmans was more cautious. 
Despite his initial doubts about the exclusively parliamentary 
organisation of the Interlaken conference,he admitted that,at the 
end,the congress had been a "great federalist victory." Mackay's 
plan was rather "centralist",but this was compensated by the fact 
that the European Assembly called for would reside nan-peraiwieHtaxy 
representatives,vhile the conference as a whole had somewhat 
elevated the "militant phase" of the European campaign. Seven so, 
in reply to Spinelli's audacious proposal to ditch the unionist 
camp, Brugman6 stressed that Churchill and Sandys "are of consi­
derable value to our cause",while, as International Executive Chair­
man, Sandys in particular had been very "effective" in pushing the 
Governments along. Above all,the EUF President argued,any joint 
EOh-ErtJ formation would lead to a counter popular and parliament
tary unionist movement with the attractive figure of Churchill at
2
the head,backed up by important interests. Brugnaos,nevertheless, 
was certainly in favour of achieving a broad alliance with the 
EPU,so long as it was in the orbit of the International Conmittee 
itself. Indeed,at the Bcecutt^emeeting oFSytewta II,along with Bi- 
chet and Sandys,hewe charged to negotiate a new united approach
3
vith the EPU. The political climate for achieving such an orgmic 
alliance in the campaign was far from favourable.
3) Political Debate: 'Feet on the Ground*
The official Franco-Belgian initiatiative of September 2 ,far 
the submission of the European Assembly me-norandum to the next./.
1 . Sr’IKELLI, letter to Brugmans, 8 .9 .46 . EUF PakIS
2. BRUii MANS, letter to Spinelli,I3.9 .48. BRUG.-ANS PAPERS; EUK 
Bulletin Wo.5 October 1948,on Interlaken CEt* Geneva
3. EX/M/4 , op. cit.
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./.meeting of the Five Foreign Ministers on October 25-6,had by nov 
caused quite a stir in pottttao. circles. Unfortunately,however,the 
veil publicised press reports of the Interlaken conference had also 
led to public and political confusion as to the actual contents 
of the original memorandum and as regards the precise designs of 
the French and Belgian Governments. Under the increasing pressures 
of office and the diplomatic.resistance of the Foreign Office, 
Bevin felt obliged to make a blunt policy statement on the subject, 
mixing his objections to the Franco-Belgian proposals with a 
stinging critioue of the European campaign as seen by Interlaken. 
On September 15 he explained his views in a major parliamentary 
debate,denying on the one hand that the Government was only "luke­
warm" to the idea of European unity,but severely castigating on 
the other hand any idea of organic union. He was particularly 
scornful of what he regardec as pseudo European gatherings:
"Our policy has not been a spectacular one. It is easy to 
call a conference. It is easy to have the floodlights. But 
vith auch a conception as Western Onion..it is going to be 
a long,tedious and difficult job to build it firmly and 
establish it on sure ground...The intricies of Western Europe 
are such that we had better proceed on the same principle of 
association of nations that we have in the Commonwealth. 
Britain. .Tiust remain the centre of the Commonwealth; she must 
be European. That is a very difficult role to play ...
I think that adopting the principle of an unwritten 
constitution and the process of constant association,step by 
step,by treaty and by agreement. . is the right way to approach 
the Western Onion problem. When ve have settled the matters 
of defence,economic co-operation and the necessary political 
developments which must follov.it may be possible..to establish 
among us some kind of assembly to deal vith the practical 
things ve have accomplished as Governments,but 1 do not «hinV 
it vill work if ve try to put the roof on before ve have 
built the building."*
It vas a much tougher reaction than expected,especially in 
view of the fact that the future negotiations about the Assembly
hinged to a large extent on the British Government’ s attitude.2
As Paul-Henri Spaak recalled:"What ve nov had to do was to . / .
I .  BEVIN, Hansard,Debate on the Address,15 .9 .48 . pp.90-107.
2. SPAAX, The Continuino Battle ,op.cit. p .203
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./.convince Bevin. At this time..he was already a sick man and very 
different from the Bevin I had come to know at the beginning of 
1948. I have nearer understood why he changed his views as he did” 
Bevin’ s views vere,nevertheless,strongly challenged by Mackay in 
the same debate,who argued that his resolution for a European 
Assembly vould not hamper the groundwork for European Onion,but 
would instead create the right and urgently needed conditions 
for progress on the mattrer:
■We must face the problem that no OEeC and no Brussels 
¿"act will ever get a foreign currency for fur op e . . .Unless 
we face this problem of the transfer of power to a new 
State,to a new authority,even in a limited way,we do not 
face the practical problem...
I think that it is completely dishonest for people to 
talk about the idea,to say they want to get some kind of 
United States of Europe,and yet not face the fact that if 
they are to do that,they *ust,in doing i t ,draw up some kind 
of document which defines the rights of the different States, 
the organisation of Government,and lays down the conditions 
in which political authority is to be agreed.* 1
riackay's juridical conception about the role of the European 
Assembly was not at all to Sandy.*' liking,and the Executive 
Chairman felt obliged to point out that the PTanco-Belgian pro­
posal for the creation of a European Assembly vas of an "altoge­
ther less ambitious nature” than the Interlaken Plan which Bevin 
had so conveniently attacked. Indeed,Sandys went on to claim that 
"almost everyone" supported the British Government's "step by 
step" policy,and that the convening of a European "deliberative"
Assembly,as proposed by the French and Belgian Governments,was
2
"complementary" to such a policy. Mackay,in turn,replied that he 
could not comprehend Sandys' position:"why does the International 
Committee treat the Interlaken Plan in such derogatory terms? 
Either the International Committee want the Assembly or not. The
3
issue is a clear one." Sandys subsequently attempted to heal./.
1. MACKAY,Hansard 15.9 »48. op. cit. pp.434-440.
2. SAHDYS,letter to the Times ,22 .9 .48 . op. cit.
3. MACIAY,letter to the Times ,26 .9 .48 .
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./.th is  grovlng public confrontation vith Mackay,and the damage it 
vas clearly causing the European campaign as a vhole,by invoking 
a common though moderate formula,vhich vas also meant to vin 
favour vith Bevin. The point he put across vas one of the rare 
indications in public of his personal feelings on the subject:
"At the one extreme there are those cases like Hr .Mackay, 
vho see no unsurmountatole difficulty in the early creation 
of a 'United States of Europe',vith a central government... 
Most people vill agree(hovever)that ve must advance step 
by step and not in one giant stride..We should not attempt 
to define too precisely the constitutional form vhich may 
ultimately emerge. It is as though ve vere looking up at 
a high and unfamiliar mountain. Some are confident that 
they are able to scale the rocky peak;others think it 
vould be rash to venture to the snov line. The truth is 
that it is still too far avay to say vhat vill be possible 
or impossible. Can ve not therefore agree for the moment 
to keep an open mind and concentrate our energies upon 
first climbing the foothills,vhence ve shall get a clearer 
vie*- of the further prospects." I
In all this,Sandy3 vas in the unenviable position of having 
not only to moderate the committed efforts of Mackay, and to 
support in effect the tone if not the contents of Bevin's 
pronouncements on European unity,he also had to uphold the idea 
ageloA the tiuixs of the Conservative Party annual conference,held 
on October 6-9 in Landudno. Indeed,despite evasive pronounce­
ments by Churchill and Eden to this assembly about Britain 
being at the centre of "three circles'-the Bnpire,Europe and 
Atlantic unity,it vas clear that grass-roots Tory opinion vas
more than sceptical about any European commitment vhich risked
2  _ _
loosening ties vith the Bnpire and Commonvealth. - The 
popular right-ving Beaver brook press had already stirred up 
Tory feelings by claiming that it vas "impossible" to reconcile
3
Britain's place within the Qipire and in durope. Siailarly.L.S. 
Am cry strongly argued in a Utfl4 Newsletter that Britain should./.
1. SANDYS,letter to the ’Times , IB .10.46.
2. See Europe Unite (Churchill speeches 1947-t - Cassell 1950) 
pp. 40b>-424; Times 'Mr Chnrchil’ s varnings to vestern vorld'
XI.IO>48.; Daily Mirror- 'Speed unity in vest - Bden,'7.I0.48.
3. Daily Express , I 6. 9. 48.
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./.strictly refuse to be a part of any organic form of European
Union.1 At the Conservative Conference itself,he firmly declared:2
"Today British Foreign Policy means Bnpire Foreign Policy!"
The Conference organising conmittee,moreover,actually decided to 
shelve discreetly a rather tame motion standing in the nane of 
Hore-Belisha supporting the "movenent for a united nxtrope",vhile 
a resolution urging the integration of the Empire into "one great 
add strategic unit" vas passed unanimously. As the Tory press 
barometer,the ‘Daily Telegraph', commented: "The conference vas 
enthusiastic on the question of imperial unity but the under­
current of uneasiness as to how this might be impaired by pursuit
3
of a closer association vith Western Europe vas unmistakable."
Sandys himself seems to have played a rather low-key role 
at the conference. He did,hovever,offer his opinions on the 
sensitive issue of Europe and overseas commitments in an JtynLaat 
letter to the 'Times',in vhich he took a considerably more pro­
gressive view on the subject than did the majority of his Conser­
vative colleagues. "A European union of vhatever nature",he 
diplomatically stressed,"vill be nothing but an illusion unless 
it obtains the effective participation of Great Britain." Yet 
any such arrangement,he continued to argue,did not prejudice the 
cause of Imperial unity,since there vas no fundamental reason 
vhy preferential trading relations could not be established 
betveen the Dominions and Western uurope. The proposed European 
Assembly,furthermore,"vould be purely deliberative in character", 
and vould raise "none of the difficult issues of sovereignty."
Instead,its task vould be the creation of a "European public
4
opinion and the sense of being turopeans."
Despite his relative isolation vithin his ovn Party on this
key issue,Sandys seems to have caught the mood of public opinion,
and even of the establishment press. Even the normally . / .
I .  L .S. AMBRY,UEM Nevsletter .September 1948,ref. Manchester
Guardian. * Europe and the Coawonvealth',1 3 .9 .48 ; 
uailv Qraphlc , 94X0 .48.
3 . Daily Telegraph. 'Oonsaretwe emphasis cn&pire Uri.tjr ,8 .10 .48 .
4 . SAJIDYS,letter to Times ,18.10.48.
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./.sedate ’Times' finally conceded that the British Government
should recognise the European Assembly proposal "more varmly",
since it did at least represent "much genuine if muddled idealism
on the Continent."1 In an even more forthright commentary,the
' Guardian' chastised the "infinite patience and infinite delay"
of Bevin and the Foreign Office,claiming that "little by little
2
is not very satisfying in days of crisis." Similarly,the bociadist 
'New Statesman' pleaded against governmental "complacency" and 
its slow "functional integration" proposals while French democracy 
was "gasping for life*. "Neither Western Europe nor Britain",the 
same Journal pointed out,"can ever be saved by letting »•’ranee
3
collapse." The Labour 'Daily Her sad*.however,was not concerned 
with continental politics,and bluntly declared in a phrase more 
akin to the right-wing imperialist press:"Britain is more than
4
a European State. She is the nother Country of a great Qaiumwcathr 
Fortunately for the iiuropean campaign, and for Sandys in 
particular,the meeting of Commonwealth ¿Time Ministers.held in 
London on October XI-22,unanimously declared its support of 
Western European integration measures,expressing the view that 
it was desirable to go beyond the Five Power Brussels ract, thoyjh 
the idea of .political integration was received with slight cautkn, 
probably enanating from the British delegation. The final state­
ment stressed,in any c u e , that "the maintenance and re-vival of 
democracy in Europe" was a chief concern of the Commonwealth 
nations. Moreover,» few days later,the South African Prmier 
stated his clear support for a "Third Force Europe",while his 
Australian counterpart recognised the concern of his country in 
Europe as "direct and vital.* - The main prop in Labour's defence 
against active endorsement of the eiuropean Assembly had collapsed 
overnight.5
1. Times leading article,17 .9 .46.
2. Manchester Guardian editorial,16 .9.48.
3. »e* Statesman and Nation.4 .9 .48 .
4. Daily Herald article 'Union'.16 .9 .48 .
5. Daily Telegraph. '  aspire PM's back Western Union'.20 .10 .48 .; 
T u e s ■'Democracy in Europe',2 0 .1 0 .4 8 .,1Commonwealth Approval 
of Western Union',23.10 .48 .
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At first.it appeared that Labour had dravn the lesson from 
the Commonwealth's embarrassing support of the EuroDean idea,end 
the 'Daily Herald' immediately published a rath®- strained state­
ment of support for European union,exclaiming,in contrast to its 
previous declaration,that "a vithdraval of Britain and the Common­
wealth from active participation in European affairs vould greatly 
assist those forces vorking for the destruction of democracy. Xt 
is madness to believe that our scattered Commonwealth could pursue 
its ideals happily and prosperously in isolation,or even in asso­
ciation vith America, if European democratic civilisation collapsed. ^  
However,the official Labour harty policy document on Western 
Union, finally published on October 20 and entitled somewhat pedan­
tically 'Feet on the Qround'.put a damper on all hopes of a new 
European political lead by Labour. Though the document paid 
much lip service to the European idea and even conceived of a 
third force European policy aiming at "economic independence from 
America and political security fro* Russia",the crucial approachtt* 
and specific scope of,Labour's European policy ronained at the 
same functional and co-operative 'step by step' level:
"We must keep our feet firmly on the ground",the 
text declared,"and resist all tempting mirages which 
seem to offer a short cut to our goal...
Federation would not solve the immediate problems 
of Western Europe,while the attempt to achieve it would 
exaggerate the differences between the West European States, 
instead of exploiting their common interests...
Moreover,the European countries differ greatly among 
themselves about the way in which a state's economic life 
should be organised;each country would do its best to 
insure that the federal government had as little power as 
possible to interfere in domestic politics;certainly socialists, 
at present a minority of about one third in Western Europe 
as a whole,would insist upon the right to organise socialism 
where they were a majority,as in Britain and Scandinavia." 2
1. Daily Herald.article 'Unity',21.10 .48 .
2. Feet On The Ground:A stuay of Western Union , LABOUR PARTY 
September-October 1*48. ARCHIVES
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The Labour Party policy,in other vords,retained all its pre­
vious dogmatic assumptions and objections to European political 
union. It vas a question essentially of building socialism 'in  one 
country',and leaving any European socialist allies to fend for 
themselves. The text then vent on to pose insular economic 
arguments based upon the pure short-term national interests of 
Britain,strongly opposing any immediate currency convertibility or 
a multilateral European trading agreement,on the grounds that the 
European continental regimes had failed to re—assert their economic 
potency ««inly as a result of the policy of "uncontrolled capâtaliar 
vhich they condoned. What 'Feet On The Ground' did not mention, 
ho»’ever,vas that five years of Nazi pillage and occupation vas also 
a factor in the inflation,strife and economic discrepancies vhich 
separated the case of the European continent from Britain. Moreover; 
at a time vhen the British Pound vas vastly overvalued,it vas 
clearly in the immediate British 'national interest' not to enter 
multilateral trading arrangements and currency parity,but instead 
reap the short-term advantages of bi-lateral trade on an indepen­
dent basis. Yet,despite this rather blatant national-orientated 
policy,later termed by Mackay as not so much "Feet on the Ground" 
as "Head in the sand ",the Labour text appears to have briefly 
influenced previously pro-continent press opinion. Even the inter­
national-minded 1 Manchester Guardian' commented that "the casti­
gation of the doctrinaire federalists is sharp and veil deserved."1
In France,h o w e v e r , the document vas received vith sadness and 
indignation. This vas especially the case among the Socialists, 
among vhon an outraged and deeply disillusioned Léon Blum vas the 
most vigorous of Labour critics« the Labour Party and British 
Foreign Office,he asked sarcastically,the sole bastion of realism, 
vhile the French Socialists vere lost in the clouds? The plans for 
European Federation supported by the latter,Blum continued in the 
same ironic tone,had a real and solid base.velj. connected to the 
ground. The British spoke of economic co-operation but could not,/.
I . Manchester Guardian ,20.10.48.
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./.appreciate the need to integrate fully Europe's economy. "Why do 
our Labour comrades’1, he concluded, "who govern the most powerful 
democracy in Europe,and whose acts and example exercise a strong 
attraction to the continent,attempt to put a brake upon the 
federalist movement rather than offer their most powerful assis­
tance?" The SFXO National Council was similarly disturbed by 
Labour's isolation. Already by the beginning of September Guy 
Hollet had reluctantly announced his party’ s full support for 
European Federation plans and the immediate European Assembly 
initiative,despite Labour's opposition. Now,in view of ’Feet On 
The Ground',a hurried attempt was made to enlist Labour support 
for a European Socialist Conference.(Mackay and Labour's 'Europe 
Group' applied similar pressure for such a conference). The 
Labour Party establishment,however , found the proposal completely 
unacceptable. The disgusted Blum in turn declared that if tie goads 
of the continental Socialists were to be obtained,the British 
would just have to be left behind.1
On October 24 Bevin arrived in Paris for the third and most 
decisve meeting of the Five Brussels r'act Foreign Ministers. 
Shuman, and Spaak were ready with their formal proposal for a 
European Assembly. The French press was all keyed up for the 
occasion,while continental observers in general anxiously awaited 
the results of the meeting. It was hardly the most auspicious of 
moments for such a trans-national enterprise. Yet elsewhere,in 
Brussels,the Executive Committee responsible for the launching 
of this European campaign was about to put the seal on the official 
launching of the ' European Movement' .
I . F.F. Ritsch The French Left and the European Idea I 947-1949 
op. cit. pp.180-183.5 BLUn article in Le Populaire,'Le Labour 
et le fédéralisn européen',23 .10 .48 . ; European socialist 
Conference proposals LAbour WEC minutes 27.10.48. LABOUR 
PARTY ARCHIVED,letter from ¡-¡ackey to i-iorgan Philips 12.9.48. 
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4) Official launching of the 'European Movement1, October 26,I9»8
la view of Britain's severe and bellicose attitude tovard the 
the European Assembly campaign and,to a lesser extent,the awkward 
hesitation of the Dutch Government,it was clearly necessary for 
the European movement to present a more unified and representative 
picture of itself. As Sandys urgently emphasised:"it is more impor­
tant than ever that the International Council...be rapidly consti­
tuted and be in a position to nake authoritive pronouncements upon 
the broad issues of European policy." Prior to such an internatio­
nal formation,however,the problem of constituting broadly based 
National Councils within the movement,and of reaching essential 
policy agreements between the existing member-organisations,were 
first necessary.
The position regarding the setting up of National Councils 
was a rather complex and tedious subject. Briefly,the basis of 
such Councils already existed in France and Great Britain,despite 
doubts in the All-Party Group led by Mackay;in Denmark,a national 
Council had actually been formed under Dr. Bogholm;in Austria, 
Belgium,Greece,Ireland,Luxembourg,Norway,Netherlands,Sweden and 
Switzerland provisional committees had discussed the subject and 
were attempting to establish a broader base. This left the 
problem of Germany and Italy. The former's delicate international 
position prevented any serious progress on the natter,though a 
study group sponsored by the International Conmittee had been set 
up. In Italy there was the reverse problem,two rival committees 
having been formed:one as an up-shot of Spinelli's long-established 
MFE, and the other backed by Governmental sources under the tentative 
leadership of Sigs. Astuto and Orlando,the latter personality being 
classified by Spinelli as an ex-fascist agent! Hetinger had . / .
I . SAMDYS,circular EX./P/I5 Septe-nber-October 1946 CAEM BRUGGE 
See also note from Dep. Secretary General to Sandys,24.9.46.
CAEM BXBGGE
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./.gone to Rome at the begining of October in order to try to 
clarify the situation,but succeeded only in antagonising the 
MFB leaders and Spinelli in particular. The problem remained an 
open one,though it was clear that Retinger and Sandys had a 
preference for the Goverment-supported group,despite its less 
legitimate historic background.1
This less than impartial meddling by Sandys' lieutenant in 
the complicated internal affairs of the Italian federalist 
movement hardly enhanced the Executive Chairman's standing 
among the radical MPE leaders. It indeed provoked still more 
ill-feeling at a time vhen the need for fusion in the campaign 
and for a better understanding betveen the member groups of the 
International Committee were imperative. Retinger had vanted to 
avoid * controversy* betveen the EUF and the International Camaittee, 
but the seeds had long been set and his Rome visit gave the final ■ 
boost to a re-newed resistance against the unionist camp.
Spinelli attariad the GUP Cmtral Cornnittee «eting on October 4—5 vith 
the intention of breaking vith the Sandys’ dominated movement, 
and branching out into a "federalist league" comprising the EEF and 
EPU. Anticipating such an attack,hovever,Srugmans vas at his most 
conciliatory,suggesting that the EPU Interlaken Plan should be 
adopted as a "vorking base" for the projected EUF Congress in 
Rome. He furthermore proclaimed his ovn belief that the time 
for "doctrinal" federalist thought had come to an end,and that 
it vas nov necessary to ccnoBntrate all thoughts on forming a 
feacrated Europe,vhich in turn meant vorking in organic unity 
vith the unionist camp,who apparently had "come closer" to the 
EUF vie*'. Approving anisnrprised by Brugmans' "evolution" to the 
"European aspect of Federalism".vhich vas "dominant in It a ly " ,./ .
1. On the formation of National Councils,see:International Execu­
tive Committee meeting,24 .10 .48 ..official minutes 
( EX/M/5 ) .plus accompanying paoers EX/P/22. tK/P/23 mod.
CA xiti BKUGGE. For Italy,see note on Retinger's Rome trip,
October 1948 RETISGE* PAPERS,op. cit.
./.Spinelli agreed vith the EUF President's basic premiss,but 
argued that in order to effectuate a unified organic European 
movement,especially vith close parliamentary links,there vas no 
useful purpose served in forming an alliance only vith the 
unionist camp. He therefore supported the general idea for a 
structural re-grouping into one movement,but only if there could 
be continuing collaboration vith the EPU,unconditional support 
by British Labour Party members(ie.Mackay),and Italian partici­
pation in the Executive Committee of the future movement. Miss 
Josephy in turn supported Spinelli's view and tabled a notion 
vhereby the EUF would officially take up the matter of the EPU's 
organic collaboration within the movement at the next Executive 
Committee meeting. The more doctrinaire integral federalists, 
hovewr.led by Marc.Hytte and Voisin,were strictly opposed to 
such a parliamentary emphasis , and even more concerned about 
Brugmans' apparent abandonment of intana.-orient?ted federalism. 
Hytte was especially harsh and claimed that Brugmans had sold 
out to the unionist camp in the hope of a “quick and easy vic­
tory." There could be no reconciliation,he maintained,with 
personalities such as Sandys,Churchill and van Zeeland,who had 
nothing in common with federalist thought and who had,from the 
start.hampered and obstructed the federalist point of view from 
being heard. It was time,he concluded,to pull out and strike up 
a fully autonomous federalist movement. Brugmans,in turn,back- 
peddled a little and promised to obtain "administrative and 
political guarantees" for the EUF within the new movement.
There followed a rather vague compromise motion in which the 
EUF would make it known that the projected ciuropean Movement 
should be "quickly organised",but according to democratic prin­
ciples in which power would "emanate from the base" rather than 
from the top.*’
I . EUF Central Committee meeting,4 .1 0 .4 8 ..official minutes, . 
plus accompanying paoers Annex I it £ CBC GENEVA 
For EUK strategy vis-à-vis the ne»’ European movement, see 
article by Silva in Problèmes du Fédéralisme October 1948
CSC GENÜV*
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The EUF Central Committee had thus given the go-ahead for an 
organic association vithin the 'European i-iovement* ,though in fact 
the degree of future involvement had been smudged over by the various 
guarantees ceded to both the political-ninded and integral federa­
list vings. It vas,nevertheless,an important tough difficult decision, 
comparable to that taken on November 15,1947,when the EUF first 
decided to enter the International Committee.* On both occasions 
Brugmans had been the leading advocate of collaboration: In Novem­
ber 1947 he had managed to retain the broad support of the EUF 
rank and file . November I948,hovevex,vould be a different story.
By detaching himself from the militant integral-federalist ving 
so condusively,he did much to undermine his position of leadership, 
vhereas the political and parliamentary MFE maximalistes remained 
sceptical. Indeed,already on October 22 ,Spinelli publicly coapladned 
that Brugmans and the tUF Executive representatives had not fully 
honoured their agreement,having undertaken conversations with the
Sandys—dominated International Executive Committee,but not vith 
2
the £PU. Brugmans,for his part,remained optimistic and unaware 
of the trouble that was brewing vithin the EUF ranks. Afta" the 
Central Committee meeting,he even told Sandys that both he and 
Silva "are extremely satisfied with the practical results and I 
am convinced that Rome can be the real 'Congress of Unity’ ve are
3
aiming at."
Thé International executive Bureau meeting,held at Brussels
4
on October 24 ,turned out m  high spirits. Hot only had the EUF 
formally come out in favour of forming a unified organic structure, 
the NeJ had also held a successful annual congress backing a non- 
doctrinal moderate approach to the tur-opean campaign"! Above all,./.
1. Cf• pp. 69—7 1 .
2. SPINELLI,open letter KFE Bollettino ,22.10.48. MFE TOE IN
3. BRUGMANS,letter to Sandys,6.10.48. EUF PARIS
4. Executive Bureau meeting,24.10.48. official minutes (SX./H/5)
CASH BRDGGtí
5. Nti’I Congress £7-19 . 9.48. Official Resolutions.pamphlet
CAEM BRUGGE.
./•despite lingering doubts among the federalist rank and file,plus 
the growing’ scepticism within the higher echelons of the Conser­
vative-unionist camp,the campaign for a united Europe was finally 
beginning to cut ice at the inter-governmental level. The 
European Assembly project was about to be discussed in detail the 
next day,in Paris,between the Five Foreign Ministers and their 
diplomatic entourage. The fears of the preceding weeks about 
Britain's reaction vere still foremost in the campaign leaders' 
minds,bat there »a» at least strong cause for hope that the formi­
dable Schuman -Spaak alliance might be able to pull off some sort 
of concession in their personal discussions with Bevin. It was in 
this eve-of-conference atmosphere that the International Executive 
Bureau,consisting of Sandys,Brugraans,Bichet,Courtin,Retinger and 
Butler,met in the private office of faul van Zeeland at Brussels, 
and officially brought into being the »European .Movement' •
The meeting concluded that the new movement vould be 
put into deration at both the national and international level. 
Hovever, due to the fact that most of the projected 'National 
Councils' were still at a provisional stage in formation,it was 
clear from the beginning that it vould be at the international 
level of the organisation where decisions vould effectively be 
made. The federalist fears of a centralised and top-heavy European 
Movement w*s-e in this sense completely justified. This would be 
especially true for the first year of the Movement's existence, 
during which it was decided to retain the current Executive Connate- 
tee as the main decision making organ of the organisation, 
being charged until January 1950 vith taking all necessary 
practical measures in line vith the still inexistent 
International Council. Upon its eventual formation,the latter 
body would thereafter take responsibility for the election of the 
Executive on a basis proportionate to member movements and nation! 
organisations. This did not alter the fact,however,that it vould 
only be able to "confirm" the existing Executive during the . / .
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./.f ir s t  and most crucial year of the official campaign,vhile the 
Executive itself could co-opt independently other personalities 
to its fold. Moreover,the International Council in question vould 
be to a large extent the initial instrument of the existing Execu­
tive,since its membership vould only partially include delegations 
from the National Councils.the other members comprising the Exe­
cutive itself,vith upto I5X supplementary representation of the 
founding and member movements(designated via the Executive), plus 
one member from each “associated" organisation. In other vords, 
the broadly based infra-structure of the Movement vould at test act 
only as a democratic 'fig-leaf* to the as yet unaccountable 
International Executive. Furthermore,since the latter body vould 
elect its ovn Chairman by simple majority vote,Sandys vould have 
no problem in dealing vith the troublesome federalist minority.
The only hint of any potential federal inroad into the central- 
decision making realm of the Movement lay in the election by the 
International Council of its ovn President and Vice-President, 
vhile the sensitive post of Secretary General seened idso to depend 
on election. Such potential openings, countered ty -Hie considerable 
difficulties in penetrating the hierarchical executive machinery 
of the European Movement,vould give rise to intense debate and 
argument during the montiis vhich folloved, and especially in 
the vake of the official inauguration of the International Council 
in February 1949. At the Executive Bureau meeting of October 24-5, 
novever, nt vhich the Movement vas officially launched,any criti­
cise appears to have heen rather muted.
This crucial meeting terminated,as of course it needed 
to,not on a note of inner dissension,but of outer unity and con­
sensus. The finale came on the evening of October 25 vhen,at a 
veil publicised civic reception in the Tovn Hall of Brussels, 
l>uncan Sandys proudly announced the official formation of the 
European Movement. Paying special tribute to the four famous 
Honorary Presidents of the new Movement,Spaak,Churchill,Blian . / .
I .  Ex /h/ 5 op. cit. .plus accompanying papers.
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./.and De Gasperi,the durable Executive Chairman in turn explained 
the main hopes of the campaign for European unity:
"The next urgent step in the building of this new Europe 
is,we believe,the convening of a deliberative European 
Assembly,whose task it vili be to create a turopean public 
opinion and a sense of solidarity among the peoples of our 
continent...Upon the outcome of this momentous crusade for 
the unity of Europe everything depends - life itself and all 
that makes life worth living. Unity offers us the only sure 
prospect for prosperity,freedom and peace. If we fail in this 
eleventh-hour to choose the course of reason,we shall be faced 
not merely with war but defeat and enslavement. We have it in 
our power not merely to save ourselves and our civilisation 
but to open vast new prospects for human happiness and endeavour. 
Our urgent task is to explain this vital issue to the people 
of every land and call for their support. If we do our part 
successfully,we trust the people to do theirs.*!
Thus,nearly five months after the historic Hague Congress,the
co-ordinatjed European pressure grows which had formed the Inter­
national Committee had now been transformed into a single and 
organic European Movement. Though these various groups retained 
their formal autonomy with regard to internal affairs,it was 
clear that the overall European campaign haa taken on a strictly 
unified and somewhat unaccountable approach to the sensitive prob­
lems and dangerous challenges which lay ahead, in the opinion of 
Jacques Pr£ymond:"These changes of name may appear to be of secon­
dary importance. But the European Movement..fully intended to
assume complete control of operations:Its creation implied a real2
concentration of forces." In retrospect.the launching of the 
European Movement has been judged as a "decisive move" and "crucial"
for the future of the European groups:
"..The federalist wing was thrown into confusion,the reformed 
Socialist pro-Europe group was tempted into collaboration,and 
the European Movement itself was brought firmly into the main­
stream of European party politics. It henceforth beca.me,at the 
international level,an increasingly top-heavy co-ordinating 
body rather than a mass,popular movement. "■*
- As the European campaign intensified,so in turn the Movesant
became detached from its base.
sandys,statement at Brussels Town Hali,25.Iu,48. SAHUYS PAPERS. 
European Hovement Press release Ho.4 .CEC GENEVA.
2. Freymond.op.cit.p.51 3. C. Webb,op. cit. p. 317.

- 319 -
CHAPTER ^  THE POLITICAL OFFENSIVE OCTOBER 1946 - JANUARY 1949
I) The Five Power Study Committee
At the same time as the official formation of the European
Movement was being celebrated in Brussels,the Five Foreign Ministers 
and Defence Ministers of the Brussels Pact were busy in Paris stri­
ving to find some sort of agreement over the European Assembly 
memorandum now officially supported by the French and Belgian 
Governments. The British Government's clear unwillingness to become 
involved in any such trans-national political European institution 
had been well illustrated during the weeks preceding the Five Po'»«r 
conference of October 25-6. On the eve of the conference,a rather 
more ambiguous position was adopted in a tightly worded 'question­
naire' sent out by the British delegation,emphasising the Govern­
ment.' s deep concern about the potential constitutional problems
arising out of an unharnessed European Assembly,as set out in the
memorandum. Has it the intention of those who drafted the memoran­
dum, the 'questionnaire' frankly asked,to alio» the proposed Assembly 
to pass from a stage in which it possessed no legislative or execu­
tive power to one where supra-national sovereignty would come into 
play? Or was the Assembly meant to remain "for an indefinite period" 
a purely deliberative body? Who .would nominate the national repre­
sentatives to the Assembly,it was further asked,and to whom would 
they be responsible? Would they be nominated on an individual or 
a government-sponsored basis? Was a "European Executive" envisaged? 
At the start of the whole process,moreover.was the preparatory 
conference to be composed of parliamentary or government represen­
tatives? The British authorities vere adamant that only the latter 
alternative applied,both vith regard to the European conference 
and any eventual European Assembly. In short,the British Government 
was prepared to tolerate the setting up merely of European inter­
governmental machinery.*
1« 'Qaestiaugirc sat by the Ba-tfehGawaimett tp the ftrmangit Cbnrdaauon of %te
Brussels Pact Powers' ,Octob& 1948 C*EM B^USGu
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The British ' questionnaire' nevertheless indicated that the 
Government did not feel inclined to reject the European Assenbly 
project as a vhole. Paul Reynaud put this dovn to the unexpected 
positive reaction of the Comnonveaith leaders to European union on 
the eve of the Brussels Pact conference. Paul-Henri Spaak.vho vas 
actually present at the meeting,discerned instead a change of empha­
sis in the British Government'.s position due to the crucial rallying
2
in favour of the memorandum by the Dutch and Luxembourg delegates. 
Be this as it may,Bevin proved less negative than feared,and put 
forvard,"as a personal and tentative suggestion",the idea of setting 
up a ’Consultative European Council of ilinisters',in other vords, 
an intergovernmental European Assembly composed of delegates chosen 
by and responsible to Governments. It vas no compromise,but it did 
at least provide an opening for further discussion. The French and 
Belgian Ministers still held out for a -tore independent European 
Assembly. They nevertheless decided to pick up Bevin's apparent 
olive branch,and the meeting as a vhoie agreed to set up a Five 
Pover Study Committee vhich vould consider both projects and make 
recommendations to the next regular ministerial meeting at the end
3
of January.
Spaak regarded this joint agreement,tentative though it vas, 
as a "concession" from the part of the British Government? The 
French President,Vincent Auriol,vas not so confident. Indeed,upon 
being briefed about the meeting by Schuman ,he privately recorded 
that Bevin's position vas conditioned by the "traditional British 
axioms" of an unvritten Constitution and opposition to a future 
European Parliament to vhich national Ministers might have to 
become responsible. "The Commonwealth countries",he concluded,"are 
varmer to European union than is Britain."5 The dangers of Bevin's 
intergovernmental opening had been veil appreciated in the French 
capital.
1. REYNAUD, Unite or Perish (Simon irSchust«-,I95I) p. 196
2. SPAAK, The Continuing Battle ,op. cit. p .204
3. Times .article 'European Unity - A British Suggestion',27.10.48.
4 . Ibid.
5. AURIuii, Journal du Septennet ,27.10 .48 .
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This vas not,perhaps,entirely the case a-nong the leaders of 
the European Movement- Sandys,above all,vas quite confident that 
the British Government's initiative represented not only a crucial 
shift towards becoming involved in the European Assembly project, 
but constituted also the actual key to the successful outcome of 
the campaign. 111 ^ct,already during the latter half of September 
he had formulated a strategy vhereby a tMropean Assembly and a 
European Council of Ministers could both be part of the same project. 
It vas not altogether'a new plan In the campaign. - The initial . 
draft political reports for the Hague Congress had pin-pointed 
such a joint strategy,as did the final report itself. The actual 
Political Resolution apirovwd at The Hague,however,had steered clear 
of such an initiative,concentrating instead upon the supra­
national idea of the European Assonbly as the main driving force 
in the campaign. Sandys had willingly gone along vith this verdict, 
vhile the post-Hague initiatives did indeed draw attention only to 
the proposed European Assembly itself. The re-neved switch towards 
a joint proposal,in this sense,reflected the pressures upon the 
Executive Chairman both to accomodate as much as possible the 
British Government’ s viev-point,and to placate the serious doubts 
vhich were surfacing in Conservative-unionist circles. It must be 
stressed,on the other hand,that Sandys vas not intending to sell 
out on the European Assembly idea. Quite the reverse: by attaching 
the Assembly to an intergovernmental executive body,he instead sav 
the means of an intricate and complementary evolution between both 
the Assonbly and Council tovar&s a future organic parliamentary 
and governmental European machinery.-The radical 'rising star' in 
federalist circles,Henry Frenay,did not see it this vay. Dpon 
studying sandys' proposals,he instead accused the latter of taking 
a "premature and arbitrary" position on this vital subject,adding 
that it vould be a serious "error" to give re-newed attention to 
a future ministerial body when it vas the European Assembly itself 
vhich vould have the real "revolutionary capacity" to unite Europe?
I . Proposals sent by Sandys to H. Frenay,plus latter’ s reply 
letter to Sandys 30 .9 .48. SANDYS PAPERS
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For the moment,Sandys nevertheless decided to naximalise 
the British Govern»ent's opening,especially vith regard to the 
setting up of the Five Power Study Committee. After urgent talks 
vith both spaak and Schuman.he therefore announced that the Euro­
pean Movement vax»ly velconed the decision to for* an "Inter- 
Govemmental Committee"»which would "presumably" give prime place 
to studying the European Assembly proposal. In view of the British 
Government's ' questionnaire', he then vent on to stress:
"The creation of a deliberative European Assembly 
naturally involves no transfer of sovereignty and raises 
no constitutional proble-ns whatever. Other problems nay 
be the question of whether the Conuirunists shall be repra- 
sentedjand what terms of reference should be given to the 
Assembly. The Executive of the European 'tove-nent will report 
on these and similar points."1
Similarly,the European Movement Executive Bureau sent out a state­
ment re-assuring the Governments concerned that the projected 
European Assembly would have no legislative or executive powers
up until the nations themselves decided independently to transfer
2
sovereign rights to a ciuropean power. As regards the representa­
tive role of the Five Power Study Committee itself, Sandys spoke 
in the name of the Movement emphasising the need to include a 
balanced list of high-ranking political leaders,despite the 
apparent inter-governmental character of the initiative:
"In the opinion of the Executive,the effectiveness of the 
new Inter-Governmental Committee will depend entirely upon 
its composition and the spirit in vhich the Committee applies 
itself to the task.
If it is a Co-unit tee of officials taking instructions 
from their respective Goveranents.it may do useful technical 
work of a preparatory character,but will produce no far- 
reaching results.
If,on the other hand,the Committee is composed of leading 
public figures representative of the main trends of political 
opinion in the five countries,it may produce proposals of 
first class importance.
An independent Co-nmittee of responsible political leaders 
vould feel able to tackle broad issues of policy and to make 
bold recommendations to the five Governments in such a way./.
1. SaNDYs, quoted in the Hews Chronicle - 'One Europe and the 
Communists'.2B.10.46.
2. ' Observations on the (juestionaaire' ( E)i/tV29) CA*n BjkUGGt;
./ .a s  would be neither appropriate nor possible in the case 
of a Committee of technical experts."1
The original idea of holding a representative preparatory 
conference,not strictly controlled and nandated by Governments, 
regained therefore the policy of the European Movement. This was also 
the way in vhich the French Government interpreted the agreement 
of October 26. On November 3 ,the French cabinet subsequently 
announced a highly respected and representative list of nominees 
to the Comalttee,namely: Léon Blum(er-Preraier and Socialist Party 
leader),Paul Reynaud(er-Preuder,Independent)»Edouard Herriot(ex- 
Prentier,Radical Party leader) ,Prancois de Menthon ( leader of the 
MRP),and Charles Corbin (former Ambassador to London). The French 
authorities further illustrated their feelings on the subject 
by referring to the commission in question as the 'Study Commit­
tee for iSuropean Onion'. The French press si.nilarly regarded the
Committee as “a mark of real progress in the European idea",and
2
considered it as having "uncontested authority* on the matter.
In Britain,hovever,the Study Committee was viewed in official 
circles in a much less representative and powerful light,and was 
the cause of yet another running dispute in public between Attlee 
and Churchill,the latter stressing the need for it to be "indepen­
dent" and composed on an "all-party" basis,whereas the British 
Prime Minister insisted upon the technical role of.the Coaaitt««, 
in which delegates v & e  to be selected by the Government, to whom 
they would report and be responsible. All suggestions by the 
Conservative Party and by "private organisations",Attlee added,
3
would be given "full weight" by the delegation. The controversy 
in turn spilled over into a sharp public clash in the House of 
Commons on November 18,when Attlee blandly announced that Hugh 
Dalton would lead th« British delegation ,the name being 
greeted with Labour cheers and Tory cries of "shame!" Churchill./.
1. SAKDYü, Nevs Chronicle ,28 . Iü .46.,op . cit.
2. See Le nonde , 'Progrès de l'Idée européenne',30 .10 .48 .;
W. Horsefall Carter Speaking European (Allen fc Un*in,I966) 
p. 4 3 .(Carter was actually secretîry to the British delegation).
3. Attlee-Churchill correspondence 4-ln.Il.48. Keesings Qrtgitpaiv 
Archives.November 1948,pp.566-569.
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./.responded angrily by asking:"In comirg to this decision did you 
take into consideration the fact that the formation of this 
r Committee arose out of the Hague Congress(cries of no from Labour 
HP’ s),and that the Chancellor(Dalton). . .did his utmost to prevent 
or spoil that conference,and is everywhere regarded as a protago­
nist against the policy of a United Europe, except upon a Socialist 
basis?"* Attlee remained unperturbed,reading out the list of the 
other members in the British delegation,namely: Sir Edraard Mdges 
(Permanent Secretary to the Treasury),T.H. Gill(ex-president of 
the Co-operative Wholesale Society),Lord Inverchapel(former 
Ambassador to Washington), and Professor u.C.S. Wade. It was a 
most respectable technical delegation,but certainly not one to 
match the politically famous and representative group in the 
French delegation. - As the 'Observer' complained:"¡-tr. Attlee 
has chosen a British delegation to the Western Union committee
vhich is neither representative of British national opinion nor
2
worthy of the momentous issues at stake." Hugh Dalton,the 
same paper added,vas siaply the "wrong man" to lead Britain 
in the talks. The disappointment felt by most of the British press 
was best summed up by a highly critical article in the 'News 
Chronicle':
"As a group they vili hardly impress the world with the 
British Commonwealth's determination to achieve the unity 
of the continent of Europe.
There is a striking contrast between this team of five 
and that nominated by the French Government vhieh includes 
three former trime Ministers of France.. .
These British appointments are calculated to spread dismay 
about the future of a United Europe. They make nonsense of 
half the professions of the Labour rarty's recent pamphlet 
on continental union. They are so far below the level of 
events that ■•anisters could hardly have found a bettor vay 
of conveying the impression that they are very half-hearted 
about the great conception to vhich *«■. Bovin has pledged 
them."
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1. Hansard. 18 .I I .46. pp .566-569
2. Observer commentary in advance of the official naming of the 
delegation,14.I I .48.
3* News Chronicle , commentary,'Half-Hearted',18.11 .48 .
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Though ,to a certain degree,political opinion on the continent 
had been expecting some sort of official climb-down from the 
British authorities on the apparent concession made at the Brussels 
Pact meetingithe hostile and rather unsuitable composition of the 
British delegation to the Committee clearly dealt a severe blow 
to those heping to achieve substantial progress in the scheduled 
discussions on European unity. The initial French reaction was to 
request a postponement of the talks,originally planned to start 
on November 20. After further delay,the first session of the 
Five Power study Group,or ' Herriot Committee’ as it came to 
be known under the latter’ s chairmanship,was finally organised for 
November 26 ,by which time the composition of the other delegations 
had been announced and conformed to the French rather than to the 
British model. These other three delegations were composed as 
follows: Netherlands - J.W. Aibarda(Labour Party)»Senator Kerstens . 
(Catholic Party and Chairman of the i/utch Buropean Movement) , J . 
Bruyns Slot(Caivlnist Party); Belgium - Max Buset (Socialist Party 
President),A. de schryven(Christian - Socialist Party ^resident), 
Fernand Dehousse (Socialist and leading member of the European 
movement),Paul van Zeeland(joining shortly after); Luxembourg - 
Michel Rasquin(Sociaiist Party and USSE Chairman),F.Loesch(social 
Christian Party). The French and British delegations remained 
unchanged but for the replacement of Blum(due to illness)by Guy 
Mollet,and the belated addition of Sir Gla&ynjebb to the British team.
On H o v e m b e r  23 ,the European Movement had actually sub­
mitted a crucial memorandum to the Committee,explaining in detail 
the case for the creation of a European Consultative Assembly V 
and a European ministerial Council together. The these was 
further elaborated in various delegations to the Com-.ittee on
3
December 6 and 9. In the meantime,the internal differences of 
Strategy and opinion within the Movement itself emerged more 
strongly.despite the outer show of unity and drive.
1. See.for example Auriol Cf.p .320; Le Soir de 3ru elles article 
•La Fédération Européenne et les réticences de Bevin* 28.10.48.
2. IHF/IO/B op. Cit. 3. Cf. pp.3«-yo.
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2) Momentum arid Friction in the Campaign.2nd.EPK Congress.
Rome.Hovember 7-11.1^46
As the official efforts to promote a united Europe were 
finally initiated within the confines of the Five Power Study 
Group,the broader campaign of the European Movement started to 
gather considerable pace and impetus. The formation of the Move­
ment was also accompanied vith the launching of the 'E' symbol 
for Europe,interpreted by Sandys and others as the post-var coun­
ter-part of Churchill’s war-time 'V* for Victory sign. There was 
no doubt about the correlation between the two. Just as 'V ' had 
become a symbol of resistance to German Nazism,now ’ E’ was seen 
as the symbol of resistance to Russian Communism.1 The Movement, 
however,was not inspired soley by Cold War rhetoric. Sandys and 
the Executive Committee were,in fact,striving their utmost to 
broaden the appeal of the European ca.mpaign and intensify the 
message for unity of action. In this context,the groving involve­
ment of André Philip within the Movement was decisive. DisiHisianed 
with the continuing half-hearted European policy of Labour,and 
pushed on no doubt by the ailing Léon Blum,Philip and a group of 
SFIO federalists finally decided to gain a stronghold within the 
USSE and,in turn,open up the long-awaited possibility of securing 
the European Socialist group’ s active *nd organic involvement in the 
European Movement. • By Novmber,PhiUp was the dominant figure in the 
organisation and had brought about a thorough transformation of 
the group's structure and basic philoBophy. The nane was now 
changed to the Socialist Movement for the United States of Europe; 
and its goals were established as,first,to achieve European unity 
through a non-partisan effort,and,second,to concentrate upon con­
verting the unified Europe to socialism.'2 By December,the SMUSi 
seriously indicated its readiness to campaign vith non-socialist 
groups within the European Movement. The B>.ecutive Committee • / •
1. See,for example,Sandys' speech at Brussels,2 6 .1 0 .4 6 .,as 
quoted in the Daily Telegraph , 'Campaign under * ' ,27 .10 .48 .
2. F .k . Ritsch,op. cit. pI85.
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./ .o f  the European Movement,after having stalled on the issue in vie»'
of the previous dogmatic stand of the USSE.now saw every reason
for collaboration,and finally accepted the request,adding that the
aims of the two organisations appeared to be "perfectly comp at Ü a "*
It was certainly an important opening for the Movement,since
it could legitimately claim vith still more force that it was now
a truly representative international organisation,and not just an
instrument of Churchillian propaganda. The SMUSE,moreover, did not
simply behave as a socialist 'fig-leaf* to the campaign,but proved
instead to be a highly vocal and effective left-wing within the
Movement,as would later be illustrated at the inauguration of the
2
International Council in February. Furthermore the SMUSE did 
actually provide the key for the involvement of many illustrious 
Socialist leaders in the campaign of the European Movement,Guy 
Mollet soon joining its ranks,while the Dutch Labour Party as a 
whole became affiliated. André Philip himself proved to be a most 
worthy Executive leader vithin the European Movement,and a very 
useful envoy in gaining popular Socialist support for the growing 
campaign. His persuasive intervention behind the scenes at the 
Belgian Socialist Party Conference in November 1948 ,for example,
3
was of crucial significance. It also helped to smooth the way in
gaining the confidence of the Socialist EPU Chairman,George Bohy,
who subsequently agreed to call a top level meeting at Brussels on
November 14 between representatives of the EPU Council u±th Sandys
and Retinger,as leaders of the European movement Executive.
This meeting took place following yet another offer
by Sandys to renew the EPO's membership of the International
Executive Committee,in view of the popular decision at Interlaken
to form "organic links" once more between the two movements. There
were,he admitted to Bohy,some "incontestable divergencies" i n . / .
I .  Executive Committee meeting.4 .1 2 .4 8 . .o fficial minutes(EX/m/ 7 )
CAtiri Brugge ; also consult Gironella-Retinger correspondence
December 1948 CABM BRUGGE. 2 . C f .pp. 389,383.
3 . Philip met leading Belgian Socialists on 9 .1 1 .4 8 . in order to
obtain more support for the Movement. Drapier in turn told 
Rebbatet that Phili d  had "profoundly modified" the Party's 
position. Letter, 15 .11 .48 . Ca <*-. BRUGG*..
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. / .t h e  "general political declarations" of the two organisations, 
but this did not prevent a rapprochement concerning the basic 
aims and actions of the KPU and European Movement.1 The joint 
meeting of November 1 4 ,at vhich Coudenhove vas also present, 
followed up this initiative. The atmosphere of the meeting 
seemed most cordial and conciliatory at first,Bohy going so far 
as to claim that the "only reason" vhich had prevented closer 
collaboration between the two movements had been the EPU's mis­
givings as to the "political orientation" of the International 
Committee. In view of the recent association of leading Soci&ists 
within the European Movement,the EPU Chairman explained,naming 
Blum,Spaak.Ramadier and Philip ,this previous objection had been 
removed,and the way was now clear for closer collaboration. He 
also added,moreover,that there were no "doctrinal or party poli­
tical reasons" vhich now separated the two movements,neither did 
there exist any "fundamental" or "irreconcilable" divisions 
about the proposed European Assembly;there remained only mere 
"differences of emphasis and presentation." It was at this point 
in the discussion,hovever,that the vaneer of conciliation 
began to slip and the real bargaining positions emerged »ore 
clearly. In brief,the EPU initially  indicated an interest only 
in  forming a Liaison Committee,whereas Sandys wanted the EPU's 
full association within the European r o v e m e n t .  Coudenhove res­
ponded by suggesting that a "Super Coordinating Committee" could 
be set up,composed of five members from the tTU Council and five 
representatives of the European ¡-lovement executive Committee. 
Bohy,in turn,made it "quite clear" that the EPU would "readily 
accept" Sandys as chairman of the proposed Committee. Sandys, 
for his part,was obviously unprepared to cede what in effect 
represented a take-over of the eiuropean Movement tacecutive, saying 
that "it  would be very difficult for the five organisations 
which compose the Executive of the European Movement to accept^ .
I . Sandys.letter to Bohy.2 .1 1 .4 8 ..consult EX/P/37 cAd-t BkDGGE.
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. / .t h a t  the Parliamentary Union should receive five tines as great a 
representation on the Super Committee as them." He did,however, 
recognise the "great importance of adequate p a r l i a m e n t a r y  repre­
sentation" and therefore proposed as a "possible compromise" that 
half of the Super Committee should be composed of Members of Par­
liament. This proportion,he added,would include not only EPU rep­
resentatives, but also those of other participating movements who 
were H .P .s . The meeting broke down on this point.
During the weeks that followed both sides continued 
to express their hopes of a positive settlement ; 1»* th«re was 
no real attempt to lower the stakes already committed on November 
14. There ensued a 'waiting game' between the two organisations, 
Bohy.on the one hand pleading for a "fifty-fifty" proportional 
representation in the proposed Committee,while sandys,on the other 
hand,regarded this as excessive. The tension mounted still further 
when the European Movement Executive decided to dispatch its memo­
randum of November 23 to the Five Power Study Committee without 
properly consulting the GPU beforehand. The EPU Secretary General, 
Coudenhove lalergi.only made matters worse by angrily denouncing 
Sandys as wanting to downgrade publicly the EPU, adding that "Your 
' E' symbol,made in England..will create distrust throughout the 
continent." In ail this,the position of the European -lovement 
Executive remained quite clear: the tTU were welcome to become 
fully affiliated to the Movement on the same basis as other member 
organisations,ie. with four Executive representatives. For its 
part,the Movement veuld urge a n  its parliamentary members 
to join the EPU. Though Bohy was personally tempted by the offer, 
the EPU Council refused to budge. The remaining split resulted in
seperate representations being made to the Five Power Study Group,
2
thus reducing the potential impact of a joint campaign.
1» European Movement,informal minutes of joint meeting,14 .I I . 46.
CAEN BKUGGE.
2, Sandys-Bohy correspondence,November-December 1946; Bohy letter 
to Retinger,25.I1.48.;Coudenhove letter to Sandys,4 .1 2 .4 8 . ;  
European Movement Executive meeting minutes( EX/M/7)op«cit.,plus 
accompanying papers EX./P/4J.4B.52 CAEM BkUGGZT
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Meanvhile,the difficulties of co-eristence between the fede­
ralists and unionists in the European Movement itself emerged more 
clearly»in the wake of the Second Annual Congress of the EUF,held 
in Rome on November 7-II. Indeed,the Congress illustrated that 
there was little  enough unity among the federalists thenselves.let 
alone in the broader context of the European liovement:*
From the formal point of viev.the Rome Congress vas 
quite a success,meeting in the presence of Italy ’ s President Luigi 
Einaudi,Prime Minister de Gasperi,and Foreign Minister Count Sforza. 
The European Diplomatic Corps »as also veil represented,with the 
notable absence of Britain 's Ambassador»while among the special 
guests who attended there were important personalities such as 
Giuseppe Saragat,Léon Jouhaux.and the French Minister of Informa­
tion ,François Mitteifand. (Léon Blum had initially intended to par­
ticipate, but was detained through illness in t'eris). In the words 
of federalist writer Jean-Pierre Gouzy,however,"this congress night 
have been the last" to be held by the EOF. It  was indeed the scene 
of a violent clash of views between the hard-line intégral federa­
lists on one side,and the pro-parliamentary MFt maximalistes on 
the other,while the moderate "possibilistes" in the centre,repre­
sented by Brugmans and Silva,were attacked from all sides. André 
Voisin latecr drew attention to the "political battle" at the
3
Congress,describing it  as "particularly b itter ." Spinelli.for his 
part,substantiated this observation by publicly complaining how 
the "radical".mainly Italian,federalist group fought far bold poli­
tical measures,but was outnumbered by the moderate Brugmans’ group 
suppcrting the "minimum programme" favoured by the unionists,in 
addition to the "ideologically anti-parliamentary" integral fede­
ralist ving,among vhom,he added .there vere former sympathisers of 
■Action Française'.4
I.EUF Rowe Congress,7- II.II.4 8 . .consult; " Notes and Extracts".plus 
speeches* CBC GEMEVA; MFE Bulletins 7 - II .I i .4 8 ,4 .I2 .4 8 .,M F E  TURIN; 
Articles in December 1948 edition of La Fédération by Voisin anl 
Max Richard,CEC GENEVA; Federal Mews No.I64,Decemb«r 1948 .artiae  
by Josephy,'All Roads Lead to Rome'; Cahiers du Monde Noveau.Dsceiv- 
ber 1948¡press reports. 2 . QOUZY op.cix. £ .14 .
3 . VOISIN. La Fédération ibid. 4 .SPINELLx.MFt; BULLETIN 4 . I«:.48.
----------  ibid, FWfefalTîta* i .
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The specific issues at stake in this second EUF Congress of 
some 700 delegates,representing twelve different countries,centred 
essentially on the question of the European Assembly,and the level 
of collaboration within the European Movement. - Brugmans,in his 
long speech to the conference,attempted to answer both questions 
in a manner vhich would appease his radical critics in the hall, 
while conform to the position'of his unionist 'vatch-dogs' in the 
gallery.(Sandys was invited as an observer to the Congress). The 
EUK Kxecutive President thus boldly proclaimed,in contrast to his 
second intervention at The Hague,that the EU* needed to "reflect 
juridically about future constitutions",adding however,"but that 
does not signify at all that we are doctrinaire." History,he said, 
could not be prescribed in advance;the future was unknown,though 
some "improvisation" was necessary. As regards the European ove- 
ment,he went on to appeal for a "fusion of democratic forces" to 
ensure the success of the campaign,adding,as compensation to the 
disgruntled integral federalists,that the European movement itself 
needed to retain its *suppl#,rich and diverse" form: "Autonomy at 
the base",he concluded,"and unity at the summit."* In this approach, 
he vas soon supported by EUF General Secretary,Raymond Silva,who 
stressed that the initial problems encountered with the unionists 
had been overcome and that there now existied "a basis for solid 
collaboration" in the European campaign. Silva further added:
* It is because we want a European Federation that we are 
proposing a coherent and simple formula for unity which should, 
above all,produce the most effective results. Let us construct 
Europe which can only be federal,rather than follow federalism 
vithout constructing Europe. Europe is not only the objective, 
it is the chance for federalism ."2
This 'possibiliste* message hardly convinced the more doctri­
naire members of the integral federalist wing,though it vas the 
maximaliste MFE ving vhich protested the most loudly. The "Spinelli 
s id e ", Brugmans has explained,indeed launched into a"bitter attack" 
against Silva and the moderate centre,though Spinelli h im self ,./.
1 . BRUGMANS,opening speech at EUF Rome Congress,7.U.48. cjC GENEVA.
2 . SILVji .» Rapport noral». ibid . CBC GiiMtVA.
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. / . "vho vas aivays a loyal opponent of our tendance".refrained from
adopting the "slanderous" critique expressed by his colleagues.
Brugmans.in the final event,made a "gallant attempt to shelter
silva",declaring that the vell-being of the iiuF vas in danger,and
requesting that the "honest and objective majority" of the Congress
should put an end to these "intrigues" vhich had "poisoned" the
2
atmosphere of the meeting. I f  indeed the spinelli group had been 
vying for the election of their radical leader to the post of EUF 
General Secretary,they failed miserably. Spinelli did not even 
secure a place in the Central Committee,his candidature being
9
blocked not only by the moderate possibilistes and by the corpora- 
tist orientated integral federalists,but also by some fainter
3
hearts among the Italian delegation itself. Count Carandini,on the 
other hand,vas elected and vould later cede his place to Spinelli. 
Nevertheless,both opposing vings in the EUr’ did in effect combine 
to reduce severely the possibiliste direction of the movement. 
The agitated integral federalists,for example,managed to push 
through an important resolution,concerning the EUr' ' s collaboration 
vithin the European Movement,vhich clearly confirmed the right of 
the annual Congress itself to decide upon major policy matters, 
and vhich re-emphasised the role that should be given to the 
"living forces" vithin the campaign of the waropean Movement.
Of mare importance,vas the tactical radical base formed vith the 
Spinelli maximalists in the election of Henry Frenay as President 
of tie E(F Cantaal Ccm ilnin  Though Brugmans retained the Presidency of 
the executive Bureau, it vas clear that Frenay vas nov expected to 
play a most active role and act as an effective counter-balance to 
the moderate Brugmans-ffilvr# axis.5 Frenay did not disappoint his 
radical supporters,and soon led a virulent EUF drive vithin th e ./.
1 . BRUGMANS,letter to the v r it e r ,3 .I I .7 7 .
2. ' Declaration d'ordre personnel*.Brugmans.ho-ne Congress.cecoacVA.
3. Si-IHELLI diary 1 4 .I I . 4 8 . ; 1 Notes and extracts' op. cit. p . 15; let ter 
from i<arc to Spinelli, 1 6 .I I « 4 8 . ,EUF PAk XS.
4 . ' Kesolution sur les Rapports de l'UEF avec les autres 'TOuvenients 
ijuropfeens1 - ' Motes and Extracts'.o p »c it .
5* 'Notes and Extracts' ib id .j  buf central Committee meeting,Rome,
I I . I I . 4 6 . . official minutes.CBC GfiNEVA.
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. / . European Movement in favour of a much stronger federal-political 
strategy in the campaign. The growing friction between the r&- 
invigorated EOF leadership and the unionist directorship of the 
European Movement needs to be appreciates,however,in the light of 
the crucial and stormy political debate at the EOF Rome Congress.
Right at the start of the Congress ,Brugmans made his own 
position quite clear,having been influenced to a considerable 
degree by Sandys' realistic appraisal of the European campaign:
It was "inconceivable",he stated,to form a European Federation 
without Britain,and this being the case,the best available policy 
was one of expanding upon the European institutions to which 
Britain was already seriously committed,such as the Brussels Pact, 
0EEC,etc. There was no ftwseasble possibility,he maintained,of 
winning British support for an "integral European Federal Consti­
tution. Spinelli sharply disagreed on this point,declaring that 
the Federalists should,if necessary,have the courage to "go agairBt 
the current" in the struggle for a European Constitution. He went 
on to argue that European Federation was not something which could 
emerge "imperceptibly". Strong and clear measures were needed,as 
spelt out in the Interlaken Plan,otherwise the European campaign
risked evading the vital Europeajy-sovereignty issue, and thus play
2
into the hands of the "vague unionist" camp. The veteran co­
founder of the MFE,Ernesto Rossi,also dre* sharp attention to the 
dangers of the EUF accepting strategic pre-conditions in the cam­
paign for the European Assembly by being over-identified with the 
"establishment" view of European unity. He further warned against 
becoming intricately associated with "false friends" among the 
"unionist*","gradualists" and "diplomats" who perceived Europe in 
military and co-operational terms,refusing to consider the need 
to supercede national sovereignty within a European constitutional
3
framework. The most dramatic moment in the debate occured ,./.
1 . BRUGMANS,opening speech,op.cit.
2 . SPINELLI,in  MFK Bulletin 4 .1 2 .4 8 . ,o p .c it .
3 . Rossi,in  special MFE Bulletin at Rome Congress,7-II.1 1 .4 8 . ,op.
article *l««  Faux Amis'. c it.
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./.how  ever, when Carandini, former Italian Ambassador to London,spoke 
out for the maximalist ving in a long critique of British gradua­
lism as personified by Bevin,Churchill,Eden and Amery. Though full 
European Federation vas "unimaginable" id thout effective British 
participation,this vas no reason,he declared,for the European 
campaign itself to be "conditioned" by Britain 's lack of enthu­
siasm. Instead,he argued,a two-tier plan should be put into opera­
tion whereby those countries on the European continent,such as 
France,Benelux and Italy.vho were prepared to federate should be 
alloved to do so,renouncing their current national sovereignty 
in  favour of a larger European sovereignty. If  the British did 
not at first feel prepared to follow suit,then they could apply 
for associate membership of the continental federation. At this
point,an angry and nervous Miss Josephy lea the British delega-
2
tion out of the conference room in protest.
The political debate developed into a more fundamental 
and "violent'' clash of views when Piero Calanandrei was finally 
able to deliver his long-awaited report on the European Assembly. 
The initial part of his paper explained the difference in concep­
tion between a European Union and a European Federation. The 
former organisation,identified vith the unionist camp,was,he 
argued,b a s i c a l l y  an association of states,whereas Federation meant 
instead the creation of a superior "European State". Such a Euro­
pean "Super-State",he continued to explain in complete variance 
with integral federalist doctrine,involved having to transfer 
sovereignty upon a "centralised" basis.(Federal decentralisation 
applied only in the case where an existing expansive state was no 
longer capable of being governed from the centre). Drawing atten­
tion to the Interlaken »•'Ian,he then outlined a clear programme 
of action for the EUF and European campaign as a whole. The Con­
stitutional fusion of European sovereignty,he proposed,could./.
1 .  CARANDINI,speech at Rome Congress,CEC GEUEVA
2. See Josephy article in Federal News H o .I64 ,o p .c it .,p lus  article 
in  .»¿nchester Guardian , ’ Federalists meet in Rome* 8 .1 1 .4 8 .,
Tribune article by B.McGum written on 1 0 .I I . 4 8 .,  
’ United Europe backers clash in Rome talks'.
. / .b e  accommodated in a scheme by vhich a state,or group o£ states, 
vould take the initiative in convening a preparatory conference 
of government representatives. Ihe conference could in turn agree 
to sign a treaty in favour of setting up a European Constituent 
Assembly,as veil as form a permanent executive committee to orga­
nise the calling of the Assembly, lhe national Parliaments could 
then ratify the treaty,and the Assembly vould be subsequently 
convened,even if  not all nations,but at least some.vere in favour. 
The European Assembly could in turn formulate a federal constitu­
tion to be submitted to each participating national authority for 
final agreement lie Constitution could then be formally put into 
operation among those states vho agree to do so,some perhaps in 
advance of others.1
The Calamandrei report,dravn up vith the help of Spinelli 
and Sossi, appeared at first to be highly theoretical and 
utoolan, and had certainly nothing in common vith the internal- 
corporatist -vlevs of the integral federalists. Yet,although the 
latter group vere clearly opnosed to the fusionist-constitutionai 
political strategy proposed,some of the less doctrinaire elements 
of the EOF might veil have considered the report a little  more 
closely. Calamandrei vas in fact stressing,in more tactful form, 
the same doubts and practical options vhich Carandini had dravn 
attention to. In short,if the r-uropean Assembly vas to have any 
fundamental political purpose and specific terms of reference 
vith regard to the real structural transformation involved in 
federating Europe,then the minority British objection should not 
be alloved to obstruct the efforts of those states willing to 
set up an Assoably on such a specific basis. The conclusion, 
of course,pre-supposed that so ne states did have the vill,and 
vould be prepared to forge ahead in constructing organic European 
political unity in the initial absence of Britain’ s full partici­
pation. Was this so unvise and so unrealistic? In the . / .
I .  CAiiA.ANDREl, 1 Report on the Convening of a European Assembly1 
EOF Rome Congress, CEC GENEVA.
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./.immediate context of the time.it certainly appeared so. Yet,only 
tvo years later a rather similar initiative was actually carried 
out by the French,West German,Italian and Benelux Governments at 
a functional level. The'Europe of the S ix ',i t  is true,drev upon 
no direct constitutional commitments,but it nevertheless proved 
that an organic European fraraevork vas indeed conceivable vithout 
any pre-condition of British participation. Moreover,by 1950 a 
functional rather than a political approach had become the order 
of the day only because Britain had successfully exhausted and 
sabotaged the official basis for a potential supra-national Bura- 
pean political authority developing out of the Council of Europe. 
All this is later history. It is nevertheless important to bear in 
mind that the radical position adopted by the MFE federalists in 
November 1948 indicated a more realistic appreciation of the 
British situation,in its ultimate non-conmittal form,than did most 
of the European campaigners at that time,Sandys included.
In the final event,the specific proposals and strategy in 
the Calamandrei report were not adopted by the GUP Congress. The 
final policy resolution instead confirmed t «  British reluctance to 
join in a European Federal Constitution vould be " overcome",vhile 
the proposed constituent role of the European Assembly vas 
alluded to only in a vague and general clause stating that aeascres 
favouring the construction of a European Constitution vere "avaitaf 
from the Assembly.no specific proposals or time limit being put 
forvard. On the other hand,a long list  of more immediate economic, 
agricultural and functional measures vere passed by the conference 
stealing to a large extent the thunder of Cala^nandrei's political 
report - just as Spinelli had feared. Only the Italian and Belgian 
delegations appeared interested in a direct constitutional stra­
tegy,vhile the integral federalists retained their fidelity to 
the functional involvement of the "living forces. ”1
I .  See list of resolutions.' Notes and Extracts'.op .cit«:SPINELLI.
Lettera Federalista No.5 . , op. c it .¡article  in Times . I I J 148. 
•European Federalist Congress'.in vhich the consultative as 
opposed to the constituent role of the Assembly vas described 
as being the consensus vie» of the Congress.
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Spinelli vas bitter but not broken by the results of the EUK
Congress. The federalist movement,he complained,had merely adopted
the "vague and non-committal unionist formula'^vhile in private he
recorded hi* deep frustration vith the "timidity" of Brugmans and
Silva vis-à-vis the European Governments. The EUF,he concluded,
had failed to rally to the bold Interlaken Plan,and had neglected
the effect upon public opinion vhich their support of the "federa-
2
list  parliamentarians" vould have had. The MFE maximalist case, 
and re-assertion of international orientated federation plans had 
nevertheless madet±BT mark at the second EUF Congress,despite the 
rearguard action of the integral federalists and tenuous defence 
by the possibilist centre. Above all,the EUF no» had a radical 
and dynamic leader in Frenay,who remained insensitive to unionist 
arguments for moderation,and vith whom Spinelli and his closer 
MFE colleagues soon formed a tight alliance,bringing the maximalist 
case more and more to the centre of EUF political affairs. In 
short,the results of the Congress upheld the immediate status- 
quo vith regard to the strategy of the European riovenent,but it 
was only a matter of time before the gradualist policies of Santys 
and Retinger vould be seriously called into auestion. Voisin 
varned Spinelli and the MFE in this context that it  was desirable 
to struggle against "timidity",but unvise to neglect "prudent"
3
advice. These voa-ds of counsel could only be valued according 
to the results vhich Sandys and the Executive Committee of the 
European Movement effectively achieved.
3) Towards the Five-Pnver Agreement for a Council of Europe. 
January 28,194 9.
Judging by the eloquent and forceful statements made by 
Sandys and his Executive colleagues during the period folloving./.
1. Lettera Federalista No.5 . op.cit.
2. SPINELLI diary. 14 .11 .48 .
3. VOISIN,article on the Rome Congress in December edition of
La Fédération ,op. cit. - 'Etape Kor.aine'. In the same article, 
Voisin attacked Spinelli for being a"hot-headed" constitutioral 
theoretician,unappreciative of Sandys'"proven" European stra­
t a »
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. / .t h e  establishment of the Five Power Study Committee,there seemed 
to be little  reason in fact to doubt the European Movement's de­
termination to achieve substantial progress in the campaign for 
supra-national European unity. Sandys,for example,delivered a most 
fiery appeal in Paris,on December I ,i n  favour of a democratic and 
independent Western Europe,declaring that Europe vould never 
become a satellite of the Soviet Union nor of the United States, 
but would "a.lvays remain her own master." Giving a preview of the 
precarious balancing act shortly to be launched in direct talks by 
the movement,he vent on to state:
"Urgent necessity compels the taking of immediate practical 
measures of functional co-operation. On the other hand,hopes 
of a happier and saner future inspire a more ambitious and 
idealistic approach,which has found expression in proposals 
for European Federation. There is no conflict between these 
tvo approaches. Both the spur of necessity and the inspiration 
of hope are essential to the success of our cause."
In similar terms,Andr6 Philip led the call in the French National
Assembly for a supra-national approach to European unity, and vas
joined by the French Foreign Minister Schuman ,vho looked to an
eventual European Federation as the only way of re-integrating
Germany. Edouard Herriot and Pierre-Henri Teitgen also added their
2
influential voice to the campaign.
This renewed bout of French appeals in the European campaign 
vas sparked off not only by an idealistic urge to unite,but also 
by the sudden spectre vhich West-Germany's re-birth now presen­
ted. on November 1 0 ,the British and American authorities i n Ger­
many indeed disturbed their French counterparts in announcing the 
promulgation of 'Law No. 7 5 '.vhich tranferred the ovnership of the 
coal and steel industries in their Bizone, (90* being in the Briti* 
zone),to an envisaged "German tJoverment, freely elected." The . / .
1 . SANDYS, speech to the Anglo-American Press Association ,I.12 .4 8 . ,
SANDYS PAPERS.
2. French National Assembly debate on the Ruhr question,1 0 .11.48 . | 
public speeches made by Teitgen and Herriot reported respecti­
vely in L 'Aube , 2 . 12. 48 . ,  News Chronicle ,3 .1 2 .4 8 .
- 339 -
./.announcement vas in turn greeted with alarm and scorn by the 
French political leaders,vho insisted that Germany's economic 
and political re-structuring should be treated essentially as a 
European problem,this being particularly the case for future 
ownership of the Ruhr.* Britain heid firm in not wanting to become 
involved, and it was in this unsavoury atmosphere that the first 
session of the Five Power Study Committee on Europe was held.
The prospects of the conference reaching agreement on a united 
political structure for Europe appeared singularly grim.
Yet, according to Retinger,who had exercised his public 
relations skills to the hilt on the eve of the conference,"a 
friendly atmosphere prevailed among the delegates right from the 
start of these difficult negotiations." He even added.in retro­
spect, that "in  this we had succeeded and I left with a feeling
2
of optimism in the outcome of the big battles that lay ahead."
The published accounts about the meeting,however, appear to
3
tell a different story. - After appointing Herriot as Committee 
Chairman, the meeting had the immediate and difficult of dealing 
with two rival plans: the first submitted by the Franco-Belgian 
team calling for a European Consultative Assembly based upon par­
liamentary lines,the second submitted by the British spokesmen - 
notably ualton - proposing an inter-governmental European Council 
of .¿nisters. "There is no mistaking the enthusiasm and whole­
heartedness of French support for a European Assembly",commented 
the 'T im es ',in  a survey reporting the atmosphere surrounding the
4
meeting. A British official who was actually involved in the 
talks,however.presented the following gloomy picture as to his 
delegations order of conduct at the conference:
1. leesinqs Contemporary Archives 1948 pp .9643-4,9688; see also 
a very strong commentary on the subject in i.'ew statesman and 
Nation. 'France and the Ruhr' , 2 7 . I I . 48.
2. KETINGER. memoirs. op. c it . p .223.
3. See,for example, ¡»t'AAl, The Continuing Battle ,op.cit.pp.204—5, 
REYNAUD, Unite or rerish ,op.cit.pp.X96-7, The Unifying Force 
of t.urope ,op.cit.pp.260-261.
4 . Times , 'Promoting European U nity ', 2 3 .n . 46 .
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■The instructions which Hugh Dalton had received,apparantly, 
were to put up as much resistance as possible to this parlia­
mentary project as being irrelevant to the practical work of 
intergovernmental co—operation and lively to be a nuisance.
As Mr. Dalton explained,the British Government's concern was 
to complete the framework of the Five Power Brussels Treaty 
by its gradual extension to any and all member countries of 
the OEEC. The British Memorandum therefore proposed the forma­
tion of a ...Council of Europe,meeting at retrular intervals for 
the discussion of any question of common interest,but to be 
■composed of national delegations exactly as the United Nations, 
headed by M inisters."1
The crucial difference therefore remained between the Pranco- 
Belgian plan for an independent parliamentary type of European 
Assembly with individual voting rights,and the British inter­
governmental proposal for a more restricted forum in which 
national delegations would be instructed to vote en bloc with the 
minister concerned. The Dutch and Luxonbourg delegates vere 
edging in  favour of the former plan,but,as Paul Reynaud explained. '
"the British Government instructed its representatives in such a
2
fashion that it  was impossible to reach agreement." It  was at 
this point that the "compromise” proposal submitted by the Europe»n 
•Movement on November 23 came into play.
Hawing reunited after the closure of the EUF F.onte Congress on
3
November II .th e  European Movement Executive Bureau had in fact 
formulated and approved a new text with regard to the convening 
of the proposed European Assembly. While retaining the same am­
biguity of former declarations,it nevertheless offered useful 
advice concerning Britain 's technical objections,as well as 
proposing a crucial ’ compromise",at the end,as to the unsolved 
argument between a parliamentary or inter-governmental approach 
to the European political institution in question. The new Memo- ,
randum,sent to the Five i-ower conference on Hovaaber 23 , th us ./.
I .  W.H. Carter, Speaking European (Alien & Unwin 1 9 6 6 ),p . 44.
Z. REYNAUD, The Unifying Force of Europe ,op. cit^? .260.
3. European Movement Executive Bureau m eetin g .II .II. 4 6 . .official 
minutes (EX A / 6 ). CAEM BRUGGr.. Attended chiefly by Sandys,
Bichet,Dautry,Retinger,D'Estaing,Josephy,plus EPU guests 
Enzo Giaccherò,Astuto De Luchesi. *
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./•conveniently dropped the previous call for a preparatory c o n fe r « *  
on the subject of the European Assembly»regarding the Five Pover 
Study Committee as a more speedy solution« Next,in deference to 
the increasing official attention being given to the establishment 
of an Atlantic Alliance system,the document vent on to suggest 
that the invitation to participate in the eventual Assembly should 
be extended not only to all the Marshall Aid countries,but also to 
Portugal,vhose strategic value no doubt outveighed her democratic 
shortcomings. Of more immediate importance,in regard to Bevin's 
specific objections to the scheme,the Memorandum broached upon 
possible methods of keeping the French and Italian Communist 
Parties out of the proposed Assembly,suggesting that each national 
parliament participating in the project should be responsible far 
deciding upon the precise procedure for selecting delegates. This 
effectively by-passed the need for a blanket and uniform democratic 
procedure vhich,vhile causing no problems for British representa­
tion, vould in fact produce Communist delegates from the other 
above tvo countries. The British Government,on the other hand,vas- 
not at all enthusiastic about the prospect of a parliamentary - 
type European Assembly,in vhich the Conservatives - and above all 
Churchill - vould be represented. The Memorandum remained firm 
on this issue,and insisted upon the representative and non­
mandated ouality of the national delegations,though adding in 
re-assurance that "the fact that they(the delegates)are dependent 
upon the goodvill of their respective parliaments for their re- 
election vhen their t e n  expires,should provide a sufficient check 
upon irresponsible action." It vas also made d e a r  that no im­
mediate direct elections to the European Assembly vere envisaged, 
vhilst the Assembly itself should nuiber betveen three and four 
hundred members,depending respectively vhether seats vere to be 
allocated according to population levels or national quotas.
The most important points brought up in the Memorandum of 
November 23 related,of course,to the title  and terms of
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./.reference of the proposed Assembly. - Whereas all the previous
terts and declarations on this ouestion had at least continually
implied that it  vas really a matter of tine before the European
nations vould decide to transfer sovereignty and set-in motion an
effectne European Parliamentary system,the November Memorandum vas
less forthright,inserting the conditioned clause that a federal
parliament vould doubtless appear,but only " i f  and vhen" governments
so decided. For the meantime.it vas stressed that "recent public
discussion" had given rise  to "misconceptions" regarding the
"limited but immediately realisable" Assembly in question. The
crucial point of the document vas nov clearly e;:plained:
"Xn order to avoid any mistciderstanding.it is desirable that 
the Assembly should be given a title and terms of reference 
vhich v ill  make it clear that it is  not a federal parliament, 
nor even a constituent or pre-constituent assembly,and that 
it  possesses no legislative or constitution-making povers."
The official title  suggested,therefore,vas - "European Consultative
Assembly*,its specific terms of reference being listed as follovsi
"a) To consider the relations of European nations vith each 
other and vith other outside countries vith a viev to 
formulating a common European policy;
b) To examine practical measures designed to promote closer 
unity among the European nations in the political and 
economic spheres;and,in particular,to study the creation 
of international organisms for the direction in common of 
important services or activities;
c) To study the social and juridical problems vhich are raised 
by such measures of integration;
d) To consider methods for developing among the European 
peoples a better understanding of the principles vhich 
form the basis of their common civilisation,and for 
promoting cultural exchanges;
e) To define the democratic liberties of the European peoples 
in a Charter of Human Rights;and for the purpose of guaran­
teeing these Rights,to examine the problem of creating a 
European Supreme Court backed vith adequate sanctions;
£) To consider means of associating in the solution of European 
problems States and territories in other continents vhich 
are linked vith European countries;and,in particular,to 
consider the representation of these countries in the 
European Consultative Assembly; • / •
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. / .  g) To make recommendations regarding the above matters to
the governments of the participating nations,cither direct 
or through the medium of a European Council of Ministers."*
The delicate balance and apparent moderation of the document 
vere perhaps more difficult to refute or ignore than had been the 
•catch a ll ’ resolutions produced some six months earlier at the 
Hague Congress. The current Memorandum,moreover,paid due tribute 
to-the increasingly talked of “ functional" approach to European 
unity, the troubled ownership of the Ruhr industrial basin having 
provoked attention to such a concept/clause b ) , while Britain's 
concern about continuing links vith her overseas territories vas 
also covered in more detail than in the past(clauses a and f ).
Above all,however,the wemorandum addressed itself to the conflict 
over a parliamentary or inter-governmental European initiative, 
attempting to reconcile differences and square the circle. Thus, 
previous declarations referring to the sensitive "constitutional 
implications" or Inherent "constitutional problems" in the work 
of the European Assembly were now completely dropped altogether
3
from the text. Similarly,despite the general defence in the memo­
randum of popular and parliamentary involvement in the convening 
of the proposed tiuropean Assembly,part of the same text specificc£lfy 
declared:"Inter-governmental studies and negotiations must not 
only continue but must be intensified and accelerated." This policy 
was briefly .though firmly .explained in clause(g) of the specific 
recommendations put forward,in vhich the idea of establishing a 
" European Council of i-dnisters" was clearly proposed, in addition 
to setting up a nnropean Assesnbly. This was indeed the essential 
"compromise" of the November Memorandum,the actual title  of vhich 
read:"European Consultative Assembly and European Council of <dni- 
sters." In  other words,the European ¿¡ovement quite simply./.
JL. ' tiuropean Consultative Assembly and European Council of drdstat#\ 
Ke-norandum presented by the European *ioveient Executive to the 
Five hover Study Committee,23 .11 .46 . CABn BRUGGE.
2. Ciause(f) was also an opening vith regard to the participation 
of Eastern European exiles.
3. Hague Congress Resolution, and blemorandum of August 16 ,respecti­
vely.
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./.suggested that both the Franco-Belgian ü'uropean Assembly plan, 
and the counter British inter-governmental sche-ne for isurope,could 
be accepted together,as one joint European package, it vas 
an opening for vhich Sandys,above a l l ,vas responsible.and vhich 
nad provoked strong resistance in radical federalist circles.* Yet, 
as the compromise stood,there vas no intention on behalf of the 
European Executive Committee leaders to renege on Europe's long­
term political and organic unification,nor to drop the European 
Assembly initiative Itself. They looked instead to a joint evolu­
tion both of the Assembly and of the Council,and not the elimi­
nation of the former project by the latter. As the Memorandua 
concluded:
"The British Government has proposed that there should be 
formed a Council of ¡-tinisters of the European states. This is 
la line vith the recommendations of the Political keport sub­
mitted to the Congress of txiroPe...
Provided that it  is clearly regarded as an addition and 
not as an alternative to the Consultative Assembly,the British 
Government's proposal for a Council of -anisters should 
certainly be adopted."
- It vas an opening perhaps capable of stimulating a compromise
betveen the British and Franco-Belgian positions,but one vhich vas
also frought vith risks and constraints. It indeed marked both the
start to Britain 's active involvement in the project as a vhole,
and the commencement,in effect,of the European campaign's gradual
slide avay from a real supra-national strategy.
The long-term consequences of this latest initiative by the
European Movement leaders w e  far from evident at the subsequent
meeting of the Executive Con*d.ttee on December 4-5 in Paris,vhere
André Philip and René Courtin pressed for a programme emphasising
the importance of organising European Federation at a quicker rate2
than Germany's recovery. A joint study group vas in turn set u p ./ .
I .  Cf. p32I. 2. Official Minutes. P ./:i/7 . op. c it .; Philip ' lipte
sur la Declaration miTl'TOfe 3U LOnseil InteraationaHfatawaen-t 
Européen' (EX/P/ÿ6) .Sandys ' Remarques' ibid. The -neeting vas 
attended by: Bastid.Courtin, uautry.de Men t h o n ,Philip,Al*on(CF EU); 
arugna^joBtphy, Stt*a,Vcdsin(SlF); XJnB-Haaii,ayta\.Sam^ s(Ut; (-OfHichet, Caboumac, 
LanaiHe^C>u*sin|<EI);BuCto, BexteB£amu,Reting«v sernys( EL£C ).
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./ . i n  order to draft a Political Declaration for the inaugural 
session of the International Council of the European Movement, 
nov planned for February 1949.* The meeting was primarily con­
cerned, however, in approving yet another text vhich vould serve 
as a basis for direct talks vith the Five Pover Study Conmittee, 
the Memorandum of November 23 having restated in an invitation by 
the latter group to the European Movement for a further explana­
tion of the compromise formula put forward. The Executive state­
ment drawn up for this direct exchange of vievs,planned for 
December 9 ,concentrated on the three main points contained in 
the previous Memorandum,in particular:the scooe.the representatise
structure,and the relation of the proposed ciuropean Assembly vis-
2
à-vis the ministerial Council.
The deliberative scope of the proposed European Assembly 
was explained tactfully,the Executive Committee suggesting 
tnat the Assembly should be precluded by statute from discussing 
direct constitutional issues,military matters or clear subjects 
already under the consideration of the OEEC and other inter-gowna- 
mental bodies. On the other hand,it vas considered that the 
Assembly should be "entirely free to discuss any subject which 
is of common concern to the nations of Europe." In other words, 
the Assembly vas not to discuss sensitive specific issues vhich 
vere related to,or vhich might impede,the current practical Euro­
pean policies officially under review; but it should,nevertheless, 
be allowed to discuss broader long-term proble-ns involved with 
European unity. This was a rather ambiguous formula. In the crucial 
debate about eventual juridical and organic union,for example,the 
agreed text reassuringly confirmed that it vas "clearly not the 
function of the Assembly to draw up a European Federal Constitu­
tion", but then later insisted that it vas "neither possible nor 
desirable to prevent discussion upon the constitutional problems 
of European union." Similarly,although the "technical aspects./.
X. The members of the study group included Boothby, Go11ancz, and 
l^ytwi(Britain),Axri,Q3srtin^hiliparïlTeitgen(ft'a)Tce)tpîus wiamed E3> reps
2. " 3urma~v of Statement tv the uaeqatioT of the Bmpe» Hawnatt to the Rye - 
Power ComrittBe on Bnopean thter.Rttis.9J2^8..KX^P/56,CABl< BRUGGE.
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./ .o f  military co-operation" were not to be discussed,the Assembly 
was nevertheless deemed a "most suitable body to discuss the 
broad problems" of a common defence policy. Finally,it was also 
stressed that the Assembly should not prepare "detailed economic 
plans",but should discuss the "general problems of economic inte­
gration" , even if this meant intruding slightly upon the vork of 
the OBBC.
Regarding representation in the Assembly, the European ¡■tovenejt 
in turn proposed that,although the Five Brussels ract covers 
should carry out the initial preparatory work,the Assembly itself 
should not be identified in the public mind as being part of a 
"predominantly military* organisation. For this reason,the other 
free countries of Eiurope villing to participate in the scheme(ie. 
such as Italy)should be consulted before the final plans were 
announced. The actual procedure for selecting representatives to 
the Assembly vas once more identified as being the ultimate 
responsibility of national parliaments,which alone vere "capable 
of assuring the authority of the national representation*, though 
the field of selection was to reflect not just the "relative 
strengths of political forces",but also include "leading figures 
from the spheres of religion,economics and culture." Each national 
parliament should choose its own method of selection,though consul­
tations betveen political parties and other interests vere never­
theless recommended prior to the final approval by parliaments of 
the national list. The "Communist Problem",in this context,was 
not to be "unduly magnified",since the relative strength of the 
Western European Communist harties amounted to little over 104 
of the total parliamentary force. -Toreovex, the preparatory text 
of the European novement even vent on to argue,in vhat seemed to 
be a sharp revision of previous thoughts on this sensitive subject, 
that there vould be more advantages than dravbacks by the inclu­
sion of Comnunists in the eiurope an Assembly:
"The presence of this element of fundamental opposition 
vili have the effect of promoting a greater sense of . / .
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./.solidarity betveen the other members of the Assembly and 
vili stimulate anong them a stronger determination to bridge 
their differences."
Whatever ' the final official view on the issue vould be,the 
European Movement,in any case,stressed that the idea of intro­
ducing a formal regulation for the exclusion of Communists from 
the Assembly vould be "undemocratic and undesirable.” Clearly 
the key to the problem still lay in allowing each national autho- 
rity(parliamentary or governmental)to formulate its ovn method 
of selection,according to custom and viewpoint.
Finally, the relation between the proposed riuropean Assembly 
and Council of ministers,which vas the crux of the vhole ''compro­
mise" proposal,vas explained in the following four clauses:
"The recommendations of the Assembly vould normally be 
addressed to the Council of .ministers,which vould provide 
an organism through vhich the governments could jointly 
consider the action to be taken upon them.
It is assumed that the Assembly vili receive from the Council 
of winisters some reply to its reconmendations. The Council 
may send to the Assembly a vritten communication or,alterna­
tively, may depute a representative to address thè Assembly 
in person.
At times the Council will itself wish to refer certain 
matters to the Assembly for consideration in order to 
obtain an expression of tiuropean public opinion upon the 
issues involved.
It vili be essential for the success of both institutions 
that confidence and "tutual respect shall be established 
between the Council and the Asrenbly. However,the relation­
ship betveen the tvo bodies cannot at this stage be precisely 
defined. It must be left to evolve gradually in the light 
of experience."
The guiding hand of Sandys was all too evident in this
final crucial passage of the European .ovement statement,stressing
the evolutionary path,but unforeseen nethods.for arriving at
closer European political union. The most important point vhich
he wanted to achieve vas not to establish a strictly juridical
raoport betveen the Assembly and Council,but to create instead ,
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. / .a  fairly loose but escpandable and adaptable basis for their
co-development and inter-dependency,in the eventual hope that the 
latter ministerial institution vould become collectively rwyonsfrae 
to the Assembly,rather like the relationship betvecn a government 
and parliament. This political strategy vould become more evident 
at a later stage of the European campaign. He first ne«ded,hoswer, 
to secure a general approval for so^e sort of organic rapport be- 
tveei the proposed Assembly and Council, vith out over-restricting 
the deliberative rights of the former. - The radical federalists 
strongly objected to the risks involved in this shadovy strategy, 
vhereas it vould indeed take a lot of argu"*«nt and persuasion to 
bring the cautious British Government delegates to accept the 
schene in its initial form.
The European Movement delegation,consisting bf Sandys,Bichet, 
arugmans.Dautry,Vallée-Poussin,Retinger and Leenhardt,vas subset 
quently received by the Five Pover Committee at the Quai d ’Orsay 
on December 9,vhere the compromise proposal of November 23 vas 
explained according to the above preparatory statement.* The 
impact and clarity vith vhich the deputation vas to have presented 
its compromise formula vas partially underlined,however,by the 
reciprocal presentation of views vhich the EPU Council had been 
able to deliver to the Connittee one day earlier,on December 8, 
in an official delegation composed of Coudenhove,Bohy,Coty,Gilson 
and Mackay. The EPU’ s list of proposals,mainly fornulated by 
Mackay also contained a ■’compromise" betveen the British and 
Franco-Belgian positions,suggesting that a broad European Council 
of about 110 members should be established representing the OBEc 
nations and West Germany on the basis of one representative for * 
every tvo million of population. National delegations to the 
proposed Council vould be constituted by Governments,but should./.
I .  ’Creation of the Council of Europe’ . 1HF/I0/E. op.cit. p p . 8-9; 
plus interesting articles in L ’Aube end Le Populaire ,
9.12.48. Leenhardt vas theoretically representing the EPU 
vithin the delegation.
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./.also  include representatives nominated from outside Parliament and 
Government. Finally,while the Council itself vould have "no execu­
tive or legislative pover",it vas meant to debate and make recorwat- 
dations to governments on "any matter affecting the political and 
economic Union of Europe." In short,the EPU propositions appeared 
to be very close to the British inter-governmental plan for a Euro­
pean Council of Ministers,operating at an official co-operative 
level.1 This vas not vhat Kackay had really intended. As lie explained 
in the House of Commons,in contrast to Bevin’ s position:
"A Council of Ministers can meet at any time. That is not 
vhat ve are talking about. What I vant is something bigger, 
something vhich vill bring in a number of representatives so 
that ve can have a vider discussion of the vhole question of 
European Union and so that the discussion vill be taken on to 
a larger f ie l d ."2
Moreover,the EfU position itself vas confused still further by
Coudenhove's individual initiative in submitting his ovn memorandum
on December 8 ,in vhich he called for both a European Council of
Ministers and a European Consultative Assembly on similar lines to
the European movement's recommendations,vhile he also could not
resist proposing grandiose statements about the German problem,the
Russian threat,American aid,and the need to adopt his treasured
3
Pan-Buropa flag as the flag of Europe!
Clearly,the case for a European Assembly could hardly have 
been put vith less co-ordination from among the European pressure 
groups,despite the efficient efforts vith vhich Sandys had managed 
to stream-line the organisation and proposals of his ovn movement. 
Indeed,right at the actual climax of the campaign,internal dissen­
sion within the various European groups themselves provided a fear­
ful and potentially destructive back-cloth to the vhole diplomatic 
saga: Inside the European Movement,the distant grumblings of EuF./.
1. For the EPU "compromise" proposal,6 .1 2 .4 8 .,see "Propositions 
sou-Tases per L'Union Parlementaire Européenne" . Plus minutes of 
British All-Party Group meeting,I 5 .I2 . h8. .iiACIAY PAPERb;press 
reports 9 .1 2 .4 8 .;Mackay press interview,'Times'10«12 .48 .¡Sandys' 
letter to Bohy,23.I2.48.,CAEn BRUGGE.
2. HACIa y ,Hansard,9 .12 .48«,pp.773-7«
3. COUDEHHDVa;, separate memorandua, 8 .12 . 4 8 . ,  HACKAY PAPERS.
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. / .  discontent aov reached à dangerous level with the formal
decision to allow Frenay a limited right of veto in the meetings
of the executive Bureau of the latter movement,along with his
election as one of the four EOF representatives to the Intematioial
Executive Committee of the tiuropean movement itself.1 The EPU
Council,in the meantime,appeared shocked and outragea vith Couden-
hove's separate initiative on Deec ember 8, and Hack ay now clearly
presented the parliamentary movement vith the tough demand eittar to
restrict severely the apparent powers of the ¡secretary General,
or risk an open split in the organisation. Failing to rally the
majority of his EPU Council colleagues to his point of vie»,he
subsequently broke vith the parliamentary movement and led his
Labour followers into the European iiovement itself,after which the
2
British All-Party Group as a whole officially followed suit. Cou- 
denhove.for his part,remained unrepentant and defended his refusal 
to collaborate vith the European movement on the grounds that the 
latter organisation was "at war with the British Government" ,wd vas 
controlled chiefly by a British clique which was Tory-dominated
3
and consequently hostile to real iSuropean Federation plans. - It 
was in such an anarchical atmosphere that the Five rover Study 
Committee was to pronounce its judgement on the tentative political 
unity of tfurope.
At an official level,however,the omens in favour of some sort 
of British dimb-dovn on the European Assembly issue did not appear 
too inauspicious. On December 8 the French Assembly's Foreign 
Affairs Committee overwhelmingly passed a motion strongly urging 
the Five Power Group to set up a parliamentary-type European
4
Assembly. On December 4 , the Italian Parliament also adopted./.’
I . EUF Central Committee meeting.17-18.12.48.. official minutes,
CSC GENEVA.
i . EPU Council meeting.29-30.12.48..official ninutes.Plus accompan­
ying paoers,MACKAY PAPERS;Mackay-Coudenhove letters ,I.I.4 9 ,14 .I .
4 9 . ,CAE,. BRUGGE.;Cf. also pp.
3. COUDEHHuVE,letter to sandys,I8.I.4 9 . , CAEU BRuGGE.
4 . See Année Politioue 1948,p .236.
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./.b y  a large majority a motion presented by EPU l e a d e r , Giaccherò,
boldly supporting the idea of European rederation. Strong pressure
vas also being put on the British Labour rarty to reconsider its
rigid tiuropean policy at the Committee meeting of the International
Socialist Conference held on December 2-4,in vhich the French,Belgi»
2
and Italian delegates appealed for a spirit of compromise. Yet it
vas the unofficial recommendations put forward by the European move­
ment and EPTJ delegations vhich in the final event provided the 
Five Pover Committee vith the aneouate compromise formula in their 
discussions,despite the evident lack of coordination and agreement 
vith vhich the deputations had delivered their proposals. On Dece»- 
ber I 6 ,Hugh Dalton jubilantly prociamed: "We are haif-vay across
3
the stream." Likevise the French ana Belgian delegates to the 
Committee could not disguise their satisfaction. After having vorked 
through four plenary sessions and twelve sub-comrcittee meetings,the 
Five Pover Study Conuriittee appeared to have adopted the "compromise" 
proposal,and unanimously agreed to adopt an interim report for con­
sideration by the national Governments concerned. "British objections 
apparently vanished", Spaak recorded."Hovever",he then added, "appear-
4
ances vere deceptive."
Indeed,vhile the British delegation,for their part,vere still 
clinging to the more limited idea of a large inter—governmental 
assembly in vhich national representatives vould participate only 
at the level of backing up the appointed govermental minister,the 
French and Belgian delegates to the Five Pover Coranittee had clearly 
understood that the European Movement’ s compromise proposal for the 
creation of both a European Assembly and a Ministerial Council had 
been accepted. This vas also the way in vhich the hopeful leaders 
of the European novement interpreted events. Lord Layton,in fact, 
felt sufficiently confident to declare publicly that 1949./,
1. See Keesinqs Contenporarv Archives 1948.pp. 9705,9689.
2. See articles in Times and Guardian 4 .1 2 .4 8 ..plus Times 
commentary Socialist Efforts to Reach Agreenent',2 .12.48.
3. See daily press 18 .12 .48 ..plus interesting analysis by Robert 
Verdier in Le Populaire 27.12.48.
4 . SPAA*., The Continuing Battle ,op. cit. p .204.
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./.would be a year of destiny for the European campaign. He further
explained:
"The coming into being of a Council for Western Europe next 
year will start a process of collaboration on a Parliamentary 
level parallel with the work being done on a Government level 
and official level under the Marshall Plan. It will set in 
train a process which the force of circumstances will turn in 
the direction of federation. It will be the first step of a 
start towards a Parliament of taurope." 1
Such confidence that the interim report of the Five Power Committee 
had indeed accepted the European Movement’ s compromise proposal was 
further reflected at an official level when,after two days of impor­
tant discussions in 1-ondon with Bevin.the French foreign l-iinister 
Schuman declared to the press on January 14 that an Anglo-French 
agreement of this kind had been reached:
"It has been agreed*,he stated,"to support a nei' proposal 
incorporating both the British plan for a Council of j-dnisters 
representing the Goveronents of Western Europe,and the Franco- 
Belgian plan for a Consultative Assenbly representing the 
Parliaments of Europe." *
However,upon the resumption of the Five Power talks,a totally
separate picture emerged. In the words of Paul-Ht-nri Spaak:
"When the committee met again,on January 18 1949,Hugh Dalton, 
the leader of the British delegation,put forward a totally 
different counter-pian. Instead of the assembly originally 
envisaged there would be a body consisting of national dele­
gations appointed by the various governments concerned,each 
headed by a minister¡voting would be en bloc. This was unacep- 
table." 3
The new draft was clearly not very much of a compromise at all, 
and vas greeted by the four continental delegations with open resent­
ment and hostility. "It would be a detestable solution",François de 
Henthon declared to the press,"It would be better to do nothing 
rather than give us a caricature of an assembly."4 Likewise,the./.
1. LAYTON,speech at Central Hall,Westminster,29. 1 2 .4e . .reported in 
Kevs Chronicle , ‘A new era or break up of Europe’ ,30 .12 .48 .; 
Times. ’ European unity:Lord Layton's hope for a new assembly', 
30.12.48.
2. SCHUMAN . Kersinqs Contemprarv Archives 1949 p .9754.
3. Si'AA*., op. cit. pp.204-5.5 Bnes , 'European Unity', 2 1 . 1 . 49.
4 . DE nEHTHON,quoted in Le fronde ,'Pour entrainer l'Angleterre a»** 
l'union euopéenne',27.1.49«
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./.French press itself mounted a bitter attack against Britain's 
apparently unreliable European policy. "3evin re-affirms his 
hostility to the creation of a £iuropean Assembly" read the head­
lines of 'Le Monde',whose influential European reporter,Raymond 
j-Allet,strongly urged the French activists for European unity to 
be even more resolute in the face of such "negative" positions and 
"deceptions."1 The French members of the European ovement Executive 
Committee did indeed respond to this new challenge and after an 
urgent meeting on January 25 they issued a stiffly worded communijafe 
expressing "deep regret" at the failure of the Five server Group, 
and called upon the French Government to "insist” •apoti a rAiropean
Assembly "elected independently of Governments" and equipped with 
2
"free voting" rights. On the other side of the channel,the UEM
cautiously decided to await the final result of the governmental
3
discussions on the issue before declaring their position. Bevin,
nevertheless,was under considerable pressure both from within his
party and from the traditional press to cede in favour of the
Franco-Belgian compromise. The left-wing labour weekly,'Tribune',
for example, commented that the compromise proposal was am "eminently
sensible" one.it being "difficult to think of any sound reason why
the British Government should object." In a later edition .the
same Labour journal was even more forthright in criticising the
British counter proposal for an inter-governmental assembly:
"This body,as the French have indignantly pointed out,would 
be a thoroughly undemocratic institution,and it is difficult 
to see what function it could perform except that of emphasising 
and aggravating existing national differences." 5
To this,the socialist 'Hew Statesman' added:
"Never officially explained,the motives behind this British 
attitude appear to be the reluctance of the Cabinet to risk 
having an Assembly in which the British delegation might include 
..Hr . Churchill."”
Even the pro-'step by step' 'Times' found it difficult not t o ./.
I .  Le Monde .leeding article ,2 7 .I . 49 . 2. Ibid.
3. UBM meeting of General Purposes Co-nmittee.27.1.49..official
-ninutes. SANDYS PAPERS. 4 . Tribune Anglo-French tataTAI««.
5. Tribune . ' What kind of unity'.2 8 .1 .4 9 .
6* Stater1»  8t Nation .'Western Onion dissension'.2 9 .1 .49 .
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./.accept the Franco-Belgian position,and appealed to Bevin to at least
make "certain small concessions.”
The final decision concerning the British proposal and the
Franco-Belgian proposal,nov supported quite openly by the Dutch
and Luxembourg delegations,vas to be nade at the Consultative Coircil
■neeting of the Five Foreign Ministers,to be held in London on
January 27-8. Having failed to' reach a full agrconent on the
subject,the Study Committee reluctantly submitted both reports to
the Council meeting. The Foreign Minister's conference commenced
2
in vhat Spaak described as a "bleak atmosphere". Hovever,a "miraoe"
apparently happened,and Bevin did in fact grudgingly concede on
so-te vital points. The general agreement finally reached on the
evening of January 28 vas announced in the following communioufe:
"After considering the valuable preparatory vork accomplished 
in Paris by the Committee for the Study of European Unity,the 
Council agreed that there should be established a Council of 
Extrope,consisting of a Ministerial Committee meeting in private, 
and a Consultative Body neeting in public."-*
The actual detidled application of this "decision of principle" 
taken by the Council vould be left to the Permanent Commission of 
the Brussels Pact.vhile the Council also decided to invite other 
European countries to take peart in the subseauent negotiations. 
Nevertheless,the crucial point that both a Council and an Assembly 
should be created had been accepted,though the method of selection 
to the latter 'Body' vould be left to each participating Government 
to decide. In this vay,the four continental governments vere quite 
free to pass on this responsibility to their respective national 
Parliaments,vith the viev to constituting a democratic - parlia­
mentary system of representation,to the sole exclusion perhaps of 
the Communists. On the other hand,the British Government could still 
decide to send a strictly mandated bloc of governnental representa­
tives, though it vas clear that in so doing they vould prove to ./.
Times . 'European Unity'.26 .1 .49 . 2. SPAAI.op. cit.p.205.
2. Keesings Conte-nprarv Archives 1949 pp.9765-7. Foreign Ministers 
vho attended the conference vere:Bevin(GB),Schujnann(P),Spac>k(B), 
stikker(N),Bech(L). Italian Foreign »iinister, Sforsa,also sent a 
memorandum to the Council,requesting Italy’ s eventual adhesion to 
the union.
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. / .  be the exception. There vas evidently much precision and future 
formulation to be done, and many dangerous openings to be tackled 
before the proposed European Assembly could be properly installed. 
Even so,the leaders of the European Movement could be veil pleased 
vith the current outcome of their campaign. Despite some vital 
concessions in approach, they had conquered the major official ob­
stacle and had von governmental approval of their plans at a Euro­
pean level,including that of the British Government vhich had been 
so hostile to the Hague Congress. It vas no iean achievement vithin 
the space of only eight months. Sandys indeed received the ness 
vith a jubilant air of satisfaction, and immediately sent a telegram 
to the Five Foreign Ministers on behalf of the European Movement 
in vhich,for once,he showec a little of his true colours as regards 
the evolutionary and constitutional potential of the European 
Assembly project:
"The European Movement", he confidently declared,"warmly 
welcomes the decision to set up a European Council of Ministers 
and a European Consultative Assembly. The Assembly vill provide 
for the first time an officiai,denocratic instrument through 
vhich the voice of Europe can make itself heard and through 
vhich her peoples can participate in the monentous decisions 
vhich need to be taken for their material and spiritual 
survival.
The European Movement vill do all in its pover to assure 
the success of this great constitutional experiment,upon vhich 
the hopes of so many millions are centred." *
Bevin also ibs only too aware of tfa* potential evolutionary capacity 
of the new European institution vhich he had so reluctantly agreed 
to set up,and he vas heard mutterring: "I don’t like it ,I  don't 
like it - vhen you open that Pandora's box you vill find it full of 
trojan horses!1,2
- The European Movement had von the first round of the contest, 
but clearly the political battle had only just begun.
1. SANDYS,telegram to the Five Foreign ¡tinisters of the Brussels 
Treaty Powers,28 .1 .49 ., SANDYs PAPERS.
2. BEVIN,quoted by W.H. Carter Speaking European .op.cit. p .45.
- 356 -
B . TOWARDS THE COPKCIL OF EUROPE STATUTE.HAY 5. 1949
The four month period vhich folloved the Five Pover agreement 
of January 28 ,and vhich led to the official signing of the Council 
of Europe Statute on May 5,1949,gave rise to the nost intense and 
publicly active phase of the European Movement's campaign for an 
independent and expansile European A s s e m b l y , it vas also a period 
during vhich the Movement itself undervent a significant reshaping 
of profile and emphasis,broadening its role and influence vhile 
shedding the more particular and diverse structural features of 
the criminal Coordination Committee. Indeed, at the seie time as the 
European campaign nov approached its "lost strenuous stape in the 
thrashing out of the Assembly's indeDendence and evolutionary 
capacity,so did the European Movement itself become increasingly 
absorbed in a strained ideological debate in vhich the centralised 
and crver-vieldy executive organisation vas called more and more 
into question by the grass-roots and radical ne^ber groups vith 
vhom it had lost touch. The vital political battles encountered 
vith the actualisation of the Council of Europe.■noreovear.vere 
accompanied by the beginning of a subtle shift in the ;-toveient's 
strategy and the restrgence of the longer-term ideas and objectives 
for vhich the European Assembly,rather than the cA*ror>ean movement 
itself,vas seen as the essential soringboard. In a paradoxical vay 
this most intense phase of the Movement's ponulnr political canpadfn 
also represented its tvilight hour. At the very nomeit of it* 
breakthrough into the real political scene,there vas a sober and 
groving realisation among the Movement's leadership that the 
actual creation of the official European Assembly vould in fact 
transfer the *ain thrust of political activity to the legitimately 
selected European representatives vho vould thereafter carry the 
European mantle, ttaxfc the Movenent could of course remain influaitiai 
behind the scenes. - It vas in such a setting that the idealistic 
and realistic currents in the Buropoin .«ve-nent faced their most 
gruelling test in the vhole campaign.
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CHAPTB! \ 0 .  A ilSW OPEKIUG TO TiiE CA.Q'AIGU
I) Initial rpactions: the Erusscl«: coinur.icu-i. February 5.1949
The Five Power decision to set up a Council of Europe,incluSiig
some sort of representative "consultative body” ,«/as generally well
received on both sides of the Channel,though additional. e:-planatary
renarks and offers of advice were madr prior to the publication of
the more detailed provisional recommendations formulated by the
Brussels Treaty Permanent Commission.
In Britain,for e? ample, the 'Observer' regarded the London
agreement as an "event of the first -.agnitudc ond an achievement
which secures for its chief architects,itr. devin, tr. Schuman ..and
Hr. Spaak.a permanent place in European id.story." The same journal
also warned,however,that there could now be "no turning back” ,that
the "incisive,irrevocable step wnich crosses the boderline between
the old Euroce of sovereign and varrinc aationo,and the new Europe
of political unity" had at last been breached.* The 'Times’ .for
2
its part,expressed "<ruiet satisfaction" at the agreement ,while
3
the 'Economist' regarded the co'pro'ise as "ingenious." Similarly, 
the Labour 'Tribune' thought that the agreement ras the "best 
possible coiproT.ise",even adding that it constituted "a far readrtap 
step",despite the "justified" precautions taken in limiting the
4
functions and powers of this new European institution. The more 
internationalist 'New Statesman' vas not so complacent about 
tne official initiative . and pointed out that the Brussels 
Pact formula was devised in order to "conceal" rather than 
"resolve” Anglo-French differences over European unity. "This 
will not be in practise".the socialist veekly ■ueTned,"the fully 
fledged Assembly,the parliament of Europe,which the French desired. 
Delegetions will not necessarily be parliomentrry.but may be 
Hover mien t nominees.
1. Observer , HO.I.49.
2. Times .Towards European Union',3 1 .1 .49 .
3. ¿cono -.ist- »Mr Bevin compromises’ , 5 .2 .49 .
4. Tribune', ’ Council of Europe',4 .2 .49 .
n> Statesman & nation. 1 »feat sort of Western Union', 5 .2 .49 .
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The limits of the London agreement h*d certainly not escaped 
French attention,and there was clear disappointment ?”Ona some sec­
tions of the corarritted European Left,despite the SFiO's enthusiastic 
endorsement of the project^The French Communists immediately labffled 
the Council of Europe plan as a "facade for a war-naking machinery/* 
The Foreign Affairs Committee of the French Assembly,on the other 
hand,greeted the European initiative vith considerable optimism,and 
adopted by 22 votes to 5 a motion vhich welcomed the Council of 
Europe project,though stressing that this vas only the skeleton of 
Kuro^ean Union,and that fresh negotiations needed to bring concrete 
results as to the precise political,economic <">nd cultural institu-
3
tions envisaged. The French Government itself appeared to be pleased 
with the initial European breakthrough, and warmly congratulated 
the French delegation to the Five Power talks.es veil as issuing a 
statement stressing the viev that a major step had been taken
4
in the direction of European Union. The French press repeated the 
same message. "A victory for France" vas the judgement passed by 
•Le l-ionde’ regarding the outcome of the talks;the Consultative 
Assembly would be a vital sounding-board ?nd vould provide a solid 
foundation upon vhich to construct the European idea.^ The right- 
wing 'Eooque' vas even more dramatic in tone,declaring that the 
London decision vas the "starting point of one of the boldest and 
most important political experiments ever made." The MRP organ, 
■L'Aube’ ,was perhaps more to the point in emphasising the role of 
public opinion in the apparent successes gained at London,thus in 
effect drawing attention to the crucial involvement of the European
7
liove-nent itself.
A similar optimistic mood also prevailed in the Belgian . / •
I . See F.F. Kitsch,op. cit. pp.186-7. 2. Ibid.
3. See Times report,4 .2 .49 . 4 . Ibid.
5. Le Monde ,31 .1 .49 .
6. See Sunday Times commentary.‘French reactions* .30 .1 .49 .
7. Ibid.
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. / .capital,where Prime Minister Spaa): described the decision to form
a Council of Europe as the start of a "great experiment” ,in which
Europe’ s "fate" was at stake.1 At the same time,the Italian Foreign
Minister,Count Sforza, warmly welcomed the invitation by the Five
Powers to involve Italy in the subsequent negotiations,and he made
an immediate broadcast to the nation declaring that European Union
2
was the only way to prevent a Third World War.
Nevertheless,despite the general approval and sense of relief 
throughout the European capitals that a compromise agreement had 
been reached in London,there still regained the difficult battles 
ahead as regards the precise details of this general agreement for 
the creation of a Council of Europe. The actual composition of the 
Assembly,as well as the respective rights and mutual relationship 
between the Assembly and Ministerial Comittee,still had to be 
formulated,while the precise method of selection was also open 
to considerable ambiguity. The official reference in the communion^ 
of January 26 to what was termed as a ’ consultative body' further 
indicated that the British Government was not prepared to accept 
the continental view that a parliamentary type European consultative 
Assembly should be established,although Governments were quite 
free to constitute their national delegations on a parliamentary 
basis. Yet,the pressure for some sort of uniform parliamentary - 
delegated representation to the ' consultative body’ T<as also strong 
in Britain. As the ’Observer’ commented,"Is it too late to call 
on our Government to take an equally broadminded vie»’? It is hara 
to avoid the suspicion that behind their anxiety to keep British 
representation strictly governmental lurks a fear that rtr.Churchill's 
towering personality,if admitted to the nUrooean Assembly,might 
steal the show."^
1. Observer report,.0 .1 .4 9 .
2. Ibid.,plus Times ,31 .1 .49 .
3. Ibid.
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The Brussels Treaty permanent Commission did little  
to allay such difficulties of procedure,though its initial draft 
regarding the form and functions of the Council of jJurope did at 
least offer some clarification as to the respective roles foreseen 
for the Ministerial Committee and the Consultative- Assembly. The 
reaenrendatians of the Commission,issued on February 5 in an official 
communiqué,were as follows:
"I )  The Council should consist of a Committee of ministers 
and a Consultative Assembly.
2) The Committee of Ministers should consist of one Minister 
from each participating country. It could discuss all 
questions of common concern to member countries vith the 
exception of questions relating to national defence. The 
Conmittee would also be responsible for preparing the work 
of the Assembly.
3) The Consultative Assembly would act in a deliberative 
capacity and would make recomnendations to tne Co'trtttee 
of Ministers. It vould have no legislative or Constituent 
powers, ¿¡ach Government vould decide tne procedure for 
appointing the representatives of its counf-y.
4) The Assembly would discuss any question upon vhich its 
opinion was sought by the Committee of ministers. Subject 
to certain rules to be agreed upon,one of the objects of 
vhich would be to avoid overlapping vith the work of other 
international bodies.it would also on its ovn initiative 
be entitled to discuss problems of common concern to the 
member nations,in particular,economic,social,cultural and 
juridical.problems,to e.\anine practical leisures designed 
to promote closer unity a:nong then.rnd to consider methods 
for developping anong the curonean peoples a better under­
standing of the principles which fori tüe basis of their 
common civilisation. The Assembly vould take its decisions 
by a majority of those present rnd voting.
5) The Assembly would normally hold o:ie ordinary sesrion a 
year. It would also have the pover to annoint Co-missions 
for a detailed eramination or pi épuration of ouestions to
be discussed at its ne>:t neetinc. The Assenbly debates vould 
be public ." 1
These provisional suggestions clearly bore witness to 
the doubts and general scepticism of the Commission’ s Chairman,
Sir Gladwyn jebb,vho lias since stated that when Britain./.
1. See Keesings Contemprary Archives,February 1949(p .9795.
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./.actually  negotiated the statute of the Council of nurooe,"she saw 
to it that it  vas a mere shadow of a union.1,1 The proposed inter­
governmental restrictions to be imposed upon the Assembly through 
the control of the latter by the Ministerial Committee(clauses 2 
and 4)vere sufficient to ensure that any potential parliamentary 
development at the European level,or any possible organic Euro­
pean initiative,could only be taken with the prior approval of 
national authorities,the programme of the Assembly being pre­
arranged and controlled by the Ministers concerned. On the other 
hand, the central part of clause 4 in the reco unendetions did allude 
to a more flexible deliberative procedure in vhich the Assembly 
itself might be able to take the initiative. But this vould be 
"subject to certain rules" for vhich the Governments and Ministers 
involved vould no doubt be responsible. In other words,t>roviding 
the general sphere and contents of a private initiative by the 
Assembly vould seem harmless enough to the nBtional-mandated 
Ministers,the Assembly representatives could oroceed to debate 
the issue. Hovever,there vas certainly no intention on behalf of 
the Commission drafters to offer the Assembly a 'caste blanche' 
to discuss any constitutional or political issue vhich the latter 
thought f it . In this crucial context, -luch depended upon whether the 
Ministerial Committee itself vould have to abide by a unanimity 
rule,as seened likely,or whether a simple majority vould suffice 
for arriving at a joint decision. In the latter case,the potential 
openings in the deliberative role of the Assembly were of course 
considerably improved,since the majority of Governments involved 
would probably not be of the same non-coi-ani11al Persuasion as uas 
the British Government towards rn orronie .¿u. o^e.in nolitical in i­
tiative stew ing fro.r. the Assembly itself. The future outcome of 
this question vas of vital concern, ¡nevertheless,one positive step 
had been taken insomuch as the Brussels Commission now officially 
referred to a turopean 'Consultative Assembly' instead of 'consul­
tative bod y ',indicating that the representative institution in ./ .
I . see Lord Gladvyn, The European Idea(Nev English Library,London,
1967) p.«,-»
./.question vas perhaps envisaged more 0:1 parlia-ientsry than on intesv 
governmental lijes,even if Governments retained final responsibility.
The official coTimuniaué of February 5 concluded on a 
positive and optimistic note,emphasising that there had been 
"a large measure of general agreenent" a-nong the drafters in the 
Permanent Co amission, though it '■as also recoonisec that "no final 
conclusions could be arrived 2t pendinc the convening of a con­
ference at which it was hoped other Buro^ean countries vould be 
present"(ie. notably Italy and Scandinavia).1 - Now that this 
official move hade been taken.it was left to the European 
i-iovenent to atteupt to secure from the ruthorities concerned a 
nore generous and effusive set of propositions for the planned 
Council of Europe statute.
2) A ner role for the European 'ioveier.t?
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The International Erecutive Con-'iittee of the European
Movement held its first major meeting of the new year on
February 5 - 6 ,at which the Five Power agreement of January 28
and the provisional recommendations of the Permanent Connission
with regard to the Council of Europe Statute were the 2
points of discussion. The coTnsunic?tion which was in turn sent 
by Sandys, on behalf of the Erecutive Committee,to the Five 
Foreign Ministers "warmly welcomed" the agreement to set up the 
Council of Europe,and further noted,"with iuch satisfaction", the 
draft details announced on February 5 regarding the role of the 
Assembly in particular,which,the statement read,"conform closely 
to the recommendations nade by the Hnrue Congress.. .f*nd further 
amplified in the nenorandu'n submitted by the European . wement. / .  *
1. Eeosinqs Contemporary Archives 1949,p .9795,op. cit.
2. Eurewan Movement Executive Ccnunttee meeting, 5-6.2.49., officialminu-
tes CEX/^</8 ). CAEM BRUGGE. The meeting was attended Dy.-tirugmrjis, 
Car andini, Frenay, Voisin( EUF ) j Sandys,Lang, Boothby(Uei-) ; Butler, 
Serruys,Retinger,van Zeeland(Ki<£C) ; 3astid,Courtin,Dsutry, 
Philip(CFEU) ; Bichet.Lajnalle, Soycur ;plus Drapier.ftristen-
sen,Madariaga,i-ionnier,Giaccherò,Lindsey,de Rougeriont as gueis. 
Bot.: the form« XMC vas now
- 7E3 “
. / .t o  the Brussels Trenty ^oveni-ents on tiovembc? 2 3 ."  The Execu­
tive Co-mittee further emphasised, hovc?ver, that their apnrov.il 
applied only in a gener.’ l sense, and thrt thf-c - ci.-ined several 
specific Questions as yet to be settled in vie* of the procedural 
rrcoranendations issued by the Permanent Coxiir.si'in: For exanpie, 
the Co nittee stressed that tne Co ir iltetivc Arse"ily :jovZd rim 
at including representatives of all tne n.’ tioos of Europe vho 
practised democratic methods,’¿'hich also meant the Western sones 
of Germany. The members of the Consultative Assembly, loreover, 
should not be rigidly landeted by Govern ■,e:its,but should be free 
instead to e: press their Personrl opinions, "deriving t-ieir mitho- 
rity fro.Ti tlieir national parlis :e::ts." -.:e 'iolc  of selection,on 
tne other hand, should also iacluoe non-prrli.-' !<>: ■ t ■- ? ■! rns,vhile 
the Assembly itself should seat ?;one 300 >e .cer s end hold at 
le ’ rt n ’o or three sessions e;>cii ■ cr; if  it vas to -naJcp -y 
real iipact upon Europeen public opinion."1 These suggestions 
./ere ir. turn described by Se.ndys as being "very important” , ~s 
he emphasised in £ press conference the speciri significance of
securing West Gernan representation at the inaugural session of
2
the Cowicxl of Europe.
The Five Power Agreement of January £8 had not only provoked 
a deeper analysis vith regard to the specific forms and procedu­
ral arrangements of the European Assembly. It had also demonstra­
ted hov the European Movement had momentarily influenced official 
European decision making. A legitimate European Assembly vould 
in turn develop this pressure group function on an official basis. 
Indeed,the realisation that this might be their tvilight hour 
as a politicrj. movement,ni-ted vith tlsc proving rumblings of 
internal dissension aiong some of the member groups r-s to the 
role and accountability of the centralised J: ecutive CoTitittee, 
resulted in an urgent re-assessment at the Executive Committ e e ./ ;
1. Accomprnying paper to EX/M.-'6. op. c it . ,sent to the Five Foreign
Ministers.
2. See nev York Herald Tribune , ' Suggestion is made by the
European Hovonent*,9 .2 .4 9 .
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./.meeting on February 5-6 of the goals and organisation of the Euro­
pean Movement. Detailed references vere Tiode *t the meeting to 
the original progra^e of the Movement,drawn up nt the Hague 
Congress,and there appears to have been a general consensus of 
opinion favouring a reneval of attention with regard to the pro­
posed European Court of Human Sights,hitherto conceived as the 
second major objective of the European campaign,and for vhich 
the European Assenbly itself had been seen as a pre—requisite.
The overall political approach and programme #f the European 
Movement,and the specific institutional-organic objectives en­
visaged.nevertheless rmained hotly in dispute,especially vith the 
groving maximalist profile of the BtJF under Frenay. Questions of 
strategy and objectives vere,of course,to be discussed and resolved 
at the approaching Inaugural Session of the International Committee 
of the European Movement,to be held at Brussels on February 25-8.
In the meantime,Brugmans tried to recoup his vaning authority 
among the increasingly inpatient federalist movement by proposing 
a somevhat radical policy document clearly emphasising the need to 
institute an independent European political community,united around 
an "author!tive legislature and a real executive power." 1 Though 
he still drev attention to the accompanying need for individual 
action and initiative,and for autonomous regional,social and 
spiritual communities, the EUF j£:ecutive President had evidently cone 
round to the overriding necessity for a strong supra-national 
political approach to the campaign,as opposed to blurring the 
thrust of the federation case by over-erohasising the narrow dogma 
of integral federalism. In this contert.his oolitical contribution 
to the preparatory arrangements of the Brussels Congress was of 
considerable importance,as vas that of the working co-nraittee 
members, Boothby,Philip and Courtin, in dravinn attention to speci­
fic goals such as the European Court,in addition to general contex­
tual problems concerning Germany,overseas teirritories.the . / .
I . BRPGMANS,'Projet de Declaration Politioue1. (EX/P/67),accompaiyfep 
paper to EX/M/8. op. cit.
- 365 -
•/.Atlantic Pact,and.US-Soviet relations. 1
The political profile and representative cruelity of the 
European Movement still rested to a large extent,however,upon 
the outcome of the Movement' s tentative negotiations in the 
continuing saga with the vily and at times querulous EPU leader­
ship. The internal struggle which now broke out in the EPU Itself 
hardly facilitated a real meeting of minds between tne parliamen­
tary organisation and the European Movement. Indeed,in bitter 
reaction to Coudenhove's autocratic initiative on the European 
Assembly project at the Five ^ower talks in December, Hackay was 
finally provoked into open rebellion,and made his last stand at 
the EPU Council meeting of February 5-6,where he not only formally 
presented a plan to prise "all organising,executive and administra­
tive work" from Coudenhove and his lieutenants,but also urged his
EPU colleagues to collaborate more seriously vith the c,Mropean 
2
■-ove-ient. His proposals were not endorsed. In fact,after a 
preliminary Meeting between the EPU leaders and the European
3
Movement Executive Bureau,convened on February 4,Bohy still insisted 
in correspondence with Sandys that the EPU should be entitled to 
a total of 15 representatives within the International Executive 
Committee,thus indicating once more the blatant lack of serious­
ness for which the «¿PU vas renowned in its dealings with the 
European Movement. Mackay and the British All-Party Group had by 
now expressed their frustration with the iiPU leadership and their 
disapproval of the letter's blocking tactics in the efforts to 
unite the European campaign. They unanimously withdrew front the 
EPU altogether at a meeting held in the House of Cowwns on Feb­
ruary 9. The sa-ne meeting also unani .iously passed a resolution 
applying for the All-Party Group's full membership of the European 
Movement,on terms vhich -vould per •’it "adequate representation", . / .
1. See EX/M/8 .op. cit.
2. ' Draft Resolutions for consideration by the Council of the EPU
at its me ting in Paris' . 5—6.2 .49 . HACKAY PAPERS.
3. Information in letter from Bohy to Sandys,6 .2 .4 9 . ,SANDYS PAPERS.
4 . Ib id .,plus Sandys' letter to Bohy,I9»2.49..SAHDYS PAPERS.
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. / .  (ie. via the British Council of tne tiuronean Movement). An execu­
tive conmittee vas in turn appointed by the break-avay parliamen­
tary group,consisting of Mackayichairman),Boothby,Barbara Castle, 
Hale,Lindsay, Macdonald,Shawcross(vice-chairlen),plus Hynd,Roberts 
and G. Wadsworth. This new parliamentary formation marked the 
beginning of a vhole stream of allegiance switching from among 
EPU member groups vho came f-ound to the vies-’ that the cause of 
European unity vould be best served by concentratiig parliamentary 
activities within the one orbit of the European Movement.
In the meantime,the application by the British Parliamentary 
Group for full membership of the European Movement sparked off a 
series of mixed reactions and slightly hesitant moves among the 
more radical member groups of the European Movement itself,some 
of whom had counted upon EPU support vithin the International 
Executive Committee. The BUF,above all .greeted the nevs vith 
some sympathy for Mackay.but vith a sense of loss in the fight 
against the unionist-dominated Executive Coimittee. It vas with 
considerable reluctance,therefore,that the federalist Central 
Committee meeting of February 12-13 decided not to endorse the 
EPU Council's proposal for an extra-ordinary executive representa­
tion of some 15 delegates,preferring instead the idea of a numeri­
cally reduced Intemntional Executive Committee under a more
2
effective control from the participating groups at the base. The 
OEM,moreover,vas also initially embarrassed by the affair,and had 
adopted a cautious 'wait and see* strategy rather than any posittae 
endorsement when Hackay had first shown signs of leading a break­
away moveaent in early January. Nevertheless, by February 10 
the new parliamentary group was given official approval by the „ 
uem General Purposes Committee and,as a result,the official • / .
1. On the formation of the break-away British Parliamentary Group 
see Minutes of the Aii-Partv Qroup meeting. 9 .2 .4 9 ..HACIAY 
PAPERS;Keesinqs Archives 1949 p .9820;article in ' Tines' .11.2.49.
(BarabaraCastle did not remain long in this group,soon affiliate 
to the European Movement, ¿fcue perhaps to her aartrn to Ob  »EC in 1950).
2. EOF Central Committee m e e t i n g , 12-13.2.49.,minutes,CEC GENEVA.
3. See UfW GP meeting. 15-16.1.49. .2 7 .1 .4 9 . . 'ijnutes, SAJffiYS PAf-ERS.
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./.setting  up of the British Council of the European ¡lovenent, on 
February 1 6 ,decided most generously to alio» upto ten executive 
representatives in the national organisation to be drawn fro* 
the All-Party Group, whereas the other participating groups(ie. 
UEM, SMUSEjELEC and Federal Union)were to be allowed only tvo 
representatives,in addition to the vice-chairmen already pro­
posed at an earlier date and vho were mainly of a unionist 
X
persuasion.
All points considered,Mackay bad for once proved to 
be a skillful tactician,whereas Sandys nad finally decided 
bluntly i d  aonfront the reluctant EPU Council with a stunning 
'fa it  accompli’ . It  was a Joint strategy in the interests at both 
personalities,and one which Sandys w u ld  in turn erploit to the 
hilt in his subseouent struggle to extract nore parliamentary 
factional snin-offs from the EPU into the groving orbit of the 
European Movement. It wa* also a policy which gathered more and 
■nore momentum in relation to EPU obstinacy and the approaching 
official inauguration of the European Assembly,by which tine 
it would be crucial for the campaign to hnve secured the good­
will and active participation of European parlia-ient?rians in 
the European Movement. However,this policy,now doggedly pursued 
by Sandys and his lieutenants,was ?lso the first major sign in 
the campaign that the time was approaching vhen legitimately 
elected parliamentary representatives would soon be leading the 
battle to unite Europe,whereas the European i-tovement itself 
would thereafter have to be content in  occupying an influential 
back-seat in these efforts.
Such a policy was not to the liking of *=ome of the more
adventurous European prophets in the EUF. The real ambition of
the Spinelli-led maximalists, for er a role, t/as cert?inly th e ./ .
I .  Cf. p p .269-^; see UEH GP meeting 10 .2 .4 9 . . minutes,Plus 
Minutes of meeting to constitute the UK Council of the 
European Movement. 1 6 .2 .4 9 . .SAI1DYS PAPERS.
(See annex for those vho attended the formation meeting, 
among vhom again Barabara Castle vas included).
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./.formation of a strong European parliamentary movement,but not 
one under the ageis of the predominantly unionist-orientated 
Executive Committee- Spinelli and his follovers instead wanted to 
form a radical and supra-national ’ European Party’ .acting as the 
outer prong of a maximalist ’ federalist league’ . The more 
dogmatic integral federalists preferred to pass over the 
political and parliamentary super-structure altogether,and were 
herSly likely to view an increasingly politicised European Move­
ment with much sympathy,since this marked yet another step away 
from the corporatist involvement of the ’living forces'. The 
growing antagonism of the SpdaSOi group tovards sandys ."md the 
perceived unionist formula indeed BDcwed the integral federalists to 
exploit the moment and push the non-doctrinal Brugmens .and even 
Frenay.into accepting a representative formla for the European 
Assembly in which it was stressed that at least one third of the 
seats in the Assembly should go to the delegates of the non- 
parliamentary ’living forces.’ 1 The message vas clear: the inte­
gral federalists had no intention of allowing Europe to become 
the instrument of parliamentary forces,still less the European 
Movement itself. In counter-bslsnce,however,the pro-parliamentary 
maximalist ving in the EUF managed to extract the Central
Conrdttee’ s commitment to the idea that the European Assembly
2
should become a "Teal Federal Parliament for Europe." In short, 
Sandys’ open accommodation of EPU dissidents neither comforted 
his maximalist HFE critics in the EUF,nor did it enforce Brugroans' 
lonely struggle in circumventing integral federalist dogma. The 
prospects of Brugmans' long-avaited 'Congress of unity* did not 
appear too hopeful in view of the approaching inauguration of the 
Buropean Movement's International Council.
The EUF Central Cowrittee meeting of February 12-13 was in , 
fact held at a tine of considerable confusion P'wng federalist./.
1. EOF CC meeting,12-13.2.49. op. c it ., annerrd notion on the 
agreement to set up a Buropean Assembly.resolution no.3.
2. Ibid..resolution no.5.
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./.circles as to their attitude not only with regard to the European 
Assembly,but also towards the Euronenr. iiove-'ent itself. The meeting, 
convened &criig another financial crisis within the EUF,* was above 
all vary,and perhaps confused,as to hov the International Council 
of the European Movement would elect the Chairman and Secretary 
General of the Executive Committee. It was conceded that there was 
"practically no way* of opposing Sandys’ candidature for the forma- 
post,vhich was broadly regarded as his for at least another year. 
The post of Secretary General,however,could nerhaps be challenged, 
and might at least go to "someone from the continent and of the 
left." The report on the whole subject of EUF involvement in the 
European Movement,drawn up chiefly by Frenay along with Brugmans' 
hesitant consent,went even further end declared:
"We have chosen to work for Europe vith people who are not
of our accord. We therefore need 'to mark out the limits ,2
of our collaboration. These limits were fixed at Rome."
The Central Committee agreed,and proceded to clarify the official 
EUF policy regarding participation in the European Movement.paying 
particular stress to the "federal character" of the Movement and 
to the essential necessity to maintain an Executive Committee vhich 
would be responsible to,and selected by, the participating member 
groups,instead of acting in the sole name of the annual conference 
of the International Council. Envisaging,nevertheless,the election 
of key Executive posts at the forthcoming congress of the Inter­
national Council,the EUF meeting seriously considered proposing 
Frenay as a candidate for the office of Secretary General to the 
European Movement.viewing him as very well fitted for the job, 
vhich was by no means "incompatible" with his presidency of the 
EUF. Frenay preferred not to state his options immediately,though 
a few days later he informed Brujnans that his proposed candida­
ture should not go forvard until the European <x>vement could first 
agree on moving the main Secretarial office from London to t'aris, 
vhich he assumed would be necessary once that the European
I.See Brugmans-Frenay correspondence,17 .&3I.1.49. BRUGMANS PAPERS
2 .Annex to EUF CC minutes,op. cit.
./•Assembly became established at Strasbouro, ps now appeared more 
and more likely. The idea of the European ’iovement setting up 
a Strasbourg office does not seemed to have crossed his mind 
at this stage.1
In all this.it was clear that Frenay and his radical EUF 
backers were no longer prepared to tolerate what they had inter­
preted as being a drastic erosion of the EUF's role and influence 
inside the unionist-dominated International Executive Committee. 
The mounting rebellious tone of the policy statements and dec­
larations stemming from the EUF Central Committee with regard 
to further collaboration in the efciropean iovement were,in fact, 
the first wambg shots of what later amounted to a full EUF break­
away from the Movement .which had by then become almost com­
pletely detached from its base. The new radical stir within 
federalist committee was also indicative of mounting dissatis­
faction with Brugmans' moderate brand of leadership. The 
recent election of Frenay as President of the Central Committee, 
and his decision to ignore the hitherto ceremonial status of 
this office in his brusk usurping of the role which Brug-nans 
had previously occupied in chairing the meetings and in strongly 
influencing policy commitments,may have given a more active 
flair and radical image to the conduct of dUF affairs,but it 
did not cut any ice within the broader European lobby. Brugmans, 
despite his tactical weaken essee> had all the same secured 
a certain status for his movement within the pragmatic and more 
influential circles of the European ¡-iovement. He had strenuously 
gained some respect and recognition for the BtIF,despite the 
rough official treatment which it w*s first given by the elitist 
Anglo-French committee. He had,moreover,built up a strong per­
sonal rapport with Sandys, manaaino to inspire the latter with 
some of the broader aspects and idealism of £iuropean Federation, 
while some of Sandys’ political realism also rubbed off on ./.
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./.Brugmans himself. In short,prior to Frenay's sudden seizure of 
power vithin the EUF,Brugraans had nanaged,against considerable 
odds,to establish a serious working relationship between 
the federalist and unionist camps,vithout viiich the European 
campaign might have have lost some of its zeal and idealism» The 
price of such positive collaboration had been the shedding of 
the more doctrinal idiosyncracies of integral federalism, and the 
shelving of a more radical maximalist campaign. The valuable 
bank of good-viil which Brugmans had nevertheless established 
was now thrown away in an increasingly anbitious and aggressive 
EUF policy which only played into the hands of the more conser- 
vative-minded members of the unionist camp,while distancing the 
nev brand of federalist leadership from the real central decision 
making majority in the Buropean -*ovement Executive Committee.
The scene was thus set for the official inauguration of 
the International Council of the European Movement. The Brussels 
Congress.held on February 25-8,was indeed convened at anoFpcrtune 
time both as regards an evaluation of the current achievements 
and the future goals of the European Movement,and in assessing 
the present and future organisational structure of the Movement 
at an international level. The historic back-cloth of the Hague 
Congress,and the not inconsutarsKLe diplomatic Progress -nade in 
the nine months that had followed,lent an air of success and 
optimism to this first official conference of the European Move­
ment, leading also to the temptation in certain cuarters to under­
value the resistance of national authorities and to overestimate 
the impact and future importance of the l-ovement itself. There 
were,in addition,various fundamental questions still to be set­
tled regarding the composition,role,strategy and aims of the 
European Movement. The federalists were now spoiling for a . / .
I . Frenay's new brand of leadership indeed already led to some 
internal federalist discontent Prong the more 'oderate circle  
and led to the eventual resignation of the Belgian federalist 
group’ s (MAPE) leader,Hamesse.vho noved fully into the Buro­
pean Movement orbit. See lia^esse-Brug-n.ins correspondence,
1949, BKUGMAKS PAPERS.
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./•fight on these issues,while increasing numbers aiong the unionist 
camp vere beginning to get cold feet .'bout the organic-politicnl 
thrust of the European campaign and the type of commitment into 
vhich they vere being dravn. Sandys in this respect,however, 
remained firmly convinced that a strong but pragmatic political 
strategy remained the key to the whole campaign. Nevertheless, 
he also realised that the European Movement itself vould shortly 
have to adapt to the political realities,?s veil as the back­
stage opportunities,vhich the legitimate selection of European 
representatives to the Consultative Assembly would imply. The 
need to formulate a diverse programme foi the future attention 
of this representative European political institution was there­
fore necessary,even if this meant ceding to a major extent the 
the future political lead and direct active role hitherto taken 
by the European Hovement. It vns not a point of view shwed by 
everyone at the Brussels Congress.
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CHAPTKtll THE BRUSSELS COI.’GR.ySS* FEBKUAT.Y 25-28,1'-49: INAUGURAL SESSION 
OF THE EUP.OP£A:t I-iOVSilSKT IHTig.HATlu:iAL ddU-'-'ClL "
I)  Qpeitino Plenary Session: the ¿urooe.-n i.oypmont's \ole
"Throughout the recent meeting in Brussels of the Internal 
tional Council of the European ¡¡ove'tent I constantly found 
■nyself wondering why the •famous international personalities 
' taking part were prepared to devote so auch time and energy 
to the proceedings. What made the presence of these eminent 
delegates so significant? The answer was clefr: it '^as not 
that politicians and economists held certain convictions, 
or even that Prime Ministers,Foreign Secretaries end Govera- 
ments were in consultation. It v/as because of the rapid 
pace of advance towards Buropean Union now being imposed by 
public opinion...
The plain truth is that there vould not have been any 
great assembly in Brussels.. .  end there ^ould not h~ve been 
any decisions by Governments to create a Buropean Consulta­
tive Assembly, if there were not throughout the countries of 
Europe a solid mass of :ien and vo len who care profoundly for 
the ideas these things e>e^plify."1
This brief introduction by Boothby to the Brussels Congress 
does in a way explain the serious though optimistic mood which 
prevailed at this first International Council meeting of the Euro­
pean Movement. It was not the somewhat free for all affair which 
had been the case at the Hague Congress in tne previous year. 
Harold MacMillan indeed recorded that it was "certainly business- 
like and efficient." Nor,on the other hand,was it viewed as 
being only a public demonstration in favour of a united Europe. 
The stage of inciting public opinion in general had been super- 
ceded. It was now a question of convincing the ruling political 
forces of Europe to put onto statute an authoritative 
and expansile European Assembly within the Council of Europe 
project officially under way. The role of the Brussels 
Congress was,in this sense,one of clarifying the objectives . / .
1. BOOTHBY.PEM Hevs-1etter.March 1949, SAIPYS PAPERS.
2. HACKILLAli, Tides of Fortune ,op. cit. p. 163.
^  For the Brussels Congress as a whole see conference file
CAEli BRUGGE.
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./ .a n d  major principles of the European iiovenent,and of consolvfetLng 
its international structure,in order to ertend and accelerate the 
first official steps already taken in the European unification 
campaign.
From the organisational point of view,the Congress was 
an orderly and impressive affair. Some 16 National Councils rep­
resenting the Western European countries,plus another 6 national 
Co-ranittees composed of eriles from the Eastern States,had all 
been instituted in one vay or another for the conference,and had 
filtered the number of delegates present to 140 in ali,?nono 
whom the member groups vere also represented. This relatively 
small number of representatives enabled a more detailed 
and thorough discussion of the vital isrues in cruestion. The 
managable size of the conference did not,however,diminish the 
quality or impact of the distinguished personalities in attendance, 
among vhom there figured the names of Winston Churchill and Paul- 
Henry Spaa):,both Honorary n-esidents of the .'¡ovement(the other 
two Presidents,Léon Blum and Alcide De Gasperi, being detained 
through illness in the former case,and because of urgent affairs 
of State in the latter),plus Harold HacHillan.i-ené Coty.Léon 
Jouhaux.Guy Hollet,Paul van Zeeland,Fernand Dehousre,Ugo La Malfa, 
Enzo Giacchero, Max BTauer,and all the familiar leaders of the 
International Committee. *
The general atmosphere at the start of the Congress vas one
of Keen expectation,boosted by the Brussels public at larce.vho
eagerly awaited the arrival of famous personal!ties,and whose
city vas decorated as in a carnival vith the 1E’ for Europe
flags. The sympathetic or closely associated European
Government leaders also followed the progress of the conference
with close attention and a watchful eye for further potential
openings in the European campaign. The French President,Vincent./.
I .  Post-conference paper of list of delegates,draw  up by the 
European uove.nent, CAEH BRUGGE.
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./.A u rio l .fo r  example,made a point of receiving a delegation from 
the Executive Committee on the eve of the conference, nnd used 
this occassion to repeat his deep interest in the need to con­
struct a United States of Jiurope,while declaring the con­
tinual support of the French Government for the project at hand. 
This message was again repeated in a strong letter of support 
sent officially to Sandys by the French Foreign Minister.Schaman, 
in vhich the vork of the European Movement was wam ly applauded
and the founding Congress at Brussels described as a "new major
2
step towards effective European unity." The Italian Prime Mini­
ster,for his part.also had a forceful message of solidarity with 
the ¡■lovement read out at the conference in his name. The U .S . 
Government similarly indicated its support of the Congress by 
sending w. Averall Harriman(roving representative for the Mar­
shall Plan)to Brussels by special invitation. ?he Government 
in Brussels itself was,of course,directly represented by Spaak's 
involvement at the Congress. The British Covernment,true to 
form,officially ignored the event,despite various invitations 
to participate in one way or another.
The opening plenary session of the Congress itself was 
preceded by various fringe meetings which served as a fore-taste 
to the debates which followed. Belgian Premier Spaak.fiar instance, 
presided over a special luncheon of the Benelux committee on 
February 2 4 ,at which he emphasised the importance of Benelux as
3
a "stepping stone” towards Buropean integration. In the meantime, 
the European rovement Executive Committee also held a short 
preparatory meeting in which various draft proposals to be 
presented to the Congress were approved,along with the proposals 
to set up a Political and a Juridical Committee undnr the res-
A
pective chairmanships of Boothby and Dehousse. This was in . / .
1. Le Monde .a rt ic le ,26 .¿ ,4 9 .
2. SCHUMA.H, message delivered to Brussels CairtL'ess, 2 6 .2 .4 9 .,
SANDYS PAPEKS.
3. Times .article ’ Inaugural Ser-sion of Council’ ,2 5 .2 .4 9 .
4. Buropean Movement Executive Committee nesting,24.2.49.* 
Official minutes. (BC/h/9) .CAB< BRUQGE.
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./.fact  the first Executive Committee meeting in which Si-iUSE rep­
resentatives officially took part,as well as various ne>w delegates 
from the National Councils.1 The wUF chiefs were also out in 
force.and Frenay already chose the occasion to ooen his counter­
attack against the growing centralising tendencies of the Commit­
tee,which the co-opting of selective national representatives to 
the Executive appeared to enhance. The Committee,he firmly dec­
lared,was a "federative and not a unitary" body. It was the first
shot of the battle which he subsequently fought out on the floor 
2
of the Congress.
The official inaugural session of the International Council
meeting nevertheless went off without ?ny hitches or embarrassing
divisions. Opening the Congress,pRul-.-ienri Spnak drew attention
instead to the great benefits which the uaity of action since
the Hague Congress had bestowed on the 2uro»ean campaign.drawing
particular attention to the direct involvement of experienced
Statesmen such as Ramadier,van Zeeland and Churchill. The unity
of Europe,he resolutely declared,was an "absolute necessity", and
the work of the European ¡¡ovement "must now be held high and
kept burning." The actual creation of a European Assembly,he
went on to warn,was still "far from completed". The campaign
of the European *-ovement was therefore crucial,as was the need
to continue with "a spirit in which the ideal ninoles with
3
realism." This message was also repeated by Churchill,vho,in his
stirring but evasive opening speech stressed the "triumphant"
and "passionate" force of the b'uropean idea,but then added with
resDect to the Movement’ s role in tne current official talks on
the Council of Eurone project:
"I will not anticipate the discussions rhich are about 
to take place...we may clear the rood,we may onen the./.
I . The meeting of 24 .i .49. was indeed attended by the following, 
rather numerous list of deleffites: Brugnans, Carandini, l^Yenay, 
Voisin( EOF); Boothby, Belisha, Lang, ¡¿.-'ncVs (OEM); Ber hens, Butler, 
iotinger , Serruys(ELBC) jCourtin, Philip (CFEU) ;Bichet, ¡iurdes, 
LamalietSoycur(i!El);Giron&l?,3enJWibrcrt3^1«dteh(Saj£irt plus 9
other national delegates. £?-/ *• 9 , op . cit.  ^ <£• I dIQ.
3. gj^Ejj^jussels Congress goecch.25«£.Ji9 .. (8/91 90/-.no.10*)
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./.passage and smooth the path for the ponderous vehicles of 
erecutive responsibility,and furnish those who drive them 
alike vith a theme and a plan. We may even,in the form of 
an active and ever-more dominant and vocal opinion,give 
them the fuel they need for their journey and the electric 
spark to set all in motion."1
The actual details of the European Movement's strategy in 
the continuing campaign vere left to ¡>andys to explain,as the 
opening plenary session proceeded to take account of the
2
Executive Committee's report on the 'Objectives and Organisation' 
of the Movement, presented by the Executive Chairman himself. 
Re-affirming the Hague Congress Resolutions as the source of 
the European Movement's programme of action,Sandys briefly 
described the basic internal structure of the Movement currently 
inaugurated. He then reached the most important part of his 
speech,relating to the political campaign pursued since the Hague 
Congress,in which the European Assembly project had prime place:
"Without waiting for the co-ipletion of our organisation, we 
have been initiating important political action...
The proposal for an Assembly has now been adopted officially 
by governments and it will soon be an accomplished fact. This 
heartening decision is due in large measure to the far­
sighted statenanship of M. Spaak and H. behuman. But I 
believe that they would be the first to agree that if there 
had been no Hague Congress and no European Hovement to 
follow it up the idea of a European Assembly would today 
still be in the sphere of academic discussion."
He in turn continued to explain,in contrast to Churchill's
elusive pronouncements,that the European ¡tovement should not
simply express its opinions about the European Assembly plan,but
should actively pursue the matter,if possible,inside the corridors
of power:
"Having had sone share in cre?ting it,the European Movement 
has a special responsibility for making the Assembly a 
success. First,ve ntust use our influence to ensure that the 
composition and size of the Assembly,the method of selecting 
its members and the organisation of its Sessions and . / .
1. CHURCHILL, Brussels Congress specch,2 5 .2 .4 9 .,(4s), CASH BRUGGE.
2. ' Objectives and Organisation'.EuroT>e?n Movement Erecutive draft
report for Brussels Congress,(C /P /I) , CAEn BRUGGE.
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./.and Standing Committees are such as to render it an 
effective institution capable of giving wide advice to 
governments and bold le?dership to the European peoples.
Secondly,ve have a continuing responsibility to intensify 
our studies upon the problem of Buropean union so that ve 
may be in a position to submit well-considered and suthori- 
tive proposals to the Assembly and to the Buropean Council 
of Ministers."
Despite this resolute coanitaient to ensure that the proposed
European Assembly vould be an “effective institution", Sandys 
nevertheless re?lised that the necessary political strategy 
vhich the Movement needed to pursue denanded a cool analysis of 
vhat vas immediately realisable, and a fine political sense of 
balance,neither bowing to governmental cautiousness nor adopting 
reckless tactics and policies vhich vould allov the Movement' s 
opponents to blast the European campaign out of the orbit of 
official recognition and decision-making. He therefore stressed 
the importance both of taking the lead ahead of governments,but 
of not over-stepping the mark:
"The influence of our Movement vith governments,vhich is 
considerable.depends upon our civays shoring a sense of 
responsibility. That means ve -iust resist the natural 
temptation to advocate projects vhich,though theoretically 
desirable,are politically impossible, nevertheless,the 
Buropean Movement must not hesitate to lend the vay.a long 
step ahead of the governments,and must fearlessly and 
insistently demand all measures vhich are necessary and 
practicable.1,1
Sandys' plea for a tough but realistic political campaign 
did not appear to make much of an i m p r e s s i o n  on the new radical 
EUF leader,Henry Frenay,vho soon mounted the rostrum denouncing 
both the limited ambitions of the unionist camp,and the attempts 
by the latter to construct an over-centralised and unified Euro­
pean Movement. The EUF,he strongly argued,vas not to be put 
"asleep" in this vay,nor vas it to be satisfied vith the "advice 
vhich is lavished upon us." It vas vrong to assume,he sharply./.
I . SANDYS,Brussels Congress speech,ordinary plenary session,
25 .2 .4 9 ., CAiH BRUGGE.
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./.continued to point out,that the activities of the EUF and of the 
E'jropean Movement as a vhole might "overlap." The former movement 
vas neither subsevimc to, nor an appendix of, the latter,but was an 
autonomous grouping vhich sought not merely the establishing of 
a "European Commonwealth based on fragile contracts",but rather 
the creation of a full "European Federation of countries excer- 
cising a part of their national sovereignty,first politically 
and then,as a result,in the economic,social,strategic and mili­
tary fields." The setting up of the European Assembly vas there­
fore welcomed by the EUF,but was seen as only the first step 
tovards a much greater goal,which the federalist movement vas not 
prepared to passively avait or vholey rely upon the unionist- 
dominated international movement to bring about.
It vas a tough opening by the unruly EUF President,and one 
vhich Brugmans,by contrast,attempted to apologise for in his ovn 
opening speech. "We are thus united to unite Burope",he bravely 
declared,"and,thanks to this unity.ve have carried through sub­
stantial successes." Not to be outflanked by his more aggresive 
colleague,however,Brugmans also retained a certain critical 
air in his delivery,though he was careful not to call into Ques­
tion the merits of the EUF's strict collaboration inside the 
European Movement. "It is not enough to display our v i n  for a 
united Europe",he went on to add,"that no longer teaches anyone 
anything. That is vhy the minimum progranwe of the European Move­
ment neither disturbs nor exalts anyone any longer. That is vhy 
one question only is now of interest to the masses and of inspi­
ration to the militants. Europe,yes,...but vhat sort?" He in 
turn indicated that this vas not so much a question of wrangling 
over dogmatic issues,but rather the urgent need to rally and 
educate popular social forces vith the "moral and intellectual" 
standards which Brugmans at least identified in the European . / .
I . HENRY FRENAY,Brussels Congress spe<Kih on behalf of the EUF, 
ordinary plenary session,2 5 .2 .4 9 .,(E 791 903,Do.15) CAEK
BRUGGE.
- 380 -
./.Idea . This,above all,entailed the breaking of nationalist thought 
and ideology. Brugmans thus made an important contribution as 
regards the broader "spiritual" side of the "popular education 
campaign^staking out his credentials for the post which he later 
occupied as founding rector of the College of t!urope)and,in so 
doing, avoided any polemics between the federalist and unionist 
camps. The pressing cause of European unity,he firmly believed, 
superceded internal disputes over doctrine nnd strategy. By 
skating over these problems,however,he not only distanced him­
self from Frenay's excessive case for EUF autonomy,he also failed 
to draw sufficient emphasis to the important,though sensitive, 
issue of transfering sovereignty to a supra-national base^The 
maximaliste Italian delegation would later react most strongly 
on this crucial point,especially in viev of evasive unionist 
pressures in the Buropean Assembly deb?te. For the moment,hovever, 
the maximalste point of view was best presented by the former 
Rumanian Minister and EUF sympathiser,G. Gafencu.
From the start of his delivery he asserted that ¿urope 
was in "complete crisis",and there was little point in putting 
forward only vague solutions. The time had come,he declared,to 
define clearly and in turn act upon either the unionist or fede­
ralist conceptions of a united Burope. Describing the latter 
thesis as a "strict collaboration between sovereign States",he 
pointed out the initial ease with which such a strategy could 
"re-assure Governments,seduce sceptics and facilitate official 
decisions.” In the final event,however,he claimed that this 
policy offered no practical solution to the infrastructural prob­
lems of the European Continent since the dangers arising 
from "recalcitrant national interests" would not be overcome.
Only a supra-national federalist approach could work in the last 
avoids. Buropean federalism, on the other hand, had its "limits" 
and could not be fully applied to Britain,where there still . / •
1. brugmans,Brussels Congress speech,ordinary plenary session,
2 5 .2 .4 9 ..(No. 20) , CASH BRUGGE.
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./.existed "natural and very understandable" objections and obstacles 
to such a supra-national comitment,and it vas therefore better, 
Gafencu proposed,to allov the European Continent itself to forge 
ahead tovards full federation,vhile Britain could remain "tightly 
attached" to the latter formation vithout having to practise its 
"federalist aspirations." In other words,the tvo-tier European 
approach first mooted by the maximaliste MFE delegates at the 
3UF Rome Congress in November 1948 vas once more proposed. The 
British delegation for the moment remained silent. Sandys still 
pinned his hopes upon a gradual evolutionary strategy tovards an 
eventual supra-national conwitment in vhich Britain vould be 
fully involved at the same level as her European partners. This 
vas propbably the case also for MacMillan and Boothby,despite 
their confederal leanings. Nevertheless,the more national or 
Empire - orientated members of the British unionist camp, including 
Eden,Amery and perhaps Churchill,were not necessarily opposed to 
such a tvo-tier arrangement,though for the moment they vere cer­
tainly not prepared to endorse the raaximaliste HFE case.
The political dilenraasof European unity could,of course, be 
partially avoided by laying more stress upon economic and sectoral 
aspects of integration. Sir Harold Butler notified the con­
ference in this respect of the scheduled European Economic
Confer «nee to be held in London under the auspices of the European
2
Movement’ s Economic Section,of vhich he vas chairman. André Philip 
similarly stressed the economic context of the campaign,though 
this vas intrinsically linked to political questions. Hence,he 
drev particular attention to the need to constitute an internatio­
nal authority for the Rhur industrial b?.sin,vhile adding that 
"clear and concrete" proposals for the European campaign as a
vhole should be dravn up,presented to Governments and "realised
3
progressively."
1. GAFEHCU,Brussels Congress speech,ordinary r'lenary session,
2 5 .2 .4 9 .,(Ho.21) ,CASH BRUGGE.
2. BOTLER, speech (No. 19). ibid. 3. PHILIP, soeech( tip. 22 ) ibid.
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André Philip's distinguished and vigorous involvement in 
this first major international congress of the official European 
Movement also highlightened the fact that the Movement conprùed a 
broader political base and appeal than it vas accused of having 
by Labour Party or Communist quarters. The assiduous entry of the 
Socialist SMUSE on the scene at Brussels further illustrated this 
point,and Marceau Pivert,as a leading spokesman for the movement, 
made it quite clear that Socialist participation in the European 
campaign vas no mere illusion or false cover. The SMUSE's involve­
ment represented a full-blooded Socialist ving in the European 
Movement t
"We are Socialists",he declared in his opening speech,"and 
if ve are latecomers to your organisation it is becaur.e ve 
did not vish to rally to your Movement as e mere handful of 
Socialists,but because ye vanted to see the vhole of Europe 
vorking at your side."
He vent on to state:
"We are international democratic Socialists,because ve have 
no understanding for socialism confined to one single country.
We even hold that it is impossible to build up socialism in 
one country alone.
As Socialists,ve support the European Hove"ient in order to 
fight against the poverty inherent in national economies...
And ve come as democrats respecting the varied elements 
vhich compose the European Movenent and asking only equal 
rights,and the means to express ourselves freely and to 
propose the solations vhich ve believe to be the best...
We therefore come to the European Movement vith the 
maxinura of sincerity and confidence in you,promising to do 
the impossible,to vin over all the vorkers who have not yet 
understood the necessity of this task of primary importance, 
so that they may all join us and that,together,ve may build 
up a true European Socialist democracy vhich vili protect the 
basic liberties of man,vhich v i n  be made by the people,for  ^
the people,and vili thus bring hope of Deace to all humanity." *
On the other side of the political spectrum,Italy's leading
Christian Democrat delegate,Enzo Giaccherò,spoke of the "spiritual
2
values" of the "European family", vhile Robert B±chet,?is President 
of the NEI,declared somevhat polemically:
1. Marcel PIVERT,Brussels Congress speech,on behalf of the SÌIUSE, 
oridinary plenary session.£5.£ .49.. ( lio.l6).CAEli BRUGGS.
2. Q.'ZO GIACCHERÒ, speech (H». 17 ). -b.u.
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"If  ve look at that part of iiurope vhich renlly enjoys 
freedom,we see that nearly everywhere Christian Democrat 
statesmen preside over or participate actively in the  ^
leadership and political life of the various countries."
Thus,in an even more convincing way than at the Hague Con­
gress, the Brussels meeting of the International Council clearly 
indicated the political diversity of the various groups affiliated 
to the European Movement. The intransigent and negative official 
boycott by the British Labour Party vas especially noticable vith 
the now active and highly vocal involvement of the continental 
Socialists,whose presence quelled the charges of the European 
Movement being a right-wing,Churchill-dominated conspiracy. The 
election of officers,and more immediately,the actual political 
debate at Brussels proved this point beyond all doubt.
2) The Brussels Programme: European Movement policy debate
Nearly tvo thirds of the official time-table at the
Brussel* Congress vas taken up by the work of the two main
committees,dealing with juridical and political problems, and
2
meeting in private. The constructive and practical achievements 
of the Congress took place in this rather private and exclusive 
setting. The work of the political committee ves especially impor­
tant,since much of the Buropean Movement’ s future official stra­
tegy vith regard to the Council of Europe project was based upon 
the political formulations drawn up at Brussels. It vas perhaps 
for this reason that Boothby.as chairman of the above committee 
had every reason to feel anxious about the problems and contro­
versies vhich needed to be resolved at this crucial stage of 
affairs. He described the scene as follovs:
"I vas elected to the chairmanship of the political committee, 
and it vas vith a sense of ave,mingled vith apprehension,that
I approached the task of presiding over a gathering which . / .
I. BICHET,Brussels Congress speech,ordinary plenary session, 
25.2.49». (No.17) , CAEM BRUGGE.
2* See Official Programme of the Brussels Congress, SAilDYS PAPERS.
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./.contained some of the most distinguished international 
figures of our time.
There they sat,these men and women,eminent in so many walks 
of life,vith paper in front of the"! and pencils in their hand 
and no other thought^or intention but to go on until success 
had been achieved."
The actual terms of reference of the political committee 
consisted in examining a draft state-ient submitted by the Inter­
national Executive Committee,entitled 'Principles of a European 
’ 2
Policy, and to draw up a specific list of recoimendations regar­
ding the European Assembly campaion,based upon the position taken 
in previous official texts and in the light of present circum­
stances. The draft memorandum itself provided a stimulating and 
concise working base for the task of the connittee,and was pre­
sented as a plan of action in favour of an "independent" political 
and economic European Onion. The scheme was defended first on 
"moral grounds",the "love of freedom and hostility to totalitaria­
nism" being held as the central tenet of the European Movement's 
political ideology. Respect for "Christian charity , "rationalism" 
and "diversity" were in tin se«i as the basic reference points for 
a tolerant European society,in which the deep conviction to up­
hold political "democracy", the "rule of lav" and the "fundamental 
liberties" of the individual constituted the practical forms of 
this ideology. The actual institutions envisaged for the organi­
sation of such a free and democratic European Union were not 
mentioned in detail,though a key part of the statement 
indicated that the structure would have to rest upon a trans­
national sovereign base:
"The present regime of wirestricted national sovereignties", 
the text read,"by dissipating efforts in mutual opposition, * 
constitutes,so long as it continues,an unsurraountable obstacle 
to the realisation of Europe's aspirations."
The draft memorandum then specifically stated:
1. BOOTHBY,News of the World article,'The United Europe Movement 
passes another milestone’ ,6 .3 .4 9 .
2. »Principles of a European Policy*.draft statement(C/P/3)sub-
mitted to the Brussels Congress by the E.M. Brcutive Committee, 
drawn up mainly by Courtin,Philip,Brv.graans,Boothby,Mackay(with 
Sandys’ supervision), CAdM BRUGGu,
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"The decision recently to establish 9 Council of ciurope.is 
to be welcomed as a decisve step towards the joint exercise 
of certain defined sovereign ©overs."
In the same context,a European "Charter of Human nights" vas 
also called for, along vith "common European institutions" in 
the economic field,the Ruhr Statute being seen as an initial 
step tovards such a goal. This in turn led to the document's 
defence of European Union on "material grounds” , the tesct poin­
ting out that the economic legacy of the var could only be fully 
redressed by the creation of a "single European market and the 
progressive removal of national barriers against free movement 
of persons,goods and capital." This did not mean,however,that 
an irrtET-gomrrmental campaign in favour of a b'uropean common market 
should take the place of a political solution. Indeed,as the 
draft statement especially pointed out:
"This vili not be achieved merely by discusr.ions amongst 
technicians or by negotiations between governments. The 
delicate function or arbitration I'hich is reouired can alone 
be performed by a European authority,possessing sufficient 
political pover to override selfich or obstructive interests 
in the various countries."
The exclusive technocratic drive vhich vas scon to activate
the "functional approach" to European unity vas therefore rejected
as an alternative method for the furtherance of the campaign:
"In the absence of joint political institutions",the text 
earned,“the European organisations and services,which are 
already in being or in the process of being created,vill 
soon either become ineffective oving to the fact that they 
are not competent to take .the necessary political decisions, 
or alternatively they vill be driven by force of circumstances 
to usurp the functions of governments ?jid set up in their 
place a technocracy. These alternatives are equally unsatis­
factory. "
The main gist of these important points from the draft 
report,outlined above,vas retained in the final text,and thereby 
illustrated the continued adherence of the Buropean Movement to 
a trans-national political strategy. There vere serious problems, 
hovever.vhen the committee debated the "democratic” . / .
- 386 -
./.defin itio n  of the proposed European Union,Aitiero Spinelli insis­
ting upon a more precise formula by vhich "democratic" was cruali- 
fied not in the "confined" geographic quantity of the OEEC naticns, 
but as regards those countries villing to resoect and adhere to 
the proposed Charter of Human Rights vhich,he argued,vas "the 
Hague formula and the essential ideal in the name of vhich Europe 
should be constituted."1 Mqre problems arose over the ’ German 
question1 vhen Bob Edvards led the call for the svift restoration 
of full democratic rights and diplomatic status to the western 
Zones of G e r m a n y , v h i le arguing that the international control
of the Ruhr should be regarded as the first stage in the creation
2
of conra Swopean industrial èsti-tutLons. In  tins be vas veil supported
3 4
both by Hiss Josephy , and above all,by André Philip. The Socialist
9-iUSE representatives vere indeed highly effective in the debate,
and shoved their muscle especially vith regrrd to Europe's ties
vith overseas territories,Marceau Pivert angrily denouncing the
imperialist designs of certain sections of the European ’iove-ientf
6
much to the irritation of MacMillan and Serruys. The final text 
nevertheless accommodated both Ptvaf s  criticises and the S.:iUSE's 
demand to include some mention of the role of vorkers in a united 
Europe. As one nnti-socialist observer to the proceedings 
commented:"The socialists vere much better organised than at The 
Hague. In  the political coianittee they constituted a disciplined
7
and offensive bloc ." On the other hand,however,the more conSŒ1- 
vative-minded delegates to the congress vere far from routed by 
this surprisingly vigorous socialist participation,and Hore-BeliAa 
above all made a point of underling the 3ritish unionist camp's 
"particular satisfaction" vith the reference retained ir. the final 
text referring to the "traditional ties that bind us to countries ‘
g
overseas;these ties(he added)vill alvays have priority."
I .  SPIHELLI.official minutes of political connittee debate,26.
Brussels Congress, CASM BRUGGE. 2. EDWARDS,ibid. 3.J0SEHPY,
ibid. 4 . PHILIP,ibid. 5. PIVERT,rpecch(Doc.No.26,AH Ho.3 ).
Plus official minutes,ib id . 6. KAC.'EIILAN & SKRKUYS,ibid.
7 . See a . V0I3DI .article in  La Fédération ,'Au  delà de la 
politique churchillienne'.April 1949.
8 . HORi»-BELISHA, speech at plenary session,28 .2 .4 9 . CA*24 B-kUGG*;.
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The most damaging division of opinion di«ring the two-day 
debate of the political committee, hot/ever, rtemmed essentiplly 
from the tough maximaliste stand taken by the Italian MFE dele­
gation. The first serious indication of their angry mood came to 
light when BrugmanB proposed a debate concerning the Riropeen 
M o v e m e n t 1b attitude towards the Atlantic Pact,stating hie own 
revieed view favouring not so much a detached and "neutral* 
Europe,but instead an "independent" Europe,acting within the 
Western alliance system.I This provoked Carandini and most of his 
MFE colleagues(though not Spinelli)into a violent denunciation
of Europe being intrinsically tied to American military designs
2
and to a US-dominated Western Bloc npdel. Nevertheless,the debate 
continued(no doubt to Sandys' embarrassmentj^nd in the final evert 
decided upon an evasive formula by vr.ich it rss stated that Europe 
would provide for her ovn defence.
More serious division «merged not over the Western Alliance 
but over the actual political approach to the Buropean Assembly 
campaign itself. The Italian delegation as a whole was indeed 
furious over the blanket approval vith which the official Council 
of Europe project vas welcomed as a "decisive step" towards union, 
and instead proposed an amendment claiming that it was,in fact, 
an "insufficient step" vhich did "not yet enable the joint exer­
cise of certain defined sovereign rights." The amendment further 
added that since the Council of Ministers regained simply an off­
shoot of the "sterile  sovereign state organis?tion",it vould 
indeed be up to the European Assembly itself to act as the main 
driving force tov-ards the constitution of a "United States of 
Europe." The means by vhich the Assembly should achieve this cen­
tral integrating role,the Italian tert continued,would be through 
bi-annual direct elections,Assembly representatives thereafter 
being able to vote according to their ovn conscience and to put 
through policies of "constitutional.politicnl,economic and nili-
3
tary " concern ia favour of Buropean Federation.
I . brugMAh'S,official minutes,op .cit . 2. CAliAiiDINI,ibid;Plus artiOe
by D. Anderson in Net,1 York Times , 27 .2 .4  9 . ;  aoine^i Diary,20.3^»9.
3. See One. V7 An >.CAE* M W » E .
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The bold initiative taken by the Italian marinaliste depu­
tation failed miserably to rally th<? majority of European Move­
ment delegates,who plainly preferred the moderate and positive 
tone of the original draft. The actual clause in question 
■»•as eventually altered only to sound even "tore favourable to the 
governmental action in setting up the Council of Europe,vhich 
was greeted in the approved tert by the committee with "gratitude 
and satisfaction*" The broad conseiffus of opinion at the Brussels 
Congress thus clearly indicated a concern not to ostracise ttoe 
European Movement from the responsible main-stream strategy with 
which the Sandys-Retinger aris had guided the campaign into the 
realm of governmental decision making. Brug-nans was not at ease 
vith this strategy,but felt there was no viable alternative.
The maximal1 stee thought differently , believing that 
if  the European Movement nov failed to strike a real blow for a 
fundamental structural transformation of ¡Surot>e,the more sceptic a. 
governments would recuperate their losses,re-affim> their cautious 
lead at the diplomatic level,regain control over the forces of 
popular opinion,and subsequently mould the Buronean Assembly 
project into a vacuous institution with no real authoritive 
scope. Boothbyras chairman of the political committee,did not 
appear to be over-interested in the loftier ideals involved 
in the European Assembly scheme. He was more concerned instead 
about ensuring the possibility of all-party representation in 
the planned Assembly,and tabled a motion for such a procedure.1 
Similarly,the French delegation was mainly subdued as regards 
the long-term impact of the European Assembly,though Courtin was 
quick to oppose Boothby*s motion in view of the fact that French
2
Communists as a result could be selected to the European Assemtty. 
This Franco-British dHame was eventually resolved by the Con­
gress accepting the broad sense of Boothby's proposal,along . / .
1. BOOTHBY motion.Uoc. No. 6b . CAEK BRUGGE.
2 . COUETIN amendment.Doc. i«o. 105 ,CAE.. 3RU3GE.
See also article in Manchester Guardian , "A European
Assembly",3 .3 .49 .
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. / .  vith the proviso that each Parliament should "be free to
nominate only those delegates who undertake to contribute loyally 
to the establishment of democratic institutions in a United 
Europe." This fornrnla.it vas thought,vould exclude the Communists 
entirely.
It vas clear, therefore,that despite some vague references to 
an eventual joint exercise of sovereign rights,neither the appro­
ved document on 'Principles of a European Policy ', nor the additio­
nal document passed by the political committee,entitled rimply 
' European Consultative Assembly'.envisaged a bold supra-national 
political strategy. Instead,the ambicruous statements of the past 
in  this context vere either summarised or simply repeated. In 
concluding the vork of the committee,Boothby spoke of the "revo­
lutionary" and "practical" results of the discussions,and descri­
bed the final formulation of the European ¡xweient's political 
policy as "destined to exercise a great effect upon the course 
of events in Europe and in the vorld ."* The Italian delegation 
did not share such a bloated vier of the liovement's officially 
approved policy. Indeed,in a long and bitter statement to the 
fincl plenary session of the Brussels Congress,on February 26, 
Carandini exclaimed that the approved tert vas "far from being a 
dynamic document", and that it failed to explain hov an effective trans­
fer of national sovereignty to a European authority vould actually 
take place. The political committee,he claimed had "lost sight of 
the fundamental goal of the European Movement - the creation of 
a European Federal State." Nothing vould be achieved by inter­
governmental agreements in the absence of a long-term strategy to 
secure an "international parliamentary treaty",*nd a short-term 
plan to provide the European Arseibly vith the "maximum political 
authority" possible. The approved Tioliey documents, he concluded,
simply lacked any expression in favour of a representative end 
sovereign Assembly. - The tvo texts in auestion are printed belov:
1 . BOOTHBY.Closing Statements.Doc.iio. 114, 28 .2 .4 9 . CAEM BRUGGE
2. c a k a h p ih i , ' Final Declaration* for the Italian delegation, 
uoc• l<o. 103 , 2b • 2.49» , CAIii BKUj GE.
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PRINCIPLES OF EUROPEAN POLICY
t. In a work! dominated by political «nJ ccorxnnk units of con* 
tincmol dimensions, the European nations cannot l>ope to survive on s 
bas» of political «ir economic indepcmlcnee. Europe must unite» not 
merely 10 preserve the pcacc and freedom of her peoples and to recover 
and augment her material prosperity, bin to »w e n  oncc more those 
principles which ptc  now mcnaccd and which must be preserved and 
jti\ro new life by being enshrined in a new structure.
2. Love of freedom, hostility tu  totalitarianism of every kind, 
the humble and conscientious scorch for truth and, above all, re^pccx 
for the human personality and for the individual as an individual— * 
the&c are the esscnrtaJ characteristics of the true spirit of Europe. l:rom 
them there spring, not a grudging toleration of diversity, I Hit *  gbd 
recognition of its merit. 7 *hevc moral values, which are the product 
of two il>ousnnJ yen« nf civilization and «ere reaffirmed in the 
roUumcc to Nazism and Fascism, must inspire the organization of 
Europe
3. European culture is expressed through that tradition of demo­
cracy which is shared by all our rations. /\il of us believe in a rule of 
law «-hid« is iudcpcndcm of the State, and which at the same time 
provides the foundations and fixes the limits of State authority. W e  
believe that the human personality is sacrosanct and that the funda­
mental liberties attaching to it must be guaranteed against all forms of
t tyranny. W e  further bdievc that the individual exists only in relation 
to his leltows and as a mem ber of organic communities. Such com­
munities must, within the limiu of their competence, enpoy * 
considcnibic degree erf autonomy, provided always tlmt the necessary 
collective discipline is maintained. Finally, we believe that tlic concept 
of democracy implies freedom of criticism and therefore the rigtu 0f  
opposition. ^
4. A  political institution or an economic and social system is never 
an end in itself; it is merely a means of creating favourable ouiditiow 
in which the human personality can develop and expand. Economic 
power slmuld be regarded as a responsibility, to be discharged in the 
best interests of aJL T h e  methods employed, as well os the political 
and economic institutions to be craned, must, above all, inspire a sense 
of personal responsibility and must eacoumgc individual ioiuauve to 
the maximum.
5. Europe is being born at a time when its constituent niuiou* stc  
undergoing a profound social transformation. Wiihin the new organ­
isms the worker* must piny their part in management and in the 
excrdse of authnriry to the full extent of their technical and puliucal 
capacity.
5. It is not a Question of choosing betw een liberty ami authority, 
nor between a frre and a collective economy, but of creating a synthesis 
of the two, which, far from being in opposition to one another, can he 
combined for constructive purposes.
7. N o  State should be admitted into the European Uniun which 
docs not Kreept the fundamental principles of a Charter of Htmvm 
Rights, and which doe? not dcdare itself willing and bound to entire 
their application. In contemicnce. the offic«* adherence of 
European iw»*nr* b*ib in tnc y * t T a * d  in iff! Cttt ^irnot he tounted 
upon Ji* tnc present. the tafiicr whicl. 4 'w U »  the free State* 
from the other European M iw r e  must not be aoi^tcd  0* pcfimir/nt 
Our aim is the uniun it\ freedom of all the peoples of E v r o K
'  8. Western Germany inu*i be invited lorthwtth (anu the rest of
Qcnnauy wltcn possible) to bccomc oil integral part of this new 
community, in which the ciiiwiw or all the nmtonx will h a w  the w m e  
rights and (lie tame duties.
9. A ny  Union must take account of the special tics which unite 
certain nations with countries overseas. T h e  traditional Jinks between 
E uropean States and other self-governing countries overseas mtist be 
preserved and extended for the mutual benefit of all. Eiimnc m u n  ***** 
actively heln irtciuwies which are nnw denendent to er»*'h- •
regim e ?f autonc«»! They must b£ permitted 10 participate full.« u) 
thi political, economic and social benefits of the European association, 
and to be represented in European organizations according to the 
¿constitutional practices in each country,
10- European values can only be preserved in so far as they are 
given new lift and «ibstancc through the medium of new 
instinmnm In the absence rvw tm*ir"*vir‘ , u»c European
offmntidbons and services, whidt %iC •ircaby 10 bfecg «  in proccj;s of 
being created, will rapidly become ineffective, or will be driven by force 
of circumstances to usurp the functions of government by setting up in 
their place an uncontrolled technocracy.
iz. T h e  International Council of the E u ropean Movcxncn: notes 
with gratitude and satisfaction the decision taken by the Governments 
of the Five Urusseh Treaty Power* to crcne a European Council of 
Ministers and a European Consultauve Assembly, in accordance with 
the recommendations of the Hague Congress. This decision con- 
smutes an important step towards the common excrcise of certain 
defined sovereign powers.
12. In  view of the profound structural alterations in world 
economy during the past quarter of a ccntury, accentuated by two 
world wars, Europe cannot find a new stability without adopting a new 
economic policy. This policy should be directed toward» the most 
harmonious end rational exploitation of Europe's resources with a view 
to improving steadily the standard of living of the European popula­
tion Only thus can Europe rehabilitate herself, contribute to universal 
prosperity» and provide for her own defence.
t^. Such a new economic policy, in the establishment of which 
the O X .E .C .  at Paris can be of very great assistance, implies at least 
an overall plan of production for the bauc industries of Western 
Europe and the progressive removal of the cxisung national barriers 
against the free movement of persons, goods and capital. T h e  inte­
gration of the heavy industries of Western Europe is urgently required» 
for if ii the necessary foundation of the economy of the Union as a 
whole. From ibis stand pout, the Ruhr Statute must not remain as an 
exceptional regime, but should be regarded ts a step towards the 
creation of common institutions for Western Europe.
14. There are, thus, both moral and material considerations which 
demand the union of Europe. T h e  tolerance of diversity, which has 
enabled her to play to notable a part in history, will find expression in a 
new  order m  which liberty joins hand* with discipline. t:rom this there 
will flow a frrch vitality, which will assure to Europe her independents 
and comftiued existence u  a vital force for rivilhutiien in world affairs.
1.
I . ‘Principles of a European Policy’ . final policy tert adopted, 





At its me.'tin; in Brussels en I ’zbrutrry jRi/i, 1^ 9« the imrtna’itmal 
Council of tm JUtropean Mmnsneni tuned cii/i rratuudr ami n,i:xfaritf*n 
t)a dcdtion taiu-n by the Govrrttmcnis of the Fh * Breads Ireor* Pmcer* 
to create a Eserapran C m m u  of Mtmsuti an t a Burvpcan CcHSuiiOttvr 
Assembly, tn acecrdanc* mth the proposals n*ad' by the EMrpfvm 
Menvmcnt foiiomng the Cangnss of Europe held at The Hague im M ay ,
1948-
It was decided to rufomi to the Governments eoneemcd the foifpving 
Hicoinmatdaamu rcgardtnf the composition and organization of the 
Assembly:
1 ..Th e  delegate* to the Assembly should be nominated h> tlic 
various national Parliaments in such •  way as to represent tl»c vial 
forces in each country.
2. Eacn Parliament should» however, be free to nominate only 
* (hose delegates who undertake to contribute loyally to the establish-
¿tent of democratic institutions in a United Europe.
3. Th e  number of delegates, cho*cn to represent rhe countries 
which at present enjoy democratic government, thould be at least 3 0 a
4. It is highly desirable that each national representation should 
indude both Parliamentary end non-Parliamcnniry rienrcn*s. Th e  
Parliamentarians should (subject to tnc provisions of paragraph 2 
above) be designated in such a way that the partic* constituted within 
each interested Parliament are appropriately, represented A  due 
place should be accorded to active supporters of European 
co-opcrayon.
5. T h e  Assembly should, from the outset, be com poses 0.'
representatives from aQ European countries enjoying democratic 
government, and should include representatives from Western 
Germ any.^ __ _____  __ _______ ___
6. Apart from national dekptinoi. another Gwen #u repre­
sentation should be provided. T h e  Assembly th<wM elect pet.>»naluics 
dtoscn for their representative European ¿nch*lm;: otiscns
of countrio which arc at present unable to express ih> -mdvt: 
dcrmcraiicaNy.
7. tn order to emphasise tlie fact that u  is the funak«. of the
Assembly to represent the whole U  T.urope, h is supprv.M th*t a ’  r
ccrtLtn number of pljcc-. m  the Chamber of the Assembly idJ hr
reserved for representatives of the counnrics which canr^ f-xprcss
themsdves democratically. These empty places would tUm-nstrate
the solidarity of all rhe peoples of Eurooe.
S. Tlie Assembly must have the rich! to discuss any cation* 
cf interest-10 the European rommuiwy. A ny  iftuc. which tffact 
the organization of Europe, slmuld be refers* } the A***?nbly py 
the Cpuncu 01 Minister; Tor discussion
9. Th e  Assembly shouui* «ten yeti, hold two or three sctstoiH 
and should sit for not less titan forty-five days.
10. T h e  Assembly should set up a certain number of Standing 
Committees.
11. Th e  Assembly should be provided with an adequate
Secretariat. ^
’European Consultative Assembly1 fin?l recommend.?txons adopted. 
• Brussels Congress, February 1949, CAE.-i BRUGGE.
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The other main policy document vhich n s  also adopted by 
the Brussels Congress related to the important proposition 
of the juridical committee,-eeting under the chairmanship of 
Fernand D e h o u s s e , vhict called for the creation of a European (*»««. 
A'ter considerable debate concerning especially the geo-political 
area in vhich the proposed European Court v o u l d  have supreme 
j u r i s d i c t i o n . the operation of a filter system for cases t o  be 
referred to the Court,and the enforcement of decisions taken by 
the Courtithe following list of recommendations v a s  unanimously
adopted: __
E U R O P E A N  COURT  OF
HUMAN RIGHTS
1. Whilst k  it of importance that the Rights of M a n  should be 
effectively guaranteed in all European countries, the judicial protection 
of these rights is capablc of being immediately assured in the States 
participating in the Council of Europe.
a. With this obiect, a European Court of H um an  Rights should 
be established by a Convention concluded between the Mem ber States 
of the Council of Europe, regard being had to the undermentioned 
considerations:
3. ThcjQfhts to be assured by the Court shall be those m d m d im f , 
fiifQilY_and social rights of an economic, political, religious or other 
nature in thcXUated Nation» Declaration cif Human. Uightuvhkh  it is 
necessary ana practical to protect by juridical process. (A  hue/Riflm  
it amexrd hem e m  a kern far cmmdrraticK.)
4. T h e  Court shall have jurisdiction to determine all cases con* 
ceraing the infringement of the above rights arising out of legislative, 
executive or juridical acts. If  the Court determines that there has been
_ an infringement, it may either prescribe measures of reparation, or it 
may require tliat the national authorities shall take penal or admini­
strative action in regard to the persons responsible for such infringement, 
or it may demand the repeal, cancellation or amendment of the act.
j. T h e  Govern ment! of the Signatory States, as well as all 
natural or corporate pcraons, being either nationals of or domiciled in 
one of these States, shall have the right to appear before the Court.
'  * 6. lViiti^shalljMiiLhrdaasidrrcil by the Courr until the interna!
(ud>cial otgceuiff of. rh" Siavt sonrrmeil t»ve been exhaust'd, 
provided that tbrse (unction wnlmut «nrrmnnaMe delay.
7. T h e  Court shall be composed ot nine manners cnosen Cram 
among persons of high moral and professional character.
8. Tlicrc shall he cnnstitutnl a European H um an  Rights C om ­
mission composed of seven members who shall be independent of any 
G overnm ent. T h e  Commission shall supervise the observance of the 
above-mentioned Convention. It shall present an annual report to 
the Council of Europe. T h e  Commission shall recrivc and investigate 
all petitions. It may carry out enquiries within the territory of the 
States concerned, which shall afford all facilities necessary for the 
efficient conduct of such enquiries.
T. Fnr laridicai debate, see official minutes, especial^ Docs.92-Iu.O, 
Brussels Congress,February CAEK BRUGGE.
- 394 -
9- If  Commotion consider! that a petition is well-founded, it 
may make appropriate recommendation* to the partie* concerned, with 
a view to resolving the matter by conciliatory method*. If  conciliation 
. cannot be achieved, the Commission may, whether it ha* made a 
recommendation or not, initiate proceeding* before the Court, or it 
may authorize the panic* concerned to submit to the Court any 
question or point of law raised by such petition.
10. In the event of failure to comply with a recommendation of the 
Commission or a judgment of the Court the matter may be brought 
before the Council of Europe. T h e  totter shall call upon the partv 
concerned to comply, and shall, in the event of continued non- 
com pliance, decide upon such measures as may be appropriate.
The Juridical Section of 11*  European Movement it prepormf a 
draft Convention, mbodymg ihe above prmnpiei, for submmon to die 
Comcil of Europe.
L IST  OF H U M A N  R IG H T S  T O  B E  A S S U R E D  B Y  T H E  
E U R O P E A N  C O U R T
(Submitted as a basis for consideration)
1. Security of life and limb.
а. Freedom from arbitrary arrest, detention and exile.
3. Freedom from slavery and servitude and from compulsory labour 
of a discriminatory kind.
4. Freedom of rriipious belief, practice and teaching.
j . P ra d o m  of speech and of expression of opinion generally
б. Freedom of association and assembly.
> 7. Freedom from arbitrary interference with the family.
"  8. T h e  sanctity of the home.
9 . Equality before the law.
10. Freedom from discrimination 00  account of religion, racc, national 
origin or political or other opinion,
11. Freedom from arbitrary deprivation of property.
12. Freedom of petition in respect of any infringement of the Rights 
guaran teed by the Court occurring within the territory of an)'
State adhering to the Convention. j
The proposed Convention vas thus to operate as part of 
the broader Council of Europe project(clause 2);indeed,the 
European Movenent regarded the formal presentation of the proposed 
Convention as one of the initial and prinary objectives of the 
European Consultative Assembly,once convoked. The problem 
remained,ho»ever, as to how precisely such a European Court, 
assuming it vould be accepted by the participating governments, 
»ould effectively sanction the enforcement of its verdict./*
’ European Court of Human Eights'- draft Convention,adopted 
by the Brussels Congress,February 1949, ( I H F / 2 / E ) . C A E H
BKUGGE.
- 395 -
./.o n  those occasions when recalcitrant national governments or 
national juridical institutions might be in violation of its 
rulings. The drafters of the document clearly based their hopes 
on the povers of European public opinion in this "flatter,or 
failing this,in the potential sanctions vhich the Council of 
Europe itself might apply. This point was strongly challenged 
by the Italian delegation vho argued that the "effective Plan­
ning" and "full functioning"of the Court could not operate in 
such a way up until the Council of Europe itself became a "Cen­
tral European Power" through a transfer of sovereignty,the Court 
being only a "basic expression* of this powerÏ As Carandini 
again stressed at the closing plenary session of the Congress:
" . . .  it see”!s rather stranae to us that the thene of a 
Court of Hunan Rights should be developed so well,whereas 
even the slightest allusion to the li-iitation of the so­
vereignty of national States has been forgotten."2
The debate cane to a conclusion on this rather bitter note. 
The European Movement had tacitly decided to work within the 
confines of the Council of Europe project as specified in offiria. 
circles,concentrating on measures vhich the European Assembly 
could in time adopt and press for.but no longer attempting to 
secure a more authoritative status for the Assembly itself.
This,it was hoped,would be achieved at a later stage through 
the Assembly's own efforts in co-development with the Council.
The European Movement would provide unofficial and indirect aid 
in the struggle,while pushing for concrete projects such as the 
European Court. The minority Italian maxinaliste delegation was 
at complete odds vith such a gradual strategy but,despite Frenay*s 
active leadership of the EUF.and the influential sympsthy of 
leading figures such as André Philip,they could acco«plish no 
fundamental turn a*nong the moderate consensus which now dominated 
the European Movement as a whole. The Brussels Congress was in 
this sense the final breaking point between the unionist-./.
1. MILO DI VILLAGRAZXA speech,27 .2 .4 9 .,Doc.92, Brussels Congress
CAEii BRUGGE.'
2. CARANDINI, ' Final Declaration . 26 .2 . h9 .■ on. cit.
./•dominated leadership of the European Movement, and the militant 
supporters of constitutional fedrration plans among the maxima- 
liste wing of the BUT. The Congress,in the sane contert,marked 
the complete ascendency of the Sandys-Retinger axis in the over­
all control of the Movement. Indeed,despite the mainly honorary 
election of the French Trade Union leader,Léon JouhauN.as Presi­
dent of the International Council,and the selection of André 
Philip as 'General Delegate' to the Executive Committee,in order 
to illustrate Socialist participation in the organs of the 
Movement  ^ the purely ceremonial renomination of Sandys and Ketin- 
ger to their former posts succinctly indicated that any federa­
list resistance within the executive organisation of the '¡ovemert
2
had no effect whatsoever. Moreover,the original draft report 
presented at the beginning of the Congress by Sandys,concerning 
the 'Objectives end Organisation' of the European ¡ovement was 
approved with hardly any alterations,Frenay's aggressive appeal
3
notwithstanding. The newly-constituted central 'Executive 
Bureau' of the Movement similarly confirmed S’ ndys' moderate 
brand of leadership,support being assured from vice-presidents 
Layton(UEM),van Zeeland(ELEC),Dautry(CFEU)^nd Karl Wistrand(co­
opted for Switierland),while Bichet(HEI),Giacchero(co-opted for 
Italy) and even Brugmans(EUF)vere hardly likely to lead an onen 
revolt against him,this leaving ü>nile Rasouin(SHUSE)as the sole
4
potential militant in the team. The Brussels Congress,in short, 
was a victory ftar the praroatic strategists of the European campaign 
as it had developed from the Hague Congress. The Council of 
fctoope project,despite its fundamental supra-national short­
comings and despite considerable maximaliste criticism,remained 
in tact.
I* See official minutes of the International Eyecutive Committee 
meeting (BC/M '10 ), 27.2.-19.. Brussel s. plus accompanying papers, 
CAEM BRUGGE,plus Boothby article »rvs of the '¿’orId ,op.cit., 
article by André Philip in Le Populaire , 'Après le Congrès 
de Bruxelles',4 .3 .4 9 . , in which the Socialist involvement is 
well explained.
2. See EXAi/iO,op.ejt. 3. Sec ' Origins,Objectives and Organisa­
tion ',  cpproved text(IHF/l.'S), Brussels Concrress, CAEM BRUGGE.
4 . See EX /H ,10.pp. cit.
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3) prussel- Congress conclusion: the European Movement's 
popular appeal
The inauguration of the International Council of the European 
Movement at Brussels vas not organised only as a private conclave 
of the leading lights in the European campaign. It vae also
arranged as the firet international gala of the officially 
constituted European Movement, and as such,the Congress attempted 
to stake out the popular appeal <"'-nd broad support which the Move­
ment vas trying to conjure. The first public manifestation of the 
Congress, held at a well-attended gathering on the evening of Satus- 
dey February 26 in the Palais des Beaux-Arts,did in this sense 
provide a convincing array of publicly committed international 
leaders,from both sides of the political spectrum,vho vere ready 
to speak out for European Union. Meeting under the chairmanship 
of Paul van Zeeland,stirring speeches vere delivered by Churchill, 
Spaak,Jouhaux,and Ruini(representing De Gasperi),along vith other 
contributions from Belgian Minister Henri Heyman,and American 
observer W. Maguire.
The address deliver by Spaak on this public occasion vas 
especially pertinent. Stressing first the viev that to "mate Europe* 
vould be a long,siov and urspectacular process,and that despite 
the official machinery being in position the most important prob­
lems still remained to be solved,the Belgian leader then issued 
the folloving sober pie«:
"People must not be discouraged or disappointed if in the 
months to come there are no achievements to compare vith chase 
of the past months. The making of Europe is à truly difficult 
task. On the road vhich will lead us to success there are 
many obstacles,but we shall manage to reach the end vith 
coiffage,patience and goodwill. Do not forget that the making 
of Europe is not the making of a rairae>e. To have made Europe 
w in  be the magnifieant reward of a long struggle... - to make 
Europe everyone must be prepared to •sake certain sacrifices."
He in turn conluded his public appeal by declaring:
I . See nouvelles de L'Europe ‘Le Congrès de aru; elles.. ' ai
pamphlet on the Brussels Congress printed by the European 
Movement ), PP • 10-11, CAEJ1 BKUGGE.
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"..Europe will be principally the creation of Governments,of 
their wisdom and daring. But without you the Governments could 
do nothing. Behind their activities,there must be a movement 
of public opinion. When the difficulties come upon us,when we 
have passed from the enthusiasm of our first successes and 
when the only way to reach our goal is to come to terms vith 
fundamental problems,the Governments »111 need to be upheld 
in their activities by a public opinion enlightened,generous 
and bold,which will help-them to triumph over their difficul­
ties." *
Evidently,Spaak did not underestimate the problems which lay 
ahead in order to uphold popular momentum in what he feared 
might be a dull though gradually constructive Council of Eurcpe 
project.
Léon Jouhaux.by contrast,struck a rather more optimistic 
note,directing his appeal not so much towards public indulge« 
with regard to long-term governmental policy,but issuing 
Instead a direct plea for active worker participation in the 
tiuropean campaign:
"Trade unionism",he declared,"must be,and indeed is, 
associated with this innense task to which it must con­
tribute with its experience,its unification,its will pnd 
its energy. Should this fundamental fact,this essential 
necessity.be misunderstood we should once again risk 
failing in our task. If workers* movements do not colla­
borate strenuously,if they do not profoundly participate 
in the realisation of this grandiose idea,this idea of 
peace,we risk another failure and that,at the present 
time,we cannot do. This experiment must succeed and for 
it to succeed it is necessary,! repeat,that the masses 
be brought into action by the trade union organisations.
That is why I believe it to be important that workers' 
movements in all countries should join in the task of 
the constitution of ttarope."2
Despite the sincerity and eloquence of these appeals,as 
vtLl as the popular throng of Brussels' citizens who er.citedly 
attended the various rallies and fringe meetings held by the 
tfuropean Movement throughout the Congress,not all ‘popular’ 
quarters were convinced about the European message being . / .
1. SPAAt,speech at public meeting held in the Pnl?is des Beaux- 
Arts, 26. 2.49. »Brussels Congress,DOC. 74.CAEM BRUGGE.
2. JOUHAUX,speech,ibid. idem..Doc.75. For Churchill speech, 
see DOC. 71. ‘
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./•put across. This vas particularly the case ?mong the 'workers' 
of the Belgian Coimrunist Party who attempted to disrupt the open 
rally held by the European Movement on February 27 at the Brussas 
Bourse. Among a vast crowd of some 10.000,who came to hear Chur­
chill, Spaak and Philip,plua Brugmans and Teitgen,address the 
meeting,some 150 Communist hecklera,methodically scattered,
In fact attanpted to disrupt the event and prevent the varions 
speakers from being heard.^Churchill si •’’ply plodded on with his 
speech,looking towards a united Europe "as the sole means of pre­
venting another war” , and as "the best way for establishing the
2
rights and freedom of the human race." Spaak,for his part,de­
fiantly baited the Communist disrupters,declaring above the 
noise "You are too few to stop us: today we 're thousands,and
3
tomorrow we shall be victorious!" André Philip similarly cried 
out "The unity of Europe for us is a cuestion of life or death, 
and I do not understand that certain 'elements present do not
4
realise that our whole existance is at stake!"
The organised rage and agitation of the Belgian Co-i'runist 
Party in its attempt to disrupt the Brussels Congress only dre* 
attention,in fact,to the status and current significance which 
the European Movement had now officially atained. The positive 
press coverage of the Congress further illustrated this fact,and 
helped consolidate the public standing and appeal of the ^xrvement.
- The'Manchester Guardian’ , for example,concluded that the Brussels 
Congress had "done its work well" and had fostered the right sort 
of "European spirit" needed for the complicated unification effort. 
With regard to the actual political recommendations of the Congres, 
the same journal commented:
"The statement on the principles of a European policy is 
a crisper document than one night eypect. It owes a good 
deal to tlie common sense of Mr. Robert Boothby,who has helped 
to exclude the grosser platitudes."
1. See ' nouvelles de V Europe' . op cit.,plus Keesinqs Contemprary 
Archives, 1949,p.9640,and press reports listed below.
2. CHUKCHILL,speech at the Bourse,Brussels Congress,DOC.95, CAEn
BRUGGE. 3. SPAAK,ibid. idem. DOC. 96 4. PHILIP,ibid.
5. See Manchester Guardian (weekly),reports and commentary,3.3 .49 .
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Similarly,the previously sceptical 'Economist' vas full of praise 
for the Congress,stating that the meeting had been "better and 
more constructive" than the Hague Congress, especially vith regard 
to the tvo "important" resolutions dealing vith the proposed 
European Assembly and European Court.1 The veekly 'Statist' gave 
an even more encouraging report after the closing session of the 
Congress:
"The results so far achieved by the Movement have been 
rather impressive,and the personalities greatly enhanced 
its standing.. .There can be little doubt that the Council 
has done magnificant vork in the c?use of burooean unity; 
and such is the caution of Governments,there is every reason 
to hope that the Council will find much more to do."
From across the Channel,the vork of the European ¡lovenent,and
especially the election of Léon Jouhaux to the presidency of
the International Council,vas greatly velconed in the French
Press. 'Le Monde' devoted positive front-parre coverage to the
3
Congress. Similarly,the more conservative 'Figaro' sr>lashed
across its headlines:"The movement for European unity has become
4
a living reality.Trtiile in the Socialist 'Le Populaire',André
Philip expressed his considerable satisfaction vith the results
of the Congress.^ René Courtin in turn added his influential
voice to the general press acclaim given to the Congress by
singling out the special role accomplished by the Socialists at
Brussels,claiming that the Buropean Movement had nov attained a
"new mystioue", as veil as being able to offer urgently reouired 
. . 6 
political and economic solutions to the problems facing Europe.
In Germany,the Social-Democratic Burgomaster of Hamburg,Max
Brauer,returned from the Brussels Congress to declare in a major
radio broadcast that the meeting had been an event of "superior
international and historic importance."7
1. Economist »article "European Unionists at Brussels",5.3.49.
2. Statist »leading article "Unite*? &'urope",5.3.49.
3. Le Monde ,main article,plus report by fc. M illet,I.3.49.
4. Le Figaro ,1 .3 .49 . 5 . PHILIP,'Le PooHlaire’ , U 3 .49. ,op. Ci t.
6. COURTIN, article in Le Monde , "AiJi'et lu Cûftgrès de â*D*SBes",S3.49
7. BRÀU£RÉradio address, March 1949. Results of Brussels meeting*
ujrep* sh\X<rh ...
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Thus,despite may.imaliste criticism of the timidity in 
the Brussels Congress reports,the pragmatic gradualistic line 
taken by the majority of the International Council was veil 
supported by the press. The Brussels Congress had now propelled 
the work of the European Movement into the foreground of politi­
cal commentary and thought,vhereas the popular manifestations 
of the Movement(indirectly aided by communist agitation)gave 
.it the appearance at least of having a mass following. The 
Council of Europe project,and more particularly,the campaign 
for a European Assertbly,had reached the zenith of its activity, 
and constituted an effective reference point for the planning 
of future European unity. The cautious warnings of Paul-H«?nri 
Spaak,however,served as a sharp indication that the stage of 
organic unification in Europe was far from achieved. The tiuro- 
pean Movement had brought forward the public campaign to a level 
where it could not be ignored by official circles,but in the 
final event the latter organs of responsibility would have to 
carry through the project on their own terms,and in their own 
time. The unionist and pragmatic majority in the European -«ve 
ment leadership were confident that the project as it stood 
would provide a sufficient base for future development at an 
increasingly organic level. The naxinaliste -TE militants,on 
the other hand,discounted any such possibility of institutional 
evolution so long- as the edifice itself vr.s not built upon 
solid juridical ground which eisizred an effective transfer of 
national sovereignty, t«e±tly envisaged and recognised by 
a trans-parliamentary pact. The ten week t>eriod which followed 
the closing ceremony of the Brussels Congress on February 28, 
and which culminated in the final Ten-Porer acrcrd an the Council c£ 
Europe Statute on May 5 ,thus represented both the last stage in 
the post-Hague campaign for a «¿uropean Assembly, ?.nd the first 
major cross-roads at which the maxi-naliste federalists openly 
disassociated themselves froi the overall cpmpaign.snd publicly 
disavowed the official Council of Europe initiative.
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I) Crisis in the Federalist camp:Poubts in the Unionist camp
There can be no doubt to the fact that the first International 
Council meeting of the European Movement left the idealistic federa­
list -movement in a state of tota disarray, Indeed,upon his return home, 
Spinelli recorded that the EUF Central Committee vas "in full crisis 
after the Brussels Congress", Frenay's outspoken position drawing 
further attention to the major splits within the movement. The 
latter's quarrel vith Brugmans,moreover, had now reached damaging
proportions vith both leaders severely criticising the respective
2
positions adopted by eaehother at Brussels. Clearly on the defen­
sive, and somevhat disillusioned vith the EUF's isolated posture as 
presented by Frenay, Brugmans even vent so far as to claim that 
under actual circumstances the federalist movement could achieve 
no further progress,and added:
"To be quite frank,it has to be admitted that at the present 
time the European Movement as a vhole has caught up vith the 
doctrine of the EOF as a vhole,though of course this does not 
signify that enormous differences do not exist betveen certain 
elements in one and the other. And since this is the case,I 
refuse to carry out a policy vhich,.instead of directing 
and stimulating the European Movement,risks putting a brake 
on it and paralysing it ."  J
It vas clearly the Executive President's final stand in his consis­
tent and principled policy in favour of unity of action in the Euro­
pean campaign. As Spinelli somevhat blandly connented,"Brugmans has
4
madeit clear that he vants to pass over to the European Movement."
Prenay,on the other hand,was equally firm in upholding his 
aggressive brand of leadership in the fight for a radical and auto­
nomous federalist strategy,and came avay from Brussels vith the . / .
1. SPirfELLI. personal diary, 20.3.49.
2. See Brugmrns/Frenay correspondence,Iifrch 1949,BRUGMANS PAPERS.
3. Ibid.,letter from Brugmans to Frenay,7.3 .49 .
4. SPINELLI,op. cit.
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./•strict Intention of westing the organisational and financial 
independence of the EUF from the "strongly centralising" ten­
dency of Sandys and the European Movement Executive Bureau.1 
This policy received strong support from the Tiiitant factions 
in the integral-federalist ving of the EUF vhere Aievandre Marc 
re-emerged as the champion for striking out a new and seperate 
federalist programme vhich vould negate the effects and results 
of collaboration vith the unionist formations dating from the 
EUF's decision to participate in the H.'.gue Congress project.* 
André Voisin in turn also echoed some of Hare's views,but felt 
that the integral-federalists should campaign both "inside and 
outside the European Movement",and re-ner the emphasis in their 
campaign for the autonomous living structures t’hich Europe should 
give egression to,rather than make demrnds only for a united 
Europe.^
An extra-parliamentary crmpaign in which the ideal of a 
supra-national Europe was given second-place to the dogma of the 
'living forces* could not have contrasted Ttore with the position 
of the maximaliste MFE ving on the other side of the EUF. Indeed, 
Spinelli's extreme frustration vith the results of the Brussels 
Congress derived not only from the "ffclse steps" which the 
majority of the European Movement had upheld,but also from the 
EUF's incapacity to put forvard a "radicâTSolitical-sovereign 
formula,the federalist movement having eitner hidden behind the
4
"empty unionist formula",or the "fantasy of integral federalism." 
The radical strategy which vas advocated in place of the 
“sterile compromises" taken at Brussels,vas explained in more 
detail by Spinelli at the Third MF£ Congress held in Florence 
on April 23-25,according to the folloving constitutional outline:
1. See Frenays letters to Sendys,£ .3 .4 9 .,3 1 .¿ .4 9 .,CBC GENEVA.
2. Information in letter from Otto Alder(Federal Union)to EUF 
Central Committee, March 1949, BRUGiiANS PAP EES.
3. VOISIH,article in ' La Fédération' ,April 1949, oo. cit.
4. SPIUELLI.'Lrttera Kedcralista Ho.8 *. l u - o p s  Federata ,1 0 .3 ^ 9 .
ItFE m m .
- 404 -
"Federations are alv/pys born,?nd can only be born,through 
pacts between states vhich are prepared to irrevocably renounce 
certain of their sovereign powers by confiding them to a 
superior state.
The number of participating states could in the initial 
.stage be quite small; the sovereign powers transferred to 
the federal state could be few and insufficient; the federal 
power could have various structural defects. All this could 
be put right at a second Stage. But the initial pact itself 
between the states should include such provisions for the j 
transfer of some portion of sovereignty to the federal state."
This call for an effective constitutional approach in which natio­
nal sovereignty was not simply "erercised" in common,as according 
to the vague Brussels formula,but actually "transferred" to a 
legitimate political authority.received the broad support of the 
MFE Congress. Carandini, for eyampie,re-affined the nerits of the
MFE’ s "realistic intransigence" on the issue,?s opposed to the
2
"timidity end opportunism" of other croups. Milo di Viliagrazia 
also insisted on the primary importance of the "fundamental poli­
tical pact renouncing sovereignty,without vhich there could be no
3
Federation,now or later." Piero Cslaiandrei added his prestigious 
voice in favour of an eventual directly-elected federal European 
political organ,envisaging a "European citizenship" above that of 
the nation states. He added,however,that d^  spite the basic "anta­
gonism" between the principles of Federation ?nd the inter-novem- 
mental aspects of the Council of Europe project,the proposed 
European Assembly should be seen as a "germ" of the future Euro- . 
oean Federation envisaged by all may:i^alistes. The subsequent 
resolution passed by the MFt reflected this view in declaring 
that it was their goal to "transform the Consultative Assembly 
into a Constituent Assembly,in order to elaborate a Ffl ERAL PACT 
OF THE UNITED STATES OF EUROPE."5 This fas by no means intended, 
however,as an approval of the Council of Europe project in it s ./ .
I .  See ' II  Pensiaro dei Federalisti Italiani al I I I  Concrresso Na- 
zionale del I!FE; ranporto del Coretcto Pirettivo Hazionale -
Discorji e ilozioni'.Florence 23-25.-t.49. .KFa TURIN.-SPIKELLI 
speech pp .37-56. 2 . CARANDINI,ibid., o p . 56-66.
3. DI VILLAGRA4IA,ibid.,pp.69-86. 4 . CALAHAHDKjSI,ibid.,pp.I 46-
150. 5. POLITICAL MOTION, ib id ., pp. 161-164.
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./.actual form. The motion indeed went on to stnte that the imminent 
creation of the Council of riurope did "not as yet constitute a 
decisive step tovards a united federal Europe",in so much as the 
Council of Ministers had "no executive powers" and the Consul­
tative Assembly had "no legislative powers".while national 
sovereignty remained unscathed. Moreover,the motion further de­
clared that "British reluctance" to be committed to any potential 
federal development could only be overcome if "continental 
Europe" provided a "strong and decisive" example in favour of 
¿¡uropean Federation in such a way as to be "irresistible" to 
Britain.^
In short, the i-SFE retained their previous two-tier European 
Federation formula,disassociating tbeaselves once and for all 
froa the current Council of Europe campaign as conducted 
by the European Movement. Nevertheless,Spinelli was still careful 
to stress the necessity to remain within the European i-iovement, 
in order to "exercise a continual critinue of unionism" where it 
most mattered. The ' federal-pact' campaign of the ¡-Ft:,however, 
would now be mounted separately,in the hope that the dissident 
B^U might also become involved,as well as the representatives 
who would eventually sit in the European Assembly itself . * 
Brugmans strongly disapproved of this policy,arguing that it 
was "premature",exclusively "political" end sectarian. He further 
accused the i-jFE leadership of contradicting federalist thought 
in their over "centralised" conception of a European "super -
3
State." Indeed the long-simmering and fundamental differences
within the EUK between the maximalist supporters of fusionist
federation plans.the internal-orientated integral federalists,
and the less-doctrinal possibilist centre could no longer be
papered over. The federalist 'marriacie of convenience* was
breaking up,and Brugmans was practically helpless.
I. POLITICAL MOTION,ibid. 2. SPINELLI speech, op . cit.
3. BRUG,ANS,article written after the III Sii Congress,entitled
'Positions Fédéralistes Européennes', later Printed in La 
Fédération ,July I9-t9, CEC GENEVA. (Cf. ?lso p .48.)
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At the same time as the federalist movement w?.s openly
divided over the Council of Europe project and federation plans
in general,the unionist camp in Britain was drawing further away
from any effective policy commitment towards a Europe united on
supra-national or organic lines. Verious doubts on the matter
had,of course,already been expressed from the unionist side at
the Brussels Congress in February. These doubts were given
much more voice at the British dominated European Economic
Conference of Westminster,organised by the duronean movement on
2
April £0-25, under the chairmanship of Sir ¡¡r-'rold Uutler.
In the first session of the "social and commercial 
committee" debate at the conference,in fact,the influential Con- 
servative-unionist spokes nan,L.S. Amery.put forward a resolution 
strongly opposed to any plan in favour of an eventual complete 
European Economic Onion,arguing instead for the retention of 
bi-lateral commercial agreements in order to maintain special 
British trading arrangements with her overseas territories. To 
French anger and indignation ,Artery further exclaimed th?*t no 
government could abandon its sovereign nowers over economic 
affairs and that Britain would alrays regard the Commonwealth 
and not ¿¡urope as her prior commitment. The French delegates, 
led by Serruys,in turn withdrew from the committee meeting,put 
f o r w a r d  a separate list of proposals,?nd oleaded with van Z«elEnd 
to straighten matters out with their reluctant British colleagues. 
The final text adopted by the conference sided nrare vith the 
French point of view,and called for a "full customs union",then 
a "full economic union" for Eurooe,and for the retention of bi­
lateral trading negotiations only during the initial stage in 
the elaboration of this plan. It vas a oaoer victory for those 
in favour of organic union.but the doubts and reticence of the
3
British unionist camp in this respect had clearly come to light.
I. Cf. p .316. 2. For full details see confercnce file.CAUN BRGG&
3. See Westminster Economic Conference ’Upneral Account and heso- 
lutions1 (IifF/4 /E) . CAEM BRUGSEi DEM iierwslPtter. hyy 1949. SAItoYS 
PAP¿¿S;article by Courtin in Le .Vande , .i0.4.49. ,i>lus other 
reports printed on 22. ,23.*'..49.
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2) decision in the Parliamentary campaign
Despite dissenting voices among his unionist colleagues, 
Sandys continued to direct the political campaign for the Euro­
pean Assembly vith increasing verve and determination,though 
never losing sight of the cool,pragmatic strategy vhich he had 
evolved since the Hague Congress,and vhich nov had the formal 
stamp of approval of the International Council. Prom the long­
term strategical view,as veil as ii the pressing tactical »repara­
tions of the campaign,the need to establish some sort of parlia­
mentary ving to the European Movement vas nov of the utmost con­
cern. The differences vhich still kept the EPU outside the offi­
cial ranks of the European Movement had therefore to be settled, 
one vay or the other.
On the eve of the Brussels Congress,Sp.ndys had in fact con- ' 
tacted EPU President Bohy,and in private talks attempted once 
more to persuade the latter to put more pressure on the EPU Coun­
cil to drop their intransigent line over representation in the 
Executive Committee of the European Movement. Further energetic 
negotiations vere conducted by the Belgian parliamentarians 
behind the scenes at the Brussels Congress itself.where van 
Zeeland manage to convince Bohy to "abandon the 50/50 formula", 
insisted upon hitherto by the EPU Council,in favour of a “com­
promise proposal" vhereby the dPU vould be allocated 8"voices" 
in the Eyecutive Committee(ie. double the number granted to 
other member groups). Negotiations on this generous offer broke 
dovn again,hovever.vhen Bohy insisted that he viewed 8 "voices" 
as meaning that the EPU Council,vhich could only manage to 
delegate "3 or 4" represent«tives.vould nevertheless be attri­
buted 8 full ■Totes".1
I. See Bohy's letters to Ssndys.J^.Z.Ag.,SAiJDYS PAPEkS.
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It Has another case of Bohy's rather naive bargaining 
methods overriding a sane.conraon sense approach to the serious 
issues at stake. Both he and Coudenhove appeared to be com­
pletely unavare of the established influence and prestige of the 
European Movement,enhanced further by the Brussels and then the 
Westminster Congresses,as the major umbrella organisation for 
all the important pro-Burooean forces and pressure groups. The 
setting up of National Councils by the latter ias particularly 
dangerous for the Ertl in this respect: Already the rebellious 
British Parlianentary Group under -■¡r<cfcay had switched sides, and 
had beco-ne fully affiliated to the British National Council of 
the European :iovement. Other Parliamentary Groups vould soon 
follov suit. Indeed,those Groups in France,Belgium and Italy 
vere affiliated both to the EPU and the ¿urooean liovement. It 
vas only a matter of time before they T>ould fully adhere to 
the latter formation. Similarly,?->ong the cautious Pprliamentaiy 
Groups in Denmark and Scandinavia the pragmatic and evolutionary 
approach to European unity pursued by Sandys and his Executive 
teen had considerable more attraction than the erratic and 
radical stand taken by the EPU leaders.
After a further unsuccessful attempt by the Executive 
Bureau leaders of the European Movement to convince Bohy 
of the need for conciliation1,the directing committee of the 
European Movement as a vhole finally decided to drav an end to 
the saga and launch instead an official campaign to constitute 
a ’Parliamentary Section* inside the European -loveient itself. * 
This decision,Sandys informed Bohy,was taken "in response to 
requests received from several parliamentary groups." It tas 
also in order to accommodate those countries vhere the Parlia­
mentary Groups vere "not affiliated to the ¿PU.J'nd therefore as 
yet not internationally organised"(ie. Trit’ in). The . / .
1. See European Movement Executive Bureau meeting,27.2.49, 
official minutes(EX/te/IO).QP. cit.
2. see European Movement j&cecutive Bureau meeting ,5-6.4.49« 
official minutes(EX/M/II).plus accompanying paper(EXA’/76 )on 
constitution of a •Parliamentary section’ , CASH BRUGGE.
./.Parliamentary Section,Sandys continues to evplain would be 
"responsible for the initiation of action in the parliamentary 
sphere to secure the implementation of the policy adopted by 
the International Eyecutive." The Chairman and Vice-Chairman 
of the Section would be members both of the Executive Committee 
and of the Bureau. According to this scheme,invitations vere 
already being sent out to. the French,British,Italian and the 
three Scandinavian Groups to pronose one of their representa­
tives as Vice-Chairman. In the meantime, S;~.ndys declared that 
3ohy himself was invited to become Chairr.rn of the l'nrliamen- 
tary Section,"as a sign of our appreciation of the outstanding 
part vhich you have played in the parliamentary sphere in 
support of the European cause."1
The dye had finally beam set, SandyB having played Bohy’e 
bluff vith considerable conciliatory grace and political skill, 
the offer to Bohy being aimed at splitting the EPU Council 
still more and at isolating Coudenhove yet further. The Execu­
tive decision to set up a Parliamentary Section fas taken on 
April 6. 3ohy laid low for the moment,while by June the actual
organisation was officially inaugurated by the European iiove-
2
ment. Already by May,hovever,the immediate effects of the
European Movement’ s parliamentary policy were felt,the Swedish
and then later the Danish farlia ~entary Groups being the first
3
to fully switch their allegiances. In the final r-un-up to the 
agreement on the Council of Europe Statute.it was indeed the 
European i-lovement alone which remained at the centre of Politi­
cal attention and discussion, the EPU being practically dis­
counted.
1. SAJJDYS, letter to Bohy,6 .4.4 y. , SAiiDYS papers.
2. Cf. pp. 430-1.
3. See letters to Coudenhove from the Chairmen of the Swedish 




3) The final push towards the constitution of the Council 
of Europe ; Tpacfi nwc
The campaign for a European Assembly had by now attained 
its most exiting phase. At the official level,Bevin sent out 
invitations on March 7 ,on behalf of the Brussels Treaty Govern­
ments, requesting the participation of the Danish,Irish,Italian, 
Norwegian and Swedish Governments in the filial for-nulation of 
the Council of Europe project, following on fron the Five-Pou'er 
Agreement of January 28 and the subseouent draft recoranendations 
submitted by the Brussels Treaty Permanent Committee on February 
5 .1 After receiving positive replies from a ll ,a  10-Power "Con­
ference of Ambassadors" »’as convened in London on Harch 28 .under 
the chairmanship once more of Sir Glad-ryn Jebb,in order to thrash 
out the last recommendations concerning the role and work of the 
Council of Europetin preparation for the subseouent and definitive 
inter-i-iinisterial meeting» held eventually on -ay 3-4. The jr«SEiires 
on the British Labour Govemnent to establish,in partnership vith 
the European Continent,a European political institution which 
would go beyond jrevijuslyeorceived inter-govermental and co-opera­
tive levels of decision making were now formidable • 2ven the 
left-wing ’ Tribune" strongly appealed for Labour Party members to 
become "Europe-conscious",adding that "our proverbial insularity
is by now wholly anachronistic and the sooner we realise and
2
acknowledge this the better." At the parliamentary level,llnckay 
once more drew up and tabled a notion in the House of Commons 
demanding that the planned liuropean Consultftive Assembly should 
be politically representative,free from governmental mandates,and 
regarded as the initiation of a future Federal European Parlia­
ment with supra-national povers. Among the 122 MP's who signed
3
this motion,there figured the name of hts Barbara Castle.
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
2. Tribune .editorial,ID.3.49.
3. See list(G9 F5 Ho. 5) who signed the motion (Up. «.I), entitlec 
' European Consultative Assembly'.February I9-i<-AC£AY PAPERS,
plus Hansard, 1 notices ',17 .3 .49»
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Siiilarly .at the first full Executive Council meeting of the 
British Council of the European ..ove-’ent,held on March 14, 
Barbara Castle, Mackay, and Bob Edvards, a-nong others, approved a 
motion suggesting that another European Movement deputation 
be sent to the forthcoming 'Conference of Aibassadors', in order 
to’ aTiplify" the International Council's programme with regard 
to the European A ssem bly .The  International executive Bureau 
had already considered the idea and formally announced at its sub­
sequent meeting on April 5 that the A ibassadorial Conference,
already in session, had indeed allowed the European -ovement to
2
submit its vievs directly. The following day,on April 6 ,a depu­
tation composed of Sandys,Bichet,Brucians,hasauin,van Zeeland, 
Philip,Ketinger,Giaccherò,Wistrand and .i'ckav vns received by 
the conference at the Foreign office,and in turn submitted a 
me-torandum based on the Brussels Concrecs recommendations. It 
vas the final official initiative undertaken by the Movement 
in the European Assembly campaign.
3
The memorandum,entitled 'Surouean Consultative Assenbly', 
dealt once more vith the three ■’lain asoects of the ¿urooe?n 
A sse^ly  project,namely,the composition,the ter "is of reference, 
and the organisational scope of the Assembly vithin the Council 
of Europe scheme as a vhole:-
The proposed composition of the Assembly vas explained 
from the geo-political point of view vitr. the nov customary 
call for the "ultimate" inclusion of all the nations of Europe, 
but vith the "in itia l" proviso that representstives should be 
designated by "democratic methods",vhich -*eant that Snain and 
the 'Iron Curtain' regimes vere excluded for the -noment, though 
Portugal ras somehov deened democratically respectable. In the./
1. ur Executive Council meeting,14 .3 .4 9 ..official minata»(UIE/- 
mA ) . caem bruqge.
2. European Movement Executive Bureau meeting,5-6.4.49.»official 
minutes(EX/M/II).op .cit.
3« ' European Consultative Arsembly - recommendations submitted
to ite  t a fg r & ice cf artx'Bsader» ftrthe estrtH drat of a QnincJ. of .
by a deputation of the European i'ove*ent' , ( E^/P /74) ,ó. » 4 ^ . ,
~ CA£m BRUGfr* •
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./.sane 'cold war1 context,the European liovc-ent deputation also 
recommended that "as a symbolic Gesture, a nunber of enpty seats 
could be reserved for the Buropean nations which,for the present, 
cannot »-press themselves democratically." ¡oving to the actual 
selection of representatives to the Assembly,the deputation went 
on to propose,in what constituted a partial pacification of the 
fgceralist point of view,that each national delegation ought to 
"adequately represent the vital forces in its country",vhich 
meant including not just "political leaders",but also rprominent 
figures in the nation's economic anu spiritual life ." In addition, 
it was proposed that in the selection of both parliamentary and 
non-^parliamentary representatives to the Apse ’.bly "an effort 
should be made to include persons who hPve actively studied the 
problems of European unification" ?nd who vould therefore be 
able to make a "special contribution to the deliberations of the 
Assembly",in other words,members of the European ¡¡ovement! The 
most sensitive suggestion,however,related to the desired all-party 
method of appointment to the Assembly,which would insure that 
it vas not simply a government-appointed ^nd 'andPted delibera­
tive body. The European Movement's finfl formula on this crucial 
point read.as followsi
"The political element in e?ch n?tional delegation should 
in general reflect the relative strengths of the political 
opinions represented in its parliament. Certain parliaments 
may,however»consider it desirable to exclude from their 
delegations representatives of political parties which are 
actively hostile to the creation of a united dcnocrctic 
Europe. It is recommended that no directive should be issued 
on this point,which should be left for decision by each 
parliament at its own direction."
It was hoped that in this way the Assembly would be essentially
a parliamentary instrument including,in the British context,both
Government *nd Opposition parties,v'hiie in the continental arena
the Communist Parties could be "democratically" excluded. The
European Movement delegation further revested that a United
number of places should be kept for “co-opted members".while./.
- 413 -
./.th e  proposed size of the Assembly v?s put at 300,in order for it 
to have an "auttrrritative" voice, seats being allocated according to the 
relative size of populations,vith special safeguards for the 
adequate representation of "less populous nations."
The terms of reference of the Assembly,proposed by the 
deputation,vere summarised in the three following clauses:
"(a) To study and discuss.the broad issues of European policy 
as they affect the relations of European ilitions vith 
each other and of tfurope as a vhole vith other outside 
countries;
(b) To examine practical measures designed to oroTote closer 
unity among the t'uropean nations in the political and 
economic spheres,and to study the social and juridical 
problems involved;
(c) To make recommendations to the European Council of 
Ministers on the above matters «‘ nd on Pny other ouestions 
vhich the Council may refer to the Assembly for considera­
tion. "
Just as in the previous statosent presented by the European 
Movement deputation on December 9 ,this rather tame list of 
duties vas explained vithin a rather «ore ambiguous context.
Hence,although the Assembly vould clearly have a "consultative" 
and not a "constituent" role.it vould be "neither possible nor 
desirable to prevent discussion upon the constitutional problems 
of European union." In short,"broad" ouestions of European con­
cern, even. if politically sensitive.should be debated by the 
Assembly,after vhich recommendations could be submitted to the 
Council of Minist«rs. This proposition vas compienented by a 
vital clause vhich described the potential joint-evolutionary role 
of the Assembly and Council vith regard to political initiatives 
in favour of closer European unity:
"In particular.it is assumed that any major issues relating 
to the organisation of Europe,such as the creation of ner 
European institutions,will be referred by the Council of 
Ministers to the Assembly for discussion before final decisions 
are taken."
In brief, therefore, the European Movement *."as attempting both to 
secure the Assembly's freedom to discuss general issues upon its 
own initiative.vhile any specific issues of importance vhich • / •
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. / .  might be avoided by the Council of Ministers would not escape 
the attention of the actual Assembly. The formula presented 
by the European Movement,hovever,ceded that the Council rather 
than the Assembly would be responsible for authorising such 
an initiative - a point vhich Sandys no doubt approved of,but 
to vhich the maximalist federalists vere strongly opposed.
The third and final part of the memorandum delivered 
by the European Movement deputation dealt briefly vith the 
organisational aspects of the projected Assembly.repeating the 
past requests for standing committees,a oenanent secretariat, 
and the need for "at least two Plenary Sessions" each year, 
lasting "not less than 45 days" at a tine. The delegation also 
stressed,in conclusion,that in order to avoid any doubt as to 
the role and status of the Assembly it should be officially 
designated the title of "European Consultative Assenbly",rather 
than the over-general term "Eurooear. Arseibly", or for that mattes 
the over-restrictive title initially giver, on January ¡¿8 - Euro­
pean "Consultative Body."
The political climax to this final phase of the Burooean 
Assembly campaign vas nov in sight. Following the official ore- 
paratory discussions and the presentation of the above memoran­
dum by the European Movement on April 6 , there regained only one 
month before the final I0-Power decision would be taken on the 
Council of Europe Statute,the conclusive meeting of Foreign 
Ministers being scheduled to take place at London on May 3-4.
In the meantime, the Boronean Movement drew still more attention 
at the Westminster Bconomic Congress(see p.4I3)in calling for a 
' Suropean governmental body* to boost production and integration. 
Plans to set up a central office in Strasbourg,the certain loca­
tion for the Ccas£fl.af arcpe^ere *033 started »Rebattet having sought the 
collaboration of local Strasbourg dignitories trith the viev 
to forming ,in advance,a European -ovetent sponsored reception 
committee for the European Assenbly delegates upon their . / .
I . FOR full details,consult »Strasbourg Bureau' file , c a s h  BRUGGE,
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./.eventual arrival in the Alsatian capital. The projected »Stras­
bourg Bureau',moreover,would be a most suitable launching pad 
for the activities of the European liove^ent Parlia -er.tary Sec­
tion, now also in the process of being firmed. On April 6 ,the 
Executive Bureau in fact gave the official go-ahead for the 
•Strasbourg Bureau* initiative.1 On April 6,Rebattet arranged 
a meeting in Strasbourg,chaired by the City Mayor,Charles Frev,
in order to set up a provisional '^traEbourg Committee of the2
European Move-nent.' The Committee w s  forially constituted four 
days later,on April 12,under the presidency of a local university 
professor,M. Pautrier,and was subsequently inaugurated on April 
29 .3
By this ti’ne, substantial but not corrolete agreement on the 
Council of Surope Statute hnd been reached st the Ambassadorial 
Conference,the main details of the proposed tert not' being 
openly circulated and discussed a long the press. The chief diffi­
culties still to be solved included Britain's insistence upon 
the application of a unanimity rule for all decisions of the 
Ministerial Committee and the need for a two-thirds ■najority in 
the Assembly before any resolution could be submitted to the 
Co™ittee. The French, for their pert, wan ted to substitute the 
proposed ’ Council of Europe* title,vith all its inter-(Tovermen- 
tal connotations to, si mply, 'European Union'. The Foreign Ministers 
finally arrived in London on May 3,neetinp under the chairman­
ship of Bevin representing Britain,vith 3chuman for France,
Sforza for Italy,Stikker for the Netherlands,MacBride for Ire­
land, Rasmussen for Denmark,La^ge for ¡lorwry.Unden for Sweden,
Bech for Lw.e'nbourg.and.in Spaak's absence through illness,Am-
4
bassador de Thieusies for Belgium. On Mey 5, ter considering 
the preparatory report,a full agreement was apparently reached 
and signed on the Council of Europe Statute. The full text of 
the co-rnunir’ui: and statute w?s as follows:
I . ¡¿x/ii. I I .op. cit. 2. Eebattet co-pte rendu,6 .-i.49 ., ' Strarfjoic?
Bureau' file,op. cit. 3. Official minutes, 29.4.-15.,ibid. id em.
4 . See Keesincrs Contemporary Archives.vol.7 .1 »19.p . 9973.
Communique.May 5 1949
“ Ä *  r w »  W a W w  mt D fM ort, f i » us, tb>' 
ttaiy. L iU » n . t»* N*tb*rtw4». X< *w *t. uri fcbc
I M U 4  I l f t W i .  « M  tb* 0 « tn a  m — Éif te iMMlM, W 4 *y  
rijvi tb* Kuiltl «f tbr Owtti.it C>Ì i P > H  l*Ml mi m x HK B l M .  
• •m a *  tb« N U b i M m i  af a P r ttM M r ?  Oatatniartoa mt tb*CwiiéI 
m Emh
T u  M i «  h t t m  mt tb» l u n u  k  ito a M M M M t t  •(  »
■ W »  a< Mtatturv n d  «r •  Oeewhetiw Awrtnfcly. «fciob 
*flllm ntk»0«M H«(C ar«p« . Uf I b w  l** HiUw , Uif O m h iU m  
mt VttMtn «rii! pfntMt ter u *  é n t k r a M i  al > n w m
O IH IM IW U . *rbb* Ito* O w t l i m w  à w m W *  Vtn pMftW •
■ n w  tbrmivt vbtnb tfe* aapkf«u«Si *f tb* Ewe«**» pw pli  
w u j b* tcraatataé tn4 u p f i w m .  U r  O n » n >w w u  tb»» M w  kepi 
••Mteaa««*) 1« («oc« wtLb L a » « f e t t e  « »h in .
It «bimtd be m v 4  LbM «u*vtiaa* mi satiowfti éftrarr ■** 
frvs t w  KMC* «f tb* Cam'll • (  t e w , Tuta •  b w a — tbcrr I» 
a* « h U n  b«i» 1  *ar aüburr «iiteaer b«t ratktr. *» u n  prwwwbk- 
tm Kb* Sutvt» My«. mt a (mrraj <lwtn I« aei.fcT* pr*r* tad w  brini 
•bwtt a n u l i  aaKr l*r tM pvntiar «f « « w n U w  aAd mkluuw 
t t m  »««ab wblcb aw tb» m i a »  af tbr weeob^ra.
Tb* uw w rat a m ia «  mt tb* ovari: ■< tw o** «lu uüci pu** »  
I w fciw ». H  to ba»«4 iartac Aura*, aaé tb* tr*t tw m  « W  
« M f i f t t I ;  bi «a ■<■( mt r w l m i  MfMftwHw «a £■ m m  
bMarr.
Tb* w alitim i 1M k  m U  *  i ^ ì w b  tma tb* Htlt**«* ami TarkM  
O*wraoicwu t* a» *4aJct*4 w  n n tu » •< tb* CwaNi «r Kurvte 
Il «a* tb* faarrai tot« U«t tbr unibili •(  Unm  twa Stale« « w U  
b* Mccatabbe. aa4 H m  acr«r4 tbai tb* TMàtrr abooM b* éaaft 
vttb waétr tb* diami* br tb* CM aaUu^ «r Mtsi^<*n u  a*ua a* n 
•M M taa« b*ta«. Tb» »w a ib fr  *1 i w i l w  W  Ibc StM«u br ■*brr 
E-*r*t —» WAtn *rttt b* «wnitf ri br «b* rtm aB In  mt Mtmrr~rr
•i  Um  K IM  (UM.
••for* tow N w r tb* l l b W w  Kft, te aemréabe* w W  tb* p*a- 
rbaiai *t tb* —’u rlat i  Mr tbi « t i M H a m  af Um h *t *r W «T  
O n a a iM M . t» b«M tb* ftr* awrUAf 1  tb* CowmT***w» BtAar tbr 
<wln>wliii *it V- bckaaiii. Ton  wauaat** 11. *»*m.
mt tb* Preseti F r n m  btnet. m  «ttmUri *ec*v*atT. M i  « m « 4  
tbat ta* aast a n ni  «4 Ito* U im p U bw  *baald IM * »Ua* is Pam  
M  Mar 11.”
Council of Europe statute
" T b *  O m n a i w b  mt tb* K u r **v  mt Mri«Ha, tb* SNrtM a af 
D naart , tb* » w i t  R u r t b .  tb* Ivtob IlfimbUr, tb* Italtaa 
RapabMc. tb* OraM IMrbr •*  irttanabwf. tbe k.ln#«<mi mt tb* 
Ncthavtaaé«. tb* liteedaw mt ?C*nr«r. tb* K ia r ^ a  M  w m t n ,  
■aé tb» taiNpa KlaWnni mt tifrt brHala and .VartMn 
O » * rt— Ì< taat Um » n j t  mt pcw* b M 4  <ipna ¡nuti* anrt tat«r 
aat«o^ *> ee jneaUea li va^l l*r tb* » u a r m b i  mt baraaa >x*ny 
m 4  dvttmta«;
neattnamr Ibctr é***ttoa la tb* a»« m m ) w m
«btab mm «b* i n a n a  binM^ *  mt tb*» »* • »«*■ • * •  tb* M  mwv*
«é l»aiytt— i b w le e . pmì**mì MWiti. **4 tb» ni* *f la*, prtau'»i— 
wbtrb t o u  ta* bM * «4 *U t»aauN iia a m . / ;
Pib*na« tbt. tor tb* a M i n w a  a K  fartbf naWaattpa or tb^»
tirai* U «  to tb* t o w a u  a( w n w x  aad melaJ am cN». tb«v fi 
ared «r a h m t  aaHf betww* all itb*-wia<rd «miiinit • (  r
(wwOenar tbat, te reiaaaJ to tba ***d abd te tb* *<r>r«w*4
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M m A otU p  mt tb* C i— rfl et Banp^
Art. L- Tki M m k m  af Um O nadl ai Kvepe « •  tbe KrtiN 
li twi iiutiu  
Art. !!!■>■ «1 tba Gameti «  H f « 1M n w t  aaeepl
Um artaelpb* af tb* rale af lew lai af Ut* eB)ormeet by *1» i w n  
wttkts tu JariadiUta* mt M M k  HtfeU »»4 IwuUm MUi bm UiM .
aad aetb>bar*ie MowTir m ì  «ffacUvelr tei ib* r-üu»üoo oí tb* 
■in af Um OoasrU m  i»m Of<  la Ari. 1.
Art. 4.— A iy L a n w n  » i.— . «rbtob le<kim i < tabeabieand «WMng 
le fuMl tbe peertooM «f A A . I. mar be ta*1tc4 te beeeu* » ile®ber 
e< tbe C M M I  ar E a r w  br tb* OeaiadTtea mt iULHtmm. a b / étate 
* • 1dtH«4 abali bM M M  a U na  bar aa dcp**lt «ritb IM  fceamerr- 
Q » t m  al aa lacu-iueatik mt aucriaaee (a tb* ««aiata.
A n. t. ta) 1» apeetai ebB n wiaane* a U m p c u  cMbOT «Web
b  «a ka abèa awt «Ulta« t» fatai tb* n »bi> ui <*L Art. 9
aar m  iaritnj br **• <rf ltlelwa «a bneaM «a AnaOat*
Xraaber al tb* L'evadi mt i w > .  « w r r  «* iirmad abati
b m au aa A m t a w  Menber «a 4 **M l «1U> tb* lam n w w ^ u n  
mt aa bili m ia i  annuii— tb* Matad. A * ¿ a H H > Ucnber 
ab*U b* M H i m  ta b* repraeaaMd la tb* Oaaaattatm Aaaeabtr 
«MT-
1*1 Tb* » n u l l a  ' Maarber * m  tba «tatwt* bglaéea aa Amim+ U  
Mraibar eaaept wbaa «aa£ la m m u I w  «Itt lapraeeaM liea uà tb* 
C b aa M *«  mt ìlbMna.
A r . L - H r im  ‘—bit  friuiii—  Udir  irtioiM « ar 4. tbe Cmm- 
■tina* mi Minutar» mali detertaiar tb* »aaibev mt w p§«*calati 
aa tb* Oaawaltasiv* ¿aaaabtr t* >Ucb thè uraenaai >t*mb*r 
b* eatJtied. o d  tu » i m t i — n  ftaaaetai <wa«nbuUeft.
Art. A *r JJcawrr mt U *  Oeeaf-u a( M k » *  aar wltMfMr
br farmalfr acuirò* tba Ik m U ir-Urtttti mt tt* ai-bU** ta «e 
«a. Hacb «itbAtawai «tali «ab* ellm at tb* rad mt tb* flaaawei 
ymmr te whtet U  ti n t W H . K tb* aetlftraiiBfc «  fina  dorar ttf 
•rat •  aaatb* mt ibat Sewial r*a«. 11 tb* w m e a m a  i* *»n*a 
la tb* ìaat I noeta* af ta* paaaala) t w .  *  «bali u à *  t «v i  at tt» 
■*»* mt im  a m  tataaai r w  
Am. ».— a*? Membar af tb* C•matti «t Rari»». «bfcb ha* H awMy 
Tketaied Art. 3. m t  b* -gfni~1 bmm  U* rtrtt» mt n pieaetauea 
aad m w au ii br tba OnmalU** mt MlBtfCrrv te «Itbdre« aadvr 
Alt t. lf »cfa il e »  ber dee* aet eembtr *H b  U M  !*«•>**.. tbe Owa- 
nftte* a « ;  «vette taat h  b*a raaerd ta be a iirmbcr mt tb* O w e ii  
a» r m  *acfc èau> a* tb* CoauaJtt** a*ar éeurwua».
Art. t.—Tb* OfNaaaKta* mt M JnM m  wmmr niiptrt tba ftabt mt 
wpi— autiit m  tb* Caraltte* aad *a tbr Caa*utatire IWraiWy 
al a Mnabrr wbtrb ba* laiM  ta rubi lt* ba*an*l ubugmUon, aana« 
Web pm a i  a* tb* aMtcaUaa i—aam nafa*br<-
’ / •
Ari. !•«—Tbr enMM mt tb* Oaaarii ut Iwnp* are j CI' tbe Ow-  
aRirt mt J U a M m  ; Ul> tb* ComLtattrr t» rniìlr U«tk tbr** 
— »a* abali b* * n v *  br tb* àeafvwtat af tb* CaaacU *f
Ali 11.—Tbe aoM mt tb* Caaacil mt tarapé *  al M i * N t n .  
A h  U .— Tbe aarieJ t*nrwiTa aC tb* Covmd» mt turvpc ar* 
K a v M  ia4 r im b . Tba r « M  mt natiiaii af tb* Cnamiu*» mt 
miniateti aad mt tb* C iaw BM Iw  AmnbMr abaU «aUfiaiai la vbat
Af«. IL— Tb* OaMwiniii mt Varrn- b  taa atfaa «bleb aet» aa 
babatf mt tba OeuDcd ai i,aw>i la aorirtear* «tu  ArUuki kA «ai i*.
Art. I 4 .- C M  »Inaber *mUI be raUUcO ta ave KpmcvtaUr* aa 
tbe n w w im a  mt lliarim aad eaub Nffm auitrr aaall b* rutn^té, 
laaavvau. H fp w — ialina a» tbeoa^atHlee bc tor 
far Keer«a Abaira. U’bca a AlMMrr l«e Kerrlga Aiuif» ^  «aaUe 
la b* p n w u , ar ba «tber umaamtaace* «br«* U maj- b* d«we»w4*. 
aa altmate aar be mmmtmmaM l a M W  Ule. «ba aMU. «-bo teaa 
»aaaib«*, be a » aw b» m  ba* CaivuM ai.
Ali li. "<a* Ot tbe wtaaainiialba mt tbaflawalMIia A m b M t .  
ar «  Ri a«v tnfttanv*. tbe Vernatiti** mt lUblM l i «batt e a— tórw
* t e  eetiea r^aara« la Nrtim tb* «ba a« tb* Oauaatt ar fcima*.
* taf>*uAai7 tbe eewmw lue ac eoarmuaw mt ■ererwnM.i aad tba 
aiapu»! br llrnniinT- mt a a» ia «a ae4*or vttb r»‘«ar4 «a peetbia. 
lar aiatt«a. Ite renatala—  ebaU be eaaMRMMeatai ta Jtf— bar« br 
tbe »eovtary «OiTKial.
» 1  la aiHm*ftab mamm. tbr n*iiaieaai 4  tbe OaanRte» mar 
•akr tbe far» af TerenaamedaUee* u*e ue>e a e iay  wt Mewbnt, 
«bi tb* Owiabift gaar w qw t  Mcb Qa»m uBtta  ta tnfena K  mt 
tb* aetlaa tak«^ br Um « «rìU> paaed te aacb w»»Maw>L'iibatlPwa.
Art. M^~Tae uawwltuy mt Htnm m  »bali. eeb»>rt * • tb» urartmi  
af Artleta* *4. X». » .  9t. » .  «ad r*lattee te Uw iw w a mt tb* 
OaawaRaUee M M i W r ,  «t*M* «Kb bladlaa «Utot ab maturi felatiMr 
te tbe MU*raal ewiaU^liMa aad arraaeneeau mt tbe Oawrll mt 
Xsapc V m  tbb paffeae tba damaabt««1 af MatNata *ait eaept 
aaeb Snaaetei aad *d*aml«tfat»re wgalelieae aa aaar br aarwearv.
Ad. |7.—Tbe r«a«uttr* mt V iuaun  m t  *nt «# admerr aad
lt bmt èi*m  «eriraMa.
Are ll^-TMi C**amltte* mt bali métmt tt» rabe mt
p ioiain . «btah aball d*nef»da* an aw  atbrr Uatag* il) lb* <mar«Bi ; 
(Mt tbe awtbnl al aw a iatm w t aad b-na al affi«« mt He f» d i m  : 
tm> tbe Pfy'■Uart far tbe admWatat» mt Ite«* ta H* aaaada. larlodtaa 
«ba «fiat *4 aeUre ar n a nea b  lev »an i m ili ¡ aad uri tba aotiaea- 
tleaa r*«abrd f«r tb* a*aataat«ea mt alt«raaasv aadrr AH. I«.
Art. I*.— At aaafe afÉua al Um CMmttai*» Aweiblr tba (Ha- 
■biaa mt ^ IfW ew  abali farai* tb* AJwaiMy w«b mutmmrntm mt 
|b arti ruba, a a a a im e i  br **n>eprtai* < « tP ta liUaa.
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' / • Art. M .— (a) BfNiwUM» ^  HkTCatawHw* ei U M « e n  v*Mtng  to Ut leùewiee iwpiwi tutttn-UMrir : <n i»i«tiw<»iir twnt 
Mdcr Art. U  <*> alciw of itoHwrtli ; iU> m öi* Art. if
|W»am  «f MU*ltte< ; mit a«r4k«i «na** A n . fi la) H» *»d <*) 
tp«btott>>: o»»ew»iie»*«Hi.TAn. »J«nwuwrieeeef ;
(V) iwnwmaáal tiran fcn «Iw Mwirtmrat mt a nton ! Ut. T, 15. rt. 
M d  tt lerga&uaUM» ; «od m i  »¿*7 «!> « t i 'n w i  wfcleb tb*; (ta- 
mIUm> may. br b rgwtatiaa pwarrt uécr trfl M m .  drcid» * n M  
w  Mb>rci tn » IM M IIH I  *pt« «g x w W  mt Its 
wqiiw u *  i m m m h  m «  mt tin m m n u t l m  cartine •  tM«. 
M d  »r *  mterttr mt tto u m — u ti>»  aotltito K  m  m  im
O) Qvm iM « « H M  aiitoi tk« rtoe« mt pi— * T  to «ttdcr tto 
iMncttJ mü tontiaMimUr* «wvwftOoM BMT *r « n M H  kr » «Mm**» 
«a)«(Hr yot* nf u *  w n w t*waa M titw  m ttoB  tto CMuaKia*.
Irl Keaoteltaa« mt u «  ConmKtto «Mer ArtJefca 4 aad ft m i l w  
«  two-Uilvto m»)fW T  «< all tto h 1 M»1 wafartra» «rtR W
ut> AU «tk« pNMvtttH mt tto Ctoawntaa. toerndtar tto r i w iiw  
«t Ito lM tr*. «I n tm  mt 9*n*túw . and mt « »wa rft «Ad M m « »  
»■ u n  n«wta««aM rtonwiwHitliü far ito l a r a M K K  mH ArtMn  
mt Uw Suiau , eüwr u m  Umw m w w «  m pwir i M  **> »▼» 
rti»i, M d  ÉiBtdior to «m> mt éaakt « n * *  n w n r b  «t ib* AKkto
apptto. r**«»* •  t i  t b n f  «Mwncr •» tto............  c—ü m
t » m  isd «4 *  aifttwltr «* ito rvviM kUU*« n t n w  i» ä  o* uw
A n . 11*—<•) lato» tk* O om m m t* dritta . ncetla**
•T tto Oofomnt«« «< 3rtnM«n h m II to to*d—d> ta purste, c m  («> 
ai Ito Mftl sf Ito OmndL
(») Tb* CeeunW#* «hall értmu»» «tot l it w w ü w  «toll to pvb- 
gtoa« K*ardito tto m i l W i M  «ad I »
W  pnrat*.
to) Tto C M w t t M  toal» i
i «r tto Cu— ita u w  à
A n . *1.—Tto OaafatUtirr A «
«< Uw Owwrll mt K V M * . 3t •
Iw Ij b m  vtorr Uh» st*t«u n d  |4w «t  ab " h c Iw u u l  i 
■ t  i m  i i m m w i d i T i  m  u  i t o  O m s k « « * ’  » I
A n . U .— 4«> T m  CeewútiHhre Awnuktr «to*J 4 k m  mm wmr 
M l f  n f » w 4 i t i w > i  «tm . a^T M tw r  toibtt tto ato ato trtpi 
mt ito O f n i i  mt ^ v w '  «rkinh **i *• u lw iU  le K k r  Hw Caaunfttrc 
mt M n M  «• «ma a n * « u l  far Ila opttao«. «c (M> b*a toc» aptwwrcd 
kr Uw cvwHiiitirr tar »in-tof ta ito arrto« mt Uw A w a M ;  aa 
■ tto pwpaaai mt tto iatt**.
Ifti la tafcla» l u t o »  »w «t  *•>. fto Oi« a » w  MmüI bar» r m rt 
to tto «mri mt ouwr k t o t x u  Wtw^nn  mawwtal nm alu i n«a 
«a vbkcH im m  ar Hi mt Uw Mwmtoi* mt ito GavMcti ar» pan«« 
le) Tto Jiveätoet mt Ito AwraHMr •m H  tortér. tu e*w «I Aasbt. 
«to*tor a«T i t M  tal tto cw nr »T (to '.l i t o  li «riUla tto
i «|ndâ «I tt* fcwwnklT «ri i " » *  m* *rr Mt aton.
A n . i i —Tl? C uwwiiau»» A M b M r  war. «*Kb dvc wr w< i« tto 
paa<rt>ii ¡i i ml Aft. »  Wi inmiMiHiN). faaitto «r
M attin i-  ta rn— Uft M d  trfMvt ta M m  M *  M U c r  wblrb lato 
«Kbáa It" M«rr A n . S3. «• c n m n r  and tonare
ftolto i m  lv« af fida- M d  U. M vto  aa «U awtti-r* mt W f W .
Aft. M.-Hai Tto (toMvnattrr A'<»wi»y «toll «tia«to nt u m - 
■ortailTr« al tarb ìtaaitor appetto tm « c l  a waabw a« tto 
Owir»inf»t mt ttot M*wbtr mm>I «r*ito. kacta repfieretauiv iaa^  
to a toiiMMt af t«w Mn iiiit  » i> n  to w w m au . M n  wiau m  at 
tto « m  lim  to a tm ibrr «( tto u m w iu m  mt M M M m .
I») Na r»wiw»tanw> Mtoil to » w tf4 mt bt> > <■ ittna dana« a 
aawtan mt tto A** m Nr witort ito aerwwmt t( tto mbly.
(r) Ktori f  pw»«aMit»w» M r  to«» •  M(toK«*v «-to i m i  . ta tto 
ato»arf mt tto *dl, »^ak. ato rot« ta to* pto»
A n . M .— Tto ft'hewlac » « ( « ,  m  t~ h w im  atott to
Mtlliiâ »a tto aaatft mt tapnautM««* H«ni M a »  : Diifiaw «.
D w w t  4. rmaaa 11. Maa KnmMte 4. Italy It, l^ M aitoia ». 
fcVttoüMto I, K m m t  «. í w p i i  I, t'altad Klwitm  1«.
A n . *î.— Tto t o d m w  aator vblab tto Ow t o ttf mt Mtato-*« 
MUrcUwtr Ptar to m m w alaá la tto dftolm *i tto (JMwtPatfr* 
t o a W r ,  ar ia4lrl4MJ rvprr*rat«Ur#e mm tto ( t o M t n  «mr 
addr^H Uw AwimWr. atoll to Jwrwiwad br MCb rato ** pu» n^m> 
m  Utia i Ncat a* «WT to éiawm v  kr tto Cww m i i aitn- w »  
ad u ito  wttb tto AMMblr.
A n . » . —w ) Tto O iwam u rr» A w w M y  «featl ad*pi Ha tain «r 
p em tK iv  aad toall ««ret ftwi to m«— tow  Us P w w p t ,  wto M l  
K M »  te mmtm m u  tto iwat nlfarT  tiNm .
4*i Tto f»w« d r ^  «moi eaatial tto praicdiwa b«t ftoU aat tab* 
put la tto 4 c U u  mt * * f .  Tto n M N a b  mt tto rrm  n’toaUrr 
irto ta Pmdtottt ««ar Mt, «peak. aad rata m M» pto».
<rl Tto nto* «r piw ulw  toall 4«<«rb»tM «ato «P« : tto «aai ian • 
tto «naaaar mt tto awotlaa aad 1**fna mt «Awa mt tto PiiiMi at M d  
•ttov aftowa ; tto taaaMr la wMcb tto m a ia  toan to «raw* a» 
aod to BiMwiM WiaU d ta r»pmw»tattww : m 4 tto Uaw aad a m n  
»• vkteife tto aaaiai mt h i w m w i k h  ato tto» n t t u w w  mma 
to aatmæ
A n . »»^ftabjact ta tto pw ^W iai mt Art. Í*. ali m oMtoii mt 
tta C<«nUUUK Ammktj. tandl» U) »M n«
•wonswvMèaUaa* ta tto Cammiit#* mt M t o u n ;  rtll pmr^a*«« 
u  tto i M u n n n  m a u m  la- dinatoaa la ito A aw w M r; «Ui- 
m i M t o i  wnmtct«ca ar m m m m  ; (»r) 1 nnaïuPa tto dau 
mt f t o M W M m  90 M  it o m i ; rf‘ du i iiaiaiin «rtot rwwniy 
li ru t o ü tar WMHna ai la mmam M  «««wwj to H) ta <tv> ah«»*« 
m  é m n « «  t o »  ar aa ta w^at M * « r  ü  »faiüJ
t o » »  a twa^itirto a a ii ity mt tto Mpiwaianrw  mmmum *  w t
* / *
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Am. H .—Os irtui* w tartan le tu tntrraaJ praoedarr. wb»*» 
M iad »  tbe Hwum m af aAtrrr*. tbe nstntaMto« af pini— to «vre» 
os m m l l i m  aad raKuatnsons. u d  U»r sdnt>Oa« #4 nür* *<«• »*w- 
ordsra. i—iautfciar af Uw CeeewMtirt ¿M em hir «ball tor ww>< b* 
M b  »iar< »w  m tb* A m m M j m t  da*»aitas ta M o e r d ^i  
W%h AIL S» **».
A»«. 31.— Deba* ea ee pnfMtii to ba «m4* U  Um Ombwm m  c4 
M IW M n  (tel » muter Mmüd ta »taaad aa Um iw tto  tf tbe Om- 
«maure i a n M r  «tell tea nibiwi U> M  tadicaUea af tbe p n « w 4  
nbuci'iNtUT ead Ma rasasae ter a
An. J9,— CfeaMttatfvs As 
« m  •  jraa*. tba és&e u d  tan it«  af erbteta aUaU be detenutole« 
br tba AMssDbtr as sa te araéd •» lir w  »iieltoe sintssiifa «a s  
P iriasnu fT  irsiiai «f awmfcwe «ad wnb s( the UJ«.
Owerü AaaaaibtT- la ae r t n — lisiM «MU tbe Aareth* «4 m  
arCmry er^UiO rtwek «a.- ummvíí Mb*-« bat* tM  A w s U r  « M  
Uw Oaounlttee «f Miatatew osaear-
An. » • — Oràtasrr mmàom  af tbe OeaaahaUee AMtabfr « a l  
be aetd si tbe «est et tbe CmmII antea bstfe tba a w  n»hty mm 
tbe Caotailuae sf Utata^en asmrm  taat ft ab sold ►* b«M ater^bun.
A n  94.— Tbe OesavUttae af Uimsrn« M r  aspeaba as extra- 
erOtaaiT m »m  t  tbe OaaealtaUr* a  a—  bly M  math U m  aad.r*e<-* 
animase si ibe Preetdeai «  tbe
«> Tbe » rertariat abat) j m M  sf s jsemair-Oiasial. 
b Depot; tlremarr-Oaarrai. MM aarb stber atafl ae h t  • *  rad«»»*.
Ibi Tbe ftemtsTT*4>ateBl sad U«e«*r itw w w y-O n w i l aboli be 
aapetaisd br tbe «nsaanaiiTa i b w » y  «a tbe w i M n i i t i w  «f 
tbe CeamKtse et Místate**.
r  atafl af tbe *ie*ea«artal eball be sFpolated br 
'*  adatotatrartee
Itfi Ne meaber ef tb* i n w W t  ebafi be*d m r  ealarte* ta»*r
> >« n r  C onniant , er be e s wibjr sf tbe C e m ia u «*  n a aa >n 
et «r sar waiinssi imitatali, er eae f e  ta aa? aaeit»eU«a iaraai- 
»atfbta trtU bla sium.
tri titrr Minbcr et tbe eaff «f tbe I k i w i W  Mail M k e  s 
■»» a »  éarlseacjes arm istas U atto  4m y  ta la tbe t'eaacll st L w m + . 
tlist be «VI pertena ble daüee laaul stingi). «atalbKSecd tor as? 
ailtesal eaaaidervtfo*«. im ttatt be « w  »st + *k  sr it* ln* 
etractwaa ta eaaarxtsa «iti. tba wrtum i b t  «f bte éatiN tr*as sar 
Om i ta a t »t er eiv aarbaitM e*reraal Ut N e  Omtart’ e«d «ntl 
rtCrtii mwt sar s^ -tisa «n*rt tatabt iriiit sa bta ptMMkm «s aa 
bUnulflMl aatrjai maaaatMe satr I* tbe Uaaaeft. la tb>* <*•■* «I 
tbe Bttw tir; -Osa»laiaad tb» DtfWr lw i m >  W m  ist. tkkffrtsr»' 
Usa «ball be fami.» ^ » »r tbe Oaa m W it, «wl ta tbe «aas mt ail sebe» 
Bwnibeft of tbe «sK. hriera tbr Ann  isti Ki t w u L 
if) fcw»r Mrater «ball n i»ret tba s»r)aHe*>r J>KrawH«M l 
etMiacter af tbe 1 1 ■inmubiiwtp« af tba w rn u r y tb a w l  sud tbe 
ata* af tbe IWertertai aad snt arHi ta taHaraa» IbeM M  tbe <*»• 
etr m fwMM WIr«.
ai TH» HsrfiCartat * s ü  bs tacats* at tbs æal «f tbs
tàl Tbe berretwrOsaeeal ki resiwdbls «s «bs Oaataüttse sf 
M b W F H  lar tbe «w k  af tbe Secret setaL.
A n . n .—<mi X aA  Mratber «ball bear tbe « W " i «f N* • * »
RV m n iU U ai ta tbr C w w lHw «f Mhù O l l  sad ta tbe UaMMttir» 
Aaarmbtj.
«tai Tbe vctmMr* ni tbr Äerrrtertat sad aB atbvr eaa»a»wa stfaata* 
«bail ta art J W-iwsa aU Mi o liit» ta sarti pwpsn b ai sa M M  
bs *<>#ra atl br «bs Oatasutue sa tbe basta sf tbe M fdtaUwa af
M a i V n  Tbe ueatrft nUaaa «f sa Aiutali H u rtar aball b* és*ae-
U d  br tbe OsawaHta». __
fr) la arusMaart «t u  tbe «aaastai n>^ilit><ai. tbe M t o d  «f
Ita OaaacS abaU ¥ • e*il>mtttsd lasai»/ br tbe litaMM j -0«asrat 
tee taunt»» br Ita OsmeiWre.
«#> Tbe Nw eVtaer<laa«rsi «4MÜ wlrt ta tbe OaatailttM r«aarata 
fiaei tbe Aiswaibfr wlüeb far «irr eereaéHa* M weedta» ca« i s sasi 
abasar altaeated ta iba Itadart lar tbe A«emb>r aad tt* mnirtUo*.
Ait. Sft.— TiM ewmtaryHKiweal abati eaeb rear mttëi tbr n*«eia- 
aa^ fti af aasb Mvmbet mt »b« ssaaaat sf tbi «iwtrlbaUaa. sa4 taeb 
Member sbail par ta Um fcrretaiy-uu M ai tba aw ital af ita saatrt- 
batlaa. whtab aball be i n a li te be dB»- sa Ibe date tà ita amHH in ia. 
aat tatar tbaa d a ia iM  after tbat date.
All — ■ ■ IS) The O sw li  «f fcaroac. nrpiaceatatleas af M awbm . 
aad t^e veeratanat «ball ea>ar ta tbe irmtwbi af lu M a n t i  mte% 
pillila»!« aad HatasBltMa a* a*r w ai niitlr ai ‘>aaarr *ar Uw húM- 
taeat • f tbetr faaetiiw .^ Tbeae ttaawaltlse ebatf tartade baiaaatrr 
lar ali iapn«sataUeoa la tbs CieaaMtaQra A m i U t  fra* ar t«  
aad all k«a> rw w » * "» »  *  lb* tervHanrs af aU Mewbeia. la ir ^iiat 
•f w«r*i aa^bea «ad eatiw asst ta lbs M att«  «f tbe A asaM r  
ar Ita w n a lt M a  or n a a M ia t a
m  Tbr Mita»ere aa*itaàs M  eaaa a» paadhta «a tate* taU 
aa M B w a a »  lar tbe parpe— af M am ar tbe a n rtaH aa af »erwwaab 
ta) abare. Far tbte main a tba fjaaaiirtaa af M iaHw» ^att w  
b m 4  tu tbe Qei Maimai» crf M e i  bete tba acaaptwaa af aa A ia»  
aM»t «adata* tbe «*l«ik«as ita imwaalltaa «a ba paatai la tbe 
taiitaaHei a( all Meta ben- la sAOMtsa s Mwctal Affaswaat b t f  
be aaaehidad wttta tto Krrttrt HeaaWBa detal—  tbe prin ter» aad 
li aaaA eaiar at »■ « t .
*/*
tm »  rvtrt«** ibcm  m m rm am rw  n w  "• ~  - M ~ Ww_
in a d  l*wwei »*mUI m «ic tat* hw* *•»** *_ " * *
■itrt u d  ntiAc« m i beWM* of tw»*tfcirt« •* ^  ^ ^ * tft„ ,l ,n , 
jj. v . i >nwnnllHr tbi inurliuM *C I** l»*imtnf K iM W l 'H  
w 7Ju\v^ rZ«^ dLrmU MAriteM« W-W, U »Mi 3» «**«
__ _ _  w »■*<.--* «dlurr ■ tM *«««7-
Fm m  r m M M i .*. TkM Mute IMH fct HUM FeU*»WW (MM
ta U M l M t  wttfc tb* O o ftn iw H  «f t*** U M U 4  
» :  Ti>. * » ™ *  »M l ~ ~  '» y  
w  - iitM iM  kftf* han 4«Imi Hf4 T N  v i w i w * »  •  *■• t. 
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- The considerable limits and tightly voven s .^iecru^rds of the 
fined Council of Europe Statute,printed Pbove.did indeed appear to 
justify the cautious and subtle strategy evoked by Sandys, vhich 
had been Ft the centre of the Eurooean Moveipr.t'c nolitical campaicei 
throughout the preceding twelve norths. Indeed,the abrupt official 
rejection of the Movement's taie proposals regarding the debating 
role and representative independence of the projected jJuropean 
Assembly was a clear indication that a more radical ^axirarliste 
approach would have received no consideration at ail in an official 
capacity,eo long as Britain regained ?t the centre of decision- 
milking. The weighty pressures of British officinldo-n ; nd orthodox 
cautiousness towards European unification,«) c.outt supported by 
the Scandinavian Governments,were only too evident in this 
final text,vhich stressed above all the precise ministerial controls 
to be exercised over the European Assembly. Article 22 thus drew 
attention to the purely "deliberative" capacity of the Assembly, 
while Article 23 made it dear that the Assembly could not initiate 
any uolicy discussions vhich did not have the orior -nandate or 
approval of the CoTunittee of Ministers. The Assembly itself »more­
over,was to be composed as the national jrovern-nents <lee™ed appro- 
priate(Article 25)and would be subject to a rule requiring a tv'o- 
thirds majority in order for it to submit airy resolution to the./.
I . Communifm6 and Council of Europe Statute,5 .5 .4 9 . ,Keesinrrs 
ConteTTPorarv Archives.vol 7,1949,pp.9973-9975.
./.Ministerial Committee(Article 29). The latter body,on the other 
hand,was not obliged to refer any question to the Assembly. The 
Committee,furthermore,vould have to decide upon all major policy 
matters according to a unanimity rule(Article 20Xvliich in effect 
allowed each Foreign Minister the right to veto important reso­
lutions. The Statute thus appeared to have fended off specific 
dangers of the Assembly getting out of h?nd and of the M i n i s t e r i a l  
C om m ittee  overriding individual national governmental policies, 
this being further underlined by Article I5b,which stated that 
even the recommendations of the Committee as a whole vere not 
legally binding upon any meiber governient.
Nevertheless,despite the considerable restrictions outlined 
?bove as to the scope and procedural independence of the Asssnbly, 
it should be stressed that even this minimal statute vas a re­
markable success in the context of the time,secured by the Euro­
pean Movement only one year after the Hague Congress. All vas far 
frost lost vithin the official framework of the Council of Europe 
Statute as regards the unwritten rights and potential openings 
of the European Assembly. Sandys would soon concentrate,for 
example,on exploiting the provisions in Article 19 ,in vhich tbe 
Ministerial Ccnmittee vas to furnish the Assanbly vith statements 
and documents about its activities,seeing the possibility for 
the future co-evolution of the two bodies in question,and hoping 
to* attain the gradual accountability of the Committee to the 
Assembly.1 Of more immediate significance to the campaign, 
w?s the fact that the general "constitutional problems of ¿European 
union",to which the me-norandum of April 6 had alluded,t'as not a 
subject specifically banned from the Assembly's ngenda,the Mini­
sterial control over the agenda no doubt being seen as a stiff id  art 
guarantee ?gainst any such initiative. - It w s  not a guarantee 
however,since the unanimity rule of the Council of Ministers 
applied only to policy matters and not to procedural decisions, 
which could be taken by a simple majarity(Article 20). Provided 
such a majority of Foreign Idnistcrs could be persuaded to . / .
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./.request, or simply alio»',an opinion of the Assenbly on this
matter, there vas nothing to jrevertt the idea of a future European 
Constitution,or the need for supra-national political links, 
from being officially discussed by the European Assembly. 
Moreover,if a two-thirds majority a”iong the Assembly repre- 
sentaives could indeed be attained,the Council of Ministers 
might subsequently find itself confronted vith an official and 
public resolution in favour of such a policy coramitnent. it vas 
certainly not unrealistic to suppose that a potential majority 
in favour of some sort of supra-national political initiative 
could be secured both in the Assembly and the committee. The 
stumbling block in such a bold project,however,would be at the 
ministerial policy decision-Tiaking stage,where the naticm?i 
veto rule could be applied. In short,a political initiative 
in favour of organic union could be taken vithin the actual 
framei'ork of the Council of Europe Statute,but the real acid- 
test for the success of such an initiative would rest upon the 
final moral pressure vhich an individual government vould be 
prepared to confront in the exercise of its veto. In ¡*ay 1949 
there was still hope that the British Government would not 
react too negatively in this respect,especially if the politi­
cal initiative in Question emerged no longer from an unofficial 
European pressure group,but from the legitimate representatives 
of the European Assenbly. On the l^te" point, in fact, the British 
Government already decided to bow down to the political pres­
sures at home and abroad, and on Hay 5 Herbert Morrison actually 
announced to the House of Commons that British representation 
in the Consultative Assembly would include members of the 
Opposition,to be chosen by the OpDosition itself,thus falling 
into line with the intentions of other meraber-Governments and 
rendearing the European Assembly a parliamentary-representative 
quality,discounting the "democratic" exclusion of Oonrordsts. To 
sum up,the Council of c.’urope project still gave cause for ./.
1. Hansard. 5 .5 .49 . .p-j.iai9-£0. Morrison ad< ed that the British 
delegation vould not include "anti-democratic" neabers.
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. / . great hope and considerable satisfaction,in the context of the 
tine. Above all,the European governments,Britain included,had 
effectively invested a moral and politic?! commitment to the 
European Itt«a,propogated by the European Hovement; it vas nov 
a msttex of finding vays to exploit and expand upon this trans­
national political opening.
The reaction of the European ¡¡oveient to the Statute was 
in this sense one of hope, from the long-term vier.but of thinly- 
veiled disappointment in the iranediate perspective,?s »as reflec­
ted in the communi<ru6 sent to the ten Foreign Ministers immedia-
teiy after the rather tense high-level Executive Committee
2
meeting of May 6-8. The statement stressed.on the one hand, 
ho?-' the European Movement "firmly welcomed" the signing of the 
London aoreement,vhich vas carried out "eractly one year after
V
the Hague Congress", and which "conformed broadly" to the pro­
posals submitted since then. It  also added:
"I f  this opportunity is usee eliice by governments and 
peonies vith courage and a sense of responsibility.it may 
veil be tnat before long there ’till gi'O'f* out of this 
Consultative Assembly the future Parliament of Europe."
In contrast,the same communique went on to «nphasise
that the immediate limitations placed upon the Assembly's
freedom of discussion vere "Dsychologicelly unfortunste and
■nay prove in practice unenforceable." In ordfr to -'void "the
risk of friction" betveen the Assembly and the Ministerial
Committee,the tert menacingly added,the Assembly should be
/  given "considerably vidcr latitude in settling its o^n agenda."
The urgent need to include West Uerm=>ny vithin the Council of
Europe project vas also emphasised,in order to "?void any
disappointment and misunderstanding."
1 . ' Observations u^on the statute of the Council ol -Europe' .
-icco ip?nying paoer( 'P 91) to dnutes below, fcnt out on 
9 .5 . ; 9 . , CASH EKUQGS.
2. European Movement Executive Committee meeting,6-8.5.49-,offi- 
cial minutes(EXAl/l2), CAEM BRUGGE. - Attended chiefly by:
8jmgrS (ChBinr.n)s Uichet, 3ruc'>pns, L*yton, ':-'sc,uin(Vice-CJrinren);
- mltvRetingar(Sc'cret~ries) ,plus representatives of member 
groups and national C j u ' . l . ' .
Tbese faint signs of initial disillusion were not shared
by all. Lord Layton,for example,jubilantly exclaimed in the
subsequent UEM Uevs-Lettei^that the Council of Europe Statute
narked "a landmark in European history...?n iimense step forward."
He in turn cominentedi
"At this moment of its birth it is tore important to 
emphasise its great possibilities iather than its limi­
tations. For the first time representatives of the Parlia­
ments of EuroT>e will meet vith official status and official 
responsibilities. After its first meeting ve should be able 
to judge to vhat eytent and hov rapidly it can develop into 
a Parliament of Europe."
Layton also notified his colleagues that it vould be a
■grave error* to consider the actual formation of the Consul- ^
tative Assembly and the Ministerial Com-ittee as necessarily
"two antagonist organs";they were to be viewed instead as the
two bases for a "future European governnent." He ?lso stressed,
in yet another indication of his considerable ootimis’i in the
project,that little by little the British Government would became
more favourably disposed towards stronger measures of European
integration,once that the Council of Europe had been able to
demonstrate its seriousness of »oproach. However.it would be a
tactical mistake,he argued,to push immediately for "supra-national"
and "constitutional" changes,in the hope of setting up immediate^
2
some sort of European authority.
In strong contrast,the federalists vere completely opposed 
to Layton's policy of prudence,Spinelli taking the lead in the 
EUF Central Committee meeting of May 4-5 to push through a motim 
compiaininc that the restrictions in the statute would mean that 
the Consultative Assembly would be "completely deprived of reel 
pover",and that priority should nov be given to convincing the 
member states of the necessity to set up a "real federal pact" 
in order to achieve an eventual and Effective European Federo-
3
tion. Spinelli repeated the same lesr-age ir. the rJPii nevs./.
1. LAYTOH,;»rtiele in ’JEM He vs Lcttrr. ?io.IJ, . "L-~nr.';erk in ¿urooean 
H istory",.W  1949, ¡¿AiliYS PAPERS.
2. LAYTON,letter to S.-ndys.IS.S.'ty. ,for circulation,SAIIDYa PAPBliS
3. See EUF C.C. meeting,4-5.5.49..official minutes,CBC GENEVA.
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. / . bulletins of May 15 and June 15,in vhich he angrily denounced 
the "timidity" of the European ©vement in not having campaigned 
more strongly for a reel transfer of national sovereign powers, 
adding that it vas now '«are urgent than ever to secure a " federal 
pact" for the establishmentcfa proper democratic European autho­
rity .1 Moreover,he later denounced the Council of Europe as 
being simply a "graiid international salon in which pnrlianen- 
tarians and Ministers spoke without end but -’ Iso without any 
responsibility. The same opinion *-?s errpressed by his radical 
colleague and President of the UUF Central Committee,Henry 
Frenay,who strongly criticised the "destruction" of federalist 
hopes by the strict and mingy limits i-posed on the European
3
Assembly by the British. Bruer!ans,for his prrt.l-'ter recoiled 
the "dangerous concessions" that were necess?ry in the difficult 
process of drawingsaiagreed Statute,adding honestly that the 
result conformed "grosso modo" to the c-xitious e; pectftionc of
4
the European i-lovement.
The centre ground of ooiûion in the Movement with regard 
to the Council of Europe Strtute *'as indeed one of making the 
best out of what ras given. Andre Philip,rbove all,adopted such 
a position,strongly pleading that the policies defended through­
out the European campaign no»' needed to be translated into offi­
cial action vitiiin thé political confines of the European Assembly? 
Similarly,Sandys,prodded on by nackay,set about intensifying 
the efforts to establish a Parliamentary Section of the Movement 
and to hold a preparatory Parliamentary meeting nrior to the 
inaugural session of the European Assembly. In this connection, 
he boldly announced to the press that the European Movement . / .
1. JPIHSLLI, "Letters Federalista liüropa Federata .
1 5 .5 .4 9 .,nlus Drticle in sr ,:e journal,15 .o . .9 . ,entitled 
"Consiglio d'Surooa è un’ -iltcyn^tiva", :arE TDSZlt.
2. SPIHELLI.in Storia e l’rosfettivc del , op.cit. p .16-,.
3. FREIJAY, article in Combat. 'ADcre-nous vers l ’ Europe?' ,15 .5 .49 .
4. EEUG/iANS, L’Idée EuroT>ienne ,op cit. p.I-il.
5. PHILIP,,-article in Populaire Dj nc.’ie . ' Pour l'organisation de
l'Europe fédérée et planifiée',1 5 .5 .49 . See also Philip's 
article in Le Populaire.'L'Assemblée Européenne de Strasbouaf,
4.5.49.
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. / .  vould start to operate as an "international p a r t y ".1 Even
Reynold, for his pert,adnitted that the final Council of Surope
agreement,for Pil its f a u l t s , a t  least "half a victory" for
the original Franco-3 cl gian project initiate«' by the European
2
¿¡ovement. Bonnefous recorded in retrospect,however,that the
political openings for the European Assembly »’ere stunted from
3
the start.
The various shortcomings,as veil as the potential openings, 
of the Council of Europe statute vere analysed in  depth not 
only by the European Movement,but also by the political press. 
The mixed reaction in  the British  press vas rather well
sunmed up by the 'Times’ ,vhich,in a first -account ..stressed
its satisfaction that the Statute did not entitle the Coirmittee
of Ministers to regard itself as a " tiuropean cabinet",nor the 
Consultative Assembly as a ”Europe?« Legislature." Upon deeper 
reflection,hovover,the sane journal anxiously commented:
"Of the tvo bodies the Assembly vill attract the nost
interest. For all its li-idtPtions it vili he,to sone extent,
a Parliament of Europe. Uven without executive or legisla­
tive povers it w in  inevitably be videly regarded as the 
first tentative step towards a f ectr-ral European State, and 
the appetite of its delegates or represor.tntives is likely 
to grov vith eating. In fact, in pnproving the idea of an 
Assembly at all,the ten Sovera~;ents "*oy have gone f-arther 
than they wished - or farther than they Jcne','."5
Similarly,in France,'Le <'ionde' attacked the "weakness" of the
final agree'ent,but then added:
"In the end it is not prohibited to suppose that one day 
the Assembly will be elected by direct suffrage...and that 
it v i n  receive,in certain areas at least,some legislative 
and constitutional powers. "6
X~. See ’ Her: York Her rid Tribune' article,' European Movement to 
fora i party to further its aims', 10 . 5 .4 9 ..plus accompanying 
?apeaCS'-A/76. B£. 9u)to E>;/k I2 .on.clt. on the formation of a 
Parliamentary Section.
2. REYNAUD, Unite or Perish ,o p . cit. ,p .I97.
3. BOiiHEFOUS, L ’ Surooe cn face de son destin .on.cit.pl£0.
I. Times, • Ten-)»o»er meeting on the Council of Europe*, 30.4.49.
5. Times editorial,'council of Europe*, 3 . 5.49.
6. Le Monde.leading article by R. Millet,6.5 .49 . See also edito­
rial, *Le Conseil de l'Burope',in same edition.
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It vas perhaps the socialist 'Hew Statesaan'.however,which best 
expressed both the sense of frustration and the rebounding hopes 
vhich the Council of tlrrope Statute provoked.:
"It is no secret that in. the drafting of the constitution 
of the Council the British delegates were the chief advocates 
of caution. In this respect they have certainly had their 
way. The Assembly is purely consultative,and even its consul­
tative capacity is hedged round with a thicket of restrictions. 
. . . I t  is possible that this restrictive constitution may have 
the opposite effect to that intended. When the Assembly 
gathers for the first time at Strasbourg,till its rae ibers 
be content to be treated as irresponsible children who 
cannot be trusted even to decide the subjects they are to 
debate? We very much doubt it. lîy cribblino and confining 
the Assembly in this vay,Mr. Bevin nay Tell give it that 
e:rplosive,corporate independence of which he seems to be 
afraid.
- It remains for the conclusion of this study to shw 
hirt? these aspirations,widely held also by the mainstream of 
opinion within the European novcnent,failed to materialise into 
political fact during the first crucial sessions of the European 
Consultative Assenbly.
I. Hew Statesman gad Nation , editorial, 'Council of Europe',
14.5.49.
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CHAPTffil  J .  CONCLUSIOH: TH« BCLIP3E OF THE POLITICAL CAMPAIGN
I) The Council of Europe: preparations and first s M s im
The Council of Europe cane into official existence on
August 3 ,1 94 9 ,by which date seven countries had ratified
the Statutejthe remaining three subsequently depositing their
ratifications before the opening session of the Consultative 
2
Assembly on August 10. The inauguration of this unique 
and historic trans-national European political institution 
gave rise to considerable idealistic speculation regarding the 
future of the Assembly. Many papers talked in t e n s  of a future 
■Parliament of Europe.' In England,the 'Observer' went further, 
arguing that the project had meny hidden opportunities,and that 
the long-avaited supra-national pacification of Europe vas now
3
practically at hand. Even the 'Sunday Ti-ies' considered that 
the "moral influence” of the Assembly's public dob-tes "may
4
become appreciable." The ailing but rtaunchly idealistic Léon 
Blum,on the other side of the Channel, similsrly greeted the 
inauguration of the i3uropean Assembly as a "great commence lent", 
draving attention to the " joy*-, "enthusiasm" ^nd "d r e n "  with 
Trhich the just and fraternal org'nisrtion of iJarope had inspired
5
the liberated peoples after the rar. Yet .only one year after 
the start of this great political experiment, the hopes expressed 
in so manj' cuartcrs ?bout the Council of ¿utopc  dvindled into 
a bitter mood of frustration rnd cisencnancment. The seeds of 
a future'European Government and Parlia ient* had given root in­
stead to vhat Boothby later described as a "talking shop in 
Strasbourg."'nd an international bureaucracy "ithout w e r . " ^
The iJuropean dream failed to atcrialise.
I .  Jreat Jrit’ in (2 6 .7 .4 9 ) ,l ta ly (2 3 .7 . f3),î>en’i"rk(X4.7.49^,^or,"’?y 
(a .7 .4 9 ) ,Sweden(lifc. 5. .5^ ,lrel*nrt(I .7 «■ $ ) , ¡>u: c-'bourgfl* .7 .-V9) 
See tCeesinos Contennrarv Archives vol.7 , o p . c i t . ,p . 101- 9. 
France, arigium and i.'etherlauds.ibid.
3. Observer .leading article,7.1 . ‘-9. <>. Su'irtay ¿imes ,7 .E .4 9 .
*>• Le Populaire , 'Un grand commencement', 8 . 8. 46 .
6 . B O O T H B Y ,recollections of a Hebei , (Hutchinson 197Ù),p .2 It .
. / .  It would be a vast over sinnlificrtion ?nd error to state
that the Council of Europe did not achieve very much at ell. It 
did provide t. nost succesful forun for the launching of the 
Sebuman Plan,in May 1950,and for the creation of mecific liuro- 
cean functional agencies. The Council of Hurooe also brought 
into being the European Convention of Human I;i?hts(November 1950), 
followed later by the setting up of a SuroT>ean Court, ¡any other 
tiuro^ean conventions regulating social,economic,cultural,medical, 
ocade-.iCfCO’TOercial»industrial ana trading activities»coniple- 
nentiag OEBC.have been brought about through the channels of 
the Council of -urone as a whole. Above all,the Council of 
tiurope set an historic precedent in trans-national political 
co-ooeration,and in reaching co-'ion underst'W ng "'^t 'nen nations 
It broke the ice existing between Kivnce and Ger^ny;it helped 
reassert Western Burope’ b sense of unity in difficult tines? 
it boosted the psychological *nd moral breakthrough between 
peoples,without which the present-day eArrooean Community could 
not have been built. It did not,hovever, pet in notion the supra­
national political unification of Europe. In short,many limited 
rchievements and valuable precedents vere achieved by the Council 
of EuroDe.but it did not produce any political -iracles.
It is not within the scope of this book to give a detailed 
account of the first sessions of the Council of Europe, on which 
there is already a considerable amount of published material?
The ^resent study is concerned instead in presenting the final 
act of the political campaign brought to birth by the European 
Movement and now carried through irtotte arenacf the Consultative . / .
1. Kor list of initial achieve -entr of the Counci l of .JitroneTsee „ 
anne: x of c.M.de Moltoes.L'Europe de Strasbourg , Oioufldl 197I\
2. »>ee especially; A .12. Kob^tson, vne Council of Tyrone:its Stric­
ture, Functions -^nd Achievements (-tevens ?■: Sons 1961 )pp.81-93;
' ifcropenn Institutions' .  b» srne .n>tnor, (-trvens So-:s 197.) 
pp.: 6-71; l. bormeloxxs, 1 'Surone .j;, r?re de son Destin.op.c-it.. 
np.121-149; Burooe.-’r. Or^pnisationE .(Alien "■ Un'-in I959)pp.I£7_ 
I6o;r>ius two interesting nerson.'i recounts liy ii. ;iae illan, 
Tides of Fortune.on. cit. ,i>r>. 165-227,rnd P.1’.. Spa*.*, The 
Conti’mina D^ttir ,op. cit.,pp.207-££o. —
./.Assembly,during its initial f'nd crucial for-irtive period.
By November 1950. the movement vould be in a state of demise, 
Henry Frenay bitterly Enouncing at the seocrrr.te i3UF sponsored 
■European Council of Vigilance’ (or 'alternative assembly’ ps it 
v? s knovn) that for the preceeding 15 months, starting in August 
1949,the ¿uropean Movement had "fallen into political lethargy", 
having taken "no initiative" and "no action",*nd having proposed 
"no solution" to the problems end «Questions arising out of the 
establishment of the Council of Europe. It v.-.s a just complaint 
vith regard to ro *e of the ’ore unenthusiastic sections vithin 
the unionist carro,but vas far of the nark concerning the T/orlc 
of the Siuropean ikrvement as a whole, «’ ni the Candvs-do rinDted 
Executive Committee in particular, in fact, already on June 17- 
I9,Sandys chaired a crucial meeting at Versailles of the newly- 
formed Parliamentary section and the International Executive
Comittee of the European Hoveierst.in rreoaration for the first
2
session of the Consultative Assembly. The •neetina, attended by 
an impressive number of eminent iiF's,effectively undercut the 
prospects of a separate E?U initiative T-dthin the Buropean 
Assembly. Having practically created a Prrlimentcry Asrf»mbly 
at Strasbourg,the leaders of the Eurooeen ¡¡ove-Tent vere noT- 
intent on establishing an efficient iouthT>iece vithin the Assaiti^ ' 
itself. The results of the Versailles confprence,co?posed of 
nany representatives who uould shortly sit in the ¿urooean 
Assenbly,rchievec just this ,and after having thor oughly ej:a-ii- 
ned previous rrco nendations issued by the European iiove^ent 
r-ince the Hague Congress, a memorandum vas formulated listing 
propositions to be submitted to the Council of Ministers,T'hich 
ware in turn dcfended in the first session of the Consultative
3
Arse-ibly. T!,e ne'lorrndui in <mestion cle-Tly stated that the 
Council of Europe Statute should be interpreted in such 
a vny so as not to "unduly restrict" the freedon of discussion./.
1. FRE:1AY,General POLxJlCAL t o o r t 'to tne H i  liW Congress. 
-tr?sbourg, 17-19.I I . 50. ,pn .31-32, CSC GTTiiVA.
2. Vej's^iDps Conference, 17—19»6» * 9.|See file,oA!lDV!j FAFtmS,
3. Ibid.,plus Executive Committee meeting.1 9 .6 .4 9 ..official
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. / .o f  the Asse ibly and especiplly its Cf>Dr>citv to drpft its ovn 
agenda. In order to leave no doubt to the "indopenedont, 
democratic character of the Assembly",a sencrate Arsenbly Secre­
tariat t’as also recoimended, .’ Iona vith the rrungestion to set up 
permanent Assembly Committees. It was also hoped that by the 
end of the first Session»the Co^-dttee of Ministers vould be 
villing to "consider symne.thetically any p-iendT.ents to the 
Statute vhich the Assembly -nay vish to propose",?ni that such 
aiendnents would be "put into effect without delay." Regarding 
the actual agenda itself,the joint leetin'-’ strongly recommended 
that “at an early st^ge of the Session there should be a debate 
upon the policy of European Union nnd the ?i >is of the Council 
of Europe." Tfis important recommendation went on to propose 
that such a debate should cover,above all,the crucial political 
aspects involved in European Union Ft ?n organic level. The . 
approved resolution read as follows:
"There should be a debate w>on the proble-s of European 
Union £ro"t the political angle and uoor. the practical steps 
to be taken to achieve such union. The scope of this debate 
should make it possible for the Assembly to discuss in 
general ter^s the problems of the creation of supra-national 
European Authorities end the exercise in common of certain 
rights and powers."
There was clearly no case as yet to accuse Sandys and his 
closer colleagues of being over-cautious mcl inactive, the above 
recommendations in favour of a suora-national political initia­
t i v e  being submitted to the first >eetina of the Co-mittee of 
Ministers at Strasbourg on August 8, Plong vith i'mortant propo­
sals ,dra»m up by the European ;iove ient kegpi Co r-ittee, for a 
 ^ Europeem Court and Convention of Hu">r’n r.irhts. *
In the -.leantiTe.nevei-thless.more radical -loves were being •* 
kindled a->ong the federalist otoups. Aitiero ¿¡pinelli in fact 
disclaimed the Versailles -leoting ?.s being "a lot of talk,but 
nothing concrete achieved".c'nd subsequently oiit-bid the . / .
1. Draft Convention,submitted by Tritren.Deioucre,r,nd Marvell 
?yf e, 12.7.*',9. , SAIIDYS PAPERS.
2. SPIIIELLI, diary, 19.6 .'-;9.
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. / . European Movement initiative by persr.uding tlie riUF Central
Conraittee meeting of July 5-6 to re-affirm its policy in favour 
of a direct "European federal Pact" formula. R.w.G. .¡ackay.for 
his part,started to entertain the idea of launching a "federa­
list party" in the Consultative Assembly.^ The inroact of the 
European Movement's parliamentary strategy vas assured,however, 
by the decision of the extraordinary EPU congress,held at Stras­
bourg on July 2-3,to recommend that affiliated groups should 
finally join forces with the Parliamentary Section of the jJu t o -
3
pear. Movement. The net result of this reluctant decision vas 
that a combined force of some tvo-thirds of the representatives 
vho sat at the first Session of the Consultative assembly in
4
August uiere affiliated to the European '¡ove-ient. Hugh Dalton
would as a result complain of the :iovement's uncanny influence
5
in "pulling the strings" in the tiurot>ean Assembly. MacMillan,
later confirmed this observation,recalling above all the
influence of thé Movement's Executive Chairman:
"S^ndys was not appointed a member of this first gethering 
but operated from the offices of the European -¡ove^cnt.
Since a very large number of the ..e~>bers of the Assembly 
were veil known to him,he exercised -uch influence behind 
the scenes,in addition to acting as Chief of Staff to Chur­
ch ill ."6
It must be stressed,howrver, thnt s.'ndys and most of the 
European r<ovement leadership were very cnxious not to monopo­
lise openly the work and political activities of the Consultative 
Assembly. Indeed, the proceeding cairoaign of the mvc lent had been 
consistently in favour of an official and representative Euro­
pean forum for policy discussion,thus elevating the debate on 
the future political structure of ¡iurooe froi the realm o f ./ .
1. EUF CC meetinn, 5-6.7. V9. . official ■âm’tey.CBC GiiJEVA.
2. IIACXAY, letter (for possible subsidies) to A.ksnlc, II . 5.*'(9,
MACtAY PAPERS.
3. SPU Strasbourg Congress.£-¿.7.49., *hesoé tions ,sr>e^ches.'etc. 
CSC GHTSVA.
4. Infortu-.tion in European Executive Bureau meeting,7 .8 .4 9 ., 
official minutes(EX/m/I 4 ) . CAEM BRUGGE.
5. See Dffily Egress article, "Puppets of Churchill",£5.1.49.
6. /iAC.lILIiAü, Tides of Fortune ,on. cit. 165.
. / . unofficial pressure groups to the Practical level of legiti’iPte 
ooliticnl deliberation. Hot all federalists fgi eed vith this 
aooroach, er.visaginr instead sone sort of ¿uroriern ’ Estates 
General ’ • Nevertheless, Sandys ’ firm control over strategy "'as 
once more dominant in the decision taken by the European Movement 
fe-ecutive Bureau , at its meeting in Strasbourg on August 7, 
"not to create an unfavourable reaction a ’ong the members of the 
Assembly by an e-cess of zeal." Instead, the -ovo-'ont vps to 
endeavour to "exercise its influence.not by organised appeals 
to Members of the Assembly, but by nrivrte convers.'tions vith 
Henbers vno are active supporters of the .■¡ovement."'1 Such back­
room activities,in which Srndys ’.t s  nov.r a nroven c: r>crt, vere 
to be co’iole tented,however,by the o^enin" of the ¡ove'<ent, s 
Strasbourg Office near the Assembly,the functions of vrhich vould 
be to offer advice end clericel asristonce to -embers of the 
Assembly rho vere active suooortcrs of the -ovc ne’it, and to help 
the Strasbourg Committee of the r-ioveient to oo'nularise the idea 
of ¿¡uropean union a long the general oublic during the session of 
the Assetbly.^
The European ; ¡ove’.ent ’ s Strasbourg Co-iittee indeed arranged 
an excellent velcome to the first session of the Consultative 
Assembly,vnich vas opened with considerable fanfare on August 10,
1949,and a refreshing ?tiosphere of friendlinesr and good-fill from 
D~ong the local Dopulation gree ted the £uror>can delegates upon 
their arrival in the city. The Aisacc capital vas once norc ’ en 
ffete >,excited crovds awaiting the arrivri of Churchill and other 
fawns t>ersonalities,vhile nearly ever" '.a.jor building ~'?s drar>ed 
in the colours of the twelve nations(Grecce r>nd Turkey having 
been invited to nartaie in the Council,-fter the :iinistera*l 
meeting of August ti). As Sdouard Bonnerov.s.one of the lending 
French delegates to the Arr-e bly,i ©corded:
i . See iv. ii. I-r.on. cr.t.,nius acco T>~nying irn;r( '1*10?). entitled 
’Activities of the ttarooean Hovcr.cnt during the Session of 
the a'uronean Asse ?blv‘ , CJASi; '5RU3U;;.
Ibid.
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"A voluntary rt'Tiosphere very favourable to the Curopean 
idea never ceased dominating the first resfion of the 
Aiseibly ."*
likewise, Lady Rhys-Villia:ns wrote back enthusiastically to her 
U3K colleagues:
"Strasbourg is wonderfully jray,with '¿he flags of Pll the 
nations up everywhere. The green end viiite flag of the liuro- 
pean ¡iove~ent is one of the nost popular ?nd can be seen 
all over the town,including the brck streets. The little  
green button-hole badge of the .¡oveient gleets on the lanels^ 
of the majority of the delegates, ir.dudivg i:. Chu? ch ill1 s.
3ven -'-¡aurice Edel inn of the British Lrbour rertv ‘ '''legation v?s
initially  seduced by the positive European -»t'ios” here,?nd inter
admitted:
"When ve first arrived rt ¿trpsbourg,a city beflpgoec r-nd 
filled with cheering people,one could not help feeling that 
here v/as an idea can able of rally! if rn£ rti Hinting clef enter' 
£urone,for after a.ll one has only to strry in Europe for a 
short ti-e to realise that even those *’ho rre technic?lly 
visitors are,in fact,psychologically v?n^uirhe<~."  -•
The prpcticrl scope for debrte outlined by the Ministerial 
Co r-.ittee meeting of August £, hot-over , fell r,ell belov the lcrvel 
Of events,the proposed agenda for the Assembly being limited 
merely to the study of social,cultural,and restricted economic 
aspects of European co-operation,making no mention of political
4
unification whatsoever. ;¡oreover, the Asse-rbly, meeting for the 
first ti“>e on August 10 under the Provision?! presidency' of 
Edouard Herriot,vas given only tliree dr>ys to reply. After a com­
plex procedural debate in which Paul-Hcnri Snaak,recently relie­
ved of the Belgian Pre-riership r.nd forthwith elccted as the first 
nernanent President of the Consultative Asseibly,appealed for 
"practical" and "disciplined” behaviour,a rrther More <'ubst?ntial 
agenda vis submitted to the Committee on August 13, and was approved 
three days later. The first rnd crv.cirl item -hicli the Asseily./.
1. B0!.T!I3F0US, L 1 Au'one an F.~-ce iJe Goa Uegtin .o p .cit . o .I2 ;
2. Rinrs-WILLXA a . ua-l Ker'Sletter. 'The Assembly Opens'.August 1949, 
SAKDYS PAPERS.
3. tHUXi.iAl;,ree ••'rtide,"The Council of cJurope", in International 
Affa irs . I& 5 I . Vol.XXVIII. ,.o.3 .
4 . joe iCQTisultptiYC A6i;c iblv 0. -_ers o. t.ie Urn'1 , IX . ti ,A>pei- 
aiy I.E.» -il of lAiropeD&p v io a u S I5a •»
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. / .  vas now free to discuss related specifically to the "consideration 
of any necessary changes in the political structure of Europe to 
achieve a greater unity betveen members of the Council of Europe.'1
The historic debate on this vital subject,which took 
place on August 16-17,was one of the most memorable moments 
in the European campaign,and was not surprisingly dominated by 
the major personalities of the European «iove-ient. In two i -nor- 
tant prticles on the eve of this discussiwi , -he veterrm iinxopeen 
cp ipp.ifTner.Leon Elu.-n,h<?d called for a "bold"’heroic"i and "revolu­
tionary" stand,as well as a decn perception of the "fundpuentpl
' 2
problem" of European unification: his fpo.th.Pul lieutenant,Andr^' 
Philip,did not disappoint him on the actual day of the debate. 
Tpicing the lead in demanding a \iodific tion of the Council of 
Our ope Statute ?nd an extension of the powers of the Asse-ibly, 
Philip vas in fact the first speaker to fin-point the centrpl 
issue at stake when he declared:
"It  is i mperative thrt the Co v-iittee of ministers shall 
not nerely be an assembly of diplo -r.ts,v.sinf the rifiht of 
veto vhich h ‘ S ?lre?dy «one too ruch I'.nrra in internrtional 
?sse"".blies for ?ny of us to wish to ir.trooucc it on a 
permanent basis here,but it shall bcco 'e a real politicp.l 
authority rulinr by a majority, tekiiv’ decisions anc effecti­
vely responsible to the oolitic?! Asse-hly rhich "•■e fom  
»ncl which is,sfter ell,the nucleus,rc hone,of vlirt r.'ill 
become a Europep.n P?-rli?ier.t." 3
Likewise,Boothby made whet the 1Gurrdian’ described ps the most
elocuent end constructive speech of the ri'tcrnoon,deploring t!ic
inherent evil of absolute state sovereignty, .*nd passionately
declaring the need for some "joint e  ercise" of Eovereicm po'v'a’S
4
Pt a ciurot>ean level within the Council of ¿¡urope 'raier/ork. Even 
Harold ¡¡.-exilian ras less cautious than usual,and exclaimed:
1. See Consultative Assembly 1st Session kenortr .political de­
bate 16-17.fc.49. , d p . 1^2-328.
2. BLUM,articles in l»e Pppulaire ,"Un Grand Cogence ■’ent” B.t.'.S. 
op. cit.,Plus "Frire L* Europe Bn ronsant Au .ionde" 10.6.<19.
3. PHILIP.C.A. Report,on. cit. pp.I'k-I-V4.
4 .800THBY,ibid., op.170-174 .plus Kecollections of t Kebel ,oo. 
c it .,op.217-216.
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"The Governments hfve given us a constitution. Lot us build 
upon it . The Committee of Ministers is a ¿uronean Cabinet 
in embryo. The Consultative Assenbly is a European Parliament 
in embryo. This constitution can be m^dc nore flerible and 
tore effective ."*
Paul Bastid went still further on this point,r.nd demanded an
2
"immediate" European executive,legislature and judiciary. On
a more cautious note,however,Lord Layton appealed for restraint,
stressing that he vas not committed to any federal solution at
3
this early stage. Morrison,as leader of the British Labour 
delegation,in turn proposed a "functional” rather than a feôeral
4
organisation of Europe. Subsequently Churchill,who ft the opening 
of the session had been one of the fiercest defenders of the 
Assembly's autonomy,now somevnat disappointed his more radical 
European colleagues in the cha-’ber by refusing to conit  himself 
as yet to any specific political unification strategy,stating 
rather blandly with regard to European unity:"rfe must look at 
the girl before we narry her.” He further added:
” ..ve  must not attempt on our present electoral basis to 
change the powers which belong to the duly constituted natio­
nal Parliaments founded directly uoon universal suffrage."5
-As Labour's International Secretary,Dennis Healev,later reported
to his colleagues at Transport House," y .  Churchill’ s specch r?s
6
~uch nore subdued than erpected." In strong contrast,the veteran 
•constitution mongerer' .K.tf.CJ. .lackay,sitting somewhat uncomfor­
tably with the British Labour delegation,wound up the debate on 
the following uncompromising federal note:
"We are here in a great erperiment. The future of Western 
Europe will be deter lined by the actions ve take...I ask the 
Assembly to turn its back on the old conceptions of political 
sovereignty,on the old conceptions of anarchy between . / .





6. HEAL Si, confidential report on the first s»..sion of the Consu­
ltative Asse;nbly(IO - £„.b.49) for the Lrbour P-Tty Internatio­
nal Committee, i-ABOUT; PASTY Ai: CHIVES.
- L V ~
. / . independent states of Europe, and to its courane in its
h a n d s ...I  ask that re should,at the sane time,dcciare that 
ve shall secure a United Stotes of -iurone .->nd the ncr<Ting of 
individual sovereignties so as to brin^ about a noliticr.i 
union on which alone the future well-being ?nd prosperity 
of our great European civilisation depends." x
Thus,despite some cautious runblinas of dissent by Lobour, 
and soie less than co 'flitted pronouncements by L?vton '.nd Chur- 
chill(the latter conccsitrsting on the need far  Germany's invol­
vement), this first msjor r>olitic?l debate in the Consultative 
Acse-nbly was distinguished by the ovrrt majority of opinion in 
favour of sort sort of European feder?l structure. As n rather 
opti-.istic Federal Union report co •wonted:"it is not stirprising 
that federation vas the centre of discusrion. As fnr ^s can be 
seen no delegate said that ve -rust not federate."4 A more objec­
tive ?sses-nent of this opening scone rt strnsbourg in the su-mer 
of 1949 vas given so-te years lrter by a le»<Hng expert on the 
Council of Europe,who clei-ied:
"It  is probably no er.aggeration to say that -nraiy of the 
original Representatives to the Asseibly believed ihft it 
t’.'s theix t.-'Sk to crente 'ccono-ic rni political union* t’hich 
they had voted for the previous yerr rt The H,-rue,->nd that 
the function of the Council of Juro^e tvs .•’lmost that of a 
constituent asse ibly." 5
This point vas also taken up by the 'Times' vhich,in the
rake of the August 16 debate,co^-mented:"It is difficult to see 
vhat purpose the Assembly can serve if  it is not to prepare the
4
ray for so-ne Jcind of federation«" On a -lore draiatic note,the 
'Manchester Wiaruian' urged that "the federation of ¡¿uroce mrt 
be realised rt the first attenot.or the iden mst be abandoned 
for a long time."^ After the debate,in 1 act,the crucial issue of 
"necessary changes in the political structure of Jurope" vas re­
ferred by the Assembly to a nerrly-co:istituted ' Uoinittee on . / .
I .  HACtAY, C. k . Rnport.op. ci t . , ,>n.«.6b—i.oi,.
2• ' rJhe Council of iJxjroT'C,Str<,s,>OTg"<7 19' ^ti-'istorv ¿'nd Conent 
froi a f ederalist m o le '.Federal Union 7 er»ort, October I9- 9, 
¡.ACkAY i-AF3iS,
3. A .H . kobertson,' i’he Council of J r o i e '.o*i. c i t .,p .6 3 .
4 . x'i-es .leading article, 1 7 . 4 3 .
5. Manchester Ouardian ,I7.fc.‘V9.
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. /.General Affairs' (ie . Political Co-’ ’itteo) , t hicli vas to present 
its recommendations on the subject back to the Assembly 
on September 2. The Committee,choired by Didrult and vith Guy 
Kollet as Rapporteur .received £4 different dto 'doscI s , including 
a key motion sub-nit ted by .ackay suggesting that a democratic 
European Federation should be established , ?nd that a Conrnissi*. 
should be set up to drr-'ft a constitution. Another -notion,pro­
posed by Schuman and Bidoult called for the cre?tion of a 
"European political authority vith limited but re?l powersr
Finally,iiacMillan actually put his name to tvo notions,one calling 
for a conference in order to decide the e> ecutive por/ers i.’hich 
should be conferred to the Committee of Ministers(submitted 
also by Boothby,Maxvell Fyf e ,e t c .) tand •'nouher proposing an 
Amendment to the Council of Europe Statute in order that the 
"Committee of Ministers shall be an «ecutive  authority with 
supra-national powers."1
The evident departure irom a normally ->ore restrained 
European posture by the above Conservative rer>resentstives 
of the British unionist camp vas a sharp indication of the 
coipelling atmosphere at Strasbourg to achieve some sort of 
authoritative supra-national breakthrough vri thin the Council 
of Europe framework,in this its first session. .*acilill?.n,Boothfcy 
and ¡layvell Fyfe were,however , tracing considerable ris'cs in 
vier of the less than positive attitude of the British Conserva­
tive Prrty towards an effective -la'onear. co--.it-!ent(a subject 
to vhich we shall turn again shortly). Churchill, in this sense, 
pj oved to be -ruch more evasive in his vropean policy pronounce­
ments in the Consultative Arre bly debate, though he v?s nlso 
c?reful not to go against the spirit of the occasion,and 
did not therefore completely close the door to future federal 
possibilities. As Boothby later remarked •-’bout Churchill’ s . / .
I . See A.H . 3iobertson,op. cit. o.C-;,p1us C.A. Report ,ou .cit., 
pp.22^-326
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. / .  perceived coumitnent a.t Strasbourg to a united Europe:"He refused
to be drawn. All he said vas f'We are not laJcing a rechine,ve are
growing a living plant’ ."^  La.bour SDokes'au,-•murice Bdel >ontdes—
cribed the Tory leader’s predicament in other ray,dryly noting
one year afterwards : "Rather coyly the Conservative Delegation did
not state specifically in 1949,as it woulrl do later in 1950,that
2
it was not a supporter of a federal solution for Hurone." It 
was indeed evident,in the heady Strasbourg a tmo sphere, that es fart
of the European ¡tove~ient, the unionist :>>e ibers of the Conservative 
Delegation needed,et le^st in this cirrt seErion,to demonstrate 
their apparent etarorean nrovess in face of Lrboitr’ s isolate«! 
policy of reluctance. It was rccin Denis He,-lea' t ho clearly ob­
served thè ftill significance of this ritu'tion '••hen he noted:
"It  would be a listaJce to regard the Suro^ean ¡¡ove->ent 
simply as the tool of the British Conservative P-rty...
It vould be truer to say that the British Conr.’-: votive 
Party dishonestly identifies itself vith the Su^o^ean 
Movement for the sake of the latter’ s international 
influence.’’^
The Suronean l-iove^ cnt was indeed iort "ctivc at Strasbourg, 
both in its sponsorship of parlirientary initiatives and in its 
nore public efforts to sustain ooouiar orinion behind the Euro­
pean ca-ipaign. It was in this content U rt  Healey further obser­
ved that,whereas his Labour Party col? p?nucs(«flclcey ar>rs t)had 
brought no "concrete prorosals"to Strasbourg,the Eiuronean iiove- 
successfvilly circulated "detailed policies" *-hich it had forrnu- 
lated during the previous twelve -’.onths. "These Policies", Healey 
continued to report,"can rely in Avance or, the rumo: t of half 
the Assembly. Consequently disewsion or. every issue tends to 
base itself round the proposals of the Jitronem iovc'ent." He
m
in turn concl\tded that "the Assembly te^df-i to behave --s an
£
instrument of the iiurot>ean ■ ¡ove’ent. " Similarly, ; lac U l a n , . / .
1. See Boothbv,Recollections of t Rebel , o^.cit. ,p .217.
2. SDi’LiAil,article,on. cit.,r>.25.
2. IISALEY,report on Consultative Assembly,o p . cit.
4 . Ibid.
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./.fo r  his part,recorded that "behind the scenes Duncan Sandvs 
continued to pull the strings." The Hove-nent ?s a *'hole,"iore- 
over.dre*' Tuch popular support at the i-nense public relly which 
vas organised in the 'Place Xieber' on the '••vening of Auoust 12, 
attended by an estimated 20,000 people rnd addressed by Spaak, 
Churchill,Keynaud.Brugnans and others.* The European campaign 
had reached the height of'its activity anc appeal.
The practical initiatives at hand,ho-;.ever,were rt first
something of a let down,Quy Mollet presentino s rather pallid
coTipro’nise formula on September 5 ,as rapporteur of the General
Affairs Co-nnit tee, reco Trending no i "mediate specific changes in
the political structure of Europe, iievertheless,the Assembly in
turn brushed aside this apparent attempt to reconcile British
Governmental opinion, and strongly rallied to a bold a imend'nertt
to the report,tabled by Mackay and Philip,rhich stated that "the
aim and coal of the Council of Surooe is the creation of a Euro-
3
pean political authority vith linited functions but real powers." 
The General Affp.irs Com-iittee vas su.bref'uer.tly instructed to 
continue its study according to che above formula,and make some 
defiliate recowendations on the subject in time for the second 
session in 1950. The Aisenbly,in addition,rub-.itted a long list 
of recommendations to the Co’mi t tee of Ministers for amend-r.ents 
to the Council of fiurope Statute designed to increase the powers 
and independence of the former body vis-à-vis the latter. These
proposed amendments urged that nev- ’te-ibers of the Council of
Europe must be approved by the Asrembly;that the Ar.se-ibly must 
be e-rwered to fix its own agenda indepenedc-ntly of the Mini­
sterial Committee; that the number of representatives should be
4
doubled,etc. Following a lively economic debate on August Si- 
23, in which Reynaud ?.ade a strong federrtion speech, the Assembly 
also presented the Cormittee of dulsters ’^ith a series of . / .
X. iiac.ilLLAtf, Tides of Fortune , op. cit. ,r>.I7(j.
2. Ib id ., pp. 17 r— t, pi us Bonnefous, L ’ c.'uro'ic -in r'^ce De Con Pestin
oo .cit .,p .I23 .
3« C.A. DOCU.uErjj 1949. no .173 .Official Report. !5. y.-*9. ,dt>. 10 2-c. 
Ibid.
U-M -
. / .  econo-nic resolutions r'llovinn the Council of iiurope to encroach 
to a large and official extent on the rork of the 0E3C. 1 Finally, 
after another long and dramatic debate,in vhich Teitgen appealed 
as a former inmate of Buchenwald to reject the ior*lity of 1'*y 
Country Eight or Wrong',the Assembly further referred a formal 
proposal to the Committee of -’ iinisters calling for the European 
¡-lavement sponsored C/iarter of Human eights.
Thus,despite the supposedly low-key profile of the European 
'¡ove”ient,the overall success at the first session of the Stras­
bourg Assembly seemedmost impressive.In adjourning the session 
on September 9,Spaak indeed declared that the delegates had 
succeeded in making the Consultative Asse.ibly ’’the first Parlia- 
-ient of iiurope" He then added:
"I came here with the conviction that a United States of 
Europe is necessary. I leave t.-ith the certainty that a United 
States of Europe is possible."3
This effectively summed up the optimistic -tood vith which "iost 
delegates left Strasbourg. There vas no ■istaking the feeling 
that they were now actually '"taking Surone' . The prestige of the 
Assembly,Brugmans has recorded,t/?s "immense” during the Autumn of
4
1949,and the "decisive coup" w s  now expected. Raymond Silva
similarly looked to the Assembly in the hope that it would
"have the final voice” in the official European debate, ¡«ackay,
however,though still optimistic,could not completely conceal his
fear and disappointment over the lack of clarification on the
vital political issue at stake,and vpcnMs return home he confided:
"In one sense Strasbourg justified itself by merely 
surviving.lt fas something never before attempted in 
history.. .  The issue of vhether t/e '»'ant a European 
Federal Parliament has yet to be decided;but if re do 
want to do it ,it  can be done."^
I . C.A. Doc. lio.s 71—7y« 2 .C.A. h o c . ilo.IOfc.
3. SPAAH. C.A. Reports.adjournment of 1st Session,6-9.9.49 .pp1326-30
4. BEUG-iAKS, L'ld^e Europcenne ,op. cit. n.I»r4.
5. SILVA, Journal de Gendvo ,II .IC .49 .
6. liACKAY.Fabian Tract no»260. ’The Strasbourg Assembly*. See
article in Federal News. • European Union - Vhere does 
it stand now*,December 1949.
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Hackay’ s transparent unease t ith. the und<irlying oolitic?l 
situation vas veil founded, rhe first session of the 
Consultative Assembly had convincingly demonstrated that the 
majority of delegates were favourable to federation plans,^nd that 
they had certainly raised the level of the European c.-rrpaign to 
an important height, but the specific "coup" torards an effective 
organic European Union hid ’been somewhat listed over. The need 
to placate sceptical and bostile opinion in British circles,as 
well as ia Scandinavia,had clearly pl-ced a damper on the 
otherwise enthusiastic mood to fro ahead tith a more rndical 
and immediate plan. Quy iollet,es the key personality-in the 
General Affairs Conrdttee had,in tnis sense,rtriven to retain a 
rather vague formula,and vas determined not to split ranks with 
labour or cause divisions betvecn the continent --nd Britain as 
a vhole over European unity .1 The British establishment press, 
in turn,gave reason to this cautious strategy,the ’Dniiy Tele­
graph’ stressing its satisfaction *.’ith the fact that the Assenbly2
had not tried to set itself up against the national Covernnents, 
vhile the •Times’ fam ed  against r>ny misconceived European cru-
3
sade. The blunt result of the Assembly’ s *ork,in  this context, 
vas later summed up by the ’Observer’ s ’ reoresentrtive at Stras­
bourg p s  follows:
"It  did not - this should be frankly confosred - change 
the political face of Uurope. It hod no power to do so. It 
did not even ask that any i 'mediate sacrifice of sovereignty 
should be nade by member governments. All it  could do ^as 
to reco'Tmend.but even its recommendations pronosed nothing 
that would affect .. .the complete freedom,in practice,. Of 
governments to set exactly as they nlersed."4
Li-on Blum ^as even more brutc.1 in his appraisal,rnd declared that
the Assembly lacked the "'.'ill" to lorge ?i>eadj the first session
rr>s "not a triumph" for ¿¿urooe.it t.p.s not the "rrrert commences err’
5
th.it had been ei-pectod.
I . see He?ley report.o p . cit.
Hailv Telegraoh .leading nrticle,<:.9.‘>9.
Times , leading article ,10 .9 .4 9 .
4 .  See S.stranne, ’ Strasbourg in ttetrorpect1 >uad A&4rsg!Dtv3\V».? 21
5. BLUM,article in Le Poouiaire ,"L e  bils" ce str-e.sboi'ra", 6er>t
" ilVJ.
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2) Tovards g Buror»e?r. Politic*! i.w
For fll its specific weaknesses, the political nrogranme 
issued by the Consultative Assembly h?£ , all the sane, oFficirlly 
called for so-ne sort of ,'Euror>er'n political ••'UthoriTy" \-ith effec­
tive rcrc/er. The supra-nition^l profile to the Buronem political 
caiapaiçm remained a live issue. Indeed, on the eve of the Consul­
tative Assembly's finnl formulation on the subject, the Eyocutivc 
Cot  ?ittee of the European i ¡ove^ent hr.d "'ctrualTy considered the 
possibility of asking recommendations regarding the creation of a 
political authority vithin the Council of Europe framework. No 
formal initiative vas taken,however,in viev of the debate which 
vas about to take place in the Assembly itself on September 5 .1 
Frenay later explained to his 2UF colle.-x^urs fiat it vrs fro™ 
fais tine onw?-ds that the Burope?n ;iove->ent, writer S.-'ndys.chose
to become the ’’Rrrière-iJ^rde" rather than the "r.vnnt-g^rde" of
2
the European idea. He chose not to ’er.tion, ho^fver.llHt during this 
very period tvo important rorkine documents ~e'e circulated to 
the E-ecutive Conurittee, both positively endorsing the need to 
pursue the idea of establishing a European politicrl authority, 
vhile President Spaak.in winding up the work of the Consultative 
Assembly,called upon the European ¡ovement for future help and
3
guidance in the official c*"ip?-ign. The first of the documents
in ouestion,drrvn up by the European -lovèrent ^ecretcriet ,clearly
indicpted the connected role of the ..overoent to the evolving
political progra-me of the Assembly :
"At »11 its conferences the <ovo-ent Itrs e-Phnsised tlie 
necessity for the creation of a European Suorn-!!ation?l 
Political Authority.. . The establishment of the Council of 
Eurooe,despite its purely consultative c^ocity,represents 
f first iTport?nt rtep, and provides t!ie fmvulntion mit of 
-hich there ’tust prorrerrively Ke ovolvot .-;n institution 
possessing re?l pover. " 4
I . ihtropean .love lent E-ecv.tive Co ’ -it.cc »c tin;;, 3-4.-5 9 . ,  
officiel '.inutes(£</>■ 15) . CAE.i nr.U'r:,i.
1. FKa:iAY.EUF report, I7-I9. I I .  50. »o^«gf t.
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.. AccoTpp.nying pgpegTfaA./Pl 1'i'ta ■ ■i.TTTop.cit.
The second docunent in euer.tio’i,dr.-”vn ”t> >>y 3-ndys himself, 
vent still further, and. actually outlined r nronrpmme of action 
for the eventual attainment of the oolitic*! authority at 
irsue. The circular vas appropriately entitled:'Creation Of 
A European Supra-National Politicrl Authoiitv. Some Personal 
Thoughts Upon The Possible Future Evolution Of The Council uF 
Europe,By Duncan Sandys.' The contents of this important 
memorandum corresponded precisely to the description in the 
title. It  was,without doubt,the most informative ?nd the nost 
reflective account written by Srndys on the subject throughout 
the vhole of the European canto rign.
The actual strategical clue to the document as a T.'hole 
cane towards the end,where Sc-ndys succinctly stated that the 
Council of Europe should "transform itself imperceptibly" at 
first,only after thich should this factual transformation be 
given "formal constitutional er-presiiom." In other vords,his 
rcheme t ps based on an e-*>irical political approach,as o t ’ofed 
to a direct constitution«'! strateriy. The sunra-n»tion?l fool 
*nd coTsmitnent vhich he had in mind, ho? ever,vere left in no 
doubt,and in this sense the paper provides a Powerful documen­
tary refutation of the federalist T*yth,fliich till this day '• 
still erists,th?t Sandys never j.ntended to po beyond inter­
governmental or purely co-operative ” odes of European integra­
tion. Indeed,right from the start of the memorandum,Srndys 
clearly drer1 attention to the supra-n?tionrj. ide?l which he 
had in mind,by exclaiming:
"Almost every measure for the closer unification of the 
Suropean States,in both economic rnd social snheres, involves 
decisions of a political character. It is clear,therefore, 
that before any far-reachin<i wo'Tress can be made to'ajds 
the realisation of this aim,there aist be created in some 
form or another a Buropean Political Authority,cenaMe of 
for—ulstinn and ereev.tine ? truly ¿Juronean policy designec 
to serve,not the seoarete interests of the component states, 
but the interests of Europe ?.s a v,hole."
- I*bt "
I .  S ,y p /I4 . rccoipairyina paper to B1_K_I5, o p . cit.,CASli )5R\k;C^.
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In terms reminiscent of his lono dcscriDtive letter to the
I
'Tines' one year previously,S.-ndys ”'ent on to present Iris case 
in stressing the gradual and pm g .'atic strategy by which the 
"European Political Authority" sought would be achieved only 
tliinui*i"aruiter of intermediate ste^s" and by "successive stages" 
in the evolution of the Council of JSurope as it actually stood. 
His plan,in short,vas based u«on a sage and complementary co­
development of the Consultative Assembly m d ■ inisterial Commit- 
tee in gaining more and more legislative and executive rights and 
responsibilities. The initial stage in this scheme rested unon 
the Assembly first acquiring official independence fron govern­
mental control,and the freedom to discuss all atters of imnor- 
tance(excluding defence)upon its ovn initiative. This battle, 
currently in progress,had to be won,however,within the limits 
of the Assembly’ s legitimate consultative functions. Indeed 
Srndys "-ent on to argue:
"At the present stage it T’ould be unrealistic for the 
Assembly to ci.~ir> leoisi.ative or c  eev.tive DO'-ers, and, . . 
i f  it d id .it  vculd certainly nave no hone of obtaining 
the anoroval of governments, fro it vhom alone such powers 
could be derived. Thus,for the i mediate future,it -Tust 
be accepted that the sole constitutional function of the 
Assembly vill be to make reco^cndrtions to the Committee 
of Ministers."
He now came to his crucial point of priority. - Once that the 
Arseibly had asserted its deliberative indcnendence,which it 
was in the process of doing.it vos necessary to ensure that its 
consultative status vis-\-vis the Ministerial Co•’mitl.ee should 
be fully recognised i-nd develooed,which in turn me.mt that the 
Committee itself needed to be in the position to request and 
receive recommendations from the Assembly on specific issues 
of incrersir.g political imoortaorice *nd relevance,’••ithout actually 
disregarding the official ¡»tatute. ;:-e thus concluded:
" . .s o  long be the Committee of inisters itself has no 
t>over,the Assembly rill  hcve no norcr either. On the other 
hand,to the ertent that the Co-.’ittee of arristorsjin i t s i/r>
1. c K  p. 3C^fc
”  l'iti» “
./.co llective  capacity, acouirrs: "over,the Assembly,as its 
idvisor,wiii acouire it also. The objective mist therefore 
be to build up the corporate strength and extend tne com­
petence of the Committee of ¡¡inirters."
In contrast^iovevex, to the purely inter-govern-iental v i e w  of
European integration,he then emphasised the need to push the
■ iinisterial Co^T.ittee towards a joint-collective role at a truly
European level:
" ..s in c e  th(ì Co-imittee is composed of leading -dnisters... 
it is clearly cap able, provided there is agrecrment a-mong its 
’iembers,of deciding anything and !~verything vi thin the 
collective competence of the participating states...
Any disposition to look upon t'ie CoTittee  of -iiiisters 
as nothing more than a fonrn for the cchange of views 
between governments upon ¡¿ur-onean problems ~ust be ener­
getically resisted. Fro- the rtaxt the Co~ mittee of lini- 
sters "rust be regarded as an instrument for action.
. . . i t  must be clenrly established tliat the function of 
the CoTnittee of Ministers is not confined to the passive 
role of considerine opinions rnd reco nendations of the 
Assembly and of passing on those of which it approves to 
the Governments of the partecipatine States. The principle 
nust.on the contrary,be accepted that the Coit-.ittee of 
Ministras has a collective responsibility for initiating 
positive action to promote the unity of Surope."
With an eye to the evolutionary nr- Litre of the unwritten British 
Constitution,Snndys in turn developed the central idea of corning 
ministerial "collective responsibility" into collective "accoun­
tability" vis-à-vis the Assembly, v/hose sovereign-democratic role 
and status would,as a result.be gradually registered and respec- 
ted.without the need for any prior juridical agreement:
"..having  secured for the Comdttee of iiinisters an active 
and "uasi executive role,steps must be taken to establish, 
in practice if  not in principle,the responsibility and 
accountability of the Co™ -ittee to the Asrembly. In short, 
a relationship nust be developed between the Committee of 
Ministers and the Consultative Assembly resenblinp as far 
as possible the relationship between a democratic parliament 
and its govern-ient."
Thus,contrary to the negative and over-cautious label vhich
federalist writers and historians h.ive a.tte-roted to pin on Sand>^
at this crucial juncture of the ¡European cmnnainn he did indeed
•A
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' propose a for-rula vhich both advocated the ideal of a. democratic 
'European Supra-National Political Authority',vhile rt the same 
appeared to offer a realistic means of achieving this goal. His 
strategy was based essentially on a system of conventions and 
precedents,rather than according to a strict constitution?! 
treaty which,vhile Britain res still regarded .’ s the king-nin 
to European unity,had no possible chance of gaining official 
support. Hence,Ssndys initial reliance on the "snirit of co­
operation" , out of vhich he hoped would grow ?n effective supra­
national co-indentification of authority and accountability’ 
between the Ministerial Contmittee and the Assembly. On this 
crucial evolutionary point,he v-ent on to nrescribe a specific 
method of action by advocating that "snecial attention" should 
be paid to Article 19 of the Council of Europe Statute,rhich 
provided that "at each session of the Consultative Assembly 
the Committee of Ministers was to furnish the Assetbly "ith  
state-'ents of its activities accomanied by auproTiriate docu­
mentation.* It  was a shrewd observation by Sandys ,i'ho,oointing 
to the Committee's failure to comply to this rule in the first 
session, strongly suggested that this " -ust certainly not be 
allowed to become a Precedent for future serrir>ns",.-nd that it 
vs.s "upon the implementation of the letter rml spirit of Article 
19 that the successful development of tne relationship betveen 
the Committee and the Asreibly rill  l=rgeley deDOnd." Drawing 
attention to the potential and "-ost important" scrutiny system 
vhich the Assembly right therefore achieve *‘ith re^ard to the 
■work of the Ministerial Coti 1ittee, he further emhasised the 
existing rights of Ministers to intervene in the discussions of 
the Assembly. This privilege, he advocated, "should not be one­
sided" ;: iinisters should also be asked to attend x-hei.for e :T ’Hie, 
their statements and policies verc unicrr iiscusrion. He in turn 
induced:
I .  Cf. pAtl.
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"The close contact which rill be est,"hiished between the 
Assembly and the Comittee of :inistcvs tirrounh these various 
channels »'ill indirectly produce t'.'o very i-mortant results. 
First,the members of the Co—iittee of inisters.rhen faced 
vith the task of orer>aring the joint statements of oolicy 
to be iade to the Acsenbly,riii find theT-elves obliged to 
reach agreement among themselves UT>on a e n v o i  line of action. 
That in itself is very i-n>ortant. Secondly the Co 'iittee of 
Hinisters,desiring naturally to avoid miblic criticism,l'il! 
be stimulated to go to the ut -ost limits of that which is 
nossible.in order to satisfy the reasonable virhes ’ nd 
aspirations of the powerful body of ¡¿uroean opinion ret)re­
sented in the Assembly."
To conclude,Sandys therefore looked to a Trill el" orovth in the 
influence and authority of both political institutions repre­
sented in the Council of Europe framework,resulting in a united 
and democratic supra-national body which could in turn be offi­
cially recognised as such:
"..th ere  -win grov up in practice p. relationship between 
the Assembly and the Committee of iiinisters in n?jiy resDects 
si îilar to that which normally c  ists bet', e m  a parli^ -ent 
and a government. 3y this process the Cou-.cil of iSi-ro^ e, 
whilst still on P2r>er possessing no nowers,-,?y,rithin a 
coaparitively snort tine, transform itsoif i noercentibly 
into something which for all practical tutnoses rill be 
a European Sunra-na.tional ro litic ;l  Authority. It \ ill then 
be tine for the States concerned to consider whether it is 
desirable to give fo n a l  constitutional e ^resrion to that 
rhich in Practice has already c o ’e to e i s t . "
The vital political dénouement vithiii the Executive Co-nittec 
of the European 'ovement in favour of (’Stablichirg a ¡¿uroneon 
Supra-National Political Authority' had thus commenced,with Sr.ndys 
taking the lead. The final formula of the Movement,however, 
which upon Mollet*5 official request vould be communicated to 
the Strasbourg General Affairs Committee in January I950,was far 
from settled. Sandys* proposals vere in earnest and w e  meant for 
serious considération,■;rhich c m  be judged. by the fact that he 
circulated then not only within the close cnrr>s of the 3;:ecutive 
Co-nmittee,but also a ’Ong potentially hostile nrov.ns rithin h is ./ .
- t+uH-
./.o^.'n raxty,despite his pending re-clcctio’L to Farlia-irnt. The 
UEii Newsletters also nave "ublic covcrcrrc to his üurooean 
convictions in this natter. The strategy he advocateel,hov;ever, 
can be seen vith the benefit of hindsight to have -elied unon 
tt/o false ascriptions.-First,by erphasiring the effective van­
guard role of the Committee of dnisters in the gradual develop­
ment of "collective responsibility", Srncys Placed too ^uch 
dependence on the good-vili of national "overrun ents involved, 
and on their readiness to "naturally '•void nv.blic criticism ."
He thought that the Asrembly.by being urrctical and reasonable, 
v>ould retain  sufficient rmblic confidence and n oliticnl resnect 
so r.s to ensure a reciprocal noritive reaction ~nd understanding 
from the cart of the M inisters. The folio-dug ’onths in the 
European c? ,paicm vould prove, hor'i-vc r , t?*at the Tritir.h Govern­
ment in  particular.and it s  representatives rt £ir n£baurg,“,ere 
fuite  nreoared to run the risk  of tmoo'jv.i.-rity in ¿uror>e,'c/ith 
the knowledge that their E u r o 'e i : policy '  ov.ld : \o  longer be 
effectively  challenged by the Conservatives ?t home.“ Secondly, 
in  order for h is  corporate "o ara lle l" develop >ent to i!ork,!’.ot 
only did the Co v~.ittee of -¡inistcrs have to .•'¿opt a collective 
Pro file ,so  too did the Assenbly it s e l f . It  is  true that at the 
f irs t  session "icury Arreibly representatives snorted the Uuronern 
Move-ent badge and displayed a convinci ng -ajority mooo in  
favour of so-.e sort of sur>r?-nation*l political rtructure for 
iiurope. Ho’ 'ever,the "federal" majority had allo’ 'cd the iwnent 
to pass,and by the t i ’ne that the Acre Vbly ~’r\s nert convened , in 
August 1950, the "fu n c t io n a iirts ", dvoc-ti".r only l ifte d  sectoral 
integration.would be in  the oscendence, -” tC the Ar.senbly far  frcr\ 
united. The unforeseen Schuman Plan of Ha_^  1950 vould indeed give 
an -imer-nected jolt towards functionalist, -ct, already in  Septem­
ber 1949, the cautious French ranoo' teur to the funeral A ffairs  
Co m ittee , i<)llet, sent out a ■Han to his fellow co n itte e  -nanbers 
in  vhich he posed the Question vhether the "functional" or
I . Of • p .4 ’i^j  ^ .
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. / .  "federal" approach to ¿uroper'n union mould, in the final eve“>t, 
be supported.1 In short, the signs of a m iit  in the Assembly, ■“'nd 
a potential diversion of the hitherto political e -phasis in the 
iiuropean campaign,were already on the enrds.
To be fair to Sandys,however,he did somewhat optimistical^ 
plead to iiac.!illfn,in receipt from the latter of iollet’s 
dangerous opening meiorandum,that there vas no fundanental 
contradiction between the two approaches, r^,d he i ’sneuiately 
tried to defuse this potential underlining oi' his ow. unity of 
action strategy vith the foil w ing most illuminating frjrunent:
"I consider that it would be most unfortunate and nuite 
unnecessary at this stage for your Co i 'ittee to '’o out of 
its way to divide people into federalists or non-federalists.
. ..Anong those who sincerely var.t to vork for closer union, 
tr.ere are some vho prefer to talk rbout the ultimate ideal, 
na tely Federation, and others rho prefer to ciscusr the nc^t
i mediate and practical steps. A-ong the so-called Federalist? 
there are none with cny emerience or sense of. responsibility 
"-’ho would be prepared to advocrte a Federation today. Whilst 
a nong those who do not proclaim thenselves Federalists there 
are few who would altogether e: elude the posribility of 
Federation as an ultimate solution in future circumstances 
which cannot at present be foreseen. It is,in  fact.nore a 
nuestion of teTPera^ent and vocabulary than of my fundamental 
difference."
In the same urgent tone,he added:
"In fact both federalists and so-called unionists want to 
go forward and recognise that the ultimate goal .whatever it 
nay be, cannot be reached in a single giant stride,and that 
intermediate steps are necessary. ^ot:i <r ouPS(if they can 
be described as groups)?re r,uite unclear in theix ov'n minds 
as to what these next inter mediate steps should be. If only 
they will study the problen together,I am convinced that the;, 
rould be able at each successive stage to agree upon the ne't 
i-iedinte step to be taken. If,on the other hand,they try 
here and nor; to define in precise detail the final objective, 
they are bound to break up in confusion." 2
These were important,and indeed prophetic,rarning signrls by
Sandys,indicating not only a thinly-veiled co'r.itment to roie./.
1. See Mollet neioraiidura: *Plan for the O.ctn.led and ob jective 
and objective study of the proposals to achieve closer politi­
cal unity between member-states’ .Sent.19i9.enclosed in letter 
from iiac.iillan to -andys,I5.9.'t9., ^A..;DY3 PAPJliS.
2. Sa:JDY^,letter to ¡iac;-:illan,I5.9 .4? ., i>Kr,jY* rAj-i;.,.
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. / .  Fort of eventual federal iSuropean structure,but r*lr.o s very 
clear preoccupation not to become bound by labels which risked 
disturbing the seemingly innocent path towards the "i-racrc entitle" 
creation of a liuropean supr?.-nation?l ooliticr-1 authority. He 
thus ended his personal appeal to MacMillan on the following 
distinctive note:
"The result of -iollet'S proposal rould be to throw all 
those,who are not at this stage prepared to label thor.selves 
as federalists,into the sane camp as Dalton and his friends, 
who appears to want no progresr- <’ t all • • •
If the federalist isrue is raised in an scute form at 
this stage.it may obscure ell the real issues end split the 
Assembly into two entirely artificial cpjros, accusinr each 
other respectively of obstruction and lack of realism." 1
It was best,he added to concentrate initially on "i mediate
steps in the direction of closer oolitic.'l union,leaving vague
for the moment the precise character of the constitution which
2
may fin a lly  emerge."
This somewhat dramatic pie? by orndys not to Precipitate 
T atte rs ,and as a result,split rajsks over tactical rather than 
fundamental objectives,res well argued,but no longer fitted the 
nood and pressures of the acturl sitv.rtion. I!is evolutionary 
policy depended upon a deliberate evasion of the precise poli­
tical definitions and reference points which -iost of the grows 
and personalities involved in the livxopcan campaign were non 
ranting to come to grips ts'ith,one ray or the other. Indeed,on 
his own side,s^ndys* unionist r»nd Conservative colleagues,per­
turbed by the apparent stand taker, in the Consultative Assembly, 
wanted to make it clear that they 'iad no intention of becoming 
cotnitted to any federal or neo-federal goal*no -.atter ho»1 Tuch 
it was dressed up and disguised in gradualism. -tonham-Carter.for 
example,as Vice Chairman of the U~M,angrilly declareO,upon 
reading Sandys’ ffcrntitLa on a ^uronean supranational Political 
Authority:
I . SAiiDys,letter,op . cit. 
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"I am disturbed by it becruse it appears to i-mly that 
that all members of the European ■ove^ent regard the creation 
of a Federal Constitution for tiurot>e as a desirable aim. ..
It is not my aim to create a Federal Constitution for 
iiurope.nor is it the aim of ~any of our colleagues in the 
UiiM. I do not believe it to be Winston's7 It is certainly 
not Mr. Amery's,Anthony Eden's nor Sir ¿J.ivid Har-well Tyfe'e”
He went on to accuse Sandys of having aisled his more caution
colleagues on the matter:
"I feel that the time has come when the position should be 
clarified. I icnor that in the oast clarification his been 
avoided in order to preserve a unite«! front,but I an 
beginning to have an uneasy fcolin^ that ro •,e of us are 
sailing under false, or at least very ambiguous, colours 
and this me 'orandun has strengthened -'nd confirmed my 
uneasiness." 1
Similarly,on a less nervous but equally forc^full note,L. S.-Amery 
told Sandys that he was a "little oerturbed" by the latter’ s 
f ormul a, adding :
"I think it is essential to make it clcar to our Continental 
friends that if and when it co^es to anythin^ in the nature 
of a surrender of sovereignty and to the creation of a 
supra-national legislature and cecutive.we must stand 
outside." 2
2ven the more committed Harold :>c:-illrn str-esr.ed when asking 
Sandys for help in the drawing up of a document for the General 
Affairs Committee:
"I must be careful not to put in anything which I could 
not defen«^ and hope to carry through a Conservative Party 
T*eeting."
•The Conservative Party itself had already officially emphasised 
in June, and again in July 1949, that its prinary com -.itment was
A
to the Empire and Co rmomealth rather than to ¡¿urorie. In a 
strictly worded note ?ent to Sandys "on the eve of the Conscrvntruc 
Party Conference,in October, the Powe-'/ul '1922 Co mittee' further 
warned him not to risk "dividing" the Party over the United Europe. /.
1. UOUüAM-CAkTiJi,letter to 'SrsnOySjH.lI.^ii., SA.E/j.’5 l-'APii'.S.
2. AMEKY,letter to Sandys, .-TT.-r9., FAKIRS.
J . i<AC.û.LLAH,letter to Sandys,£2.9.•■■9., i*A PAr-i’-S.
See ’A Statement of Conservative Pniicv for the >ritir,fr 
E mire and Co r.ionresltii'.^lus The :;irht ^oad for irit^in ', 
June,July I9>»9 recT>ectivelv,Ci_’i:^  JKVAJIVi] i’Ai'.Vï OFFICE
5. Letter to Sandys from A .3. Grialcr-, .10. ,s ., £A i>y£ PA^iikS.
. / . resolution down in his nane. Smciys rubse^uently delivered 
a diplomatic speech to the Confercncc,nevertheless calling for 
a "strong and united Eurooe,linked through Uritein to '¿he 
British Connonwealth" - a point which Aiery immediately cxnan- 
ded upon by saying that the Conference would not co-mit itself 
to any schene which could "in the slightest degree .nar the 
existing unity of the Empire,or stand in the way of its fullest 
development."
On the other side of the Europe?"! cr-npaiçm, however, the
nore federal inclined groups rid not greet San^ys’ noliticnl
formula with the tinid dsgivings anC c.ution with which it
vas greeted by the unionist camp,but ranted instead to go ruch
further ,f\nd to push directly for a constitvtion?l ¿itrooean
T>l?n. For exa'Tnle, the Third JPU Congres«:, held in Venice on
Seote iber 19-22,led the field in re-nffir dnc the Interlaken
2
proposals for a "Constituent -uronepn Ar sc.bly •" One month
later Bohy sub -dtteif a leiorandun to the ^trssbourg General
Affrirs Co sittec in which the EPU dcclrrec’ that the Evxooenn
Asre-nbly, "whilst preserving its cor.siatcvtive chcracter, should
be given forthwith the laoidate for preparing a Draft European
Constitution", to be subsequently considered by the national
3
Prxlipments. Likewise,’ obert 3ichet declrrod, on behalf of ids
;.EI coll eatnies, that "the A?reribly shovlo be granted the po '^crs
A
of a Constituent Assembly at its third resrion." Similarly, 
Kackr-y,the mrin propagator of constitutional for ulre.rlso 
thought that the necessary oolitic*! initiative towards federa­
tion should snrii’jj fro.- the Consultative A'rc ibly, me he pri­
vately coiirolained to Crndys thp.t the sort of " ji\u'or>ean Cabinet” 
visu?lised by the letter would never set in nroccss the./.
1. See Conference Kenort,CPriO; -<r-esi■•''n Conte ^ r .T '  Archives 
v ol.7 , op. c it . t»p. IU285-1; U E.. i:e‘ ■ si ett rrr. octobcr 19-.-Stilus 
Spndys’ Craft, SA’rjYS ?APi2:s.
2. EFU Conirress l<er»o; t .^eot.I9-V9.: ol.; ticr.l Hesolution.CA.i. .
3. EPU -ne ’o. ' ^ e  structure of am one’ . 17 . 10 . S.,C3C
DICHET.ictter to Crnêys rc«-ic’inr t^o V oter 's  for <vlr, 
6 . 1 0 . « . ,  SAI.DYS rAl’±:£.
./.th e  oositive measures hooed for.1 Andri I’hiXin ,->lso declared,
unon bcino elected President of the S.iUSi; on Septe-tber ¿.that
it up to the European Arsenbly to create a fe<'es-al Political
2
Authority'. At the subsequent Third S-il'SE Congress,held in P?ris
on Itovember 5-7,Philip and Spinelli successfully tnirhed for a
"federal pact" formala, envisatrinn the eventual transfer of key
3
sovereign powers to a directly elected European legislature.
In the •neanti-'.e, noreover,St>inelli had ?lso taken the lead in 
calling for a "federal pact" at the i> traordinary General 
Assembly of the EUF,convened in Paris on October 29-31. as he 
recorded, this crucial EUF -leetine in Paris rps "co-roletely 
different" to the Mantreux Conaresi two years earlier,since it 
v.-'.s n w  the "European federalist point of vier which con^letely
4
triumphed over the integral feaer.list one." The "Draft Federr.l
P?ct" vhich the Assembly anuroved tts  :n  t”m  submitted to the
Strasbourg General Affairs Co-unittee, ?>nd lent no rtoubt ?s to the
firm suora-national federal vier.v which the BUF no-.’ represented.
A key Clause of the approved text declared:
"The first session of the Council of t>urope icr’ted at the 
same tiie a beninninf and an end. It narked the beginning of 
a real and organic co—operation betvoen the ■■■'tions of Juro^e; 
it narked the end of the illusion that the aim of ¿¡uropean 
unity c?«n be achieved without noiiticrl nachinery on a supra­
national level. The time has nov come to rtraw the necessary 
conclusions."5
The HiF le iorwidum.in turn,menacingly rtated that the Consultative 
Assembly mist "Prevent" the Strasbourg eroerri lent from "degenera­
ting" further into an "irresponsible international technocracy", 
or into another sort of "dinlo •’Stic League of Nations" . Tiiis 
could only be done, the te>t continued to declare, by the "vtrcent" 
p-mroval by the As>-e~’bly of a Feder al / “ct providing for a 1>ica- 
■’errl Surooean Leoisietnce(one c h a -ber bein« directly elected),., .
I . :«ackay,letter to Srndys,l0.10.-.f. ,  a c :,»y  ^AJ’KRS.
£. SifUSE nress strte"'ent,3.9.<'-£?. • ¿:ii iiiH.
o. b.iUSE, III Mr.t.-'l Conf erence.iiopoi t , !iov.I949.--Aii.. UllUCGE.
4 . SPIKEXLI, 'Storia e Frositettive del -J'’!)*, >t>. c. t. , p t > .  164-5.
5. See 30K Congress Resorts, Oct/.iov. I9-,S, of a Feder.-l
Pact - for presentation to the Consultative Asr.e bly~~of tne 
Council of Buuooev CaC
and a European Suprene Court independent or n - T l i ’ent ■"'nd 
govern 'enti *
It *'ss f’uite clcar therefore th.-t Sandys' cunningly vague,
thou^irefined evolutionary strrtegy foj r. U'"OT>e?n Pol:.tic,'I
Authority satisfied neither the bulk of his cautions unionist
colleagues,nor the radical .federal movements. The shift tou-ards
cntrenched positions •md to^erds tvo sepcrnte c .-t ip s  vas ftlre?dy
under T;?y, and Spndys vps rabidly friling between f  o rtools.
Yet,perhaps there las still time to arrange mother tentative
conpro-iise? The SUF,despite the rsccndoncy oi the Frenpy-Spinelli
r-is, had, after all,given a guarded rledoe to m sh for the federal
2
pact policy vithin the Europe,->n !-ovc ^cnt. The SirjSi had also
3
isrued a sn ilar  message. ¡¡oreover,orndvs rt?.ll h^ cl so 'e voliiBblc 
allies who supported his Dramatic unity of r-ction cr.-nsrign.
Aiong the federalists,for cr. p I c , irua •■■'ns opp-ily declared his 
current fidelity to Sandys1 •noderpte and realistic •¿uropei’n 
policy, arguing that it vp.s not yet tine for a "finrl struggle" 
betveen "nationalists” and "federrlists",.’nd tnrt the vehicle
4
of the European 'iove ient still served ?. useful pjctposc. ¡lies 
Josenhy,for her part, also e: pressed "i;n'"nalified npp? ovr'l" of 
Sandys’ proposals for a European P'lliticr'l Authority.^ Paul-Hertri 
Spank lent his powerful support, at a -:ioetin<T of the British 
Council of the European iiove >cnt in Bove ber 19 2, to the "prac­
tical* and "realistic" strategy hitherto carried out by the 
Moveientfvhiie his faithful collergue.iirapiej'.flso forially
7
"adhered" to Sandys' ooint of vier:-. In short, there was stll 
soTie slender hope of nulling the iiurope?n liovc lent together 
behind Sfndys' strategy,but ti ie »'£.s running out. *
1. «ee 'Draft of a federal ifact'.op . c it ., "iisiwr-.tiol Institutions'
2. BUF Co:iit> esr Kqpq:i ts.o ^ .c it ., j'To^ern -;nve C'lt i esolution.
3. S.iUSE Conference Report, o p . cit.
3KUG11A1IS,report to EUF E'traord:' nr: y Arne >bly,29. IO.'i 9 . ,C.JC
5. JOSEnfY.see’ jw » '*rv of cviticis cceivnd on l>. m. napcr'f 1311' ^
6. liP/iAt,SPerch to U.K.Council,*:!?.II.-.9. , U .;>-o
7. USA; IiIK, ' -u nrcn,’ of criticis <s1, or>. c.:.t.
- Usb-
The case for patience and moderation in the campaign 
received a severe blow vhen,on November 5 ,the Council of Europe's 
Ministerial Committee bruskly communicated to President Spaafc 
that it vould not at present consider any of the proposed 
changes to the Statute,nor vould it  alter the official relation­
ship between the Assembly and the Committee. Nearly all the policy 
recommendations presented by the Assembly vere simply shelved.
As Paul Reynaud coimlained,the Arse^ibly's r»rot>o5?ls,in aggregate, 
vere either "refused" or "indefinitely riostnoned." Indeed, the 
only issue on fhich the . ¡inisters vould try "to _,eet the virhes 
of the Assembly" was in diminishing their control over the 
latter 's  agenda, though even this ’-oulo. be at a mirely infor -.al 
1evel. 1
The unc.-nected severity of the -¡i-iisterial co ’-ixaiirui1, 
strongly influenced by British and iicandinpvinn ^resriire,not 
only placed the recent federalist policy documents in a nore 
detached And confrontationary light,it  above all thr«r the 
evolutionary strategy sdvocsted by San6ys,vith its strong eitpha- 
sis on Ministerial good vili.co-mletely off balance. The Buropean 
Movement &ceoat±ve»led by Sandys.t-'as ^uick to close rarOts,issuing 
a joint statement in which they ejroressed "profound disanooint- 
"ient" at the "entirely negative and dilatory attitude" of the
£
■ ministers towards the reco miendations of the European A^se-nbly;
but clearly,the decisive last ditch brttle in the Movement *'as
now drawing near. Sp.ndys tried to rten the s^iit.or at least
reduce its inpact,by suggesting that the ovoient should set up
an "Ad Hoc Political Authority Co -littee",”’hich would consider
the federal poet proposals of the JUF ->nd .'long vith his
3
ovn revise« proposals for a e.'uronean i olitic-1 Authority'. A
neoting of this nronoser Ad Hoc Co i.dttce finally convened./.
i .  >^oe Kersin^s Conte-morarv Arci'.ivos, v o l .7 . o p .c it . ,rcp. 10344-5.
t»1us  kEYliAUD, Unite or Perish .o ^ .c i t . , r>n.J;0I-i:Gt.
£. See statement issued at the Bu?'o*'e?*i -ove 'ent £  ecutive 
Bureau >'.-»etirwT, I I .  1 1 .4 9 ., ( s : I I ).  ¡*Ai’j!;S.
■. S /.. II  ibid.
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. / . i n  Prris on Uecember 16 ,by v/hich tiie even the Conceil Franc?.is
had also been von over to the idea of a /'ecr'ral nsct.^ This
crucial neetin<i,presided by C.'ndys,included tiie faniliPT leaders
of the affiliated organisations nnd h^tionrl Councils of the
iJuropean -'¿rve’nent, notably P.etinrrcr, Trumans, Lr’yton.Lhuj llier,
Serruys,Bichet,Gironella,Sr>inelli,Wistrej»d, Vni6e  Pmirrin.Krenay,
2
Macdonald, Cour tin, Bedcinfton-Behrenr-jK^'at,J.'crmet and Boothby. 
Its results would constitute the final political •■’ct in the joint 
campaign:
Scndys clearly had an unenviable t?sH in trying t.* find 
connton ground in the formulation of ? joint nolicy. i'he p.-*r>er 
which he produced,and v/hich according to Frenay he tried to
3
buldose through the ■’leetina, rtill rtrongly rl1 udod to ?n even­
tual supra-national European Executive rnd Forli,--lentary Autho­
rity,but now also emphasised other m ecific  European institutions 
of a more immediate nrora-nrtionrl cK.-'r-'ctcr,incluOinn ? Court 
»nd Cordisrion of Hunan Rights, a ¿¿urooean nrtrnt office, a &rro- 
posn passport office,advisory deorvfients on econo-ic is'nie.etc., 
?11 of T/hich could be set up in the near future by "Convcntionr" 
anfroved in the Council of Europe, -he direction of these "inrti- 
tutions and services",he in turn proposed,could be entrusted to 
persons jointly appointed and " accountn:lc" to the Consultative 
Asneibly nnd Coir.ittee of Hinisters.vho rtibse^uently could 
"rermonsifcility" foT further "i-unctions" cnt:ni; ted by Governents 
through the creation of additional oepart-cnts set up on the
4
sr-^ c lines a.s previously. Under pressure fro-; his party,by his
unionist affiliations ••’nd by the political reality o r the tine,
Srndys.in rhort(T/as proPosi:iti ■'n inter-’edi.-’ry "• i’_nctir>nalist" m
bridge between the present inter-oovern’e-ital approach, stJ ictlv
adhered to by the ¡¿inisterial Co*nittee,oni t^e eventual goal
of a European political-federal structure.
!• See EOF C.C. meeting.12-14.12.49..official minutes,
CEC GENEVA.
2 . E.m. meeting.16 .12 .49 . . official minutestPAC/m/1) ,CAEH BRUGGE.
3. WiQJAY, letter to 3-i Ifcecutive, 17. li. .: . , -A O'Cj iV.i'iJii.
A . See S.:/P/I20( ip Q .cae.. j 852.
This point was further illustrated -->t t^e .leeting, where, 
according to the official iimitcs , "t'-'o definite trends of 
opinion" uer-e discerned on the Question of "approach", the first, 
supported by the French, Italian rnfi Dutch representatives,bein'-? 
"federalist" or "contractual",the other,upheld by the British 
delegates,being described as "functionalist" or "evolutionary". 
The primer approach vas identified with the federal pact idea, 
by which the European nations would .-'■■ree to '’transfer ccrtain 
precise powers and functions to a federal ‘ I'thority.11 The second 
approach vas defined as follovs:
" T h e ’fxm ction^list’ or ’ evolutionary’ a*>^ro'ch envisages 
the joint direction of policy  ani: action by tl.e partici-natirr 
cnuntries to ? progressively i-icrecr.i<c extent ti: oojh the 
¡ediu-i of c o vio:i fiico^en  i nrtit-’t io n r ,' it  iov.t, Ho~ ovoi, in  
the first  sta^e -t a’ty rr.te,irrcvoravlv t: ans/'ei-ring 
sovereign oor-ers to those in* titvtior.s. "
The ’ functionalist’ and ’ evolutio-irr-v’ r-mroach ' ’C’ è tirus now
identified as one. It >nzst be strecsecl,noT ever, that despite
being cushec into a tight corner, i-'ndys rt s  not rdvoc-’'tin" the
strictly li-*ited "functionalism" proposed by the British
L.'bour delegates at Strasbourg. Indeed,rhoreas the latter rrroup
coiisidorcd a ’ functional* approach ~s a slight technical
diffusion of T.liat remained, and w s  ••>eant to regain, a purely
inter-govermental com~.it Tent, C-ndys, on t ie other hand, view ed
the approach r i thin a "responsible" a id 'Accountable" ”>olitica.l
light,and as the only possible practical option for the "first
stage" in a more enbitious evolutionary strategy towards ar.
effective supra-national political ccrdttent in ¿urope.
Those upholding a ’ feeeral-contractual* strategy at first 
remained unconvinced, Spinelli,Sironella and nov. also 3rucrmans 
declaring that it va.s necessary to drav tsp r. fed ral oact iron 
the outset, since no effective political avthority could e- j st 
*'i?ftov.t clearly deiined,'T itten  no- ers. Bonthbv.on the other 
hand,suggested that the federalists shoulc accept ano support 
the 'functional* approach rhilst -akin? it  clear that it  d id ./.
1. FAC/;: 1 . 0? . cit.
- W 91-
./.not, in their opinion, no far enough, reserving the ricbt to
t/ork x/ithin their 01«  organisations for e •'ore radical solution. 
It vas "essential",he went on to argue in favour of Sandys imnie- 
cicte strptegy, that the Council of Europe rho-uid achieve sone 
power if it vas not to be destroyed. Layton,along vith his 
Closer unionist colleagues,proved tougher,and maintained that 
a federal pact at the current stage t’ould set back rather than 
advance the cause of European unity both ir. Britain and in 
Scandinavia. Courtin,for his part,boldly stood out in this 
final debate and strongly supported the federal nact plan, 
suggesting that it should be acco-roanied by popular direct 
elections to the European Asseibly. The Anglo-French axis 
in the European ¡■iove'nent had at last broken dovn.
It was Frenay of all people,hovever,'ho finally cr i^e up 
"’ith a co’ipromise solution,repenting in rf'ect the long-standing. 
T’.pyi'naliste for-rula for an initial f'o-tier Btiropean co-n-nitnent. 
His proposal read as follows:
"A Federal Pact should be concluded between .Til the democratic 
European countries vho feci able to do so.
This Pact shimld regain onen to any other democratic Euro­
pean countries who rished to join 1 ater.
Preferential relations should be <?str,blished between the 
Etrtes signatory to the Pact and other Ap’iocratic ¿uronean 
countries.
Despite strong objections by Lrrfm,S?ndys immediately seized 
upon Frenay's proposal,declaring that such 2 union concluded 
between certain states.vhiie others at first felt unable to join, 
was "not inco T>Ptible" with his or n " r>voli'tionary'“ arroroach.
With am eye for Britain’ s eventual transition and inclusion to 
the tighter pact,Sandys did,!io'.ever, co".rider it "■’ost i"inortJ«t'= 
that a grows of nations conclude ng a fe'Vm l pact should not
on that account claiTi that those t..l-o did not rign the nact
fere "outside" the "n'urooean uuior.". It ' oulrt, he argued, be 
preferable to regard all -.eMbers of the Council of ¿Xtrone rs ./.
I . FI'.JIAY,federal pact prono sals,rAC/:I I . o i .  cit.
- Ufc.o -
./.constituting the "¿'uro'nesn union",within t iich cert?in states
might concl\ide a federal pact. Although this t.-.i s  only "^erhans
a nuestion of presentation", it light,he stated,"grove to be
psychologically and politically of great i-^nortance."
It vas indeed a clear indication of the negative political
clinrte in Britain regarding a real ¿urooeap com '.itient, and a
vivid indictment of the declining interest for the idea t’ithin
his own party,that Sendys,who had eonsistcitly and at sone
risk argued in favour of Britain’ s oarticinrtion "ith in  and r.ot
on the sidelines of 2urope.no”' had to grasp rrer.ay's t''o-tier
solution,which in effect considered Britain as an asrociated
'e-nber to a Federal Eurot>e. He did so in the hope of Britain's
full eventual inclusion. The Council of turope vas therefore
to be regarded as the overall political authority within which
various functional agencies and a numerically limited inner
federation should work together and perhaps finally link up in
a common supra-national commitment. This vas the message which
was approved in the final policy document,subsequently submitted
by the European Movement to the Strasoourg General Affairs
2
Committee .after a stormy two-day Executive meeting held on 
January 20-21,1950. A full copy of this text is printed belov:
1 . The Secretary General of the Council of Airone,A.s. Hciford, 
officially *sked the iJuro'iean -ove -icnt for its opinions on a 
Airogean Political Authority on 2 * < 9 .  ~>ee lettertiv./P /j O) , 
CASK 3KUGGU.
2. 2uroT>esn .iovencnt B-ecutive Co-iittee iei'ting,20-i-I.I.50., 
official iinutes(SX./K/IB) . CA^.. d?.ugge.
- -
E V P. 0 P K i S irOTtltl!  T
s ? a t 3 y. ; r  ;
1. Ir. 1948, the Congress of 3uro,oe, convened by the Eiropean 
:i»nt at The I-Ia-ne, declared"that "the tine has corse when 
t:.; European cations nuat transfer and sicr£e sssc portion of 
sovereign right3 so as to secure ocssioc political and 
-.:;r.snio action for tha integration and proper development of 
T.-.rir comon resources".
£. T-.is principle has been recognised by the European .dasczibly 
Trhiih, in its first session at Strasbourg, proclaimed as its 
zir. "the creation of a European Political Authority with limited 
I'^-.otions but real powers."
3 . Ir. <>ux3uanoe of this ain, it is necessary that all Lfcriber 
States of the Council of Europe snould without delay conclude
e Pact for the creation of the European Union. This Pact would 
;r :v ide  for the establishment of a Political iuthcrity through 
-hioh tha Ksabor States wiuld Jointly decide by democratic 
hods a cocoon policy ir. rr..~ard to the prjtGetion of hunan 
ri^nts, crternc.1 relatione and coor.o^ic aff-irc.
4. Ur*dsr the direction of this ?;liticp.l xuth^rity there should 
te crsat6d functional institutions decline with such problems 
zs ourrcncy, cor=crce, * rjnsTcrt, Invcstncut policy, the
2^-ordination of basis industries., arriouicuril ?r;duction, 
cultural and social questions, — dcfenco.
5. Thilst it is essential for the effective operation of the 
^-ropaan Union thet all the Idcnbors of the Council of Europe 
iiruld participate in the Political Authority, it is not on 
the other hand essential that all should participate in every 
one of the functional institutions.
6. ?ho European Political Authority nust bo croeted within the 
rrrancTTork of the Council of Euxopo which nust bo given adequate
of initiation, exeoution and denocratic supervision, 
i;-.;-u.aing the power to create such new organa as cay be accessary
7. Tr.ose States which desire frori the outset to establish 
closer organic links fcetwaen one another should be cncouraged
to do so by the creation of a federal organisation, the structure 
-'hich should bi r.eoitf.oi*. cy then after joint discussion 
¿atriGcn all kenber Slatca of the European Union. This federal 
or^ir.isstion should rc-T^n otic p. to other States rrhich nay wish 
to adhere to it at a later date.
£. Sir..ce it is in the general interest that the links which
- r.izi bctnoen European Spates r_ii associated countries oversees 
should be ualntained and strengthened, it should be open to these 
countries overseas to participate froa the outset in those 
functional institutions which deal with catter3 in r;hich they 
•-re interoatcfi. 1
z ’ gj/£Z^.accoTii>anying pacer to gsA-IC.on.cit.
- W »x *
It is important to note thr t this rtatenent.issued by 
the European iiove-ient jidvocatin'’ the creation of SDecific 
Burooean "functional institutions",pre-dnted the declaration 
of the Schwnan Plan by nearly four months. It is also worth 
oboerringjhof ever, that whereas under the Sc hitman: i'lnn a hicrher 
co nmon authority was to be entrusted v.-ith the suoply and 
Tiananeient of Burooean coal and steel,no umbrella Political 
Authority vith supra-national ootential was outlined,as vas 
the case vith the above Buronean Move cent's prooj^al. This is 
a point to which we shall shortly return. Suffice for the 
•’O-ient to stress that the so-called 11.oidon iiesolutions' 
te-rporarily re-united the two distinct vines within the Euro­
pean ¡¡oveient, and ■sere well received by ■■'.ost of the leading 
federalists. Brumans.for era't>ie,optimistically declared that 
the resolutions represented the "burial of the functionalist" 
anoroach as a limited concent, and as such,co:istitutod a "fede­
ralist victory." '1 Likewise,even rrenay stated that the "essen-
2
tial" tenets of the ¡Xf had been "safeguarded", nelli, on 
the other hand,continued to crumble that he would hrsve nre-
3
ferred a document with iore nrecision fbmat “organic linJcs” .
3ene?th the surface,however, the I’ lflsrent comro iise of 
January 21 merely papered over the crovinrr division within the 
European nove lent,as the hopes for an effective ¿uronesn Poli­
tical Authority began to crumble. The unionist c.nn drew fur­
ther and further back from a supra-national nolicy com'iit-ient 
to 3urooe,'»facrc0S the federalists si-.Div rent their own way, the 
BUF Central Connittee having rlready submitted its O 'n Fenarate 
proposals for a federal r>act to t .^c ¿¡trasboi’xr G ^ ’erpl Affairr 
Coi’Tittee on Deceneber ¡¿i/V'.iilo t ie ne- year ra_r the nronotio-
5
of siwilsr nationM caipainns esneei-ll'' m  Itai^ ?-nd France.
1. BKUQMANS, BUF C.C. aeeting,4- 5.2.50.. official minutes,
CEC GENEVA.
2. KiiiitAy, III 3UF Comrress -oliticrl j-cnort.oo. eit.
3. SPIUELLI, 3UF CC Tie^tinq.o^.cit.
4 . EU? <Re->ly to the Uuestion^air'e sent by the Gene??.! Affairs
Co ~,ittee(AS/A‘j 1 9 ) .2 1 .1 2 .0 9 . . GiJC G.I.JVA. ”  ” * *
5 . see Spinelli,' ¿torie k P 'S->ettive t'ni p j ' , cm.c: t.onl^i 7.
-uG"!»
Indeed the Movement vas soon rrackfd rrsin by bitter «Hswtes 
between the rarring factions,its political energy being sa^oed 
further by the fact that Sr.ndys.havinc reo-ined his parliamen­
tary seat in the British elections of February 23,re-irined nomi­
nal chairman of the Executive Co~,iittee(until his replace ent 
in September by Spaa.k) ,bv.t *’?s increasingly dram  into the 
broader European Parliamentary arena of the ¡love-ent's activi­
ties, taking over the chairmanship of the Parliamentary Section 
from Coty,who had been "keeping the scat vrrji1’ for him. I:eti:iga; 
for his oart,devoted his skills ns Secretary General of the 
<iove->ent almost totally to training the good ill  •-nd lo.iey of 
American sponsors. In short, the Uove i<-nt entered into a dramatic 
period of inner decline. As ¡ o'.'ert Boothby co "tented in ¡-y 
1950;
“ ..the  European iovement has beer, in rtnte of continuous 
?nd progressive disintegration; *:id, ■ s a. result,hrs ce-?ed 
to give any effective leadership i-: the cause which T:e all 
have at heart. The cause of this is ,in  •’y oninion.the inter­
necine disputes arising iron the re la te d  ■'tto-’Pts of our 
federalist friends to substitute a 1 constitutional1 for a 
‘ functional’ anproach,as a result of '■’hich the .iove-ent 
has literally been tearing itself to nieces." 1
The political ca-paign began to grind to a halt. In June 
I950,sandys nade a last effort to influence the work of the 
Strasbourg Generad Affairs Committee by presenting yet another 
nrivate document appealing for a united «rvolutionary approach, 
vhich,in addition to accommodating functional projects and 
inner federal links,also stressed the overriding ne^d to "pro­
gressively confer" uoon the European Arsontly "certrin rerl
i
7>oT-ers.’' The final report liy the Co ’ ittec,entitled " -¿urorie.-n m 
Folitical Authority" , ras, ho- ever, a iost timid and -allid c" ocu­
pen t ■’ nd *ade only obrcure references to “he rort a!: ’ nstitutio-*.
3
in cuestión. "The total result", .. c. ilTan priv 'tely  c 'T '/ii'W ,.'.
I .  ilOu "iJY, iir ■orrndu"’ o~i Fplir-'. ..-y X¡bO,UA¿ í rj-lUC'Jü. ¿'h<? 
document is ,-lro re^riuteO in io?!:h'vi/:..fy?o?.l(ytio:'.r. of r 
«sbel , oocit ■ , appendi:- £. ^ce »:-‘crrw-rl : e-flfytivir
m on  the future Political rpuctrr'1 of_S-l'P. •
Ii<. t>.4 y. , ¿»A;i)Vu VAPkiiÜ. * C .  A. aocs í QcssiO:! I'. jiO
. /  »" j £ rather disappointing, aitho’.inh vsrv voir o'.-'ons.,'1 In the 
meantime,on May 9 1950 ,the European bombshell had already
been launched elsewhere in the ¿'em of the hirtoric Scim"ian. 
i
Declaration.
The Schuman Plan, out of vhich grew the ">resent-day ¿uronear. 
Co—munity.ras not an overtly political nrojcct; it  ’ as not a 
¿irect product of the European political c.-T>ainn Tiiich had beer. 
vaned t.-ith increasing force since the Uf rue Congress up until 
the first session of the Council of l>jrope) it t t e  not a nroject 
r t iT ’lPted by *ny naive supra-n’ tionai ider.liiw indigenous to 
the Resistance years and subsenueitly chamoiPd through to vhat 
attempted to be a representative nonular ¡ovc ent- The Schuman 
Plan v?s instead the product of a ne- and elite technocratic 
breed, among whom the 2urooea:i Idea vs»s the oro ine^t -otivating 
force and i~mulse,but mas also t'ie e- ncriment'l fra-re".or}: for 
supra-national bureaucratic -manage-■eit .■'tripped of ;'olitic-i 
idealism and of effective political responsibility. l»?-?™ up 
secretly by Jean .-*onnet ■■'nd a c-aii 't o u p  of o friciais,the  m e ;  
of the Plan entailed the proposed pooling of the entire French 
*nd German coal and steel production,along r-ith that of other 
interested European countries, under a ’’co-rto” higher authority" 
t’hich vould be set up by joint govem-c^trl acree icnt and rould 
have “erecutivc powers" in this particular industrial sector.
?he • functional1 approach wp.s clearly not "buried" r s Brua’ans 
had optimistically announced only a f r  reehs earlier. Indeed, 
lignt at the start of his famous speech,schuaan firmly declared 
in this respect:
"¿vtrope T'ill not be -<aOe all .’ t once,or .'ccoi'an« to a. 
single Plan. It vill be built \\r>o:\ concrete .-»chieve-'ents 
which first create a de facto solidarity.
Kurther’iore, despite Sc human ’ a .-’rsurance th^t the tlan i enrerei-
ted only "the first step in the federation of -Vx o p c ’S  the scheme
did not openly comprise the joint,evolutionary functiov.^l-ft'c'eipi
approach for which S:>ndys had been striving. Indeed a crucial./.
I .  ¡•¡ACi.lLLAIJ.ietter to iiandys,i:6.6.:>G. , :>A.iDiS ¿ A>'ca:u.
k. ic U ;am ¡>ECLiiii/iTiui!, see Kef.-sin^s Contemporary Archiver vol 7
ol-bit . I»- i«»oi 3. ItoU.
- Ufa.»*"
. / .  tenet in the s£r?tecy advocated by S--*ndys,endorsed by the 
■London resolutions' of J.’ Trurry 2I,y-s thr't tlie v^riod snd 
-ulti-layer sectional integration projects should all fall 
under the ultimate executive responsibilty of the Strasboxirg 
■Political Authority* »represented by the dnisteriol Conr-.ittee 
and the European Assembly, The Schu'ian Plan,on the other hand, 
t'?s Drooosina a technocratic "h i^h e  ruthority1' indenmdrmt of 
the political Council of fur one structure. As ¡irrold *."ic illrji 
arcrued in this context:
"While the plan haci :nany attractions,ve '¡ere frightened 
of technocrats. We had not dostroyed the divine right of 
Icings in order to fall down before the divine iijrht of 
e'-nerts."
Developing the story further, he ■' ent on to state:
"Certain changes Schunpn e. H e .. ''cceitfi, in
addition to the Hioh Authority,? Co viittee of Ministers 
rnd an Ar se"bly of ?.TXlia^entfrions,but these "erre both 
to be attached to the countries vhich {r~e ncrties to 
the agreement. We wished these to be attached to .the 
Council of Eurooe.
Duncan Sandys emphasised the same point vhen,as an official
representative in the Conservative Party delegation to the
second session at Strasbourg,he made an impassioned plea to
avert the "technical" nature and "controversial" character of
the Plan. He went on to declare that the Plan needed instead to
fit into the politically responsible Council of Europe framewate
"Decisions of this kind cannot be left to international 
experts hoc ever co'nuetent they '*ay be. . . I f  on the inter­
national plane ve t/ere to lervp the cmcrts not only to 
advise and erecute but to decide the noljcy ¡»s Tfell.ve 
should find that ve had cr cntod an i? ? Gmonsible and 
autocratic technocracy vhich escaped all democratic „
control. . .  The overall policy- 'a.lcin? body -rust clearly be 
this Council of tJurope and,in the ’«in, this Assembly here 
in iitresbourg. " 2
Stating liis "warm approval" of inner rfeeleral constitution''
re h e 1 os, he sxibse^uently concluded that a real and effective ./.
T. iAC ILLAIi, Tides of For time ,on, cit. p .¿06.
2. SAIIu¥t>,speech,It.k.So.w» iieport.7-£t- Au^st I'1 50.Part I I I . 
sittings I .-17.pp.7:.±-i t,.~
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. /.united Europe was the final goal for all:
"The Council of ¿>urope ru.sttj. bclievp.be sufficiently 
flexible to allow its Ue'bers to advance by their ovn 
methods and at their ovn "ace. fhe slow est oir.t not be 
thrown out and the fastest rust not be held back. So e 
nay be -ore adventurous at the beginning;so te "i?y,in the 
long run, nrove to have greater oo’-.ers of endurance. We 
■iay travel ty different roads,biit I fir 'ly believe that 
provided we give to one snotties' support •■’nd undfrrstanding 
?nd encouragement, we shall po eiiov lanage, all of us, to 
arrive together at the end of the joxuncy."1
Four days later,on August ¿£,he in turn submitted a reoort
calling for the creation of "functional institutions" and for an
inner "federal organisation", both being envisaged as part of the
Council of Europe framevork,and as the initial components of an
2
eventual "European Political Authority".
The seoarate Schuman Flaji had,hovever,in the rords of A . : i .  
Uobcrtson,"struck the popular imagination ‘ nd see-ied to noint 
the vay out of the difficulties in 'r.ioh ti:e Council i as floun­
dering."^ dy contrast,the crertion of a political authority rith 
liiited  but real powers regained the "lonn te-i objective" of 
the European Assembly,"but it had come no nearer to definition,
4
nuch less to realisation." After a year's reflection ’ nd delay, 
the sights of the ¡iuroT>ean Asre-iblv lor ered to considering 
i mediate functional projects and nallid political initiatives. 
The French delegation which had led the federal field one yerx 
Previously -'ere now seriously sniit. On the one ha-iid.Ur^ -naud 
bitterly denounced the vague reoort of the General A'fa-\rs 
C o n ittee .m d  still demanded a Tuch stro-.irer colitic.-'l initiativfi. 
On the other hand, lollet vould do nothinq -hicft 'icht cause a 
breach v.ith the British. Andre Piiilin.for ¿¡is ^art,had lost all 
hot>e in the Consultative Asr-e >bly ever bcco ■’inn a real European 
Parlieicntary Asseibly.and no- lo Diced to li ited fvi:v:tion<-l./ .
X. SAi.'DYS,si>e-*ch,It.£. 5U. ,on. cit.
i . SAiIjVS.Draft ¿-esolutior.(Aq/AG k l<';\rnfr itted to General
Affairs Co r-d11ee, . t . 50. ,  i;A.d/'j rAi'il-.S.
3. A .u . Kobertson, Council of u^~ oic  ,o i. c it .,o .S £ .
>. Ibid ,p.£7.
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./.initistives,.•‘nd above all, to p. s"i.’M or  lodcra! organisation 
with its otti responsible political lachinery. On the British 
side,Hackay still valiantly pusher for a revision of the Council 
of Europe Statute,presenting his o"n ■¡>r.-'rt Protocol* to'ards 
the end of the session,in vhich he continued to hold the nicture 
of an eventual European Federation nnd Constitution.* Italim  
delegate,Ugo La Haifa,also submitted a scheme in favour of in- 
creasing the consultative povers of the Assembly! in the first, event, 
however.both schemes were blocked l>y -linisterial intransigence. 
The federal rsDirrtions r.'ith rhich the first session of the 
Council of iiurone had given so -’rnch esenresrion to were no _^ 
almost forgotten as functionalis- boc- ie the order of the d?y 
2nd sr/ept the field at Strasbourg. fhe ->cwn?-i F?.an, loreover, 
with its strong e->ph*Eis on Frraco-S'T irr. r'^concilirtion,i l l i ­
citly indicated that Britain fas no lonner recorded as the 
centre-oiece of e future European co"~u’uty. Continental Ourooe, 
the ’ ¿¡ui‘OT>e of the Six ', decided to break out on its ot'»i. "he 
Labour Govern-lent* s unco-rpro-iising 'ttitv.de not to be co'i’itted 
in advance to the reco vnenda.tions in the Plan vts co'demented
3
by the Party's policy document,' iJuro^ran Unity1 ,r'hich rigidly
reseated that Labour 'would not be rrar/n into any rchene »’hich
could involve the surrender of sovereigr.t" to a ninher authority.
On the Conservative side,Hac illan nrivately T>iead<»d vith
Churchill to "give the lead" rnd resist "inaction" rithin the
Council of J2uro->e. "fhis is the first ant' svTirerte test", he
at>t>ealed, "You cannot let do"'n all £wro*>e."r -hit Ch'trchill did.
On June 27 he declared in the Houre of Co '■’one:
"I  cannot conceive that ^ritrvin '•■’oulc* be an ordinary m
neiber of a federal union limited to ^rro^e in ’ny period 
r'hich can at present be foreseen."^
In the Consultative Asre-.bly itself, he tent on to demand the
formation of a Bwror>err. Ar-ry,but then 3--r?dys .-cturlly . / .
I. ^ee CA lieco-"iend--,tions,I950
‘ • Ibid. afnendir. II  to rcc.5-». " . licc LA.iO ij. rtcvfi 1‘Ajri.w.
A. iACUliljArr, 'e-.orsnduTi to Churchill.,£0 .S .50. ,£A U'/j VAPJ.ij,
5. HA;;sA2i>,£7.6.5<.».
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. / .^re sen te d  'tore detailed, nro->os’ l?  to th<? nrrc l 'ly '5  j-curity 
sub-co-n*:ittee, flying in  the f.'ce o c the statute, o nr c lill 
ordered him fro i London to rithdra— i^is t>i n. As Denir. He?ley 
co-imented:
"Personal relations inside the Conservative -V-rty delega- 
tion ■s ere not good. Sr-ndys irritated his colleagues j 
repeatedly by ridinr unnomilar hobby-hor se: of his ovn. ”
To sum up,the combination of the Schuman Plan,the Assembly's 
ovn divisions and timidity over an alternative political pro- 
gra-we, the increasingly isolated r>onitio:i of "xitnln,and the 
European continent’ s final conceptional breakthroucli that burooe 
could be constructed without Britain, <*11 linked ut> into a disa- 
voring of the basic political n; in c it e s  me' strategies which 
had narked the Suronean ca-rocign Hitherto. West ¿er’ any's econo-
■ ic recovery end inclusion into the t-uro1^ “!: r>oliticrl scene in 
this second session at Str.-sbourc sealet the .‘ ste of t!ie future 
cs-Tirifn. ivithin a yerr or s o ,1 ¿vroDe of the Sir;' v.-s establish ’ 
and - a n y  of the continental Jiurone--"i r.ctivists trnnsferred 
their energies to working vithin the Irtter fra -icork. ilie 
hones of a larger Suronean Politic ’ l Authority ‘ rf.ed ray.
3) Epilogwe
"The 3uror>ean I'ove ent",i?efley succinctly remarked at the 
second session of the Strasbourn A s 'e  ilsly, "was n\ch less influen­
tial than last yerr,<--nd it is likely to Oecline still further.,,‘’ 
It  *'?s an accurate analysis. The 2urot>em '¡ove-ent.vitii its 
t>olitic?.l conceptions,i;mcr divisions, "C "rcviour c 'ph.-sis on 
the overriding nec-d to include ^r it 'in  vitran a future Aironean 
Union,no*’ rescinded into the eackfn.ov.nd of internrtional aff^irs, 
~nC vould never re-ocruny the pro linent ~:k' Historical ro le ./.
I . !>m L'A lieco •"’cyjrtioiir.6~>. c it .,''ln s  ’.'a.M-.y,: onort to L hour 
TJC on second session of the Consultative A5 se ->>ly, August 
1950, LABOUi: PAKTY PAr J ;3 .
'<■ • K.'iALCi’.ibitU
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. /.T-'hich it held during the i~nedirte nost-'-Pr ora. Strong official 
forces no".' c.'” ie to doiin?te the durope.?n scone: functionalist 
swept through the integrating process of t'ie 'Europe of the S ir '; 
any lingering "third force” 3urope?n politicrl iderls fro’i anor.g 
the European Left disappeared in the T.'plte of the Ivorean W.^r ."’no 
the fins consolidation of the Vestern-Atl critic Rlr>c; the C.'tholic 
rnd Liberal establishment in turn consolidrtcd itr political 
hold over the Uurooepn continent,lcrving ~sriti5h Labour out on 
a l i ’nb and forcing the British Conservative pd inistrrtion of 
the 1950 's  to cone out cleanly in i "vour of the C o ’■’'.on' ep.lth 
"nd Eroire r?ther than Europe. In such conditions, the co -.itted 
3ritish ' unio’iists' and the vir.ly continental ' feaeralists' ,rho 
together bpsicslly co’roris'd the r/uro’-'ean "«ve'ent, abruptly 
realised that they no longer shared the Svronern li relight,.~nd 
their uneasy alliance fornally broke uo.
Tired vith the timidity of t!ie ->.ironem Absently, rnd frustrr— 
teC with the lack of noliticz.1 vigour of t!>.e Buropcnn ¡¡ove-cnt, 
tlie BUF vas finally provoked into open rebellion at its Third 
Congress, held at Strasbourg itseOf eti Hovenba'I7-J9 I950,and de=iied to* take 
the campaign to the people" by actually setting up in Strasbourg 
an "alternative Assembly", known f>.s the ’ ¿iuroper.n Council of 
Vigii?nce',in conjunction with the iii.llGii n d  U-I. In r’ddiesring 
this so-c-’Iled "oopul?r councilD,Altiero Gpinelli Qcclcreu:
"We ?re sitting ne: t door to Pn impotent Assenbly. And it 
is therefore our duty to ior-ulPte a prcrrise deiand for rn 
i-mediate international treaty betw een t'»ose governments 
willing to li:ait their o’-n sovereignty.. . r>nd to convoke a 
2uropee_n Constituent Asreibly. " 2
Henry Frenay.for his •o?rt,delivered to bis federalist colleagues
a long and blistering attack against the European movement, and *
ospecirlly Gmdys, claiming thrt th' letter had rti shonouret't ?',rce- 
 ^ icnts wr.ile the :^ove lent itself h«-d .'chievpc1 nothing in the lfst 
year» It vas now time,he concluded,to dish npst co«Tit ’ents./.
1. On’ HXtrope?n Cowicil of V ig iln e e ' • see i eder.’ lir-t file  Co- 
SBTIiiVAjnlus article by JosePhy, "^ ’Aro^ern. liws at •'tr£,s'r>ourg', 
in Federal -!cvs .Jan.I9jI:¿run-*ms. SX-. c Arn-Vr riP1 .noor p.I-',7.
2. u ‘'Iii»AI.I,report, ¿1.11.50. .printed in .a’..
. / •  and re-launch an independent feueralist campaign.1
The Spinelli-Frenay dominated campaign for a federal pact 
and the convening of a European Constituent Assembly in the 
final event cane to nothing. Inside the Council of Europe 
itself,they did manage to bring an ambiguously vorded draft 
before the Consultative Assembly in November I95I,but it vas 
defeated,and provoked speak's resignation as President of the 
Assembly. The 'Ad Hoc Assembly' of the European Coal and Steel 
Community proved to be more receptive to the ides,but could not 
persuade governments to adopt the same attitude. By the mid-I950£ 
the federalists,like the European Movement,slumped into the 
periphery of European political affairs,and it  vas Jean Monnet 
vho again stole the limelight,after the defeat of the European 
Defence Community project,by forming his elite but effective 
'Action Committee'. The popular political campaign launched at 
the Hague Congress of May 1946.rationalised at the Brussels 
Congress of February 1949, and finally suffocated by the immobile 
and timid formative sessions of the Council of Europe,nov became 
a thing of the past. The fresh hopes and idealism of the inniediate 
post-var years for the creation of a real and democratically- 
controlled united Europe evaporated instead into a ouagmire of 
European technocracy and red tape,in vhich national interests 
remain those vhich are most vented and best defended. Many of 
the goals outlined at the Hague Congress vitb regard to human 
rights,economic co-operation,and cultural understanding have 
been accomplished in Europe; but the primary overriding goal 
of political supra-national unity still seems far avay.
To s w  up,the inspiring appeal of the immediate post-var 
European Idea has beccne stale • It  vas to the credit of the founding 
campaigners in the European Movement that the Idea "achieved 
popular acclaim in the late 1940 's . Yet.vere they also responsible 
in not having maximalised the occasion,in having lost a unique 
opportunity to "make" Europe? The more radical federalist./.
-U10-
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. / .  activists still to a large degree believe so,and point to the 
cautious leadership of the British unionist camp,and to Sandys 
in particular,as a convenient vhipping-boy. This dissertation 
has attempted to strike a more balanced picture. There can be 
bo doubt to the fact that the British unionist camp as a whole 
vas not just cautious in its tactics,but also sceptical vith 
regard to any fundamental European political commitment. This 
became increasingly the case as the return to pover of a Conser­
vative administration drev nearer. Leading figures such as 
Harold MacMillan,nevertheless strove their utmost to bridge 
the traditional doubts of the British establishment towards a 
continental commitment and the post-var necessity to re-vitalise 
the British political econony vithin a setting more apt to a 
post-imperial era. This vas also the case vith Robert Boothby.
It vas above all the case vith Duncan Sandys. Motivated initially 
perhaps by an aversion to Sussi&n Communism,by his war—time 
experience and by a need to make a name for himself,he did not 
remain long under the shadov of his eminent father-in-law. Indeed, 
despite federalist accusations to the opposite, there is considerable 
documentary evidence to shov that Sandys vas closely committed 
to the European ideal,also in its final supra-national form.
His political formation and,above all,the political context of 
the time,resulted,however, in his adoption of a pragmatic approach 
to the problem of European unity. The frustration felt among some 
of the continental federalists vith this approach is all too easy 
to appreciate. The fact of the matter,nevertheless,vas that up 
until the Sebuman Plan of 1950 the idea of uniting Europe in the 
absence of Britain vas simply unacceptable to official European „ 
circles. In these circumstances,a ’maximalist1 European campaign 
vould hardly have succeeded. In fact,if there vas a real 'culprit' 
in the story.it vas not Sandys,nor even the two-faced sceptics 
V/ in the British unionist camp. It vas the British Labour Party.
For,even if the Labour Government itself.under pressure from the 
Foreign Office,vas only luke-warm to the European unity idea,
- i» n -
./ . i t  vas essentially th« Labour Party machinery,and especially 
the NEC,vhich proved to be the nost dogmatically hostile. It 
vas ironic, indeed tragic, that the most respected international 
socialist party,the party vhich had preached "revolution by 
consensus",and the adoption of "third vay" political philosophy 
neither capitalist nor communist,proved to be intolerant 
of continental socialist appeals,uninterested in aiding the 
social progress of neighbouring countries,and unmoved on the 
political "third force" potential of a united Europe. The left 
ving of the Party,led by Crossman, Poot.Milcardo and even Barbara 
Castle,rebelled on the issue of Kurope.but later succumbed to 
Party policy,and eventually led the anti-Europe Labour party 
crusade. Having resisted the nationalist orientation of Labour 
Party policy in the 1940’ s, they vent onto sabotage the opportuni­
ties vhich arose in this area during the 1970's. In the inter­
vening period a European Community,for all its defects and 
weaknesses,vas established. The British Conservative Party, 
having initially dravn bade from a European commitment under 
the Churchill and Eden administrations,vas eventually svung 
round by MacMillan to supporting Britain's membership of the 
European Community. Likewise,the Labour Government under Harold 
Vilson(a former leading member of 'Federal Union',it vill be 
recalled)also applied for membership of the BBC in the late 
1960's. By this tine,hcxvever, it vas no longer Britain vhich 
vas exerting a blocking influence in the progress of the 
European unity idea,but France under De Gaulle. The vheel 
had turned full circle.
This vas indeed the viev taken some thirteen years ago 
vhen.in the vake of De Gaulle's "enpty chair” policy and 
his veto upon British entry into the European Community,
Duncan Sandys re-appeared on the European political scene 
and launched almost single handed a second Hague Congress, 
held on November 6-9,1968. His address to the Congress,./.
.  i.T* -
./.attended by many illustrious iJitropeP.n politierl leaders,sone of 
vhom had participated at the 19*8 Untrue Conrress.r^s as follovs:
"Here in this hall, twenty years ago, sTtnr a <3r>vastating 
v/ar,ve called upon ciurope to unite. '-I'he response rrss 
inmedi?te and dra-natic. Within a year t^c Council of liurope 
/^as created. This i'?s folio1 ed by the ¡¿chumKi Plan,
Western Suropean Union and the Treaty of -tome.
But we have not invited you hero to a jolly birthday 
party to celebrate past achievements, yitite the opposite.
We have called you to the sick-bed.
The liuroDean idea, after at first blosso-ing do vigourously, 
has now for several years almost ceased to "lake ray process 
at Ell • • .
But let us not imagine that this is the fault of one 
Govern-ient or one -.an. At various tines different countries, 
including my ovn,have,by their inaction,contxibuted to the 
present stalemete. Let us not,therefore,rcste ti-<e in 
recrimination about the past, -et us rather concentrate 
our attention upon shaping the future.
The choice is uch clearer than it T\->r f  enty years 
ago. We cam drift on,veak and ¿ivided. Wc c n continue 
to deprive ourselves of the econo'ic r>or er vhich rould be 
ours if only ve could nake un our Binds to co^biie our 
in-jnense humcji and •naterial resources.. .
In short,^e can take the viev that old Europe has had 
her day and that the tine has nor.' cone to hand over the 
torch to younger and ■'ore vigorous iirtions.
Uut that is not the iood oi the peoples ve represent.
They have not lost faith ir. the ¡selves. The;' have not 'riven 
up the -.aridate to abdicate ttoop^’ s position in the rorld.
On the cor.trary.tliey looJc to us to restore her strength, 
influence and independence - .~.nd the only ?y to achieve 
this is to create the United states of iJurope...
The purpose of this Concress is to sound the alam 
and to call for action,before it is too lntc." I
3y"sounding the alarm",¿»andys Tte'nt calling a ;Juror>ean 
Governmental Summit T/hich could initiate stent to ernand durones 
econonic and social integration,progressively re-enforce the 
democratic character of bVropean institutions,allov British 
entry into the Burooean Commmity,rnd ?.bo\'e all, extend to the 
greatest degree possible the political s-vheres of t!ie Co’mTunityT
1. SaIIDVLi,speech Ttade to the isuroperm i'arlianentary Congress, 
The Hague,opening sessio n ,t .II.6£ . , 2AJIDY3
2. teco^endations approved by the css, ibid.
-  UT«*
within a year,a Tiajor £.'uro*>cr’;i uovrrn >rnt ov.v-.it vbs in 
f?ct held, and triggered off the -’otions vhicii subse^uontly led 
to the direct elections of the ouronean rvrlifient in June 1979. 
And yet,had not the first step been taken these thirty years 
ago,and had not the first European Assembly,Tor all its weak­
nesses, been achieved, the notion of a ¡Juropean Parlinent ^.ight 
never have become a working reality. This Buropean ^arlianent, 
now having been directly elected, -inht indeed full'ill the fi i~l 
pledge taken at the Hague Congress of I94b,Pnd hopefully '„'ill 
be the"corner stone" of a great future for the present 
generation.
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I- PKPPBLISHJg) MATERIAL
The two basic and essential sources of archive material consulted 
far this book,containing a vealth of ¿»portant and unpublished 
information,are:- the PRIVATE PAPKEa OF LORD PTOCAK—SAKDYS(depo­
sited at Churchill Coll* 9 « ,Cambridge)and the CENTRAL ARCHIVES OF 
THE EUROPEAN HOVBWSKT( Col lege of Burope, Brugge). The varions 
national centres of the European Movement also,for the u s t  part, 
retain limited primary source material, but very little  of i «par­
tance that can not already b* consulted at Brugge. For this 
reason,! see no academic reason to list these national organi­
sations. Other valuable archives used in  vriting this book 
include:- the EBTUlGg PAP SES(Polish Library,London),the HACXAY 
PAPOtS(L .S .B . London) , the BRUSMAKS PAPERS( College of Europe, 
Brugge,plus correspondence papers fro* t£e archives of the Beve- 
ging van Bnropese Federalisten.The Bagne). The archive collection 
at the STOOPBAB CULTURAL CENTRE,Genera,also has a lot of useful 
»»terial on the Buropean Movement,and especially the Bur o p en  
Onion of Federalists and the Baropean Parlianentary Union. The 
archives of the MQVTMorro ys>ERALlSTA bqeopbo at Tarin,and of 
the B .P .P . in Paris,have been of much complSsentarr value te 
this vork. The HISTOET RB8ISTAHCK ARCHIVE CENTRE in Florence has 
a most interesting set of papers for researchers' concerned vith 
the background study dealt vith in Chapter I , including the 
Sosselli papers,the Calamandrei papers,and speeches,correspondence 
etc. of Rossi,Spinelli and Salveedni.
The BRITISH LABOUR p a s t y  ARCHIVKS(Transport House,London -since 
transferred to nev Labour H.Q.)have been of particular help in 
analysing the position of the Party,the H .B .C. and of the Intar- 
national Committee vith regard to the European Movement,vhich 
has been a vital theme in this book. The BRITISH COHSBBVATIVB 
PARTY RESEARCH OFFICB(London)has also been of limited help in 
supplying official. Party material of the period in  question.
(The British Government papers for this period vere net avail£Oe 
during the most part of my study.though they v ili be constated 
before eventual publication of the text!
The PBRSOBAL DIARY OF ALTIBtO SPIKELLI(I948-I952)has been an 
invaluable amd coknfol aid in my analysis of the federalist 
movement and its relations vith the Buropean Movement as a 
vhole. The DALTON DIARY(L .S .E . London) also provided much 




In addition to the collection of unpublished material contained 
in the Tarions centres listed above, there is also a large 
amount of printed works relating to the European Movement's 
programee of action. The press files at these centres, and among 
the personal collections also listed,provide the researcher 
with a very detailed account ef the European Movement's public 
role vithin the broader context of the tine. The main journal* 
consulted both am o ng  these vast collections and in public 
libraries includei- L'Aufce;L 'Aurore.Avant!I .Cahiers du Monde 
Nouveau.Combat. Continental Daily Hail, Corriere Della Sera.
Dally Express.Daily Herald,Daily Sraphic.Daily Hail. Daily Mirror, 
the Economist. Bnropa Federate, E.U.F. Bulletin. E.U .f. Lettre 
Circulaire. Federal Mews. Fédération. Figaro. Herald Tribune. r  
Humanité. Journal de Oenève. Italia Libera. Libération.Manchester 
Quardlan. Le Monde. News Chronicle. Wev Statesman and Nation. Meva 
of the World.Nouvelles de 1 'Europe.Le Populaire.Observer. 
République Moderne. Le Soir de Bruxelles'.The Statist.Times. 
Tribune. Sunday Dispatch. Sunday Times. P.B.M. Newsletter. Pmanità. 
Qnita Soropea. etc. Among the various history reviews con­
sulted in depth were the relevant sections of Année Politique. 
Chronique de Politique Etrangère. Current History. Foreign Affairs; 
and leesincs Contemporary Archives. Similarly the pertinent pares 
of Hansard.and of Documents Parlementaires.es well as the Eeports 
and Documents of the (European)Consultatlve Assembly.hare all 
been studied in detail.
(b) Secondary Works
This book is the first to deal seriously and ^eficsy with the Initial 
history of the VoropeaB Movement' . Until now,the only other 
published account written on the subject was the book brought 
out by the European Movement itself in 1949,entitled The European 
Mûrement and the Council of Burope(Hutchinson). Other published 
works dealing with the historic background,the general context, 
and with particular themes contained in this study are briefly 
listed below:-
M. ALBERTI*1 ,A. CHITI-BATKLLI,6 . PETEILLI, Storia del Feder&lito 
Buropeo(E .K .l .,Turin,1973).
M. ALBEETZirx, XI Federalist» e lo Stato Pederale(xii&n.i»63 
Î..S. AMKEY, My Political Llfe(Hutchinson.I953-I955).
C.E. ATTLB8. As It Happened(Condon 1954).
V. AUSIOL, journal du Septennet
M. BALL, RATO and the European Union Movement(London 1959)
A. & F. BOYD, Western Onion(Hutchinson.1948).
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J .L . loubet del BA.YLK, Les Hon-Conformiste» de» Année» 30 
(Le Seuil,Paris,1969).
B. BBDDIH3TOH-BEXEENS, Loot Back-Look Forward(MacMillan.1963).
M. beloff, The United State» and the Pnitr of Europe(Brookings 
Inst .,Washington,1963).
G. BIDAULT, Resistance - political biography(weidcnfeld k Hocol- 
s<m,I965).
S. BJ0L, La Prance Devant L*Europe.la politigae européenne de 
la IVe Répnblicme(Hnnk5gaardtCopeahBgea,I966).
L. BLUH, L'Oarre de Léon Blua 1947-1950(Soc.des Anis de Léon 
Blu»,Pari»,1963).
S. BOBUBTOOS, L 1Idée Bnropéenne et sa Réaiisation(Paris.X95I).
L1 Barope an Pace de son Destin(Presses Universi­
taires de Prance,1952).
R. BOOTHSY, BoothbrîRe e l  1ections of a Rebel(Hutchinson.1978)
H. BZOQKAK Le fédéral is—  Contemporain S-.tthoff .1963 ).
L'Idée «aropéenne 1920-1970(Collège d ’ Burope.Teapel, 
1970i,
La Pensée Politi<me da Pédéralisi»e(3L1thoff.1969). 
Prophètes et Fonda tears de L* Bar-ope (
H. CAMPS, Britain and the Korop can riininlty(London.I9<4).
W.H. CARTER. Speaking EnropeantAllen It Pirwïn. 1966).
VXKSTOH CHURCHILL, Bnrope Unite(ed. R. Churchill,Cassell,1950).
D. CONFRAHCBSCO, ch. in Idêa dell1unificaIIone enropea dalla 
prina alla seconda «roerra iondiale(Slnandi.Tarin.1974).
R .* . COUDIHHOVB—EALERGI, PanecropatHer York,1926),
An Idea Congaars the World(Loadon. 853), 
Storia di Panenropa(Mllan.1965).
R. COURTII, French Viees'on BBropeanPnlo*(CTTBmATI01CAL AFFAIRS 
▼ol. XXV,no.I,January 1949.
B. CRIDDLB, Socialists and Baropean Integration
w . b . CURRY, The Case for Federal UnlonfPengain.London.1939).
F. DEHOUasS. L 1 Borope et Le Monde(Paris.I960).
W. DIBBOLD, The Schanan Plan.A study in Economic Co-operation 
(Be* York,1959).
D. DIOUDOHKAT, Je Sais Partout 1930-1944; las naarrassians 
derant la tentation fasciste(Table Ronde,Paris,1973).
P. DUCLOS, Le Rèforae da Conseil de L , Bgrope(Paris.I95S).
F. düpîat , Les Honraaents d'Sxtrene Droite en France depuis g»44 
(Albatros,Paris,1972).
J .B . DUROSELLK, L'Idée d'Europe dans L'Histoire(Paris.I965).
H.A. FITZSIOMBKS.The Farelni Rücy oftfaeMtàh UtnrQaaana« I9 & g flEJ53 ) 
J . FRBYMOKD, Western Europe Since the W ar ( Pra eg cr. Washington. g64) 
LORD SLADWYV, The European Idea(Mer English Library,London,1967), 
J-P. OOÜZY, Les Pionniers de l 1Bnrope Cownnau taire (Lausanne 
1974),
Le Fédéraiiswe de Alexandre Marc(Lausanne.1974).
A. GREILSAMMER, Les Mouvaient» Fédéralistes en France de 1945 à 
I3?4(Presses d'Bnrope.Paris.1975).
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C.G. HAINES, European IntegrationCj. Hopkins, 1957).
V. HALLSTEI», Pnited Europe:CfaaJaqe ani qpartarttyCcaiiixttoe.Massa962). 
R .J .HARRISON, Europe in Ones t i on(Al1en * Onwin.1974).
5. HAVES » R. WHITE, Resistance in Europe I939-I945(Paic*nJ976). 
R. HOSTIOD, Robert Schuraan et L'Europe (cu.1 as .Paris. 1969 ).
J.H . HOIZINGA, Mr. Europe.« political biography of Paul-Heart 
Spaat(Weidenfeld k Hicolson,I96I).
I.V  JENNINGS, A Federation for Western Barope(Ca»bridge.1940).
P. tINStY, Pédérallsae et personaiismetPresses d'Europe,1976).
H. LANGE, European Pnion- False Hopes and Realitic»(POREI(a 
AFFAIRS,April,1950).
A. LAORBJS, L'Europe avec les An<rlals(Arthaud,Paris. 1972).
L. LEVI k S. PISTONE, Trent'Anni di vita del Movimento Federa­
lista Europeoted. F. Angeli,Milan,1973).
I . LINDSAY. European Assemblies.the Experimental Period 1949-
I959(London i960).
Towards a European Parliament(Strasbourg.1957). 
v. L1P3BBS, Burope-F6deratlonsplane der Widerstandsbeyequngen
1940-194 5 ( Munich. I9~6b7I
Die Anfange der Europaischen tlnqunspolitlfc 1945- 
I 947(tlett. Stuttgart.1977).
E. LIPSOM, Europe 1914 to 1939(A.fc C. Black,London,1940).
L. DE ST. LORETTE, L'Idée d* union fédér&le enropéerrne(Par 1 » E?55)- 
A. L0VH3AY, The Baropean Hoveaent(INTBtHATIONAL ORGAKISATIONS. 
vol.3 ,November 1949).
R.W.G. HACLAY, Federal EurepetLondon 1940),
Yon Can't Turn the Clock Back(London.I94B). 
Western Onion in Crisls(Oxfard.I949).
Head in the Sands(London.1950),
Towards a 0nited States of Earope(Hutchinson, 
1961).
H. HACKTLLAI, Tides of Portone I945-I955(MacMlllan.I969).
6. MALLY. Britain and European Uni.tv(London.1966).
The European Co»nwity -t« perspective
S. DE MADARIAGA, Portrait of Bgrope(London,I967).
A. MARC, L*Europe Dans le Monde(Payot.1965).
S. MARCS, The Illusion of Peace;International Relations in 
Europe.I9I8-I933(MacMillan.1976). 
c. mayhsw, British Foreign Policy Since l945(nrTBUUTlOKAL A n n s  
yol. xxvi,Ho. 4 ,October 1950).
* .J .  MAYHE, The Recovery of Europe I945-1973(Garden City,1973).
C.M. DE MOLEtiss. L» Europe de StrasbourgtRoodil. 1971 ).
J . MONNET, MEMPIRES (FAYARD. ISf76) ♦ * ,
R. MORGAN, Western European Politics I945ftb«
the Baropean CoamuaitvfBastford.London. 1972). ?
M.C. PEARCE.Federal Pnion(London X940).
G. PETRILLI, La Politica Estera e Europea di De QagpgrK Turin. 
ì$75).
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A. PHILIP, L ’ Europe Pai« et sa place dans 1 1 Econo«!e Inter­
na tignai e (Paris. 1953).
0 . PHILIP, Le Problème de 1 'Pnion Buropé«pne(«d. La Baconniere, 
1950).
E, PINTO, Lea Organisations Buropéennes(Payot.1963).
J . PLOMYKHE ft t . ASSlOtA, Les Fascjsnes Francai» 1923-1963(Seuil.
Paris ,1963).
J .  POMIAH e d ., Joseph Eetinfler:Memoirs of an Beinence Qrise 
(susse* University Press, 1972).
P . KAHSOMB e d ., Studies in Tederai Planning(London 1943).
J .  RETINGEE, Memoirs(se« Poaian above).
P . EKTKAUD, Pnite or Perish(Simon ft Schuster,1951 ),
The Pnifyinq Fore« for Burope(P0EBI0W AFFAIES,vol.2B, 
January 1950).
P .P . KITSCH, The Preneh Left and the Buropean Idea 1947-1949 
(Pageant Press,lev Xork.1966).
A . H. ROBERT»ON, The Council of Buropes Its Structure. Functions
and Achiev«ments(Stevens ft Sons.1961).
Buropean Institutions(Sterens ft Sons Z973).
B. ROSSI (A. SPIMELLI.E. COLOR«), Problemi della Federartene
»tropea (Rome. 1944).
L*Europe de Demain(Penerà I 944,reprinted by Nuova Italia  
in 1948).
D. DK E0UGB10MT, Politique de la Personne(ed. J .Sers ,Paris ,1946X 
L'Burope a  J w llt Baconniere.1948).
Dix Ans d'efforts pour Unir 1 1Burope 1945-1955 
(Paris .1956),
The Meaning ef Europe (London.1965),
The Campaign of the Bnropean Congresses 
(oovernmeht ft OPPOSITION,rol.2 ,no .3 ,April-July
1967),
Le Chemjnement des Bsprlts(Penerà.1976).
R. SCHUMAH, Poro 1 'Europe(Paris.IQ6^1.
C. sfoe z a . Cinque Anni a Palatso Chigitla politica estera
italiana dal 1947-1951¿Rome.1952il 
PAUL-Hatti spaak, The comtinainfl Battle:Memoirs of a European 
I936-I966(Hedenfeld ft Nicolson,197Ì).
A.. SPINELLI, Pagli~5tati boVranl agli Stati Uniti d»Europa 
(Florence,1950),
Storia e Prospettive del M .F .B . (printed in  L'Europa 
nel Mondo - HPS publication,1953),
L'Europa non cade del cielo(Il  Mulino,Bologna I960), 
The Bnrocrats^J.Hop t in s .1966)
European Onion in the Bcsl»tance(QOVSEMHBHT ft 
OPPOSITX ON, Vo1 .2 ,Ho.3 .April-July,1967).
D .P . 8TIIXER, Men of Responsibility -a ■«noir(j.Murray,London
1965).
LORD STRANG, At Home and Abroad(A.&eutsch.London.1956).
S. STRANGS, Strasbourg in Retrospect(WORLD AFFAIRS,vol.4 ,1 950 ).
C .I .  STIKIT, Union Nov,(Her York,I939).
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U .E .P ., Actio« fédéraliste Européenne (Ba conni ere. 1947).
D.W. USWIN, Western Union Since 1945(London.1966).
G.M. VAU BELLE, Le» »ocialistes Belges et 11 intgration ■lurcufiniw 
(Brussels, 1968 ) •
C.WKBB,gTi7-frpeaTi-t— and the Baropean Movements (printed in Social 
and Politicai Move»ents in Western Surape
E. WEBER, Action Prancaiset Stock.1962)
P.R. WILLIS, Italy Choose» Saxope(Hev York,Oxford University 
Press,1971),
European lntegration(Ne* York, 1975).
A .J . ZOZCHER, The Straggle to Unite Europe I946-1958(Nev York
1968),
•  •
D. Acheson.fresent at the Creationim-, vcara in the State
Department (Hew York 19 70J
E. Barker, Sri tala in Divided Europe 1 945-1 970 («'eidenf aid 4
I.' i col son, 1 97 1 )
H. Bmgnane. Yin/rt Ans d'Burope 1 °46-1 9 S6( Coll e/*e of Europe,
De laopel Bruti/re, 1 966)
D.P. Calleo,Europe's Future;The Grand Alternatives^ « »  York
J. Fran kd ,British Jfrrel/g Policy 1 <’45-1 g73(0Ug 1575)
J . 1 . Gaddis.T&e United States anü ¿he Qri'rins of the Cold War
1941-1 947(Colmbia University Press 1972)
Louis J . Halle.T^e Cold War as Hip tor.' (London 1967)
R .Jenkins.Kine Men of I-ow^riHcniKh ilamllton. 1 974)
W. KnaPP.Unity and Nation align in Europe since 1945(Pergamon 
Press, 19 69)
W. lajuer,Europe Since HitlerCJeldenfeld A Eicolson,1S70)
G. lichtheia . Tve I?ew Sit ropes to day & tomorrow (Prae*rer 1963)
R.J.lieber .pritish PnlitiCB and Saropean U;iity ^ University of 
California 1?70;
R.Mavne.Tve Connunltv of TfriropefOollancg 1?62)
D. Rees.The A^e of Cpntaincentithe cold varO-iacl.lllan 1967) 
Hans A. Schmitt. Tv.e Path to aa rope an UwioniThe Karahall Plan
to the Common Market{Louisiana State University 1962) 
R. VauglnTPost War interrratlon in air0Pe(E. Arnold,1^74)
F. W illiaas.Ernest Sevin.portrait of an great SngUslsMBi
(lux chin son 1*52)
C.M. Woodhouse.British Foreign Policy Since the Second World
Wartftitchinaon 1961 J
D. Tergm. shattered PeacesTv.e O r l ^ ia  of tlie Co .Id. War and the
;;&ti0L.8l security stataiPelican 1980).
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BIOGRAPHICAL SIBTCHBS
la this study of what vas essentially an International pressure 
group, there are clearly far too »any personalities involved fer each 
to be given a biographical outline. The long list of »e»bers 
of the Baropean Movement International Council w e  thus only 
very briefly described in the following pages*in an extract 
taken fro» the Move»ent's  own publication in 1949: ' The Baropean 
Movement and the Council of Barope' ( m  ) . The »ore f amous
leaders involved in the Movement,such as Léon Blum,Winston 
Ctrarchill,Alcide fee Qasperri, Paul-Henri Spaak.Paul van ¿eeland,
Paul Eeynaud,Harold MacMillan,etc., are sufficiently well-known, 
it is assumed,not to warrant separate »cation hare. This leaves 
the impartant,but less familiar leaders of the Movement who 
figure as central characters in the present work,and whose biblio­
graphical details are briefly sketched out below:
BOItWEPOOS. EDOOAED. b. 1907 (Prance)
Member of resistance. M.P. (tJ.D.S.E. )for seine-et-oise 1946-1958. 
Senator since. President of Preach Rational Assembly's Coanittee 
on foreign Affairs X94B. A leading French delegate to the Baropean 
Consultative AiSenbly 1949.Minister of Commerce 1952. Minister of 
state X953. Minister of Post and Communications 1953-1956. Minister 
of Transport and Public Works,1957-1958.
BICHKT.EOBSET b.I903(Prance)
Engineer background. Resistance organises- in Burgundy during 
World War I I . Editor of Christian Democrat underground journal 
'Cahier» du Témoinage Chrétien'. M.P. (MEP)for Seine—et-Oise,1945. 
Secretary of State for Information,1946(under Bidault). Pounding 
President of HKl 1947, th«i Secretary General. Vice Chairman of 
the Baropean Movement International Executive Committee,!948. 
Member of European Consultative Assembly,1949. Holder of Légion 
d' Honneur, Croix de Guerre,Rosette de la Résistance.
BOHY.GBOEQES b .1897(Belgium)
M.P. for Charleroi,President of Parliamentary Socialist Group 
in Belgium. Later President of the European Movement Parlia­
mentary Council. Pounding Chairman of the SP0,I947.
BOOTHBT.EOBSET. b.X900
Educated at Btoa and Oxford. M.P.(Conservative and Unionist)for 
Bast Aberdeenshire 1924-1958. Parliamentary Private Secretary to 
the Chancellor of the exchequer (Winston Churchill)X926-I929. 
Parliaaentary Secretary,Ministry of Pood,I940-194I . A leading 
member of the Baropean Consultative Assmbly, 1949-1957. Life 
Peer 1958. Close colleague of Ckarchill,despite their many 
disputes and differences.
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BKDGMANS.HEKDEII b .1906(Netherlands)
Student ia Amsterdam and at the Sorbonne. Director of the Nether­
lands Workers Educational Institute,1935-1940. M.P.(Socialist) 
1939-1940. Arrested and imprisoned as hostage in Camp Geisel,
1942-1944, then worked underground for the 'Je Maintiendrai * 
resistance movement. Sent to report to Netherlands Government 
in tecil*, 1945. State Secretary for Press and Information in 
first post-war government,1945. Pounding Executive President of
E.O .P .,1946. Vice Chairman of the Buropean Movement International 
Executive Comittee,X946. Sector of the College of Europe,1950- 
1972. Bolder of the Charlemagne Prise and the Légion d*Honneur. 
COOP KHH0VS-[AL EEGI. EICEAJtD b.I894
Son of an Austro-Hungarian diplomat and Japanese moths'.
Pounded the inter-war 'Pan-Buropean Movement1,1926,and 
was of considerable influence behind the BriaolPlan,1929.
After the Maxi occupation of Austria,X93B,he fled to Prance 
and then the O .S .A..where he became a Professor at New York 
University. Constituted with Fulbright and Builit the 'Ameri­
can Committee for a Pree and United Europe',1942. Returned to 
Europe,1946, and was the founding Secretary General of the 
SPU in 1947. Honorary President of the Buropean Movement,I952. 
Holder of the Charlemagne Prise.
COTOTIV.tEwfr b .I 900(Prance)
Professor of Law at Paris University. Former Secretary- 
General at the Ministry of the National Economy.Editor 
of 'Le Monde' and later of the 'Ktvue d 'Economique Politique1 
Founding leader of the Conseil Français pour l'Europe Onie,
1947« Leading member of the European Movement International 
Executive Committee,1948. Holder of the Légion d 'Honneur and 
the Rosette d« la Résistance.
DAUTKY.EAOOL b .1680(France)
engineer background. Leading member of the Economic National 
Connell,1926. Director of National Railways,I936-1937. Minister 
(Independent)of Armement,1939-1940. Minister of Reconstruction,
1944-1946. Head of French Atomic Energy Department 1947. Chairman
of CP SO. 1946.
CDWARDS.ROBg T b.I906
Chairman of youth delegation to ïussia,1926,and later in 1913. 
Served with Republicans in Spain during the Civil War,along 
with George Orwell. National Chairman of Independent Labour 
Party,1943-1948. General Secretary of Chemical Workers Onion, 
1947-X97X. Pounding Chairman of 0 .S .S .E .,1947. M.P.(Labour) 
for Bllston X955-X974,and Wolverhampton S .S .,1974 till present. 
Leading British member of European Consultative Assembly in 
X960's,and of the European Parliament in 1970's.
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PRKMAY. HEKE1 b.I905(Prance)
Military career up until french débàcle,1940. Pounding leader 
of Kesistance group 'Combat' ,1941. Comissioner to Prisoners 
and Deportees in French Algiers Cacari.tte«, 1943. Minister of 
Prisoners,Deportees and Refugees in provisional French Govern­
ment, 1944-1945. E.U.F. Central Committee President 1946.
■TOSEPffir.Mlss F .L . b.Z9I0
Student of French and German. British delegate to Liberal 
International during inter-war period. Executive member of 
Federal Onion,1940,later becoming President. Buployed as a 
lecturer by the British arny, 1941 -194 6. Unsuccessful Liberal 
candidate six times between I 939-1959.
LAYTOK.WALTER b.1864
Econoaic-acadenic and journalistic background. Director of 
the Economic and Financial Section of the League of Nations. 
Editor of'The Economist* , 1922-1936. Chairman of 'News Chronicle', 
1930—1956. Chairman of the War Production Staff,1942-1943.
Peer,1947. vice Chairman of I .L .B .C .,1947,Treasurer of U.E.K.,
1946. Leading Liberal delegate to European Consultative 
Assembly,1949. Deputy leader of Liberal Party in the House 
of Lords,1952-1955.
HACIAY.KOKALE b .I902(Australia)
Acadeaic-Law career at Sydney University, Settled in Bttgland 
la 1934,as a soliciter. Prospective Labour Party candidate,
1935-1942. Chairman of Federal Onion, 1942. War-time appointment 
with Ministry of Aircraft Production. M.P.(Labour)for Hull K.W .,
1945-1950,Reading,1950-1951. Member of Labour Party 'Keep Left' 
group,I947-1948. Founding Chairman of Labour's 'Europe Qroup' ,
1947,and of the ‘All Party Pari lament aery Qroup for European 
Unity1, 1948. Vice-President of the ffD, 1948-1949. Perhaps the 
■ost active delegate to the European Consultative Asseably,
1949-1950.
HABC.ALKAHDE» b. 1904 (Odessa)
Baigrated to France at an early age. Student in Germany. Left- 
wing intellectual la contact with the inter-war non-conf ormist 
circles 'Esprit' and 'Ordre nouveau'. Leading resistance member 
of 'Combat' and 'Libérer et Fédérer',1940-1943. Founding Secre­
tary General of E .U .F .,1946. Founding Director of the 'Centre 
internationale de formation européenne',1954 ,and author of many 
works on féderalist-aaarchist thought.
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PHILIP.Agpti b.I902(Prance)
Professor of Politicai Economy,1926. M.P.(Socialist)I936.
Opposed to Vichy capitulation. Reached London and »Free 
French,1942. Resistance coordinator for the French National 
Com ittM , 1942-1943,and subsetroently on the Natloanl 
Council of Liberation. Finance Minister,1946. Minister of 
National Economy, 1947* Chairun of the SMDSE, 1949.
Delegate General of Baropean Movement,1949. Actire »«b er  
of Baropean Consultative Assembly,1949. A close colleague 
of Léon Blu»,a »ember of the SPIO Directing Co«mittee fro«
1944,he »as finally expelled toy Guy Hoilet fro« the Party 
la 1956,due to his opposition to its Algerian Policy.
PIVBCT.HAKCEAg b.I895(France)
Acadmdc. Mutilé of World VarlX. Secretary of the powerful 
SPIO Seine Federation. Leading activist In the Popular Front, 
1936,as head of the •»evolutionary Left'. Escaped to America 
during the occupation. Founding French President of the D3SB,
1947,and a vocal left-wing leader in the European Movement,
1949.
EETINGEE.JOSEPH b .1886(Poland)
Studied in Paris.London and Munich. Director of the Polish 
Bureau,London,I9I2-I9I4,and worked for Polish independence 19X4- 
1918. Adviser in Mexico,1918-1926,and then in London as agent 
for General Slkorskl and the Polish Socialist Party la oppo­
sition to Pilsudski. Close collaborator of Prl*e Minister in 
exile,Sikorski,1940-1943,and worked clandestinely in Poland,1944. 
Leading «ember of I .L .B .C .,1946,and founding Secretary General 
of the European Movement,1948. Later founder of the 'Bilderberg' 
organisation.
ROSSI.ERNESTO b. 1897 (Italy)
Disabled oa active service la World War 1. economics Professor 
and writer. Loyal follower of Italian liberal-Socialist G. Sal- 
ve«ini. Founder with Salvemini and Rosselli brothers of Italy's 
first «aia anti-fascist movement 'Non Mollare',1924. In turn, 
of 'Giustizia e Libertà*. Arrested 1930. Imprisoned and 
confinad until 1943. Founding moáber of Resistance 'Action Party', 
and M .F .E .,1943. Close colleague and advisor to A. Spinelli.
DE ROPGPCHT.DPas b.I906(Sviti«rland)
Academic and writer. One of the founders of the 'Personalist 
Movement' in France,1933. Leading member of the non-conformist 
inter-war 'Ordre Nouveau' and ' Esprit' circles. Important 
contributor to post-war European federalist thought. Director, 
since 1949,of the Buropean Ouiturai Centre,Geneva.
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SAJTDYS.DTOCAM b.I906
educated at Eton and Oxford. Foreign Office,I930,in London and 
Berlin. Resigned,X933,in protest against the Government’ s 
Dcraan policy. M.P. (Conservativ«)for Lambeth 193 5-1945, Streatham
1950-1974. Married Piana Churchill 1935. An important moaber of 
the anti-appeasement group formed around Churchill. Borway 
Expeditionary Force,1940. Disabled on active service,I94I. 
Financial Secretary,Wax Office,I94I-I943. Minister of Works, 
1944-1945. Founding leader of the D E M ,1947. rounding Executive 
Chairman of the European Movement,I948-I950. Member of the Buro­
pean Consultative Assembly,1950-1951. Minister of Supply,1951- 
1954. Minister of Housing and bocal Government,1954-1957« Minis­
ter of Defence,1957-1959. Minister of Aviation,1959-1960. 
Secretary of State for CoHonwealth delations,1960-1964. Life 
Peer,1974. Holder of the European Movement 'Gold Cup'.
SBUHJYS. DAMI KIT b.I875(France)
Civil Servant and aid te Clemenceau,them Poincaré. Chairman of 
the League of Hâtions Economic Council. Founding leader of the 
KLBC,1947,and of the European Movement,1948.
SPIKelLI.ALTIn o  b.I907(Italy)
Student of Lav and mother of Comnmist Party. Spent ten years 
in prison and six years in confinement on account of his poli­
tical activities,1927-1943. Left Communist 'cell' in objection 
to Stalin's 'show trials'in 1930's. Founding member of the 
'Action Party',1943,later becoming Secretary General. Founding 
leader of the M.F.B. and active European campaigner since the 
war. Advisor in Buropean Affairs to Pietro Nenni(Socialist 
Foreign Minister),1968-1969. E.E.C. Commissioner for Industrial 
Policy and Technology,1970-1976. Founding leader of the 
'Independent Left' Party(on Coammnist Party ticket)and M.P. 
since 1976. Leading member of the Buropean Parliament.
VOISIH,AXDES b.I9I2(France)
Teacher and Journalist. Contributor to the nationalist,anti­
democratic and anti-Semitic journal 'Insurgé',1937. Director 
during the Vichy regime of the 'College of Syndical and Cer- 
poratist Studies'. Founding Director after the war of'Fédéra­
tion' . Central Comittee member of the EOF and of the Buro'pean 
Movement International Executive Committee. Later,adviser to 
the Chabaa-Delmas Cabinet.
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E r a O P g A J  HOVSMBHT L I S T  O P  O F T I C O tS  AMD M gM B B tS . 1 9 4 9
I N T E RNA TIO NA L C O UN CIL  OF THE 
EUROPEAN MOVEMENT
P R E S I D E N T S  O F  H O N O U R :
L e o n  B l u m  
W i n s t o n  C h u r c h i l l  
A l c i d e  d e  G a s p e r i  •
P a u l - H e n r j u S p a a k
C H A I R M A N  O F  I N T E R N A T I O N A L  C O U N C I L :
L e o n  Jo u i i a u x  C h a ir m a n  o f  French T r a c k  U n i * n  Coo-
ffderactor» (Force O uv rifrt ): C h a r m a n  
o f  E c o n o m ic  C ouncil o f  French R ep u blic  
(Socialist).
C H A I R M A N  O F  I N T E R N A T I O N A L  E X E C U T I V E  
C O M M I T T E E :
• D w c a h  S a n d y s  Focm rr British M inister  (Conservative).
V I C E - C H A I R M E N  O F  I N T E R N A T I O N A L  E X E C U T I V E  
C O M M I T T E E :
F ren ch  M e m b e r  o f  Parliam ent ( M R P ) ;  
form er M inister ; C im rm a * N cw xlU s  
Epriptt Interngticm l/s.
Professor sc U trech t University; I x m m w  
Ciatrwusm tf f.vrtfttn  L 'm tn ej FtJsrtitrti. 
H f i d  o f French  A t o m ic  E nergy  D c p s n -  
ir.cnt; form er M inister  (Independent): 
C h*irm *H  s f  C m s il  Frtnfti* pour f f  n w  
U n it.
British Econom ist (Liberal); T n t n m r  of 
U nitti ¿ u n p t  M evm en i.
M e m b e r  o f  L t n e m b u r g  Parliament; Ckaii- 
m a n  o f  Socialist Party: G b r i m *  s f  
SttitliM  iS n m r r t  f t ' tat U tu u J S t u u  
Zmtmr.
Senator; F orm er  P r im e  M inister  o f  Bel­
g iu m  (Christian  Socialist); Ckiitm e*. y  
ttmmmk latpn jv C+fvratK*.
D E L E G A T E - G E N E R A L :
* A n o u  P h u j p  Fren ch  M e m b e r  o f  Parliam ent (Socialist);
former Minister.
S E C R E  T A R Y . G E N E R A L :
•ROttRT BfCKZT
• H enehlu: Bkugmans 
•R aoul  D autry
•L o u d  Layton  
• M j c k e i  R a s q u t n
• P a u l  v a n  Z e e l a n d
• J ,  H .  Retinger P o iu R  writer; form er Political Adviser to 
General Sikorski.
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L .  S .  A m c r y
C .  A n t o n u p c  
K a h l  A r n o l d
• P a i h . d »  A u e r
N i c h o l a s  E a l a m n o t p  
L e o p o l d  B a k a n y a i
• P a u l  B a t t i d
L u d o v i c o  B e n v e n v t i
C o r n e l  B i a n u
M u n i r  B i r s e l
P .  B o l l a
• R O B E R T  B o o t h b y
M a x  B  H a u e r  
T h e o d o r  B r o c h
* S t r  H a r o l d  B u t l e r
U k i e r t o  C a l o s s o  
A r t h u r  C a l t e u x
• C o u n t  N ic o to  
C a r a m m n i
G r e g o i r e  C a s j q m a t i s
M o n s i q n o r  F e r n a n d o  
C E N T O  
•s. P .  C h a m b e r s
L i o n  C h e v a l m e
M a r i o  C i n g o l a n i  
A d a m  C i o l k o s z
• H u b e r t  C l e m e n t  
R e n e  C o t y
R j m e  C o u r t t n  
• F e r n a n d  D e m o u s s e
Suhcyf Derail
Former Miniwrr (Conservative).
Fermer Rumanian Mininer Pleniporrm wry. 
Prime Minister of North Phsne-Weu- 
phaiia {ChnsUii Democrat).
Former Hungarian Minister Pierupocenti- 
"7-
Former Bulgarian Ministrr.
Farmer Chairman, Hungarian Nartoral 
Bank.
Former French Minister (Radical Socialist);
Member of Institut dc France:— C-f-Ê. . 
Italian Member of Parliament (Christian 
Democrat).
Member of Executive Coruminee of 
Rumanian National Peasant Patry. 
Turkish Membtr of Parliament (Republi­
can— People's Party); former Minister. 
Judge of the Swiss Federal Court.
British Member of Parliament (Conserva* 
tiny—U^M 
Mayor of Hamburg.
Norwegian Member ef Parlimen: 
(Socialise).
Former Director of the Intemauonal 
Labour Office; Ciai'nua Intti- 
njtmu1/ Zconamu *nj SctUl Seetm1 tf tie 
ZvnftMM Hav*m*r.—t.L.i.C.
Italian Member of Parliament (Socialist).
Councillor of Luxemburg High Court of 
Justice.
Italian Senator (Liberal); former
Ambassador:— L.U.F*
Greek Member of Parliament (Socialist); 
former Minister.
Aposroiic Nuncio in Brussels.
Brirish Industrialist; CUirman tj hnamt 
Committet of lir Zurepttn Movement. 
Chairman of "Force» Ouvrière» Syndi­
calistes Européennes*'; Secretary-General 
of "Fédération des Métaux.”
Italian Senator (Christian Democrat). 
Vice-Chairman of "Central Committer. 
Poli*h Socialist Party; former Member 
of 'Parliament.
Director o f Luxemburg newspaper fmnul 
i'Ltch; f « n >et Minister.
French Senator (Independem); former 
Minister; npnvntimg JuUmtttmal Par- 
¡iamerttry Crrvf af tie luraptsn Mewmenl. 
Professor of La«* a* Paris University:—  
C J J ..U .
Professor of Law, Liège University; tjf- 
fmUter af ibt Juridual Seeltm af tie 
Zun ftm  liwwfltf.
Turkish Professor of Law, Ankara Uoim- 
sny.
- 4g«| -
* G .  M . D i m i t r o v
F r a n c e s c o  D o m j n e o o  
•Je a n  D u m R
•Bo* Edward«
H a n s  E h a r o
B e n o t  E l a i g r w  
L a m r r o s  E u t a x i a s
P a u l  F i n f t
• H e w h j  F r e n a y
• G r j g o r i  G a t e n c u
M r u N  G a v r i l o v i t c h
Haiu, GrtLER
* Andre Genot
• K n z o  G i a c c h e r o
• E n r i q u e  A o r o h e r  
G r ^ON T X LA  
H .  H e y m a n
L s s u b  H o r c -He u s h a  
• F e u x  H u r o e s
H . H tk o  
J. B. H vhp
' F R O O f  Ja K O *S C H
F r a n c e s  L .  J c .z w n r  
Jvuo Ju s t
•PlFIT* KtRSTENS
Secrttarp-General of Inrcmariorul feasant 
Union; Ctaifma* ef Bulfsrij* Cwwmirtrr 
*f  tit Zmrtftmn Mtwmrwt.
Italian Member of Parliament (Christian 
Dem o arat).
Chef ¿c Cabinet to the Belgian Prime 
Minisrer (Socialist): Vui-Cburmd* t] lit 
Juridtrt! Stetiem i f  tht Europe** M svem nr. 
Secretary-General, British Chemical 
W orkm ’ Union:— S M .U J X .
Prime Minister of Bararia (Christian 
DcmoCTt).
S»*cdish Senator (Socialist).
Greek Member of Parliament (Pe'^e'i 
Part)*); former Miniirer. 
Secretary-General, Belgian Federation <*f 
Traces Unions.
Former French Minister (Soralinr); Clarr- 
m m  tf C m t n l  Crm m ittn pf £ .U .F .
Former Rumanian Minister of Foreign 
Affair*.
Former Yugoslav Ministrr; Leader of 
^ Yugoslav Peasant Party 
Rector of Heidelberg University; focmrr 
Prime Minister of Gms*-He«»en.
Seerrtary-Gtneral of the Belgian Public 
Services Trades Union.
Italian Member of Parliament (Chiistian 
Democrat); trpnttmtu  ^ the Jntrmtu'it*! 
P*rhm m m l*ry Crcttf tht L n r ^ .- n  ¿Jrvr-
Sttntmry-Ctmrd j  S M .V S JL .
Belgian Minister of State; Pie*i&nt 
of Lower Chamber of Belgian PjtIu - 
mcm (Christian Socialist).
Former British Mininer (Cemmaiivr).
Austrian Minister of Education (People's 
Party): N JLJ.
British Member of Parliament (Labour).
British Member of Parliament (Labrv'; 
nymrmiiiif ham uriana/ P*riuFne$j*iy 
Cftm p tf tht Lttreprtrt Slowm rni.
Danish Member of Parliament (Socialist}, 
former Minister; rrfrmiirf intr*ntt\tn*l 
Ftrlttm tm sfy Crm tp i f  tht Ettrcfttr 
Movement.
Chairman of Executive Committee of 
Federal Union.
Former Spanish Minister (RcpuMtcaa'.
Netherlands Senator (Catholic Party*: 
£^ .£.C.
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• E u g e n  K o g o n
T i m t  K o p r u l u  
Our Björn Kraft
•T H O I l K J L  K  R IS TEN  S£i-' 
)U R A J  K R N JE V IC
U c o  L a  M a l t a  
• D e s i r e  L a m a l l £
■ R e v . G o r d o n  L a n g
H e r m o d  L a n n u m c  
J o s e  M a u a  d e  
L a s a r t e
• R e n e  L h u i u j e r
A l b e r t  U l a r  
K e n n e t «  U n d s a y
) .  L i n t h o m t  H o m a n  
R o d o u o  L l o f i s
A d o l f  L u d w i g
E d u a r d  L u d w i g  
Jo h n  M c C a j l l u u - 
S c o t t  
H a r o l d  M a c m i l l a n
• S a l v a d o r  d e  
M a d a i u  a c a
T h e  V b r t  R e v .
W .  R .  M a t t h e w s
D .  M a t z a n k i e f f
S i r  D a v i d  M a x v t l l -  
Frrc
• F r a n c o i s  d e  
„  M e k t h o n
) .  M e y k e n  
E d m o n d  M j c h e l e t
£d»oi of German newspaper frankjxrttr 
Htju.
Turkish Member of Parliament (Democrat).
Danish Member of Parliament (Conserva* 
tin); former Minuifr.
Danish Membei of Parliament (Radical); 
former Minuter.
Former Yugoslav Vice-Premier; Seeretary- 
Genrral of Croat Peasant Party.
Italian Member of Parliament (Republican).
Member of National Committee of Belgian 
Christian Social Party:— N .E .l.
British Member of Parliament (Labour):-- 
U.ZM.
Former Danish Seraror (Radical).
Minister of the Inferior of rhe Basque 
Government in exile.
S#msr+-CtMT*l •$ Tft neb Cm»ril if the 
ittrepun Mfiemnt.
Belgian Senaror (Liberal); former Minister.
British Member of Parliament (Independ­
ent); former Parliamentary Secretary,
M i n t M i y  o f  E ducation.
Chairman of Netherlands Town and 
Country Planning Department.
Ijgrmer Head of Spanish Republican 
Government in Exile; Secretary-GcncraJ
« of Spanish Socialist Party.
Member of Rhinrland-Pabtinate Assembly 
(Social Dcmoqat); Chairman of Rhine- 
land-Palau rtart Trades Union Federation.
Former Austrian Minister (People's Party).
Seaetar)-General, Liberal International.
British Xfrmber of Parliament (Cowerr*- 
tire'fc former Minister.
SpanishphiioM>pheraRdhtstorian; Presid:m 
of Liberal international; Cbttnun 
I a im *  tend Ctdturai Suttm cf tht £*n- 
ftan Mrnmcnt.
Dean of St. Paul's Cathedral.
Former Bulgarian Minister Plemrrtenciary; 
former Director of Bulgarian National 
Bank.
British Member of Parliament (Conserva-
*  tive): JU fjm m r $  tht Juridutl StttUK tf 
jhr iwrwpran Mevrmn*.
French Member of Parliament (M RP); 
fonnrr Minister:— C .F JLV .
Netherlands Industrialist; former Nether­
lands Minister (People's I'arty).
French Member of Parliament (Independ­
ent Popular Republican); former Minis­
ter; Chairman of the Association cf 
former uuwates of Dachau.
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A .  M i l o  p i
VlLLAGRAZlA
Gin* M o u Et  
C h r i s t i a n  M o k n i e r  
E r w i n  M u e l l e r  
H . R. N o r d  
C  S. O m  d a l  
H . O O S T E R H U J S
H a n s  O p r e c h t  
A n  d e  m  O r k e
Ja m  P a u l i  n y  T o t h  
H a n s  P e r n t e r  
C h a r l e s  P e y e r  
C a r l o s  P i  i S u n e r  
M a r c e a ü  P t v f r t
E d u a r d  R a c z y h s c  
P a u l  R a m a d i e r  
E m i l «  R e u t e r
P a u l  R e y n a u d  
• L a d y  R h y s
W lLU A M S
P a u l  R j v e t
C o n s t  ak t i n  
R o d o p o u l o s
H e k r j  R o u n  
* D e m i s  d e  
R o u c e m o n t
L E O F O L D O  R U K K A C C !  
H a s a n  S a i u
•E . M . Sassen
C a r l o  S c k m z d
LOWSB SCHROEDER
Italian Member of Central Committee ef 
E.U.F.
French Member of Parliament; Secretary* 
Geneul of Socialist Party.
Vur-Chdintum if Jnlrrntlier.d /i matt 
Commit la if tht Zurofttr. MovcrwrJ. 
Member of Saar Assembly (Catholic 
People's Party).
Dutch jurist Netherlands Member oi the 
Central Committee, E.U.F.
Norwegian Member of Parliament 
(Liberal).
Netherlands Member of Parliament 'Social­
ist); Vice-Chairman oi National Sjmcicai 
Bureau.
Swiss Federal Minister; Chairman of 5**ra 
Socialist Party.
Director-General of the Swedish Sstjoral 
Debt; former Minister.
Former Czechoslovak Minister Plenipo­
tentiary; (Slovak Democratic Parry).
Austrian Member of Parliament (People’s 
Party); forma Minister.
Farmer Hungarian Prime Minister: Chair­
man of Hungarian Socialist Parry.
Farmer Minister of Spanish and Catalan 
Republican Governments.
French Member of Parliament member; 
of Central Committee of French Socialist 
Party:— 5Jli.t/.5.r 
Former Poluh Foreign Minister and former 
Ambassador.
French Mimsver of National Defence 
(Social i sr); former Prime Minister.
Luxemburg Member of Parliament; (Chris­
tian Socialist); President of the Luxem­
burg Parliamentary Group.
French Member of Parliament (Independ­
ent); former Prime Minister.
Hon. Sea etary of British Economic Re­
search Council:— I'-Z.M.
French Member of Parliament (Socialist); 
Curatur of MMtuee de l'Homme.*’
Greek Minister of Health (People’s Party). 
President of Belgian Senate (Socialist).
Swiss writer; Dnater if CmUmtM  B »rn  
tf tlr Etmptm Mnrmmf.
Italian Senator (Christian Democrat).
Former Tiffkish Prime Minister (Republi­
can People's Party).
Former Netherlands Ministrr (Catholic 
People’s Party); N S J .
German Member of Parliament (Socialist): 
rrpntmtirtf IrdrrtuJitnsl Pdriidmtmttty Cromp 
•f tht ¿mnptta Afovrmrm.
Deputy Mayor of Berlin.
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•j . S. SERRAKENS
• D a n i e l  S e r r i t y s  
A n d r e  S i e g f r i e d
i G N A Z IO  SJLOK E
• R a y m o n d  S i l v a
• H e r m a n n  S m i t t - 
InGSERETSUN
K a r l  S p ie e t *
*  A l t t c r o  SriN ELLI 
Je a n  S p i k o p o u l o s
M a k n e  S t a h l  
R o d o l p h e  S t a d l e r  
Ja n  S t r a n s k t
•Agis P.
T A M *  A COPOULOS
* P i e r r e > H e n r i  T c t t c e n
O n a m N E  T e u s c h
Z i v x o  T o p a l o v i t c h
A U  RlZA T u r k .
E t ie n n e  d e  la  
V a il e e  Poussin
G e o r g e s  V j l u l r j  
• A n d r e  V o i s x n
G .  A .  W l C A K D E R  
• K a r l  W t f n u N D
T e r j e  W o l d
NrtlirriatKis Member of P-wli.nr^  m (Catho­
lic Peoples Parr}: Vire-rrvsiikrt of 
Imernaupnal Christian Trat* U-'icre 
French lironomiw (Liberal); f«n>cr Itctv: 
Minister; L .L E .C .
Member of the Academic lnrv;jtsc. 
Italian wnrrr; (Socialisr).
Frmch «ritcr, Sffrrltry-Gtn’rt' ef Cnhx'jl 
Bm tu ibt frtropt** Ximmwni.
l^ rtidcnt of Lo*m  Clumber of Nor- 
wegtan Parliament; (Cottocrvativc), 
Member of G overnment of North Rhine- 
Westphalia (Centre Party).
Secretary- of Italian Federalist Mavrment. 
Professor cf International Law, Athens 
University.
Swedish M'-mber of Parliament (Liberal). 
Swiss Indartriaiitt.
Former M^:nhiT of Czechoslovak Parlia­
ment (Soculiu).
Former Greek Minister (Conservative).
French Mem Ur of Parliament (M .R .P.); 
former Vice-Premier; Ckttrmsn ejJuriJtn* 
Section «f tit Emrtfr&n JkfowKfflf.
Minister for Cultural Affair*. North 
Rhine-Wftfphalia (Christian Deme*raf\ 
Yugoslav PinideM of International Socialist 
Rureau for Eastern Europe.
F ormer Turkish Minister of Justice 'Re* 
publican People's Party).
Belgian Senator; (Christian Soeialis: Pan^; 
npnwnttxf Jntrmttienal Psrlimerutfy 
Crmtf pj la  Emrcpttn )thvrmeic.
Chairman of French Employers* Federation. 
Secretary-General of the French Federih« 
Movcmcnr:—  L .U S .
Swedish Industrialist.
Swedish Senator (Comerratrve).
Norwegian Member of Parliament (Social­
ist); Cirf^ T>Mr* tj >prri*n A±»in Cfws.'wfrtr 
*f fir Sttrtwg.
Futm u.
Unless ocher»M« indicated, fhi members of ti*e International 
Council represent the National Council of the Etfupcan Movement 
in their respective countries.
C.F.E.Ü . ~ Conseil Fran^ais poiu ¡’Europe Unit.
E.LX-C. »  Economic League for Etrropcan Co-operanorv.
E.U .F. w  i-ntopean Union r*f Federalists.
N.EJ- *• Nourelk* Equipe* Imcrnationales.
S .M .U .S X . - Social«» Movemti* for ths United Marc* of F-u^<- 
U .E .M . *  United Europe M w e w m .
• — Member of ibe Earee'Jtm Committee.
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